Poly Ritz Development Sdn Bhd v 1. Pua Hwee Leong & Another. (WA-22NCvC-644-09/2019)

PUA HWEE LEONG & ANOTHER. (Identity Card No.: 681213105719)

TAN CHENG TUCK [ Identity Card No.: 660704105235] «'()(1'$17S GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT 2 A. Introduction 7KH3ODLQWLII¶V&ODLP

The Plaintiff claims that the Sale and Purchase Agreement entered with the Defendants dated 13-2-2018 is a sham. Instead, the Plaintiff alleged it had undertaken an illegal money lending transaction with the said Defendants.

The Plaintiff further claims that at the material time, it was facing financial difficulties and had to undertake the said illegal money lending transaction with the Defendants.

The said transaction was undertaken by way of an introducer ZLWKWKHQDPH³%U\DQ/HH/XQ7HRQJ´ZKRZDVWKHDOOHJHGUXQQHU for a group of money lenders.

The Plaintiff further alleges that the stated loan sum was RM 1, 750,000.00 but it only received the sum of RM 750,000.00 from the Defendants. The remaining sum of RM 1,000,000.00 was 3 deducted from the said amount of RM 1, 750,000.00 being interest, late payment charges, legal fees payable and other deductions.

The Plaintiff further alleges that it had paid to the Defendants the sum of RM 1, 350,000.00.

The said Sale and Purchase Agreement dated 13-2-2018 was allegedly a sham or as a cover for the illegal money transaction.

As such, the Plaintiff alleges that the said transaction is contrary to the Moneylenders Act 1951 and is therefore illegal. The said illegality will therefore extend to the said Sale and Purchase Agreement. 7KH'HIHQGDQWV¶'HIHQFH

The Defendants deny the above allegation. Instead, the Defendants claim that the said Sale and Purchase Agreement is a valid agreement.

Instead, the Defendants allege that the Sale and Purchase Agreement is valid on the following grounds: - 4

The Plaintiff had appointed their own set of solicitors in the name of Messrs Ngah Arifah & Chai and the Defendant was represented by Messrs Lim Sumami & Partners to handle the Sale and Purchase Agreement.

(ii) There was a valid Director Resolution dated 13-2-2018 agreeing to sell the property for RM 1,000,000.00.

(iii) The Defendants had issued payments as seen in paragraph 6(d) of the Defence to the Plaintiff for the purchase of the property for a total sum of RM 1,000,000.00.

The Defendants further allege that under the said Sale and Purchase Agreement, in particular clause 13 of the same, the Plaintiff is entitled to purchase back the property within 6 months of the said Agreement.

The Defendants further state that parties had agreed for the Plaintiff to repurchase the property for the price of RM 1, 350,000.00. However, the Defendants allege that the Plaintiff failed to pay the said sums in full to the Defendants.

The Defendants also rely on clause 5 of the Sale and Purchase Agreement which states that vacant possession is 5 immediately given to the Plaintiff upon the signing of the said agreement.

The Defendants also rely on the emails dated 11-4-2018, 19- 4-2018, 21-8-2019 between solicitors for the parties and the letter dated 22-3-2019 between the Plaintiff and Messrs LC Ng & Associates.

The above allegations were denied by the Plaintiff in their Reply to the Defence dated 24-10-2019.

The following witnesses gave evidence at the trial held on 13- 9-2021 and 14-9-2021: -

3ODLQWLII¶VVWZLWQHVV± Chan Teck Chong SP1

Plaintiff 2nd witness ± Wong Siew Woon SP2

'HIHQGDQWV¶ZLWQHVV- Pua Hwee Leong (1st Defendant) SD1 6 C. Applicable Law in Determining Whether the Agreement is a Sham

To ascertain who is telling the truth, I am guided by the decision of Lee Swee Seng JCA in Global Globe Property (Melawati) Sdn Bhd v Jangka Prestasi Sdn Bhd [2020] 6 CLJ 1. In that case, the Court of Appeal was also dealing with a similar case where the Plaintiff alleged that the transaction at hand was not a genuine sale and purchase agreement.

The Court of Appeal stated that in such cases, the Court of First Instance should ³FRPEWKHHYLGHQFHFDUHIXOO\WRVHHLIWKHUHDUH gaps that could not be explained away in the sale and purchase WUDQVDFWLRQ´ DQG ZKHWKHU WKHUH H[LVW ³XQXVXDO IHDWXUHV WKDW ZLll militate against the existence of a genuine sale and purchase DJUHHPHQW´.

His Lordship further stated: - ³>@,QWKH+RXVHRI/RUGVFDVHRI$*6HFXULWLHVY9DXJKDQ 2UV > @$&%LQJKDP/-H[SODLQHGD³VKDPDJUHHPHQW´DVIROORZV 7 A written agreement is a sham where it incorporates clauses by which neither party intends to be bound and which is obviously a smoke screen to cover the real intentions of both contracting parties: Hadjiloucas v. Crean [1987] 3 All ER 1008, 1014, per Purchas LJ. The accepted definition of a sham is that given by Diplock LJ in Snook v. London and West Riding Investments Ltd [1967] 2 QB 786, 802: As regards the contention of the plaintiff that the transactions between himself, Auto Finance and the defendants ZHUHDµVKDP¶LWLV,WKLQNQHFHVVDU\WR consider what, if any, legal concept is involved in the use of this popular and pejorative word. I apprehend that, if it has any meaning in law, it PHDQVDFWVGRQHRUGRFXPHQWVH[HFXWHGE\WKHSDUWLHVWRWKHµVKDP¶ which are intended by them to give to third parties or to the court the appearance of creating between the parties legal rights and obligations different from the actual legal rights and obligations (if any) which the parties intend to create. But one thing, I think, is clear in legal principle, morality and the authorities (see Yorkshire Railway Wagon Co v. Maclure (1882) 21 Ch D 309, CA and Stoneleigh Finance Ltd v. Phillips [1965] 2 QB 537), WKDWIRUDFWVRUGRFXPHQWVWREHDµVKDP¶, with whatever legal consequences follow from this, all the parties thereto must have a common intention that the acts or documents are not to create the legal rights and obligations which they give the appearance of creating. [102] Put simply, a sham exists where the parties say one thing intending another (see Donald v. Baldwyn [1953] NZLR 313, at p. 321, per FB Adams J). [103] In a world of genuine imitation, it is often not easy to discern a sham from what 8 it really is in substance for those bent on perfecting the art of deception would try their level best to leave behind no trace. « [105] Precisely because a sham agreement can very easily be abused with the controlling party slipping into its dark side, the Court of Appeal in Hitch And Others v. Stone (Inspector of Taxes) (2001) STC 214 referred to the Snook v. London And West Riding Investments Ltd [1967] 2 QB 786 and laid down the applicable test to sniff and smoke out a sham document as follows: [64] An inquiry as to whether an act or document is a sham requires careful analysis of the facts and the following points emerge from the authorities. [65] First, in the case of a document, the court is not restricted to examining the four comers of the document. It may examine external evidence. This will include the pDUWLHV¶H[SODQDWLRQVDQG circumstantial evidence such as evidence of the subsequent conduct of the parties. [66] Second, as the passage from Snook makes clear, the test of intention is subjective. The parties must have intended to create different rights and obligations from those appearing from (say) the 9 relevant document, and in addition they must have intended to give a false impression of those rights and obligations to third parties. [67] Third, the fact that the act or document is uncommercial, or even artificial, does not mean that it is a sham. A distinction is to be drawn between the situation where parties make an agreement which is unfavourable to one of them, or artificial, and a situation where they intend some other arrangement to bind them. In the former situation, they intend the agreement to take effect according to its tenor. In the latter situation, the agreement is not to bind their relationship. [68] Fourth, the fact that parties subsequently depart from an agreement does not necessarily mean that they never intended the agreement to be effective and binding. The proper conclusion to draw may be that they agreed to vary their agreement and that they have become bound by the agreement as varied (see for example Garnac Grain Co Inc v. HMF Faure & Fairclough Ltd [1966] 1 QB 650 at 683-684 per Diplock LJ, which was cited by Mr Price). [69] Fifth, the intention must be a common intention (see Snook) ... . (emphasis added) [106] The above test was followed by our Court of Appeal in Dr Mansur Hussain & Ors v. Barisan Tenaga Perancang (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors [2019] 1 LNS 661; [2019] MLJU 1552 where Abang Iskandar JCA (now CJSS) observed as follows: 10 [46] It had been observed that the policy considerations that underpin the concept of sham are the protection of the rule of law, to prevent abuse of fundamental legal principles and the prevention of evasion of statutes, among others. It was also commented that the Snook case (supra) had narrowed down the test for sham. See the relatively recent case of Autoclenz Ltd v. Belcher [2011] UKSC 41, a landmark case in the UK on labour law and contract law; and the related article by Toby Graham, appearing in Trusts and Trustees, volume 22, Issue 8, October

Indeed, on the authority of the case of Sri Kelangkota-Rakan Engineering JV Sdn Bhd v. Arab Malaysian Prima Realty Sdn Bhd [2001] 1 MLJ 324, the courts are entitled to go behind the impugned agreement or transaction to ascertain the true nature of such agreement or transaction. In the case of Lori Malaysia Bhd v. Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd [1999] 2 CLJ 997, it was there observed by our apex court that in other Common Law countries, courts were slow to declare commercial contracts as void on ground of illegality, but having said that if the circumstances so warrant, the courts would not shy away, from doing what would be in accord with what the law expects to be done, as a keeper of the public conscience. The fact that the apex court had done that could be seen in the recent case of Merong Mahawangsa Sdn %KG $QRUY'DWR¶6hazryl Eskay bin Abdullah [2015] 5 MLJ 619 FC, DPRQJRWKHUV HPSKDVLVDGGHG ´ 11

I also refer to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Mahmoohd Ooyub v Li Chee Loong [2020] 1 LNS 660.

My understanding of the legal proposition laid down in the above cases are as follows: -

As a general rule, a Court of law should uphold the sanctity of agreements and should not rewrite the terms that have been agreed to and contained in the written instrument.

(ii) However, there are exceptions to the above general rule. One of the applicable exceptions concerns the situation where the agreement is shown to be a sham.

(iii) To determine whether the agreement is a sham, a Court of law should ascertain whether parties intended not to be bound by the written instrument.

(iv) To ascertain this subjective intent, this Court is not limited to the terms appearing in the said agreement but is entitled to take into account SDUWLHV¶ H[SODQDWLRQV DQG FLUFXPVWDQWLDO evidence such as evidence of the subsequent conduct of the parties. 12

The answer to the question of whether the agreement is a sham will depend on the facts of each case as found by the trial Judge.

(vi) Simply put, no case is alike but various factors may assist the Court in its task which includes, among others: - - Whether parties were represented by their own choice of solicitors - Did the pre-contractual relationship indicate there was an intention to enter into a genuine Sale and Purchase Agreement - Did the agreement contain what would normally be expected in a similar instrument - Did parties comply with the terms of the agreement - If they failed to comply with the terms, whether they had any reasonable explanation for such failure - If the terms of the contract do not appear to be commercially real or are suspicious, whether there is any explanation provided to explain the same - Parties conduct after the agreement was executed 13 D. Is the Agreement a Sham? Factors at play in this case.

:KHQ,SHUXVHWKH3ODLQWLII¶VVWDWHPHQWRIFODLP, the evidence and arguments presented during the trial and its written submission, I find that that the Plaintiff relies on the following factors to support its contention that the Sale and Purchase Agreements is a sham: -

That it was not presented by solicitors at the time of the execution of the Sale and Purchase Agreement.

Pre-Contract conduct

No booking fee, deposit or any form of negotiation was undertaken before the execution of the Sale and Purchase Agreement.

(ii) The transaction was undertaken at the introduction of the one Bryan.

(iii) Part of the purchase price of RM 1,000,000.00 was paid by the Defendants even before the Sale and Purchase Agreement was executed. The Defendants had directed the Plaintiff to pay the sum of RM 250,000.00 to one Bryan who had introduced the Plaintiff to the Defendants. 14

(iv) No securitization of rights by the Defendants.

The Defendants did not inspect the property before purchase.

(vi) The property was not advertised for sale.

Post-Contract Conduct

The Defendants did not comply with the material terms of the Sale and Purchase Agreement.

(ii) The Defendants did not take physical possession and did not have access to the property after full payment was made.

(iii) The Plaintiff agreed to purchase back the property for RM 1, 350,000.00.

(iv) The Plaintiff had paid the Defendants the sum of RM 1, 300,000 for the principal sum and interest.

The actual value of the property was about RM 3,000,000.00 and the said transaction was undertaken at a substantial undervalue.

The Defendants denies the above, relies on the above and provide their version of the events. 15

I caution myself that this Court should generally uphold the entity of any agreement entered by parties. Otherwise, a party who has entered a disadvantaged or commercially unviable agreement will easily wiggle their way out of a valid agreement. I refer to the decision of our apex court in Lori Malaysia Bhd v Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd [1999] 2 CLJ 997.

At the same time, as stated by Justice Lee Swee Seng in the above Court of Appeal cases, this Court must ensure that any agreement that is intended to mislead the authorities and are contrary to law, should be dealt with adequately. It is trite that sham agreements that are intended to be utilized as a smokescreen for illegal or unlawful agreements would not be enforced under law. Refer to Yok Wai Hon v Tang Cheng Huat [2017] MLJU 1171 and Ngai Fong Lan (P) & anor v Li Chee Leong [2018] MLJU 1518.

I am further reminded that this Court should consider the totality of the evidence before me to see whether there is a clear dissonance between the conduct of the parties and the terms of the agreement at issue. The factors identified earlier, and the 16 explanation given by the Defendants, will be considered by me holistically.

Whether the Plaintiff was represented by a firm of solicitors at the time of the execution of the Sale and

The first issue I should consider is whether they were not represented during the negotiations of the terms of the Sale and Purchase Agreement with the Defendants. The Plaintiff alleges that the said agreement and the resolutions executed by them 13- 2-2018 to authorize the said instrument were prepared solely by Messrs Lim Sumarni & Partners. This can be seen in the evidence SUHVHQWHGE\WKH3ODLQWLII¶V)LUVW:LWQHVV&KDQ7HFN&KRRQJ

However, this contention is contrary to the documents tendered in Court. The Sale and Purchase Agreement indicates that Messrs Ngan Arifah & Chai was the solicitor representing the Plaintiff. This also appears in the letter dated 10-2-2018 issued by the said firm on behalf of the Plaintiff. There are no contemporaneous written documents tendered by the Plaintiff to 17 show that it had protested or at least state that it was not represented at the time the said instruments were prepared.

At the very least, the Plaintiff should have produced any letter issued by it confirming that the said resolution and Sale and Purchase Agreement was prepared solely by Messrs Lim Sumarni & Partners without any involvement from Messrs Ngan Arifah & Chai. The Plaintiff did not provide any reasonable explanation why such documents did not exist or could not be produced and why the said firm name appears in the said Sale and Purchase Agreement as solicitors for the Plaintiff.

I also note that the Plaintiff chose not to produce any evidence or any witness from Messrs Ngan Arifah & Chai to show that the said firm was not involved in the said transaction. If the said firm did not act for them, evidence could have been obtained from the solicitors or any person from the said firm to confirm this fact. The Plaintiff did not provide any reason why such evidence was not produced. 18

Thus, I believe section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 will be applicable in the circumstances of this case and such evidence if procured would have been adverse against the Plaintiff. The burden of proof to show that they were not represented by the said firm lies with the Plaintiff as seen in section 101 of the Evidence of Act.

Therefore, considering the letters issued by the said firm on behalf of the Plaintiff dated 10-2-2018, the content of the Sale and Purchase Agreement and the failure of the Plaintiff to produce any witness from the firm of Messrs Ngan Arifah and Chai, I am of the opinion that the evidence shows, on the balance of probabilities, that the Plaintiff was represented by Messrs Ngan Arifah during the transaction. LL 3DUWLHV¶3UH-Contractual conduct The Sale and Purchase Agreement was procured through one Brian (Lee Lun Teong)

I accept the Defendants arguments that generally, pre-contractual negotiations should not be utilized by the Court in ascertaining the meaning of the terms of an agreement. 19

However, there are exceptions to this general rule. As shown by the Court of Appeal in the above-cited case, one of the factors that should be considered in determining whether the agreement is a valid and binding document or is merely a sham, this Court should consider parties pre-contractual conduct. The events before the Contract may not color the terms contrary to those appearing in the contract itself, but these pre-contract events will assist the Court in determining whether the agreement is genuine or otherwise. This also extends to post-contractual conduct of parties.

I am satisfied that the Plaintiff has shown to this Court on the balance of probabilities that the following events transpired before the Sale and Purchase Agreement was executed between parties:

That the Plaintiff was in financial difficulties some time in late January or early February 2018 and it needed financial assistance near or at the time of Chinese New Year.

7KHFRPSDQ\WKHQDSSURDFKHGRQH/HH/XQ7HRQJ ³%U\DQ´ WR obtain assistance to resolve this financial issue. 20

Bryan then introduced the Plaintiff to the Defendants which then lead to the execution of the Sale and Purchase Agreement and the payment of the sum of RM 1,000,000.00 to the Plaintiff from the Defendants.

The issue of contention is whether Bryan had introduced the Plaintiff to the Defendants for a sale of the aforesaid property as alleged by the Defendants or for a loan which was secured by the Sale and Purchase Agreement as alleged by the Defendant.

The existence of Bryan and his involvement in the whole transaction was not denied by either party. This can be seen from the evidence tendered by the litigants which are reproduced below:-

The Evidence of Chan Teck Chong Q19: Could you elaborate on the circumstances involving the loan of RM1,500,000.00? Sometime early 2018, the Plaintiff was faced with financial constraints as the some of the other housing projects that we were supposed to launch could not take off due to the change in governmental requirements, delays and other factors. However, the initial 21 development plans have already started and due to the abovementioned unforeseen circumstances, our cash flow was badly affected. The Plaintiff was desperate to obtain funds to ensure that business continues, our development obligations are met and that the livelihood of the 3ODLQWLII¶V employees of not less than 300 people was not jeopardized. We could not secure loans from licensed financial institutions then. The Plaintiff was left with no other option but to seek for short term loans from the unlicensed money lenders in the market. The Plaintiff was then introduced to one Bryan Lee Lun Teong (Bryan) who is a 'runner' or 'arranger' who had networking with people and/or companies who were willing to loan monies. We did not known Bryan earlier. A copy of his identity card is found at page 64 CBD. Q20: What happened then? Bryan arranged for a loan of RM1,500,000.00 for us. We did not really know who were the actual funders. This is how syndicates or unlicensed money lenders usually work. As a form of collateral, the Plaintiff was required to pledge one of the bungalow units at the Residence 33 Project to the persons nominated by the funders. 22 In view of the circumstances, the Plaintiff agreed to collateralise one our completed bungalow units i.e Unit B - 4 at Residence 33 Project.

Cross-Examination of the Phua Hwee Leong (SD1) *' 3ODLQWLII¶VFRXQVHO 0DFDPPDQDNDPXGDSDWWDKXWHQWDQJUXPDK ini? Melalui itu Bryan. Siapa? SD1: Itu Mr.. Bryan. Bryan? SD1: Bryan Lee Lun Teong. 2N%U\DQ/HH/XQ7HRQJ2.%ROHKNDPX«'LDLQWURGXFHLQLUXPDK kepada kamu? SD1: Ya. Dia melalui satu Mr Raymond. Payment of the Purchase Price before the Sale and Purchase Agreement was executed and no securitization of rights

I also find that the Plaintiff had successfully proven that a substantial part of the purchase price was paid by the Defendants before entering into the said Sale and Purchase Agreement was executed. 23

Half of the purchase price was paid via 7 cheques issued by the Defendants on 12-2-2018 for the total sum of RM 500,000.00. The remaining RM 500,000.00 was issued by 3 cheques dated 13- 2-2018. There was an urgency on the part of the Plaintiff which was reciprocated by the Defendants.

The only explanation given by the Defendants was that the Plaintiff had informed them that the company was financially distressed, and it need money. Therefore, as the price of the property was attractive and that they wanted to buy it, they decided to pursue it and paid the said sums quickly to the Plaintiff. In other words, the said transaction was undertaken hurriedly by both parties. One could see this from the excerpts of the notes of evidence: - Cross-Examination of the Phua Hwee Leong (SD1) GD: Ok. Now, sebelum kamu sign itu SPA. Kamu tak ada sign apa-apa booking form kan? SD1: Itu SPA. Kita sign SPA. Just sign SPA. Tapi lain yang kita tak pasti sebab kita ada lawyer. 24 Yalah. Kamu tak sign apa-apa booking form kan? SD1: Booking form I rasa tak ada. GD: Tak bayar apa-apa deposit bukan? SD1: Masa itu, masa sempit. Dia cakap dia nak pakai wang so kita pun tak ada bayar apa-apa. Kita Cuma beri ini untuk (inaudible). So maksudnya, kamu tahu bahawa Plaintif, Poly Ritz dia mau pakai wang sebab itu dia tanya itu wang cepat kan? SD1: Ya masa itu dia cakap dia mau jual ini rumah. Ok untuk kamu, dia kata dia mau jual itu rumah lah? SD1: So kita beli. Tapi dia nak dapat itu wang cepatlah? SD1: ,WX´

Although this explanation seems plausible, this Court finds it strange that half of the purchase price was paid or issued before the Sale and Purchase Agreement was executed and before any form of security was provided by the Plaintiff. The said cheques were also issued even before the resolution dated 13-2-2018 authorizing the sale and purchase agreement was executed by the Plaintiff. The 25 lack of any form of securitization continued even after the said Sale and Purchase Agreement was executed and even to this day.

This is not what would be expected in a typical sale and purchase agreement. A reasonable purchaser of a property will usually only pay a small deposit of the agreed sale price and subsequently decide to pay the full purchase price upon the execution, stamping of the said agreement and securitization of their rights.

I also note that the Defendants did try to explain that this was due to their alleged reliance on their solicitors and their trust that their rights will be amply protected. However, I do not find that the said explanation is believable especially when considering that there is no evidence that the Plaintiff and the Defendants had any pre-existing relationship and the sums of monies that were involved. The Defendants also did not provide any evidence that they had either enquired from their solicitors as to the status of the land title and whether any form of securitization was obtained or filed over the said land. It was as if the Defendants were not interested in their right to the property itself. 26

This situation becomes further puzzling when one considers that the registered proprietor of the property was not even the Plaintiff. The registered proprietor at the material time was one Dato Wan Ab Ghani bin Wan Yusuf. The Plaintiff was only the developer. This can be seen in the terms of the Sale and Purchase Agreement.

A reasonable and genuine purchaser of any property, having paid the full purchase price of RM 1,000,000 in full would have expected at least a caveat will be entered on the land. No such attempt to securitize any right was undertaken and I find that no reasonable explanation was forthcoming from the Defendants to explain why this was not done.

I also note that the property was not advertised for sale as what would be normally expected in a property development. Although, this may not be unusual in certain circumstances, especially when dealing with a private sale. However, WKH3ODLQWLII¶V contention is correct that this fact must be considered by this Court especially when the said sale was undertaken through the introduction of the aforesaid Bryan Lee. 27 No Evidence of Negotiation of Rights, no deposit paid, no evidence of receipt of payments

I also note that during the whole transaction, there was no form of negotiation as to the terms of the agreement between parties, no form of deposit or receipts for payment issued by the Plaintiff. There is also no exchange of draft of agreements between the Plaintiff¶V VROLFLWRUV DQG WKH 'HIHQGDQWV¶ VROLFLWRUV Thus, indicating that the transaction was rushed and both parties understood that this had to be undertaken quickly.

The Plaintiff relies on these peculiarities to support its case WKDW WKH WUDQVDFWLRQ ZDV PHUHO\ D VKDP 7KH 3ODLQWLII¶V ZLWQHVV states: - 3ODLQWLII¶VZLWQHVV The Evidence of Chan Teck Chong Q25: When was the loan released to the Plaintiff? 28 Several cheques were given to us dated 12.02.20218 and 13.02.2018. In total, we only received RM1,000,000.00 out of which we had to repay RM250,000.00 to Bryan as directed by the funders towards legal and miscellaneous charges. Another RM500,000.00 was pre-deducted towards advance interests and late payment interests. Therefore, the net amount received by the Plaintiff from the loan was only RM 750,000.00 Q26: Please turn to pages 53 to 57 CBD. Could you explain these documents? Pages 54-57 are 10 cheques issued in favour of the plaintiff by the Defendants and / or persons related to them dated 12.02.2018 and 13.02.2018 respectively for various amounts totaling RM1,000,000.00. The document at page 53 is the deposit slip for the Public Bank cheque no: 615991 found at page 54 CBD. ,DOVRQRWHWKDWWKHHYLGHQFHRIWKH3ODLQWLII¶VZLWQHVVDERYHZDV QRW FDUHIXOO\ RU YLJRURXVO\ FKDOOHQJHG E\ WKH 'HIHQGDQW¶V counsel. Instead, the learned counsel for the Defendants had chosen to ask general put questions that did not test the veracity of the witness.

7KHVH SHFXOLDULWLHV ZHUH QRW H[SODLQHG E\ WKH 'HIHQGDQWV¶ ZLWQHVVGXULQJH[DPLQDWLRQLQFKLHI7KH'HIHQGDQWV¶H[SODQDWLRQ 29 only came out during the cross-examination of the 1st Defendant, parts of which are reproduced below: - Cross-Examination of Pua Hwee Leong .DPXDGD«6D\DUXMXNNDQNHSDGD,NDWDQ\DQJVDPD,NDWDQ'RNXPHQ