Petroliam Nasional Berhad (Petronas) v Ketua Pengarah Hasil dalam Negeri (WA-14-10-04/2023)

Courts must also bear in mind the SCIT’s specialisation. Dealing with terms and practices of the business and the business community enable them to have special insight, understanding and appreciation of the evidence and facts, to make the findings drawn from those evidence and facts. While a finding of fact often touches upon the law, the determining factor in the finding is their special insight and appreciation of the facts. Hence, unless it is demonstrated that SCIT had erred on a question of law, resulting in a manifest error in the deciding order, the court cannot intervene, as it would amount to interference contrary to the intent of legislation setting up and empowering the SCIT. (see Lower Perak Co- operative Housing Society Berhad v. Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri, [1994] 3 CLJ 541; [1994] 2 MLJ 713; [1994] 2 AMR 1735;

1 MLRA 262). (emphasis added) 11. The legal principles of appellate intervention in cases of a full trial involving oral evidence of witnesses are well-settled. It is trite law that an appellate court will not intervene in a trial court’s actual decision unless the trial court has been shown: (a) Wrong in arriving at its decision; (b) There is no or insufficient judicial appreciation of the evidence; (c) No reasonable judge, similarly circumstanced, would have decided in the manner that he did; (d) Drawing the wrong inference of fact; and (e) To have erred in law or principle in deciding the case. (a) Gan Yook Chin (P) Anor v. Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng & Ors [2005] 2 MLJ 1; [2004] 2 MLRA 1; [2004] 4 CLJ 309;

6 AMR 781; Page 7 of 22 (b) Delta-Pelita Sebakong Sdn Bhd v. Wong Hou Liang @ Ors and other appeals [2020] 3 MLJ 415; [2020] 3 MLRA 434;

MLJU 109; (c) He-Con Sdn Bhd v. Bulyah binti Ishak @ Ors (as administrators for the estate of Nor Zainir bin Rahmat, the deceased) and another appeal [2020] 4 MLJ 662; [2020] 5 MLRA 98; [2020] 7 CLJ 271; [2020] 5 AMR 645. The Issues 12. The issues before this Honourable Court are: - Issue 1: Time Bar Assessment (YA 2010 PYB) Whether the Revenue has successfully discharged its burden of proof under Section 39(3) of the PITA in relation to Form JA dated 30.12.2015 for the YA 2010 PYB? Issue 2: Disallowance of Country Office Related Expenses Whether the Appellant is entitled to claim a deduction of Country Office Related Expenses under Section 15(1) of the PITA for YA 2010 PYB and YA 2010 CYB. The decision of the Court Issue 1: Time Bar Assessment (YA 2010 PYB) Whether the Revenue has successfully discharged its burden of proof under Section 39(3) of the PITA in relation to Form JA dated 30.12.2015 for the YA 2010 PYB? 13. The Appellant submits the SCIT had erred in stating that the Appellant is negligent in preparing its tax return. The SCIT failed to realize that the Revenue had failed to discharge its burden of proof under Section 39(3) of the PITA. In this vein, the SCIT had also failed to highlight the evidence led by the Revenue to aver the same. Page 8 of 22 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. The Appellant reiterates that the SCIT’s basis to aver that the Appellant is negligent is premised on the fact that the Appellant wrongly claimed deductions in its tax return. Similarly, the Appellant submits that it was not negligent merely because deductions were made and taken on the A&P expenses, NTF Contributions and Country Office Expenses. The deductions taken by the Appellant were merely based on technical adjustments i.e. where parties have different interpretations of the deductibility of the expenses under Section 15(1) of the PITA. The fact that the Appellant took a different position from the Revenue cannot and must not mean the Appellant was negligent in preparing its tax computation. The Appellant had not acted unreasonably by taking a deduction on expenses to which the Appellant is of the view are deductible in law. According to the Appellant the Revenue failed to put forth any proof of negligence on the part of the Appellant. The Revenue also did not provide any reason to justify the basis for raising the time-barred assessments nor did it allow the Appellant to explain otherwise. The Appellant, therefore, submits that the time-barred assessment for the YA 2010 (PYB) is null and void and should be set aside. Having perused the cause papers and the evidence produced before this Court. | am of the view that the SCIT had not committed any error of law when it decided that the Appellant had committed negligence as envisaged under Section 39(3) of the PITA. Section 39(1) of the PITA clearly gives power to the Revenue to raise an assessment or additional assessment on any person chargeable to tax in that year or within five years after its expiration where it appears to the Revenue that no or no sufficient assessment has been made on that person. Section 39(1) of the PITA reads as follows: - Assessments and additional assessments in certain cases 39. (1) The Director General, where for any year of assessment it appears to him that no or no sufficient assessment has been made on a chargeable person chargeable to tax, may in that year or within five years after its expiration make an assessment or additional assessment, as the case may be, in respect of that chargeable person in the amount Page 9 of 22 or additional amount of chargeable income and tax or in the additional amount of tax in which, according to the best of the Director General’s judgment, the assessment with respect to that chargeable person ought to have been made for that year. (See: Government of Malaysia & Anor v. Jagdis Singh [1986] 1 MLRA 207; [1987] 2 MLJ 185; [1987] CLJ (Rep) 110; HZHS v. DGIR [1990] 3 MLRH 423; [1991] 2 CLJ (Rep) 765) 21. Therefore, based on the provision of laws and decided cases, the Revenue is correct in raising the additional assessment under Subsection 39(1) of the PITA against the Appellant in this case. 22. The law itself gave the Revenue an exception to the limitation under Subsection 39(1) of the PITA whereby an assessment can still be raised even after the expiration of five years limitation under Subsection 39(3) of the PITA. 23. Section 39(3) of the PITA states as follows: - (3) | The Director General, where it appears to him that any form of fraud or wilful default has been committed by or on behalf of a chargeable person, or that any chargeable person has been negligent, in connection with or in relation to tax, may at any time make an assessment in respect of that chargeable person for any year of assessment for the purpose of making good any loss of tax attributable to the fraud, wilful default or negligence in question. (emphasis added) 24. The onus of proving that the said assessments fall within the exceptions under subsection 39(3) of the PITA lies on the Revenue to show that the Appellant has failed to exercise the standard of care that a reasonable man would have exercised. 25. In the instant case, | find that the Appellant has been negligent in preparing its tax computation and reporting its income for the YA 2010 PYB. 26. The word “negligence” is not defined in the Act. Thus, the word should be taken to be used in its ordinary sense. In Opus International (M) Berhad v. Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri

MLRHU 612; [2019] CLJU 883, the High Court has referred to the book of Whiteman on Income Tax (3% Edition) which outlines the scope of the word ‘neglect’ page 1361 as follows: - i] Page 10 of 22 27. 28. 29. 30. “neglect” means negligence or a failure to give any notice, make any return, statement or declaration or to produce or furnish any list, document or other information required by the Income Tax Act, but a person is not deemed to have failed to do anything required in a limited time if he does it within such extended time as the Commissioner or officer concerned may allow, where a person has a reasonable excuse for not doing anything required he is deemed not to have failed do it if he does it without any reasonable delay. It should be noted that even though an incorrect return was not made fraudulently or negligently originally, a subsequent failure to remedy it without reasonable delay may result in the return being treated as having been made negligently’. In Black’s Law Dictionary, 10" Edition, Thomson Reuters, p1196, the word ‘negligence’ is defined as follows — “The failure to exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in a similar situation.” Therefore, to determine whether the Appellant had been negligent, this Court will have, to look at the definition of ‘negligence’ and apply them to the facts of the case. (See: Government of Malaysia v. Ng Song Choon [1974] 1 MLRH 507; [1975] 1 MLJ 131; [1974] CLJUU 41) Upon perusal of the evidence adduced before this Court, | find that the Revenue had successfully discharged the burden of proving the Appellant's negligence in preparing and submitting its tax return for YA 2010 (PYB) and the exception under Section 39(3) of the PITA applies to the Revenue. Therefore, the Notice of Additional Assessment for YA 2010 (PYB) dated 30.12.2015 issued by the Revenue is good in law. The said negligence was only discovered by the Revenue through an audit carried out. The Appellant had negligently filed an incorrect return for YA 2010 PYB as follows — 30.1. The Appellant had negligently claimed for a deduction for expenses of club membership fees whereby the Clubs, Corporate Credit Card Fees and Subscriptions expenses do not meet the provisions of Section 15(1) of the PITA since the expenses are not wholly and exclusively incurred in the Page 11 of 22 basic period in production of the gross income of petroleum operations; 30.2. The Appellant had negligently claimed a deduction under Section 15(1) of the PITA for Eastern Corridor Economic Region (ECER) Related Expenses, however the expenses were not wholly and exclusively incurred in the basic period in the production of the gross income of petroleum operations and it is not an expense that is related to petroleum upstream activities. 30.3. The Appellant also failed to submit supporting documents to show that the claim of expenses related to ECER are wholly and exclusively incurred in the basic period in the production of the gross income of petroleum operations; 30.4. Based on the audit finding, the Appellant has failed to submit supporting documents to show that the Country Offices Related Expenses are wholly and exclusively incurred in the basic period in production of gross income of upstream petroleum activities and the Taxpayer had negligently claimed a deduction under Section 15(1) of the PITA even though the expenses claimed were not wholly and exclusively incurred in the basic period in production of the gross income and the expenses are not related to upstream petroleum activities. 30.5. Apart from the above mentioned expenses, there are other expenses stated in Revenue’s audit finding letter dated 26.12.2014 that are not eligible to be claimed by the Appellant which were not appealed as follows — i. Other Materials and Supplies - Miscellaneous Expenses; ii. Project Management Fees & Charges; iii. Environmental, Engineering Studies and Services; iv. Acctg/Legal/Secretarial-Legal Fee & Chrg —- Corporate; v. Management Consulting Fees & Charges; i] Page 12 of 22 vi. Repairs & Maint-Office & H/hold Equip, Furn & Fit; vii. Other Purchased Services-Miscellaneous Expenses; and viii. Research Expenses. 31. The findings and conclusion made by the SCIT can be found on pages 44 — 68 of the Rekod Rayuan Tambahan Kedua. For ease of reference, the relevant paragraphs of the findings are reproduced as follows — “Isu (1) sama ada Responden telah berjaya membuktikan menurut subseksyen 39(3) APCP bahawa Perayu cuai bagi membangkitkan Notis Taksiran Tambahan bagi TT 2010 PYB bertarikh 30 Disember 2015” ANALYSIS DAN KEPUTUSAN

PKCP berpandangan isu mengenai taksiran luar had masa dalam rayuan ini berkaitan dengan isu sama ada Perayu cuai dalam melaporkan taksiran cukai Perayu.

Perayu menafikan bahawa Perayu cuai atas alasan tindakan Perayu menuntut penolakan antaranya bagi perbelanjaan Yuran dan Keahlian Kelab, Kad Kredit Korporat, Pengiklanan dan promosi, Eastern Corridor Economic Region (ECER) dan Country Offices semata-mata penyesuaian teknikal susulan pendekatan tafsiran Perayu mengenai subseksyen 15(1) APCP berbeza dengan tafsiran Responden.

Selain itu, Perayu juga telah pun mengambil langkah mematuhi kewajipan pelaporan cukai pendapatan dengan sewajarnya dengan melibatkan ejen pengauditan professional.

Sebaliknya, Responden berhujah tindakan Perayu menuntut perbelanjaan yang tidak secara keseluruhan dan eksklusif ditanggung dalam menghasilkan pendapatan kasar Perayu merupakan suatu kecuaian.

PKCP merujuk kes Infra Quest Sdn Bhd v. Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri (2016) MSTC 30-133 seperti yang berikut :

On the aspect of the burden of proving negligence, this Court held the view that, consistent with the provision of section 101 of the Evidence Act 1950 [Act 56], the burden of proving negligence is placed on the DGIR, as borne out by the words “The Director General where it appears to him ....” Page 13 of 22

[29]

[30]

[31]

[33]

[34]

Dalam hal ini, Responden yang mempunyai beban untuk membuktikan berdasarkan imbangan kebarangkalian bahawa Perayu telah cuai. PKCP berpandangan berdasarkan keputusan kes Opus International tindakan terkurang lapor merupakan satu kecuaian seperti yang berikut: “It should be noted that even though an incorrect return was not made fraudulently or negligently originally, a subsequent failure to remedy it without reasonable delay may result in the return being treated as having been made negligently ab initio.” Setelah audit dijalankan Responden mendapati Perayu telah mengemukakan Borang Nyata Cukai Pendapatan (BNCP) yang tidak betul melalui penemuan penolakan perbelanjaan yang tidak ditanggung bagi menghasilkan pendapatan kasar Perayu dan telah pun dimaklumkan kepada Perayu. Ini bermakna melalui penemuan audit tersebut Responden telah berjaya membuktikan berdasarkan imbangan kebarangkalian bahawa Perayu cuai. Selain itu, seksyen 39(3) turut memperuntukkan kuasa bagi Responden membangkitkan taksiran bagi maksud menggantikan apa-apa kerugian cukai. Dalam hal ini, terkurang lapor tersebut telah menyebabkan kerugian cukai maka Responden mempunyai kuasa untuk membangkitkan taksiran cukai bagi maksud menggantikan apa- apa kerugian cukai. Kecuaian Perayu menuntut perbelanjaan yang tidak sepatutnya telah memberi kesan terhadap liabiliti cukai Perayu bagi TT 2010 (PYB). PKCP berpandangan bahawa bagi tahun taksiran 2010 TT 2010 (PYB), Responden telah berjaya membuktikan berdasarkan imbangan kebarangkalian bahawa Perayu cuai menurut subseksyen 39(3) APCP. Maka oleh yang demikian, PKCP memutuskan Responden tidak dihnalang oleh had masa dan mempunyai hak untuk mengeluarkan Notis Taksiran Tambahan bagi TT 2010 (PYB) terhadap Perayu menurut subseksyen 39(1) APCP.” 32. In the case of Opus International (M) Sdn Bhd (supra), the High Court has agreed with the findings by the SCIT that the Appellant has been negligent for ‘failure to report its actual income in accordance with the provisions of the Act’ — Page 14 of 22 33. 34. 35. 36. “(31) | agree with the findings of the SCIT that the Appellant has committed negligence when the Appellant failed to make amendment to the actual recognition of income for YA 1999 when the account was finalized in 2000. Added to that the Appellant was negligent in not reporting its actual income in accordance section 24(1)(b) of the ITA 1967 thereby causing losses to the tax collection in YA 1999. (32) Based on the findings of facts, the SCIT found that the DGIR had discharged their burden of proof that the Appellant had committed negligence as envisaged by subsection 91(3) of the ITA 1967. Therefore, | agree with the SCIT’s conclusion that the DGIR’s action in raising the tax after the period of six years is valid.” (emphasis added) Therefore, given the above, | am of the view that the Revenue has discharged its burden of proof that the Appellant had committed negligence as envisaged by subsection 39(3) of the PITA and that the Revenue’s action in raising the tax after the period of 5 years is valid. The Revenue has established a prima facie case of negligence and having done so, the burden shifts to the Appellant to displace the assessment. It is clearly stated in paragraph I| Third Schedule of the PITA, that the burden of proving an assessment is excessive or erroneous is upon the Appellant. The burden of proof is carried by the Appellant throughout this present Appeal and in the event the Appellant fails to discharge his onus of proof the assessment that forms the subject matter of this present Appeal must be upheld and the Appellant appeal be dismissed. Having perused the evidence adduced before this Court, | am of the considered view that the Appellant has failed to tender any evidence to discharge his onus of proof to show that the assessment made by the Revenue is excessive or erroneous. Page 15 of 22 Issue 2: Disallowance of Country Office Related Expenses Whether the Appellant is entitled to claim a deduction of Country Office Related Expenses under Section 15(1) of the PITA for YA 2010 PYB and YA 2010 CYB. 37. Section 15(1) of the PITA reads as follows: - “Deduction in respect of outgoings and expenses 15. (1) Subject to this Act, the adjusted income of a chargeable person for the basis period for a year of assessment shall be an amount ascertained by deducting from the gross income of that chargeable person for that period all outgoings and expenses wholly and exclusively incurred during that period by that chargeable person in the production of the gross income.....” (emphasis added) 38. It is clear for deduction in respect of outgoing and expenses to be allowed under Subsection 15(1) of the PITA it must be “wholly and exclusively incurred during that period in the production of the gross income”. 39. In the case of Esso Production Malaysia Inc. v. Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri (2003) MSTC 4016, the High Court had affirmed the decision of SCIT in EPM Inc v. Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri [2001] MSTC 3306 on the deduction in respect of outgoing and expenses to be allowed under subsection 15(1) of the PITA when the SCIT held as follows: - “Our findings on this issue are — (a) To be deductible an expenditure must be authorised as a deduction under section 15(1) of the PITA and it must not be disallowed by section 18(1) of the PITA; (b) In order to qualify for deduction it must satisfy, inter alia, that the expenditure is incurred wholly and exclusively in the production of gross income; (c) We are of the view that the expenditure does not satisfy the tests enumerated above for reasons set out below — Page 16 of 22 i. What is wholly and exclusively laid out to produce income is a question of fact and the circumstances of each taxpayer have to be considered on their own merits. The mere fact that the expenditure had been incurred and that the expenses are reflected in the Profit and Loss Account of the taxpayer does not, without more, qualify for deductions; ii. We are mindful of what Azmi, J (as he then was) stated in Ampat Tin Dredging Ltd v. DGIR (1982) 2 MLJ 46 at page ‘....in the final analysis, the question whether money is “wholly and exclusively incurred in the production of gross income”, within the meaning of section 33(1) of the Income Tax Act 1967, is a question of fact to be decided on the circumstances of each case and it is on the finding of these facts that a conclusion of law is arrived at.” 40. The leading provisions in determining the eligibility of business deductions are Sections 33(1) and 39(1) of the ITA which are pari materia with Sections 15(1) and 18(1) of the PITA. 41. Section 18(1) of the PITA states as follows: - “Deductions not allowed 18. (1) Subject to any express provision of this Act, in ascertaining the adjusted income of any chargeable person for the basis period for a year of assessment no deduction from the gross income for that period shall be allowed in respect of — (a) any disbursements or expenses not being money wholly and exclusively laid out or expended for the purpose of producing the gross income; (emphasis added) 42. Given the above, | am of the considered view that the Country Office Related Expenses are not eligible for deduction under Section 15(1)(a) of the PITA as the expenses are not expenses “wholly and exclusively incurred” in the production of the Appellant’s gross income within the meaning of Section 15(1)(a) of the PITA and should not be allowed under Section 18(1) of the PITA since the expenses not being money wholly and exclusively laid out or expended to produce the gross income. Page 17 of 22 43. Section 6 of the PITA states as follows: - “Ascertainment of gross income 6. Subject to this Act, the gross income of a chargeable person for the basis period for a year of assessment from his petroleum operations shall be the gross income for that period ascertained in accordance with the following provisions of this Chapter (that chargeable person and that period being referred to in those provisions as the relevant chargeable person and the relevant period respectively).” (emphasis added) 44. Under Section 2 of the PITA “Petroleum Operations” means: - “(a) searching for and winning or obtaining of petroleum in Malaysia by or on behalf of any person for his own account or on a joint account with any other person by any drilling, mining, extracting or other like operations or process, in the course of a business carried on by that person engaged in such operations, and all operations incidental thereto, and any sale or disposal by or on behalf of that person of petroleum so won or obtained, and includes the transportation within Malaysia by or on behalf of that person of petroleum so won or obtained to any point of sale or delivery or export....” 45. | am of the view that the Country Offices Related Expenses are not expenses wholly and exclusively incurred during the basic period in the production of the Appellant's gross income since those expenses are not related to upstream petroleum activities or petroleum operations. 46. Further, | find that the Appellant's claims on Country Offices Related Expenses involve the Appellant's expenses for offices abroad, namely in Hanoi and Sudan. Therefore, the said expenditure is not eligible to be allowed under Section 15(1) of the PITA. 47. Expenses related to overseas offices / offices abroad are not allowed under Section 15(1) of the PITA because the expenses claimed were not expenses wholly and exclusively incurred during the basic period in the production of Appellant’s gross income since those expenses not related to upstream petroleum activities. 48. Based on the audit finding, the Revenue found that the expenses claimed were not wholly and exclusively incurred during the basic period in the production of the Appellant’s gross income. Page 18 of 22 “S36.: Apakah asas pihak Responden tidak membenarkan perbelanjaan Country Offices Related Expenses yang menjadi isu dalam kes ini? J36.: Asas pihak Responden tidak membenarkan perbelanjaan Country Offices Related Expenses adalah perbelanjaan tersebut tidak kesemuanya dan semata-mata dilakukan dalam tempoh asas dalam menghasilkan pendapatan kasar dan ianya merupakan perbelanjaan yang tidak berkaitan dengan aktiviti huluan petroleum atau operasi petroleum. Tuntutan Perayu terhadap perbelanjaan Country Offices Related Expenses adalah melibatkan perbelanjaan Perayu untuk pejabat di luar negara iaitu di Hanoi dan Sudan. Oleh itu, perbelanjaan tersebut tidak layak dibenarkan di bawah Seksyen 15(1) AP(CP)....” (See: Pages 201 — 203, Rekod Rayuan Jilid 1) 49. Upon perusal of the evidence produced in Court, | find that the Appellant failed to submit supporting documents to show that the claims for Country Offices Related Expenses in production of the Appellant's gross income from upstream petroleum activities. 50. In answering question no.41 during the examination in chief, SP confirmed that the sole purpose of Country Offices Related Expenses was to promote and increase the visibility of the Appellant's brand in these countries with the aim to attract investors into Malaysia. (See: Pages 140 —- 141, Rekod Rayuan Jilid 1) 51. SP also testified that the Appellant is not allowed to enter any business transaction by setting up the home country office in Vietnam, Thailand, Beijing and Sudan but merely to look for opportunities with the international oil and gas players. (See: Pages 136-139, Rekod Rayuan Jilid 1) 52. Based on the breakdown of the Country Offices Related Expenses stated on pages 45 — 46 of the Exhibit PSP, it is clear that the listed expenses are not expenses that are wholly and exclusively incurred in the production of the Appellant’s gross income from the petroleum operation which brought to tax under PITA. (See: Pages 132 — 133, Rekod Rayuan Jilid 1) 53. SP agreed that the purpose of setting up home country offices in Thailand, Vietnam and Sudan is to obtain business opportunities. (See: Pages 174 —- 176, Rekod Rayuan Tambahan) Page 19 of 22 54. 55. 56. 57. Further, reference was made to the document on page 477 of Exhibit C1 and it was confirmed by SP that the Appellant did not submit any document to support its claim regarding country office related expenses. (See: Pages 174 — 176 Rekod Rayuan Tambahan) Given the above, | find that the Appellant has failed to provide evidence that the additional assessment is excessive or erroneous and discharge his burden of proof under Paragraph 11 Third Schedule of the PITA. Further, | find that the documents and information tendered by the Appellant during the hearing of this appeal do not support all its claims. Furthermore, for the issues of the country office related expenses, it does not show that the expenses are wholly and exclusively incurred in the production of the Appellant's gross income and were not related to upstream petroleum activities. The Appellant's negligence and failure to recognize income accurately and deliberately reporting income tax incorrectly has caused tax leakage and resulted in losses to the government. Conclusion 58. 59. 60. Premised on the aforesaid reasons, | am of the considered view that the SCIT had not committed any error of law nor facts in dismissing the Appellant's appeal. The Appellant had committed negligence when the Appellant claimed expenses which are not wholly and exclusively incurred in the basic period in production of the gross income of petroleum operation as a deduction under Section 15(1) of the PITA and other expenses that are not eligible to be claimed by the Appellant. The Revenue had successfully discharged the burden of proving the Appellant’s negligence and the exception under Section 39(3) of the PITA applies to the Revenue. Therefore, | view that the Notice of Additional Assessment for YA 2010 (PYB) dated 30.12.2015 issued by the Revenue is good in law. Page 20 of 22 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. The Appellant had failed to discharge their onus of proof to show that the assessments made by the Revenue in the present Appeal are excessive or erroneous as provided under paragraph 11, Third Schedule of the PITA. The Appellant is not entitled to claim a deduction for the Country Office Related Expenses under Section 15(1) of the PITA as the expenses were not expenses “wholly and exclusively incurred” in the production of the Appellant’s gross income. The Appellant is not entitled to claim a deduction for the Country Office Related Expenses under Section 15(1) of the PITA since the expenses claimed are not wholly and exclusively incurred in the production of gross income and not related to upstream petroleum activities. The Appellant’s claims for a deduction on the Country Office Related Expenses should not be allowed since the expenses are not being money wholly and exclusively laid out or expended to produce the gross income pursuant to Section 18(1) of the PITA. As such, | dismissed the Appellant's Appeal with no order as to costs. Dated: 30 June 2024 pmo. Ahmad Kamal bin Md. Shahid Judge High Court Kuala Lumpur Page 21 of 22 Counsel For the Appellant: En. S. Saravana Kumar (Cik Nur Amira bt Anmad Azhar with him) Tetuan Rosli Dahlan Saravana Partnership Peguambela dan Peguamcara Level 16, Menara 1 Dutamas, Solaris Dutamas, No. 1, Jalan Dutamas 1, 50480 Kuala Lumpur. (Ruj. Tuan — RDS/SKS/AAA/2020/0154) For the Respondent: Cik Noor Faezah bt Zainodin, Senior Revenue Counsel (Cik Munirah bt Abd. Wahid, Revenue Counsel with her) Ibu Pejabat Lembaga Hasil Dalam Negeri Malaysia, Jabatan Undang-Undang, Menara Hasil, Aras 11, Persiaran Rimba Permai, Cyber 8, 63000 Cyberjaya, Selangor Darul Ehsan. Page 22 of 22