Pertubuhan Dansanak Haji Awang Bin Chik v Kerajaan Negeri Terengganu Darul Iman (TA-24NCvC-165-09/2025)

of the Federal Constitution In the matter of Section 29(1)(b) of the Government Proceedings Act 1956 In the matter of Section 4,

1.

MAJLIS AGAMA ISLAM DAN ADAT MELAYU TERENGGANU (MAIDAM) … DEFENDANTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT

This Originating Summons (as amended in Enclosure 29) concerns a long-standing dispute over a piece of land originally known as KSB 770 (KSL 1614) Lot 2062, Mukim Bandar Kuala Terengganu, and subsequently registered as GRN 3108 Lot 2062 (“the said Land”). The Plaintiff, a registered society under the name “Pertubuhan Dansanak Haji Awang Bin Chik”, claims that the said Land is “Tanah Wakaf Zuriat” (family waqf land) belonging to the descendants of Haji Abdullah Bin Abd Aziz (Tok Pelam), and that the Plaintiff’s members are the lawful heirs of Haji Awang Bin Chik and Che Long Bin Haji Da, who were the last registered “Tuan Tanah” (landowners) on the title. The Plaintiff seeks either the return of the said Land or, in the alternative, compensation amounting to RM9,133,430.27 plus interest, being the sum paid by the First Defendant (the Terengganu State Government) as compensation to the Second Defendant (MAIDAM) following the compulsory acquisition of the said Land in 2010.

Before delving into the legal issues, it is pertinent to reflect on the historical and cultural significance of the land in question. The said Land which is known as Kampung Ladang Tok Pelam was not merely a piece of real estate; it was the cradle of Terengganu's Malay heritage and culture. Established around 1800 by Haji Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz (Tok Pelam), a revered Islamic scholar from Hadramaut, Yemen, the village became a centre of Islamic learning, traditional Malay copper crafting, and culinary excellence. Its demolition in 2011 sparked controversy, and the present dispute is a continuation of that historical tension.

In the current dispute, both Defendants have raised multiple preliminary and substantive objections. Having considered the affidavits, written submissions, and the authorities cited by all parties, this Court now delivers its grounds of judgment.

The historical narrative is largely not in dispute. As mentioned earlier, Tok Pelam who died in 1819, was the original owner of the said Land. Following a dispute in 1936 (Case Ref: A.M.T 3/55), the Land Court ordered the land to be divided into two halves: one half as a burial ground, and the other half as "Tanah Tempat Rumah" (residential land) for the descendants of Tok Pelam. Subsequently, the residential portion was registered in the names of Haji Awang Bin Chik and Che Long Bin Haji Da as "Tuan Tanah" and "Penjaga Zuriat" (guardian of the descendants). On 20 March 1954 (or 22 March 1954), Haji Awang Bin Chik and Che Long Bin Haji Da executed a declaration stating: "kami jadikan Wakaf Zuriat Tok Pelam". This declaration was made to ensure that the descendants of Tok Pelam would benefit from the land in perpetuity through a wakaf ahli (family waqf) arrangement. From that point, the land was reflected in the land registry as "Wakaf Zuriat Haji Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz (Tok Pelam)". The title (KSB 770, later replaced by GRN 3108) showed 1/1 ownership in the name of "Wakaf Zuriat Haji Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz (Tok Alam)".

On 30 July 2009, the First Defendant published Gazette No. 867 declaring the acquisition of the said Land under Section 8 of the Land Acquisition Act 1960 for a development project known as “Projek Pembangunan Di Kawasan Kampung Ladang Tok Pelam”. An inquiry under Section 10 of the Act was held on 28 February 2010, attended by the Second Defendant as the sole trustee of the waqf land. On 2 June 2010, Form K (Notice of Taking Possession) was issued, and compensation of RM9,133,430.27 was paid to the Second Defendant. The title to the said Land was then cancelled.

The Plaintiff’s members claim that they were never notified of the acquisition, that no compensation was paid to them, and that in 2011, their houses on the land were demolished by bulldozers under police supervision. The Plaintiff registered its society on 17 December 2024 and filed the present Originating Summons on 17 September 2025 (amended on 11 February 2026).

The following issues arise for determination:

Whether the Plaintiff has locus standi to bring this action;

Whether the originating summons under Order 89 of the Rules of Court 2012 is the proper procedure;

Whether the Plaintiff’s action is barred by limitation under Section 9 of the Limitation Act 1953;

Whether the civil court has jurisdiction to determine the validity of the waqf status of the said Land or to adjudicate on matters of Syariah law;

Whether the compulsory acquisition by the First Defendant was lawful and complied with the Land Acquisition Act 1960 and Article 13 of the Federal Constitution; and

Whether the Second Defendant was lawfully entitled to receive the compensation. COUNSELS’ CONTENTIONS Plaintiff’s Contentions

The Plaintiff contends that the said Land has always been “Tanah Wakaf Zuriat” (family waqf) for the benefit of the descendants of Tok Pelam, and not a general waqf (wakaf am) vested in MAIDAM. The Plaintiff argues that the original landowners, Haji Awang Bin Chik and Che Long Bin Haji Da, never executed any “Ikrar Wakaf” (waqf deed) in favour of MAIDAM or any religious authority. Therefore, MAIDAM’s claim to be the sole trustee is fraudulent and unlawful.

The Plaintiff further argues that the First Defendant’s acquisition was not for a “public purpose” as required under Section 3(a) of the Land Acquisition Act 1960, but rather to enable the Second Defendant to sell the land to a third party for a profit of RM9,133,430.27. The Plaintiff asserts that no inquiry was properly conducted, no notice was given to the Plaintiff’s members, and no compensation was paid to them, thereby violating Article 13 of the Federal Constitution which guarantees that no person shall be deprived of property save in accordance with law and with adequate compensation.

On the issue of locus standi, the Plaintiff relies on the Federal Court decision in Al Rashidy Kassim & Ors v Rosman Roslan [2007] 3 CLJ 361 (FC) for the proposition that beneficiaries of an estate have standing to bring an action to protect and preserve the assets of the estate, especially where there are special circumstances such as the risk of the property being lost to a third party.

On the issue of limitation, the Plaintiff invokes Section 341 of the National Land Code 1965, which provides that adverse possession for any length of time shall not constitute a bar to the recovery of land, and that the Limitation Act 1953 shall not operate to extinguish any title or interest in land.

The First Defendant submits that the acquisition was lawfully carried out under Section 3(c) of the Land Acquisition Act 1960 for a development project, which falls within the permissible purposes under the Act (not limited to public purpose alone, but also including residential, commercial, or industrial purposes). The First Defendant produced Gazette No. 867, the inquiry proceedings, and Form K as evidence of compliance.

On procedure, the First Defendant argues that an originating summons under Order 89 of the Rules of Court 2012 is a summary procedure intended for uncontested possession claims, not for complex disputes involving questions of title, waqf, and constitutional law. The First Defendant cites Bohari bin Taib & Ors v Pengarah Tanah Galian Selangor [1991] 1 MLJ 343 (SC) and Lee Wee Choong & Anor v Teh Ching Yan & Anor [2018]

The First Defendant also relies on Sections 68 and 68A of the Land Acquisition Act 1960, which bar any suit to set aside an award and provide that subsequent disposal of acquired land does not invalidate the acquisition. On limitation, the First Defendant relies on Section 9 of the Limitation Act 1953, submitting that the Plaintiff’s cause of action accrued in 2010 at the latest, and the action filed in 2025 is 15 years late.

The Second Defendant (MAIDAM) argues that under Section 63 of the Administration of Islamic Religious Affairs (Terengganu) Enactment 2001 and Sections 4 and 5 of the Waqf (Terengganu) Enactment 2016, MAIDAM is the sole trustee of all waqf properties in Terengganu, and all waqf properties vest in MAIDAM without any need for transfer or conveyance. The title itself shows ownership as “Wakaf Zuriat Haji Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz (Tok Alam)”, which is a waqf registration.

MAIDAM further argues that the civil court lacks jurisdiction to determine the validity of a waqf or to interpret Syariah law principles regarding the distinction between “wakaf am” and “wakaf zuriat”. Relying on Latifah bte Mat Zin v Rosmawati bte Sharibun [2007] 5 MLJ 101 (FC), MAIDAM submits that such issues fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Syariah Court.

MAIDAM also points out that the Plaintiff is a society registered in 2024, long after the acquisition in 2010, and that the Plaintiff’s members are not the registered proprietors of the land. The Syariah High Court has already issued orders (dated 17 April 2022 and 17 June 2025) identifying the legitimate descendants of Tok Pelam entitled to benefit from the waqf, and the Plaintiff’s members are not listed therein. COURT’S FINDINGS AND DECISION ISSUE 1: Whether the Plaintiff has locus standi to bring this action

The first hurdle the Plaintiff faces is its capacity to bring this action. The Plaintiff is a registered society under Section 7 of the Societies Act 1966, registered on 17 December 2024. The action is brought in the name of the society itself, not as a representative action under Order 15 Rule 12 of the Rules of Court 2012 on behalf of the alleged descendants.

The Federal Court in Lee Tak Suan & Anor v Tunku Dato Seri Shahabudin & Ors [2009] 4 CLJ 365 (FC) held that a registered society is a legal entity capable of suing and being sued, but it does so in its own capacity and not as a representative of its members. The society’s rights and interests are separate from those of its individual members. In the present case, the Plaintiff society has not shown that it has any proprietary interest in the said Land. The society was not the registered proprietor, nor was it the beneficiary of any trust over the land. The mere fact that some of its members may claim to be descendants of Tok Pelam does not vest any property right in the society itself. Accordingly, this Court finds that the Plaintiff lacks locus standi to bring this action.

Even if the Court were to disregard the corporate veil and treat this as an action by the alleged 7 living descendants – namely (1) Ramiah Binti Awang, (2) Nokman Bin Awang, (3) Yahya Bin Awang, (4) Muhammad Sa'ari Bin Awang, (5) Fatimah Binti Awang, (6) Mohd Yunus Bin Hj Awang, and (7) Ibrahim Bin Haji Awang – none of them have obtained letters of administration or a grant of probate in respect of the estates of Haji Awang Bin Chik, Che Long Bin Haji Da, or Tok Pelam.

The Federal Court in Deraman & Ors v Mek Yam [1977] 1 MLJ 52 (FC) and the Court of Appeal in Law Hock Key & Anor v Yap Meng Kan & Ors [2008] 3 CLJ 470 (CA) have held that only the lawful administrator or personal representative of a deceased’s estate has standing to sue in respect of the estate’s property. A beneficiary does not have an automatic right to sue on behalf of the estate unless special circumstances exist.

The Plaintiff attempted to rely on Al Rashidy Kassim & Ors v Rosman Roslan (supra) to establish special circumstances. However, in Al Rashidy Kassim, the beneficiaries commenced action because the personal representative had defaulted and the land was at risk of being sold to a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration, which would have triggered the indefeasibility provisions under Section 340 of the National Land Code. Here, the land has already been acquired by the State Authority under a compulsory acquisition process, and the title has been cancelled. No risk of a third party obtaining indefeasible title through a fraudulent transfer exists in the same manner. Therefore, the special circumstances in Al Rashidy Kassim are distinguishable. ISSUE 2: Whether the originating summons under Order 89 of the Rules of Court 2012 is the proper procedure

The Plaintiff commenced this action by way of an originating summons under Order 89 of the Rules of Court 2012. Order 89 provides a summary procedure for a person claiming possession of land which is occupied solely by a person who entered into occupation without license or consent. This procedure is intended for virtually uncontested cases where there is no issue or question to try. As stated by the Federal Court in Bohari bin Taib & Ors v Pengarah Tanah Galian Selangor (supra), Order 89 (formerly Order 113 of the Rules of the High Court 1980) is a “summary, simple and speedy” procedure meant to operate without a plenary trial.

The present action is far from uncontested. The Plaintiff raises complex issues of constitutional law (Article 13), land acquisition law (Sections 3, 10, 68, 68A of the Land Acquisition Act 1960), indefeasibility of title (Section 340 of the National Land Code), waqf law, and jurisdiction of the Syariah Court. Multiple affidavits have been filed, and the parties are in sharp dispute over fundamental facts, including the nature of the waqf, the validity of the acquisition, and the identity of the legitimate descendants. Such a case is not suitable for summary determination under Order 89. The proper procedure, if the Plaintiff wished to challenge the acquisition, would have been an application for judicial review under Order 53 of the Rules of Court 2012, albeit subject to strict time limits. Accordingly, the originating summons is procedurally irregular and is dismissed on this ground alone. ISSUE 3: Whether the Plaintiff’s action is barred by limitation under

Even if the Plaintiff had standing and had used the correct procedure, the action is clearly time-barred. The acquisition took place on 2 June 2010, when Form K was issued and compensation was paid. The Plaintiff’s members admit that they became aware of the demolition of their houses in 2011. Yet the originating summons was only filed on 17 September 2025, more than 14 years after the cause of action accrued.

Section 9 of the Limitation Act 1953 provides that no action shall be brought to recover any land after the expiration of twelve years from the date on which the right of action accrued. Section 10 provides that where a person has been dispossessed, the right of action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date of the dispossession. Applying these provisions, the Plaintiff’s right of action to recover the said Land accrued at the latest in 2011 when the Plaintiff’s members were allegedly dispossessed. The action filed in 2025 is therefore 14 years too late.

The Plaintiff sought to rely on Section 341 of the National Land Code 1965, which states that adverse possession shall not constitute a bar to recovery of land and that the Limitation Act 1953 shall not operate to extinguish any title or interest in land. However, Section 341 must be read in its proper context. It protects the registered proprietor against claims of adverse possession under the Limitation Act. It does not operate to extend the limitation period for a person who is not the registered proprietor. The Plaintiff is not the registered proprietor; indeed, the registered title has been cancelled. The Plaintiff cannot invoke Section 341 to avoid the limitation bar. Moreover, the acquisition was not an “adverse possession” in the common law sense; it was a compulsory acquisition by the State Authority under a statutory regime. Section 341 is therefore inapplicable. ISSUE 4: Whether the civil court has jurisdiction to determine the validity of the waqf status of the said Land or to adjudicate on matters of Syariah law

The Plaintiff’s core contention is that the said Land is “Tanah Wakaf Zuriat” (family waqf) and not a general waqf, and that MAIDAM has no authority over it because no Ikrar Wakaf was ever executed in favour of MAIDAM. This contention raises questions of Syariah law relating to the validity and classification of a waqf.

Before examining the jurisdictional question, it is useful to clarify the Islamic legal framework governing waqf, as the Plaintiff's claim is predicated on a fundamental misconception of the distinction between wakaf am (general waqf) and wakaf ahli (family waqf, also known as wakaf zuriat).

As explained by Farhana Mohamad Suhaimi (2018) in the academic article "Wakaf Ahli: Peruntukan Undang-Undang dan Pelaksanaannya di Malaysia", wakaf ahli is a valid and recognized form of waqf under Islamic law. It is defined as property or benefits dedicated by a waqif (the person creating the waqf) to one or more of his or her descendants (mawquf alaih) for welfare purposes. This practice has been endorsed since the time of the Prophet Muhammad SAW, as exemplified by the waqf of Saidina Umar for his descendants and the waqf of Abu Talhah to his relatives, as recorded in authentic hadith.

The earliest written legal code in the Malay world to contain provisions on waqf was the Hukum Kanun Pahang, compiled during the reign of Sultan Abdul Ghafur Muhiuddin Shah (1592– 1614), the Sultan of Pahang. At the time of its compilation, Terengganu was a vassal territory of the Johor-Pahang-Riau-Lingga Empire. This legal tradition, which recognized and regulated waqf, would have permeated the legal consciousness of the region, influencing the practice of waqf, including the creation of wakaf am and wakaf ahli (family waqf) by later generations.

Throughout its existence, the distinction is crucial: in a wakaf am, the beneficiaries are the general public or specific charitable causes (e.g., mosques, schools, the poor). In a wakaf ahli, the beneficiaries are specifically the waqif's own family members or descendants. However, both forms of waqf are valid under Syariah law, and both are subject to the same core principles: the asset is preserved (it cannot be sold, gifted, or inherited), and its income or benefits are used for the designated beneficiaries.

Under Malaysian law, the administration of all waqf properties, including wakaf ahli, falls under the jurisdiction of the respective State Islamic Religious Councils. This authority is now codified pursuant to the Administration of Islamic Religious Affairs (Terengganu) Enactment 2001 and the Waqf (Terengganu) Enactment 2016. Section 4(1)(a) of the Waqf (Terengganu) Enactment 2016 explicitly provides that "the Council shall be the sole trustee of all waqf" in the State of Terengganu. Section 5(3) further clarifies that any waqf existing before the coming into force of the Enactment shall vest in the Council without any transfer or conveyance. This is a statutory vesting, meaning MAIDAM does not need a separate Ikrar Wakaf (deed of declaration) from the original waqif to assume its role as trustee; the law itself confers that status.

The role of MAIDAM as the sole trustee of waqf properties in Terengganu is not merely statutory but has been exercised in practice for decades. According to Mohd Afandi Bin Mat Rani

in his article "Mekanisma Istibdal dalam pembangunan tanah wakaf di Terengganu", MAIDAM has been administering waqf properties since at least 1951. The article further records that there are at least 111 lots of waqf land in Terengganu that have been acquired by the State Authority since 1951, with most of these acquisitions located in Kuala Terengganu district where the said Land is situated. This demonstrates that the acquisition of the said Land in 2010 was not an isolated or arbitrary act, but part of a broader, long-standing pattern of state acquisitions of waqf land for public development projects.

The concept of istibdal (substitution or replacement of waqf property) is central to understanding the propriety of MAIDAM's actions in this case. Istibdal serves as a mechanism to ensure the perpetuity and productivity of waqf assets, particularly when waqf land is acquired by the State Authority for public development projects. In Terengganu, the State Fatwa Committee has ruled that acquired waqf land must be replaced with other land of similar value, and that compensation received must be used to purchase replacement assets (Mohd Afandi Mat Rani, 2015). This is precisely what occurred in the present case: MAIDAM received compensation of RM9,133,430.27 and used the funds to purchase nine replacement properties (istibdal) for the benefit of the legitimate descendants of Tok Pelam. The Plaintiff's claim that MAIDAM's receipt and use of the compensation was an "illegal profit" is therefore fundamentally flawed and fails to appreciate the Shariah-compliant istibdal process that underpins the management of wakaf ahli.

Critically, the article highlights that one of the primary responsibilities of MAIDAM as sole trustee is to identify the legitimate beneficiaries (mawquf alaih) of a wakaf ahli and to ensure that they receive their entitled share of the benefits. This is not an act of usurpation but a statutory duty. In the present case, MAIDAM has demonstrated that it has carried out this duty. The Syariah High Court issued orders on 17 April 2022 and 17 June 2025 containing a list of 855 individuals identified as the legitimate descendants of Tok Pelam entitled to benefit from the Wakaf Zuriat Tok Pelam. MAIDAM has also established a special committee to trace and identify more descendants who have yet to be located.

The Plaintiff's contention that MAIDAM has unlawfully appropriated the said Land is therefore misconceived. MAIDAM is acting precisely within its statutory mandate as the sole trustee to administer the wakaf ahli / wakaf zuriat for the benefit of the descendants. The fact that the Plaintiff's own members are not listed in the Syariah Court's orders does not mean MAIDAM has acted unlawfully; rather, it indicates that the Plaintiff's members have not yet been formally recognized by the Syariah Court as legitimate descendants entitled to benefit from the waqf. Their remedy, if any, lies in applying to the Syariah Court for inclusion, not in challenging MAIDAM's lawful trusteeship in the civil court.

This Court's analysis of the nature of wakaf ahli and the statutory role of MAIDAM as sole trustee brings us directly to the jurisdictional question. Section 11(3)(vii) of the Syariah Court (Terengganu) Enactment 2001 provides that the Syariah High Court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine matters relating to waqf. The Federal Court in Latifah bte Mat Zin v Rosmawati bte Sharibun (supra) held that where an issue falling within the jurisdiction of the Syariah Court is raised in civil proceedings, the civil court must refer that issue to the Syariah Court for determination before it can be relied upon.

The Plaintiff's contention that the said Land is not a valid waqf, or that MAIDAM is not the lawful trustee, are precisely the types of issues that fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Syariah Court. The Plaintiff has not obtained any declaration from the Syariah Court on these matters. Furthermore, under Section 89 of the National Land Code, the title registered in the name of "Wakaf Zuriat Haji Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz (Tok Alam)" is conclusive evidence that title is vested in that named entity. This Court cannot unilaterally declare that registration to be a nullity without first having the underlying waqf issue determined by the Syariah Court. Accordingly, this Court finds that it does not have jurisdiction to determine the validity of the waqf status of the said Land or to adjudicate on whether MAIDAM is lawfully the sole trustee. This is a further and compelling ground for dismissing the Plaintiff's claim against the Second Defendant. ISSUE 5: Whether the compulsory acquisition by the First Defendant was lawful and complied with the Land Acquisition Act 1960 and Article 13 of the Federal Constitution

For completeness, this Court will address the merits of the challenge to the acquisition. The First Defendant produced Gazette No. 867 dated 30 July 2009, which is conclusive evidence under Section 8 of the Land Acquisition Act 1960 that the land was needed for the purpose specified (the development project). The First Defendant also produced evidence of an inquiry under Section 10 held on 28 February 2010, attended by the Second Defendant as the sole trustee of the waqf land. Form K was issued on 2 June 2010, and compensation was paid.

Section 68 of the Land Acquisition Act 1960 expressly provides that “no suit shall be brought to set aside an award or apportionment under this Act.” Section 68A further provides that subsequent disposal or use of acquired land shall not invalidate the acquisition. As held by the High Court in Soon Jing Enterprise Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Perak & Ors [2017] CLJU 427 (HC), these provisions operate as a statutory bar precluding any action to challenge the acquisition procedure.

The Plaintiff argued that the acquisition was not for a "public purpose" under Section 3(a) of the Land Acquisition Act 1960. However, Section 3(c) of the Act allows acquisition for residential, commercial, industrial, or recreational purposes, or any combination of such purposes. The development project in Kampung Ladang Tok Pelam falls within Section 3(c). In any event, the declaration under Section 8 is conclusive, and the Plaintiff has not successfully challenged that declaration by way of judicial review within the required time.

Further context is provided by the academic literature on the acquisition of waqf land in Terengganu. Mohd Afandi Mat Rani

records that the State Authority has been acquiring waqf land in Terengganu since 1951, with acquisitions peaking in the 1990s and continuing into the 2000s. The purposes of these acquisitions include road upgrades (34 lots), government administration buildings (10 lots), drainage (15 lots), mosque expansions (13 lots), and other public infrastructure such as schools, airports, and public housing. Significantly, between 2009 and 2014, there were 17 additional cases of waqf land acquisition by the State Authority, involving compensation totaling RM11,893,723.19. The said Land, acquired in 2010 for the Kampung Ladang Tok Pelam development project, falls squarely within this period and pattern. This demonstrates that the acquisition of the said Land was part of a consistent and lawful state policy of acquiring waqf land for public development projects, and was not an arbitrary or unlawful act directed specifically at the Plaintiff or the descendants of Tok Pelam. The challenge to the acquisition is therefore without merit. ISSUE 6: Whether the Second Defendant was lawfully entitled to receive the compensation

At the time of acquisition, the said Land was registered in the name of “Wakaf Zuriat Haji Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz (Tok Alam)”. Under the Torrens system embodied in the National Land Code 1965, the register is everything. Section 89 provides that the register document of title is conclusive evidence that title is vested in the person named therein as proprietor. The Federal Court in Teh Bee v K Maruthamuthu [1977] 2 MLJ 7 (FC) affirmed that indefeasibility of title is the hallmark of the Torrens system.

The named proprietor was a waqf entity. Under the Administration of Islamic Religious Affairs (Terengganu) Enactment 2001 and the Waqf (Terengganu) Enactment 2016, MAIDAM is the sole trustee of all waqf properties in Terengganu. Section 5(3) of the Waqf Enactment 2016 expressly provides that any waqf existing before the coming into force of the Enactment shall vest in MAIDAM without any transfer or conveyance. Therefore, MAIDAM was the proper party to receive compensation for the acquired land.

The Plaintiff’s claim that the RM9,133,430.27 was an “illegal profit” is misconceived. It was compensation paid by the State Authority for the taking of land, not proceeds from a sale. MAIDAM has explained that the compensation was used to purchase nine other properties as replacement waqf (istibdal) for the benefit of the legitimate descendants of Tok Pelam. The Syariah High Court has already identified the legitimate descendants entitled to benefit from the waqf in its orders dated 17 April 2022 and 17 June 2025. The Plaintiff's members, who are said to comprise 7 living descendants of Tok Pelam through Haji Awang Bin Chik, as listed in paragraph 8 of Enclosure 30, are conspicuously absent from those orders. If the Plaintiff’s members believe they are legitimate descendants, their remedy lies in the Syariah Court, not in the civil court.

For all the foregoing reasons, this Court finds that the Plaintiff’s Originating Summons (as amended) is fatally flawed and must be dismissed. The Plaintiff lacks locus standi as a registered society to claim proprietary rights over the said Land. The originating summons under Order 89 of the Rules of Court 2012 is the wrong procedure for a complex dispute involving challenges to a compulsory acquisition and the validity of a waqf. The action is time-barred under Section 9 of the Limitation Act 1953, having been filed more than 14 years after the cause of action accrued. The civil court lacks jurisdiction to determine the validity of the waqf status of the said Land, which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Syariah Court. On the merits, the compulsory acquisition was lawfully carried out under the Land Acquisition Act 1960, and the statutory bar under Sections 68 and 68A prevents any challenge to the award. MAIDAM, as the sole trustee of the waqf property, was lawfully entitled to receive the compensation.

This Originating Summons (as amended) is accordingly dismissed. Costs are awarded to the Defendants against the Plaintiff, with costs fixed at RM10,000.00 per Defendant. Dated: 28 June 2026 Yusrin Faidz Bin Yusoff Judge High Court of Malaya Kuala Terengganu Counsel for the Plaintiff: Horley Isaacs Messrs Horley Isaacs & Associates No. 30-J, Tingkat 1, Jalan Hiliran, 20300 Kuala Terengganu, Terengganu Darul Iman. Counsel for the First Defendant: Zulfazliah Binti Mahmud Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Terengganu, Tingkat 14, Wisma Darul Iman, 20200 Kuala Terengganu, Terengganu Darul Iman. Counsel for the Second Defendant: Hazri Bin Haris Messrs Zamani Mohammad & Co. 1107-E, Tingkat 1-3, Jalan Pejabat Off Jalan Sultan Ismail, 20200 Kuala Terengganu, Terengganu Darul Iman.

Al Rashidy Kassim & Ors v Rosman Roslan [2007] 3 CLJ 361

Bohari bin Taib & Ors v Pengarah Tanah Galian Selangor [1991] 1 MLJ 343 (SC).

Lee Wee Choong & Anor v Teh Ching Yan & Anor [2018]

Latifah bte Mat Zin v Rosmawati bte Sharibun [2007] 5 MLJ

Lee Tak Suan & Anor v Tunku Dato Seri Shahabudin & Ors [2009] 4 CLJ 365 (FC).

Deraman & Ors v Mek Yam [1977] 1 MLJ 52 (FC).

Law Hock Key & Anor v Yap Meng Kan & Ors [2008] 3 CLJ

Soon Jing Enterprise Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Perak & Ors [2017] CLJU 427 (HC).

Teh Bee v K Maruthamuthu [1977] 2 MLJ 7 (FC).

Order 15 Rule 12, Order 53, & Order 89 of the Rules of Court 2012.

Sections 3, 8, 10, 68 and 68A of the Land Acquisition Act 1960 3. Section 9 of the Limitation Act 1953.

Article 13(1) & (2) of the Federal Constitution.

Sections 89 & 341 of the National Land Code 1965.

Section 63 of the Administration of Islamic Religious Affairs (Terengganu) Enactment 2001.

Section 11(3)(vii) of the Syariah Court (Terengganu) Enactment 2001.

Sections 4 and 5 of the Waqf (Terengganu) Enactment 2016.

Isa, Y. (Ed.). (2003). Hukum Kanun Pahang: Manuskrip Agung Negeri Pahang. Lembaga Muzium Negeri Pahang.

Suhaimi, F. M. (2018). Wakaf Ahli: Peruntukan Undang-Undang Dan Pelaksanaannya di Malaysia. Malaysian Journal of Syariah and Law, 6(2), 73-81.

Mat Rani, M.A. (2015). Mekanisma Istibdal Dalam Pembangunan Tanah Di Terengganu. Journal of Contemporary Islamic Studies, 1, 115-133.