Pook Jyh Long v Ta Jin Kiat (WA-24NCC-16-01/2026)

These two matters were heard together:

The Plaintiff's ("P") originating summons dated 8.1.2026 under Enclosure 1 ("OS"). Where P seeks an order to secure the statutory books and records of the companies of which he is the company secretary; and

P's notice of application dated 24.2.2026 under Enclosure 18 ("committal leave application"). Where P seeks leave to apply for committal against the Defendants and three other individuals who are said to be employees of Waz Lian Enterprise Sdn Bhd.

On 13.1.2026, I granted an ad interim order in the following terms pending the disposal of the OS ("ad interim order"): "1) An injunction is granted to restrain the Defendants or their employees, servants, agents, nominees and / or otherwise howsoever from stopping or blocking or otherwise howsoever interfering with the Plaintiff's access to the statutory books and records as well as exercise of his statutory and other duties as the company secretary of the companies listed out in Schedule A hereto; 2) The Plaintiff is permitted to obtain access to the statutory books and records of the companies listed out in Schedule A hereto in such manner as he shall deem fit and proper at the registered office;”

At the inter partes hearing on 7.5.2026, I dismissed both the OS and the committal leave application. Here are my reasons. Background facts

The $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ and $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ Defendants ("D1" and "D2" respectively), along with the $ 3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendant ("D3"), are directors of Waz Lian Enterprise Sdn Bhd ("WLE"). WLE provides company management services such as company secretarial management services to its clients.

P was employed by WLE from 6.5.1998 to 31.12.2025. His employment was later terminated for serious misconduct. During his employment, he was appointed as company secretary to WLE's client companies. The demise of Tan Sri Ta and family dispute

On 15.6.2024, one Tan Sri Ta passed away. Thereafter, a family dispute ensued. The family dispute was between two factions of the Ta family. Namely:- (a) the children of Tan Sri Ta's first wife ("first family") which includes D1 and D2; and (b) the children of Tan Sri Ta's second wife ("second family"). It is opportune to note at this juncture that P is the nephew of the matriarch of the second family.

After the passing of Tan Sri Ta, the two factions of the Ta family fought over control of the 16 companies owned by the Ta family which operates slot machines business and management companies that operate recreational clubs (collectively "family company"). There is an action brought by D1 against the second family for a return of the shares in the family company under Kuala Lumpur High Court Suit No. : WA-22 NCC-111-02/2026. Events leading up to filing of the originating summons herein

The Defendants' version of events is this. On 28.11.2025, WLE's entire administrative department and 7 out of 16 staff in WLE's accounts departments resigned. In a collective and organised fashion, their resignation emails were all sent at 4:38 p.m. with templated messages. On that very day and prior to their resignation, at 7:04 a.m., the accounts department personnel arrived at WLE's office and removed company laptops, desktop and accounting documentation. Also, on the same day, WLE's ex-accounting and ex-administrative personnel were all offered employment at the family company now controlled by the second family.

On 15.12.2025, D1 and D2 handed over a redesignation letter to P at his office. P was redesignated from head of the company secretarial department in WLE to corporate planning advisor. The staff of the company secretarial department were informed to return home. This was followed by an official memorandum sent by way of email. Nevertheless, P and the staff of the company secretarial department refused to leave.

Following that, P did leave. But the staff of the company secretarial department, who reports to P, remained in WLE's premises and locked themselves in the company secretarial department. Emitting from the company secretarial department was shredding sounds heard by WLE's staff. D2 was informed of the same and immediately requested that the door to the company secretarial department be unlocked. After the door was opened, it was discovered that the shredder in the company secretarial department was filled to the brim. P had instructed the staff of the company secretarial department to stay. Arising from the above, on 30.12.2025, P's employment with WLE was terminated for serious misconduct. The applicable law

P prayed for the following reliefs through the OS: "2) order restraining the Defendants or their employees, servants, agents nominees and / or otherwise howsoever from stopping or blocking or otherwise howsoever interfering with the Plaintiff's access to the statutory books and records as well as exercise of his statutory and other duties as the company secretary of the companies listed out in Schedule A hereto; 3) the Plaintiff shall secure the statutory books and records of the companies listed out in Schedule A hereto in such manner as he shall deem fit and proper at the registered office or in such manner as may be directed by Court; 4) alternative to paragraph 3 above, the Defendants shall, within 24 hours (or such other period as the Court may direct) of an order being made herein deliver up to the Plaintiff or allow the Plaintiff to collect the statutory books and records of the companies listed out in Schedule A hereto;”

The prayers sought in the OS are in essence final, mandatory and perpetual injunction. The prayers sought would, in effect, compel the Defendants to actively allow P access to WLE's premises to obtain relevant statutory books and records belonging to WLE's clients, as opposed to merely refraining from acting.

The court's discretionary powers in granting preventive and mandatory injunctions are provided in sections 50 to 54 of the Specific Relief Act 1950. Sections 50 and 53 of the Specific Relief Act 1950 read: "50) Preventive relief how granted Preventive relief is granted at the discretion of the court by injunction, temporary or perpetual. 53) Mandatory injunctions When, to prevent the breach of an obligation, it is necessary to compel the performance of certain acts which the court is capable of enforcing, the court may in its direction grant an injunction to prevent the breach complained of, and also to compel performance of the requisite acts."

An injunction ought to be refused, pursuant to section 54 (j) of the Specific Relief Act 1950, "when the conduct of the applicant or his agents has been such as to disentitle him to the assistance of the court". Illustration (a) of section 54 of the Specific Relief Act 1950 provides - "A seeks an injunction to restrain his partner, B, from receiving the partnership - debt and effects. It appears that A had improperly possessed himself of the books of the firm and refused B access to them. The court will refuse the injunction." Section 54 (j) of the Specific Relief Act 1950 embodies the principle that 'he who comes to equity must come with clean hands'.

In CBM Construction Sdn Bhd v Builtcon and Development Sdn Bhd & Anor [1999] CLJU 2, the High Court held : "Injunction being an equitable relief, the Plaintiff must come to court with clean hands: they did not do so ... This reason alone was sufficient for me to set aside the injunction ..."

In Tahan Steel Corp Sdn Bhd v Bank Islam Malaysia Bhd [2004] 6 MLJ 1 at 35, the High Court said : "[103] Now, since injunctions are a discretionary remedy, the plaintiff must come to this court with clean hands for he who comes to equity must come with clean hands. ... [104] Here, there is more than an impending breach. Here, there is a pre existing breach on the part of the plaintiff and for that reason this court will not come to the aid of the plaintiff."

In Golden Plus Holdings Bhd v Teo Sung Ngiap [2019] MLJU 1850, the High Court held : [67] As mentioned above, injunctions are equitable reliefs which the grant of one is contingent on the applicant persuading the court to exercise its discretion. One important consideration is the need to be forthright in seeking for one. Any conduct which falls short of coming clean before the court entitles the opposing party to capitalize on such behavior and disentitles the applicant of relief. In the current case, the Plaintiff has failed to convince this Court of its entitlement to such a relief."

In deciding whether to grant an injunction, the Federal Court in TR Hamzah & Yeang Sdn Bhd v Lazar Sdn Bhd [1985] 2 MLJ 45 at 55 offered the following guidance : "The grant of a mandatory injunction is entirely discretionary. Every case must depend essentially upon its own particular circumstances. It is a jurisdiction to be exercised sparingly and with caution but in a proper case unhesitatingly. When the court decides to grant such an injunction then the court must see to it that that person against whom it is granted knows exactly what he has to do."

It is my finding that the OS is an abuse of the process of the court. On the face of it, P sought access to the statutory books and records ("statutory records") for companies which he is the company secretary ("subject companies"). But although P is aware that WLE has possession and custody of the statutory records, he has wrongly filed the OS against three (and not all) of WLE's directors. I agree with the Defendants that the OS has an ulterior or collateral purpose. It is a litigious vehicle employed by P to oppress the Defendants in light of the ongoing dispute between the two factions of the Ta family.

I dismissed the OS for the following reasons. First, P sued the wrong party. The statutory records are, and have always been, with WLE where the registered office of the subject companies are at.

Second, the OS is futile and incapable of enforcement. The ultimate prayer for P to secure the statutory records at the registered office or alternatively for the Defendants to deliver up the statutory records to P, cannot in law be enforced against the Defendants in their personal capacities. Further, barring any express agreement from the subject companies, the statutory records cannot in law be removed from the registered office.

Third, P committed an abuse of the process of the court. On 19.1.2026, P executed the ad interim order at WLE's office. WLE, despite not being a party to these proceedings, allowed P to install a lock at the company secretarial department pending settlement discussion. After the lock was installed, P refused any settlement discussions, resulting in WLE's company secretarial department being locked. WLE repeatedly invited P to make copies of the statutory records. P ignored all such requests.

On 10.2.2026, P appeared at WLE's office with less than one day notice. WLE was prepared to accommodate P and asked him to specify the documents he needed and a brief description of what he intends to do at WLE, so that logistical arrangements can be made. P failed to reply but turned up on 10.2.2026, demanding to be granted access within two minutes failing which he will leave. P made a recording of WLE's staff purportedly refusing to allow him access to the company secretarial department. It appears that P has little interest in obtaining access to the statutory records. Instead, the OS was used as a tactical tool to disrupt the Defendants' or WLE's operations.

Fourth, P's conduct disentitles him from the court's assistance. His actions, prior and after the filing of the OS, are tainted with a lack of good faith.

Fifth, P failed to provide full and frank disclosure. During the ex parte hearing for the ad interim order, P failed to disclose material facts and highlight potential arguments from the Defendants. P portrayed D1 and D2 as power - hungry individuals who want to take control of the family company after their father's passing. P's narrative suggested that he was a victim, whose employment was terminated merely for D1 and D2 to illegally seize the statutory records. However, P failed to highlight the following:

there was a family dispute to which he had taken side in;

as the company secretary, P lodged the share transfer forms of 11 companies in favour of the second family. The share transfer was lodged despite D1's written instruction to not lodge the transfer of shares, as D1 claims that he was forced to sign the share transfer forms under duress and misrepresentation;

the heist from WLE's accounts department where seven staff from the accounts department resigned on the same day and was caught on CCTV removing company laptop, desktop and documentation from WLE. On the same day, the entire administrative department of WLE resigned. All these personnel were offered a position at the family company controlled by the second family. This would explain WLE's need to heighten security; and

P was terminated for destruction or unauthorised handling of company documents.

Here is my explanation. The Plaintiff sued the wrong party

The OS ought to be dismissed in limine because P has sued the wrong party. The essence of the OS is for P to "secure the statutory books and records of the companies" at "the registered office", and for the statutory records to be delivered up or collected by P. In other words, P sought for possession and custody of the statutory records.

The statutory records are kept and maintained at the "registered address", that is "No.99, Jalan Pudu Lama, Kuala Lumpur, 50200, Wilayah Persekutuan" ("said address"). The said address is the registered and business address of WLE. The statutory records are kept with WLE because:- (a) the subject companies are clients of WLE; and (b) the registered address of the subject companies is at the said address. (See section 47 of the Companies Act 2016).

P denies that the subject companies are clients of WLE on the grounds that "no management agreement ... has been produced". P's denial is illogical. If the subject companies are not clients of WLE for the purpose of management services, it begs the question - why would the subject companies assign their respective registered addresses and store the statutory records at WLE's premises.

The Defendants are directors of WLE. As directors of the company, they do not own WLE's property. Nor do they have custody or possession of the statutory records retained in WLE's office. The custody and possession of the statutory records lie with WLE. This is in line with the doctrine of separate legal personality. (See Aron Salomon v A. Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22). A plethora of authorities supports the proposition that directors of a company ought not to be held liable for the company's wrongdoings or properties.

In Lee Eng Eow (as director of Lee Guat Cheow & Co Sdn Bhd) v Mary Lee (as executrix of the estate of Low Ai Lian) & Ors [1993] 3 MLJ 481, the defendant was sued in his capacity as a director of the company. The Court of Appeal held: "One of the first things a law student learns is that a limited company has a separate legal personality of its own. It can only sue or be sued in its own name. And here we have a case of a company being sued, not in the name of the company, but in the name of one of its directors by people who are not even members of the company. ... We frown upon the conduct of the counsel who had appeared for the respondents (plaintiffs) in the court below for insisting on pursuing with his clients' action (which was misconceived ab initio) and for still supporting it even when it was before us in the Court of Appeal as if the law does not matter. Nevertheless, the whole scheme of the Act is predicated upon the company's separate existence: see Walter Woon at p 25; and the well known cases of Aron Salomon (Pauper) v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 (HL) and Lee v Lee's Air Farming Ltd [1961] AC 12 (PC). This is elementary law. Yet, we have here a practising lawyer who is unaware of what is trite who has the audacity to appear before us in the Court of Appeal. Since the orders sought by the plaintiffs in the instant originating summons are not founded on any cause of action against the company, the originating summons should have been dismissed. The originating summons itself does not disclose any reasonable cause of action against the company. In any case, even if they have a cause of action against the company (which they have not), the respondents have not sued the company. They have sued a director of the company who is the wrong party to be sued."

In moving the OS, P has not averred how the Defendants, in their personal capacities, have custody or control of the statutory records so as to justify the prayers sought. When challenged, P's only response was the Defendants' assertion that they do not have personal possession over the statutory books but "their conduct shows otherwise". This obfuscate the legal capacities in which the Defendants are acting and does not detract from the fact that they do not, in law or in fact, have custody or control of the statutory records. There is no evidence that the Defendants had any personal possession or control over the statutory records sought for outside of their duties as directors of WLE.

P, in his contemporaneous conduct, had acknowledged this position. In his letter dated 16.12.2025 addressed to WLE, he demanded the return of all the statutory records and an undertaking not to interfere with, remove, destroy or alter them.Notably, in P's solicitors letter dated 6.2.2026 addressed to WLE, he took the position that WLE is "the entity having custody and control of the floor where the documents are stored". P's solicitors subsequently continued to exchange correspondences with WLE concerning the execution of the ad interim order. It is plain that P had sued the wrong parties and the OS ought to be dismissed on this ground alone. The OS is futile and incapable of enforcement

By the OS, P is ultimately seeking prayers for the statutory records to be secured at the said address or, alternatively, for the Defendants to deliver up the statutory records to P. This prayer, if granted, is unlawful.

Section 47 of the Companies Act 2016 stipulates that statutory books and records of a company are to be kept at its registered office. A company and every officer who contravene this provision commit an offence and shall, on conviction, be liable to a fine not exceeding RM 10,000 and, in the case of a continuing offence, to a further fine not exceeding RM 500 for each day during which the offence continues after conviction. The legal position is clear. The statutory records must be kept at the registered office of the subject companies, i.e. WLE's premises.

It would be impossible for the Defendants to comply with the prayers sought by P. First, as explained earlier, the Defendants do not, in their personal capacities, have possession of the statutory records. They cannot in law be compelled to procure WLE's compliance with any such order, as there is no basis for treating WLE's custody as that of the Defendants.

Second, the subject companies (including P as an officer of the subject companies) would contravene section 47 of the Companies Act 2016 if the statutory records are allowed to be removed from WLE's premises.

Third, the statutory records cannot, without any express agreement by the subject companies, be removed from the said address. (See sections 47 (2) and (3) of the Companies Act 2016). In the absence of the requisite notification to the Companies Commission of Malaysia (SSM), P is not legally permitted to unilaterally direct the removal of the statutory records from the said address.

An injunction should not be granted if it is of no practical consequence, cannot be enforced or it is impossible for a party to comply with. In the High Court case of Lee Thye (as president and office bearer of the Selangor Yan Keng Benevolent Dramatic Association) v Tan Sri Ngan Ching Wen (as president and office bearer of the Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall) [1999] 6 MLJ 390 at 404, it was held that the court shall only grant mandatory injunction which is capable of enforcement.

In Redland Bricks Ltd v Morris [1970] AC 652, the UK House of Lords said: "The court does not make an order which it may be impossible for a party to comply with. Jurisdiction to grant a mandatory injunction is exercised with caution and is strictly confined to cases where the remedy by damages is inadequate for the purposes of justice, and the restoring of things to their former condition is the only remedy which will meet the requirements of the case." Abuse of the process of the court

The OS bears an ulterior or collateral purpose which amounts to an abuse of the process of the court. Namely, to inconvenience and disrupt the Defendants' or WLE's operations, instead of genuinely enforcing any right of access, especially in the midst of the ongoing Ta family's dispute. The court possesses an inherent jurisdiction to prevent an abuse of its process. (See the Court of Appeal case of Mayban Allied Bhd (formerly known as Phileo Allied Bank (M) Bhd) v Kenneth Godfrey Gomez & Anor [2011] 5 MLJ 219 at [14]).

In Jasa Keramat Sdn Bhd & Anor v Monatech (M) Sdn Bhd [1999] 4 MLJ 637 at 645-647, the Court of Appeal held : "It is trite that a person who has a legitimate grievance may invoke the court's process to obtain redress. But cases may arise where the true purpose for invoking the court's process is something other than to obtain a remedy provided by law. It may be to oppress a defendant. Or it may be to apply pressure upon him which the law regards as illegitimate. Or it may be to merely commence an action and let it hang over the head of the defendant with no intention of bringing it to a conclusion. Since the circumstances in which the court's process may be abused are varied and numerous, the categories of such cases are therefore not closed. Whether the institution of an action or its continuation or a step taken therein amounts to an abuse of process depends upon particular and individual circumstances. Where an action is found to be an abuse of the court's process, it may be struck out or stayed. If it is too late to do this, the party aggrieved may bring an action based upon the tort of abuse of process. Abuse of process in the context of a step taken in the proceedings would, in my judgment, include the use of interlocutory relief as an instrument of oppression. The law provides for remedies, both interim and final, to a litigant to set right, or to prevent, some harm or injury that has been done or may be reasonably apprehended. It is plainly an abuse of the court's process where relief at law or in equity is used, not to remedy a genuine grievance, but as an instrument of oppression. There have been instances before our courts where an interlocutory injunction has been found to have been used as an instrument of oppression. We have always intervened in such cases and set the matter right."

The following passage from Malaysia Building Society Bhd v Tan Sri General Ungku Nazaruddin bin Ungku Mohamed [1998] 2 MLJ 425 was referred to by the Court of Appeal in Jasa Keramat (supra at page 646) : "Every person who is aggrieved by some wrong he considers done him is at liberty to invoke the process of the court. Equally may a litigant invoke the process to enforce some claim which he perceives he has against another. When however, the process of the court is invoked, not for the genuine purpose of obtaining the relief claimed, but for a collateral purpose, for example, to oppress the defendant, it becomes an abuse of process. Where the court's process is abused, the proceedings complained of may be stayed, or if it is too late to grant a stay, the party injured may bring an action based on the tort of collateral abuse of process. The position has been neatly summed up by Lord Denning MR in his dissenting judgment in Goldsmith v Sperrings Ltd & Ors [1977] 1 WLR 478, where at p 489 he said : In a civilised society, legal process is the machinery for keeping and doing justice. It can be used properly or it can be abused. It is used properly when it is invoked for the vindication of men's rights or the enforcement of just claims. It is abused when it is diverted from its true course so as to serve extortion or oppression: or to exert pressure so as to achieve an improper end. When it is so abused, it is a tort, a wrong known to the law. The judges can and will intervene to stop it. They will stay the legal process, if they can, before any harm is done. If they cannot stop it in time, and harm is done, they will give damages against the wrongdoer."

I find that the filing of the OS is tantamount to an abuse of the process of the court on the following grounds:

since the dispute between the two factions of the Ta family, P had sided with the second family. The OS is filed for P to secure the statutory records for the benefit of the second family, rather than to carry out his duties as a company secretary under the Companies Act 2016;

the OS was taken out, not to "remedy a genuine grievance", but to serve as a form of "oppression or to exert pressure" on the Defendants;

the ad interim order was obtained by P and deployed as a tactical trap designed to manufacture technical breaches - exposing the Defendants to adverse consequences; and

the OS was filed to inconvenience the Defendants and due to P's personal vendetta against the Defendants for his termination from employment. The Plaintiff's ulterior motive to secure control of the statutory records for the benefit of the second family

There is no denying that P had aligned himself with the second family after the dispute within the Ta family arose. The following facts ascertain this. Firstly, P is related to the second family wherein he is the nephew of Tan Sri Ta's second wife.

Secondly, in commencing this action for the statutory records retained in WLE's office, P sued the directors of WLE - save for one other director, Lim Sip Choon. Lim Sip Choon is a business partner of the second family. Lim Sip Choon is P's uncle. In his affidavit in reply (Enclosure 33), P does not attempt to justify why Lim Sip Choon was not made party to the OS. This unexplained selective prosecution lends credence to the fact that the commencement of the OS bears an ulterior motive.

Thirdly, notwithstanding D1's notification to P that he had been misrepresented and was forced to execute the share transfer forms of the family company and despite being warned not to register the relevant share transfer forms, P proceeded with registration anyway. This led to the second family attaining ultimate control over the family company.

P attempted to justify that the impugned share transfer forms were "completed with the board resolution" and "as the company secretary" he is "obliged to act impartially, on the instructions of the Board of Directors". This is a lame excuse. P has not produced any board resolution to substantiate his assertion. Of note, a member of the second family (who is the beneficiary of the impugned share transfer forms) sits as a director in the family company where D1's shares were transferred out. Lim Sip Choon also sits as a director in 7 out of 11 of the family company. P turning a 'Nelsonian blindness' on these relevant factors is indicative that his allegiance is with the second family. Further, a truly impartial company secretary would have made further enquiries with the shareholder who had claimed that fraud had taken place.

The surrounding circumstances evince that the OS is not a bona fide attempt to discharge statutory duty as the company secretary, but is instead brought in furtherance of an ongoing family dispute. As P has aligned himself with the second family (who do not have control over WLE), the true objective of the OS is to secure possession of the statutory records for the benefit of that faction and to stifle the first family's access to the statutory records.

This is especially so when P refused to engage in any settlement discussion, after the lock was installed and he is assured that the company secretarial department and the documents therein are not accessible by anyone else without his knowledge. This includes documents for companies to which he is not the company secretary. There is no evidence of any imminent statutory non - compliance or urgency necessitating the drastic relief of a mandatory injunction.

In the premises, I conclude that the present proceedings constitute an abuse of the process of the court, in that they are deployed for a collateral purpose extraneous to P's duties as company secretary. The court will not lend its process to such purposes. No genuine grievance and a tactical trap

In the OS and his affidavit in support (Enclosure 2), P suggests that the commencement of the OS was in order for him to perform his duties as company secretary of the subject companies. At paragraph 13 (a) of Enclosure 2, P deposed - "as the lawful appointed company secretary of the Companies, I should have custody and reasonable and proper access to the statutory books and records ... to be able to discharge my duties."

Nothing P did, especially after granting of the ad interim order, was akin to reasonable for the purpose of discharging his duties. The true intention was to frustrate and induce a breach of the ad interim order from the Defendants or WLE. Execution of the ad interim order

On 13.1.2026, I granted the ad interim order permitting P to obtain access to the statutory records. Execution of the ad interim order took place on 19.1.2026. On that day at around 12 p.m., P and his team (consisting of his lawyer, supervising solicitor and WLE ex-employees from the company secretarial department) arrived at WLE's office and demanded to enter the company secretarial department. WLE, after understanding the circumstances, made logistical arrangements to accommodate the ad interim order and to ensure that it was executed under supervision. Supervision was warranted given:- (a) the incident on 28.11.2025 where WLE's accounting and administrative staff removed company properties (laptop, desktop and documentation); and (b) the incident that occurred on 15.12.2025 (P or the ex-company secretarial staff shredding documents).

It must also be borne in mind that the company secretarial department in WLE contains not only statutory records belonging to the subject companies, but also documents for other client companies of WLE.

WLE, despite not being a party to these proceedings, made the following arrangement in order for P to discharge his duties as the company secretary:

negotiations took place between WLE's solicitors and P's solicitors wherein WLE was willing to allow P to make copies of the statutory records;

pending settlement negotiations:

P, his lawyer and the supervising solicitor was allowed access to the company secretarial department;

(ii) notwithstanding that the ad interim order did not specify any "securing" of the statutory records, WLE allowed P to install a lock at the company secretarial department. The key is kept with P;

(iii) in the event that WLE requires access to the company secretarial department, P will be available within two hours' notice to unlock the door. The Plaintiff's refusal to engage in any settlement talks

After the company secretarial department door was locked by P, on 23.1.2026, D1, D2 and WLE's solicitors forwarded a draft settlement agreement to P's solicitors. There was no response. On 30.1.2026, D1, D2 and WLE's solicitors forwarded another reminder to the draft settlement agreement. Again, there was no response.

Notwithstanding that WLE had made accommodations, allowing P to make copies of relevant documents, no attempts were made by P to do so. If in fact the true purpose of the OS was to allow P to discharge his duties as a company secretary, there would, at the very least, be attempts to negotiate even if it may not be fruitful. There was clearly no intention to do so. This put paid P's theory that the OS was bona fide.

P subsequently denied any agreement that he is to unlock the company secretarial lock within two hours' notice. This contradicts what was agreed upon. No company would permit a third party to install a lock at its premises without reason and without stipulating a timeline for the third party to unlock the same, upon notice. The terms of the installation of the lock at the company secretarial department were agreed upon and documented between WLE's solicitors and the supervising solicitor during the execution of the ad interim order: Pook, Terrence and Chua Yi En are allowed to go up for quick inspection and the locksmith to install a lock. However, Pook and/or 1 of his other representative (whose name must be informed to us), are to hold the keys to access the CoSec department and be there to open the door should we require access into the room as this locking of door is only to facilitated the settlement discussion. Our documents are also inside which logistically will be hard to remove today as well. Pook and/or his representative should be there to open the door within 2 hours of advance notice. 2:41 pm

When the draft settlement agreement was sent to P's lawyer on 23.1.2026, WLE's lawyer again reminded P of the same: "Kindly be reminded that as agreed on 19.1.2026, your client and / or 1 of his representative (whose name must be provided to us as Waz Lian Enterprise's solicitors), are to hold the keys to access the CoSec department and be available within 2 hours' notice to unlock the door should Waz Lian Enterprise require access into the CoSec Department. The lock was allowed to be installed to facilitate this settlement discussion and due to the logistic issues of moving the files on 19.1.2026."

P's solicitors did not respond to state otherwise. Only after a month later on 4.3.2026, P's solicitors wrote back to say: "Our client has never agreed that the installation of the locks was a prerequisite to engaging in settlement discussions." "... the imposition two (2) hours' notice requiring our client to attend at the Premises is unreasonably short notice and wholly unworkable."

P's conduct of going back on his word is inequitable and demonstrates a lack of intention to genuinely resolve the matter at hand. Such bad faith disentitles him from the court's assistance. P's motive in not engaging in settlement negotiations then became clear - he wanted the company secretarial department to remain locked and used this as an excuse to not carry out his company secretarial duties, as well as to inconvenience the Defendants or WLE.

This is manifested by the following:

P was removed as the company secretary for a few companies including WLE ("removed companies");

P's excuse for not handing over the statutory documents of the removed companies to the newly appointed company secretary was supposed because all his secretarial files had been "locked down" by WLE;

WLE then wrote to P to clarify that he was never denied reasonable access to the statutory records. Contrary thereto, WLE had on multiple occasions invited P to make copies of the statutory records, but it was P who refused to do so, impeding his own access. WLE requested that P attend at its premises on 4.3.2026 at 11:00 a.m. to unlock the lock to hand over the documents to the newly appointed company secretary;

at least 19 hours' notice was given. P did not show up and ignored all messages and calls - despite his WhatsApp status showing that he was online;

surprisingly, P's solicitors replied to WLE at 4:02 p.m. on the same day and stated that the installation of the lock was "consistent with the terms of the [ad interim order]", that P "has never agreed that the installation of the locks was a prerequisite to engaging in settlement discussions" and that the imposition of two hours' notice is unreasonably short;

P's solicitors thereafter continued to deny that there was an agreement that P is to unlock the lock within two hours' notice.

P finally attended at WLE's premises to hand over the documents for the removed companies on 16.3.2026. Even then, not all documents were handed over as P had surprisingly kept a key to a safe in the company secretarial department (which he ought to have returned upon his termination from WLE), and he conveniently forgot to bring the keys to the safe on that day. Due to P's delay in handing over the documents, the newly appointed company secretary had to apply for an extension of time for the filing of statutory documents.

The above situation demonstrates the unworkability of an arrangement where P refuses to make copies of the statutory records, but want to be allowed unimpeded access to WLE. P also wants the company secretarial department locked to avoid any alleged tampering of the statutory records, whilst WLE require access to its own company secretarial department. In the circumstances, WLE's invitation for P to make copies of the statutory records is reasonable given that:

P, as company secretary, has the right to access the statutory records;

however, P's right to access must be balanced with the need to ensure that the statutory records are kept at the registered office, i.e. WLE's premises, in line with section 47 of the Companies Act 2016;

given that P was terminated for inter alia the destruction of company documents, WLE could not grant P unsupervised access to its office. WLE has a duty to protect its clients' documents;

therefore, a logical solution would be for P to make copies of the statutory records so that he can have access to the same "in such manner as he shall deem fit" (as pleaded in the OS).

Despite WLE's reasonable solution above, P refused to consider the same. Instead, P stated in his affidavit in reply (Enclosure 33) at paragraph 36 that: "(a) ... I was not allowed to retrieve the original statutory documents of the Companies which were necessary to discharge my statutory duties;

that I was only allowed to make photocopies of the statutory books and records. This unilateral condition interferes with the discharge of my statutory duties. In this regard, I am advised by my solicitors and verily believe that this unilaterally imposed condition is in breach of the Order."

P's position is an impermissible expansion of the ad interim order. The ad interim order did not entitle P to "secure" or "possess" the statutory records. It merely granted him access to them, which WLE duly provided. In fact, WLE went further and offered P the opportunity to make copies of the statutory records - a relief that exceeded the scope of the ad interim order. Notwithstanding this, P has remained purportedly dissatisfied and has sought to prolong these proceedings by seizing upon alleged technical non-compliance, in particular by asserting a breach of the ad interim order on the untenable basis that he was not given possession of the original statutory records. This demonstrates that P is not genuinely seeking to give effect to the ad interim order, but is instead attempting to manufacture allegations of breach where none exist.

Separately, for the statutory records to be lawfully removed from the registered office, the subject companies must pass a resolution to change the registered office address and notify the SSM of such change pursuant to section 47 (3) of the Companies Act 2016. P as the company secretary has no authority to change the registered office address of the subject companies. Should the court allow such removal of documents or for the delivery up of the statutory records as prayed for in the OS, this would either:

unlawfully circumvent the need for the directors of the subject companies to decide on the change of registered address and notification to the SSM of the same;

allow P as the company secretary to unilaterally change the registered address of the subject companies, which is unlawful; or

cause the subject companies, P and WLE to breach section 47 of the Companies Act 2016 which is accompanied by heavy fines, if found guilty. Harassment and oppression

What occurred thereafter is a series of unfounded allegations and harassment - baiting WLE's non - compliance of the ad interim order. First, rather than respond to the settlement negotiations, P issued a letter dated 6.2.2026, demanding CCTV recordings at WLE's premises and making unfounded allegations that the documents were "tampered and / or interfered with".

Second, the following suggests that there were intentions to procure a breach from the Defendants or WLE, and that P intended merely to harass and oppress the Defendants and WLE:

On 6.2.2026, the ex-employees of the company secretarial department, who now work under the family company controlled by the second family, requested to collect personal belongings. WLE then made arrangement for collection to be made on 10.2.2026.

In an uncanny development, on 9.2.2026, P's solicitors wrote to WLE stating that P will be present to "discharge his statutory duties" on 10.2.2026.

Of note, the communication regarding the ex-staff of the company secretarial department collecting their personal belongings were communications only between WLE and the ex-staff concerned. P was not informed of the arrangement. In other words, P would not have been aware-unless the stunt was coordinated. This further point towards P's motive in these proceedings.

On 10.2.2026 around 12:30 p.m., P arrived at WLE's office. As opposed to "discharging his statutory duties", P requested to do his work at the company secretarial department. Upon refusal of the said request, P threatened further legal action and immediately took out his phone and started recording WLE's staff. P then proceeded to invite himself to the $ 3 ^{rd} $ floor of WLE's premises without permission.

On the same day at 3:15 p.m., WLE accommodated and wrote to P's solicitors, inviting P to liaise with WLE to arrange for a mutually convenient time to inspect and make copies of the statutory records. On the same day, P's solicitors rejected the proposal and states that they have instructions to "proceed without further reference to you".

Despite the above, on 23.2.2026, WLE again wrote to P's solicitors in an attempt to invite P to make copies of the documents he would require. On 24.2.2026, P's solicitors instead responded to state that P "will not be engaging in litigation through correspondence". After four attempts (on 23.1.20226, 30.1.2026, 10.2.2026 and 23.2.2026) by WLE to engage in settlement talks and allow P to make copies of necessary documents in order for him to discharge his statutory duties, P did not engage in any meaningful settlement talks.

It is evident that P, in obtaining the ad interim order, did not use it to perform his statutory duties. But instead "use ... interlocutory relief as an instrument of oppression" and "not to remedy a genuine grievance", which tantamounts to an abuse of process. This is the very definition of an abuse of the process of the court. P's conduct has unnecessarily prolonged court process, wasting time and costs; and he is clearly not interested to resolve the matter.

Recall that P selectively commenced this action against the Defendants, but not Lim Sip Choon, who is also a director of WLE. Lim Sip Choon is P's uncle and the business partner of the second family. He is also the person who signed off on most of the offer letters to the accounts and administrative staff of WLE on the same day of the heist.

The above manifests that P is set on being difficult and cause as much inconvenience as possible. I conclude that:

The OS was commenced against the Defendants with an ulterior motive to oppress them in view of the ongoing dispute within the Ta family, of which P is aligned with the second family;

P had demonstrated no real grievance. He constantly refused to, at the very least, engage in any settlement negotiation;

P, in the guise of executing his statutory duties, failed to retrieve any statutory records from WLE when the opportunity was given to him to make copies of them;

P used the ad interim order, not to perform his duties but to obstruct WLE's operations and in an attempt to procure technical breach from the Defendants or WLE;

The above demonstrates that the OS was commenced for a collateral purpose, thereby constituting an abuse of process and warranting its dismissal.

The case of Manjung Aqua Farming Sdn Bhd v Yong Kwai Heong & satu lagi [2020] CLJU 1416 contains parallel facts to those of the present matter. The facts in Manjung Aqua's case are as follows:

The plaintiff (Manjung Aqua) filed an originating summons against the defendants. The $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ defendant (Yong) is a former director of the plaintiff. Yong is the director and owner of the second defendant (Emperor Marine).

Manjung Aqua filed an originating summons against the defendants, seeking the return of the accounting records of Manjung Aqua. Manjung Aqua alleged that Yong did not return the said accounting records after he resigned as a director of Manjung Aqua. The accounting records were stored at Emperor Marine's premises.

Manjung Aqua also filed an ex parte injunction application against the defendants, seeking access to the said accounting records. The High Court granted an ex parte Anton Piller order to Manjung Aqua.

After a full hearing, the High Court dismissed Manjung Aqua's originating summons on, inter alia, the following grounds:

Manjung Aqua's originating summons failed to particularise the cause of action against the defendants. Mere assertion of trespass or interference committed by the defendants did not reveal any clear and valid cause of action, as required under Order 7 rule 3 (1) of the Rules of Court 2012.

Manjung Aqua failed to establish the possibility that defendants would destroy the accounting records of Manjung Aqua.

Manjung Aqua also failed to provide full and frank disclosure during the ex parte injunction application. In particular, Manjung Aqua did not reveal that it was using Emperor Seafood's premises as its business address.

The failure of Manjung Aqua to make full and frank disclosure during the ex parte injunction application is an abuse of the process of the court.

After the ex parte injunction was executed, Manjung Aqua did not change its business address. Manjung Aqua was aware that the accounting records were stored at Emperor Seafood's premises. There is nothing illegal with the accounting records being kept at Emperor Seafood's premises.

In the present case, the statutory records of the subject companies are lawfully kept at WLE's premises. The registered address of the subject companies remains as the address of WLE's office. WLE is therefore the lawful custodian of the statutory records, until and unless the registered address is changed. Inequitable conduct and material non - disclosure

The court may exercise its discretion to decline injunctive relief to a plaintiff who has been guilty of inequitable conduct. (See the High Court cases of Natseven TV Sdn Bhd v Television New Zealand Ltd [2001] 4 CLJ 722 at 736; Chin Wai Hong & Anor v Lim Guan Hoe & Anor [2014] MLJU 1948 at [41]). This is in line with section 54 (j) of the Specific Relief Act 1950, which provides that an injunction cannot be granted "when the conduct of the applicant or his agent has been such as to disentitle him to the assistance of the court."

The court will also regard any material non - disclosure during the ex parte stage as an abuse of process and disallow any injunction relief prayed by the plaintiff. In Damayanti Kantilal Doshi & Anor v Jigarlal Kantilal Doshi [2004] 1 MLJ 456 at 464, the Court of Appeal said : "23. Next, on the issue of material non - disclosure of the earlier orders we are inclined to agree with the contention of learned counsel for the appellants that the paramount consideration is whether the justice of the case requires the granting of the interim injunction on the facts presented in an inter parte hearing despite the making of an ex parte order earlier on. Of course, that would entail an examination of the manner in which the non - disclosure was carried out. Indeed, if it amounted to an abuse of process then that would have justified the court in taking the punitive step in not only setting aside the ex parte order but also refusing the subsequent application irrespective of its merits."

The Court of Appeal went on to cite the following passage from Salcon Engineering Sdn Bhd v PRM Energy Systems (M) Sdn Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 64 (supra at [24]): "This is a more sensible approach since the task of the court at the inter partes hearing is to consider on the basis of all the evidence before it, whether the injunction should be continued or not. I do not agree with the Bennett and Broadbent approach in so far as serious non - disclosure is concerned. In my judgment, where the non - disclosure is very serious so as to amount to a positive misleading of the court, then it becomes a matter which goes into the balance when considering the probity and bona fides of the applicant. In such circumstances, the court will look at the applicant with a high degree of circumspection."

In Golden Plus (supra), the High Court found that there was material non - disclosure on the part of the applicant during the ex parte stage which amounted to an abuse of process. The court held: [63] It is the decision of this Court that there was material non - disclosure of information during the ex - parte application. The picture painted to the Court was one which portrayed the Defendant as someone who was under the control of the Plaintiff. It was described to this Court that there was a need to restrain the Defendant from carrying out the day to day affairs of the 3 Shanghai Companies. The seals and other assets of the company was in jeopardy if they were not delivered to the new representative of the Plaintiff. Above all, there was mismanagement being perpetrated by the Defendant. [64] The subsequent explanation by the Defendant provided an entirely different perspective to the issues. At the risk of repetition, this Court is satisfied that the Defendant was appointed by the 3 Shanghai Companies as the LR. It had nothing to do with the Plaintiff given the fact that all the companies were separate legal entities."

P's duty to make full and frank disclosure during the ex parte hearing includes:- (a) bringing to the court's attention of material evidence, not merely producing them in affidavit. (See the High court case of Bakmawar Sdn Bhd v Malayan Banking Bhd [1992] 1 MLJ 67 at 72); and (b) highlight potential arguments against the grant of the application including facts likely to be raised in objections during inter partes hearing. (See the Court of Appeal case of Mukhriz Mahathir v Datuk Seri Mohd Najib bin Tun Hj Abdul Razak (suggested contemnor) & Anor [2018] 3 MLJ 715 at 721).

Circling back to P's affidavit in support (Enclosure 2) relied upon to obtain the ad interim order, he portrayed the Defendants (not WLE) to be the oppressor for allegedly interfering or seizing statutory documents. P failed to disclose the following material facts and position which the Defendants would "potentially argue" and have indeed argued at the inter partes hearing:

the statutory records of the subject companies are kept at WLE's registered and business address because the subject companies are clients of WLE;

only WLE have possession of the statutory records - not the Defendants, as directors of WLE;

the statutory records could not, in the absence of the agreement from the subject companies, be unilaterally removed from the said address;

despite being aware of the Ta family dispute, P did not mention a single word about it in his affidavit in support (Enclosure 2). All he said was "The dispute was increasingly heated up as it appears to me that Poh Po Lian, Dato (D3) had taken side of and / or ganged up with D1 and Tan Jin Wei (D2).";

P made unsubstantiated allegations to portray to the court that D1 and D2 appear to be power - hungry in light of Tan Sri Ta's demise. The OS itself states - "perhaps knowing that they did not have control over the boards of all the companies, the Defendants with thugs in place 'proposed' to 'promote' me out of my company secretarial duties and also physically relocate me to another space ...". Actually, P was redesignated by WLE, not by the Defendants in their personal capacities;

P failed to adduce facts of the stunt pulled by WLE's former accounting and administrative staff, which includes removing the company laptop, desktop and documentation on 28.11.2025;

in summarising WLE's $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ show cause letter dated 16.12.2025, P failed to highlight that WLE did not merely allege that there were shredding sounds, but P was specifically accused of "destruction and / or unauthorised handling of company's documents";

P merely exhibited WLE's $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ show cause letter dated 19.12.2025, without stating in the affidavit of the contents of the show cause which shows that P had transferred D1's shares in the family company. This contradicts his duties as propounded in the Court of Appeal case of Kosma Palm Oil Mill Sdn Bhd & Ors v Koperasi Serbausaha Makmur Bhd [2004] 1 MLJ 316 at 328: "He must identify the crucial points for and against the application, and not rely on general statements and the mere exhibiting of numerous documents. He must investigate the nature of the cause of action asserted and the facts relied on before applying and identify any likely defences. He must disclose all facts which reasonably could or would be taken into account by the judge in deciding - whether to grant the application."

In connection with the above, P failed to disclose or exhibit D1's letter dated 19.3.2025, instructing P not to effect transfer of D1's shares in the family company.

The above material facts and position taken by the Defendants "provided an entirely different perspective to the issues". The above material non - disclosure indicates P's mala fide intentions and his abuse of the process of the court. P's inequitable conduct would disentitle him from the court's assistance.

Even if P may have acted in good faith at the time of the filing of the OS, once WLE invited him to make copies of the statutory records, P should not have continued on with this suit. WLE's letter to P on 23.2.2026 was clear - WLE is willing to provide access to P for him to make copies of the statutory records. The substratum of this suit no longer exists. The Plaintiff's submission

I will now address the arguments canvassed by P in his written submission. First, P complains that the Defendants illegally interfered and seized company statutory records. The matters complained of arise from WLE's issuance of the redesignation notice to P. The mere fact that the notice was signed by D2 in his capacity as a director of WLE, and handed to P by D2 together with D1 and other WLE personnel, cannot be relied upon to impute personal liability to the directors. In any case, P's assertion is baseless. He was terminated from WLE's employment for serious misconduct, including for destruction of company document (the very documents he sought to have access to).

Second, P contends that as company secretary of the subject companies, he would be liable as an officer of the company under the Companies Act 2016 if he is not allowed to discharge his duties as the company secretary. This is a red herring. At all material times, WLE was willing and had provided P with reasonable access to the statutory records. As the statutory records cannot be removed from the registered office, P was invited on at least four occasions by WLE to make copies of the statutory documents. However, at every turn, he refused to do so without providing any reason for his refusal.

Further, P did not address how he would be unable to discharge his duties as the company secretary if he made copies of the statutory records. The Companies Regulations 2017 provides that SSM lodgements can be made electronically, hence there is no need for original documents.

Third, P complains that there is no management agreement between the subject companies and WLE. This appears to be an obfuscation tactic. Whether the subject companies are WLE's clients is immaterial to these proceedings. What matters is that the subject companies' registered addresses are listed at WLE's office. Therefore, in the absence of any change of registered address, WLE is not in a position to lawfully release the statutory records to P.

Moreover, it is not disputed that most, if not all, the subject companies were the late Tan Sri Ta's companies. The directors and shareholders of the subject companies are the late Tan Sri Ta's own children or business partners.

It seems to me that there is no reason for the subject companies to register WLE's premises as their registered office, if they were not WLE's clients. The very fact that the statutory records of the subject companies were kept at WLE's business and registered address is ipso facto evidence that there is an arrangement between the subject companies and WLE.

Separately, P's written submission is silent on the following core issues that have been raised by the Defendants:- (a) P sued the wrong party as the Defendants do not have personal possession of the statutory records. WLE is the entity that has custody of the statutory records sought for; and (b) P's reason for not making copies of the statutory records when invited by WLE. Enclosure 18 - The Plaintiff's application for leave to commence committal proceedings

P's committal leave application under Enclosure 18 was heard on an opposed ex parte basis pursuant to my direction. It is my finding that there is no prima facie case for contempt against the Defendants. As discussed earlier, P has elected to omit material facts that are likely to be relied upon by the Defendants in opposing Enclosure 18, and which, if properly considered, would be sufficient to defeat Enclosure 18. Namely:

the ad interim order is incapable of being enforced against the Defendants, as none of them are in possession, custody or control of the statutory records. The Defendants are not in a position to impede P from accessing the statutory records at the registered address of the subject companies, which is at WLE's office;

notwithstanding his knowledge of the above, P nevertheless sought to enforce the ad interim order against WLE, despite WLE not being a party to these proceedings. The ad interim order has no effect on WLE;

P's statement pursuant to Order 52 rule 3 (2) of the Rules of Court 2012 averred that "the parties sought to be committed are the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ and $ 3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendants ... as well as their staff / employees", despite them being WLE's employees. P has obfuscated the parties' respective capacities and the principle of separate legal personality;

notwithstanding the fact that it is not bound by the ad interim order, WLE has at all material times been cooperative and accommodating to P;

the ad interim order did not stipulate that P is entitled to "secure" or install a lock at WLE's company secretarial department. Notwithstanding this, WLE allowed P to install the lock at the company secretarial department;

the ad interim order did not provide that P is entitled to make copies of the statutory records. Nevertheless, WLE repeatedly invited P to make copies, so that these proceedings can be brought to an end without unnecessarily prolongation. However, P absolutely refused without providing any reason;

P's trivial complaint on service of the cause papers is misconceived. The truth is that P failed to serve the originating summons on the Defendants personally in accordance with the prescribed rules. This is evidenced by P's notice of application dated 24.2.2026 under Enclosure 22 for dispensation of service. Nowwithstanding, the Defendants entered appearance. P nevertheless elected to file the committal leave application on the purported ground that the Defendants "repeatedly evaded service".

P did not satisfy the threshold required for leave for committal proceeding as he failed to identify a recognised specie of contempt. P claims that there has been contempt due to the following:- (a) the Defendants' purported evasion of service; and (b) the Defendants and "their" employees' purported breach of the ad interim order. P's claim is unsustainable. Here is my explanation. The Defendants did not evade service

Under Order 10 rule 5 of the Rules of Court 2012, read with Order 10 rule 1, an originating summons must be served personally on the defendants. In the present case, the OS was never served personally on the Defendants. The attempts of personal service were not successfully effected, as P stated in his affidavit of service (Enclosure 20) - "Semasa serahan fizikal itu di buat, tidak wujud sesiapa untuk menerima penyerahan dan Ejen Penghantar Saman telah meninggalkan kertas kausa tersebut (Saman Pemula termeterai) di perkarangan rumah".

As at 23.1.2026, the Defendants' solicitors did not have instructions to accept service of the OS. Therefore, it was conveyed as such to P's solicitors. It is noteworthy that P filed Enclosure 18 (leave for committal proceeding) at 5:53 p.m. on 24.2.2026, before Enclosure 22 (application for dispensation of service) was filed at 6:07 p.m. on 24.02.2026. If P considers it impracticable to effect service of the cause papers on the Defendants, the proper course would have been to apply for substituted service under Order 62 rule 5 of the Rules of Court 2012. Or, where appropriate, to seek a dispensation of service.

Absent recourse to these prescribed procedures, P cannot properly sustain any allegation of contempt against the Defendants. To hold otherwise would effectively render the procedural mechanism for substituted service otiose. In any case, and notwithstanding the requirement to effect personal service (which was not done here), the Defendants' solicitors attended court. Therefore, Enclosure (application for dispensation of service) was withdrawn.

It should also be highlighted that between 19.1.2026 (when P purports to execute the ad interim order against WLE although it is not a party) and when D1 and D2's solicitors appeared during the case management on 25.2.2026, WLE was trying to settle the matter amicably with P as the position was clear - P wanted access to the statutory records, which WLE was willing to provide. Briefly, the chronology of events is as follows:

On 19.1.2026, P executed the ad interim order at WLE's office. WLE offered P to make copies of the statutory records. P did not have enough manpower. WLE and P came to a consensus to lock the company secretarial department door for the time being so that parties can negotiate settlement.

On 23.1.2026, D1 and D2's lawyer sent the draft settlement agreement to P's solicitors. There was no reply.

On 30.1.2026, D1 and D2's solicitors followed up with P on the draft settlement agreement. Again, there was no reply.

On 10.2.2026, WLE issued a letter to P's solicitors inviting P to liaise with WLE to arrange for a mutually convenient time to inspect and make copies of the statutory records.

On 23.2.2026, WLE again invited P to make copies of the statutory records. Since P did not reach out to WLE, WLE proposed some terms to govern the photocopying process (which is reasonable considering that the parties are not in an amicable relationship) so that the photocopying process can be done systematically. WLE requested P to withdraw the present suit to avoid malicious prosecution and incurring unnecessary costs since WLE is willing to cooperate with P.

Despite this, P wrote back to WLE on 24.2.2026 stating that they will not be engaging in litigating through correspondence. Seeing that parties could not settle amicably, D1 and D2's solicitors attended the case management on 25.2.2026.

In the circumstances, there was no evasion of service as alleged. The cause papers were never properly served on the Defendants. In the meantime, the Defendants engaged in efforts to resolve the matter amicably, particularly in light of WLE's willingness to provide P with access to the statutory records. In any event, the Defendants voluntarily entered appearance despite no personal service. The foregoing conduct does not amount to evasion of service, nor does it constitute any specie of contempt. Accordingly, the threshold requirement for leave to commence committal proceedings on this ground has not been fulfilled. No breach of the ad interim order

P's characterisation of the ambit of the ad interim order is inaccurate. Putting aside the fact that the ad interim order cannot be enforced against WLE and therefore there is no basis to contend non compliance, the ad interim order did not provide that P:- (a) has the right to remove the statutory records from WLE; (b) can have unimpeded and unsupervised access to WLE's office; (c) can remove company seals from WLE; (d) can secure the statutory records at WLE's premises by installing a lock at the company secretarial department; and (e) can make copies of the statutory records.

It is my finding that there was no breach of the ad interim order justifying the grant of leave for committal proceedings against the Defendants. Here is my explanation. Execution of the ad interim order on 19.1.2026

On 19.1.2026, P and his team arrived at WLE's office at approximately 11:54 a.m., during lunch hour, to execute the ad interim order. At that time, a substantial number of WLE's staff were not present in the office, which made it impracticable to immediately arrange for P and his team to access the company secretarial department. Nevertheless, at approximately 2:45 p.m., P and his team was allowed to enter the company secretarial department.

P himself failed to bring sufficient manpower during the execution of the ad interim order. Hence he could not catalogue the statutory records. P's own written submission states - "The Plaintiff was however not able to catalogue all the statutory books and records due to manpower constraints".

WLE allowed P to install a lock on the company secretarial department, despite this not being provided in the ad interim order and despite WLE not being a party to these proceedings. WLE cooperated with P beyond what was provided in the ad interim order. As such, there was no non - compliance of the ad interim order on 19.1.2026. Plaintiff's presence at WLE on 10.2.2026

P seems to have taken the position that once he had obtained the ad interim order, he can appear at WLE's office anytime, without supervision and he shall be provided unimpeded access. P's solicitors letter dated 10.2.2026 stated - "Our client is entitled to unimpeded access to discharge his statutory duties as company secretary ...".

When P was present at WLE's premises on 10.2.2026, he demanded access within minutes, failing which he will leave, threatening non compliance. WLE's letter dated 10.2.2026 recounted - "Your client's insistence on immediate, unsupervised access and the threat to allege non compliance within minutes is unreasonable and does not reflect the terms or spirit of the ad interim order. The Company is ready and willing to provide access, subject only to reasonable supervision and logistical arrangements."

P engaged Messrs Vince Chong Partnership as the supervising solicitor for the execution on 19.1.2026 to purportedly "ensure a full, accurate and objective record of all events during the execution process". However, no supervising solicitor was present with P on 10.2.2026.

As the ad interim order is essentially an Anton Piller order or a delivery up order, the importance of having a supervising solicitor during the execution cannot be overstated. In Arthur Anderson & Co v Interfood Sdn Bhd [2005] 6 MLJ 239 at 252, the Court of Appeal highlighted the necessity of having a separate, independent solicitor to supervise the execution by the applicant's solicitors. The absence of a supervising solicitor at the execution was found to be a fatal defect, and the order was set aside on this ground alone. The court further stated that these safeguards are so entrenched that any departure would be contrary to the common law of Malaysia, even in the absence of a specific Practice Direction.

In OAG Engineering Sdn Bhd & Ors v Ng Hoe Keong & Ors [2023] 1 LNS 2321 at [22], the High Court held that the involvement of supervising solicitors is required at all stages of the execution of an Anton Piller order, including the inspection, examination and recording of the fruits of the search. The court stated that the requirement is not merely best practice, but is necessary to ensure the integrity of the process and to protect both parties. The absence or improper involvement of a supervising solicitor is a serious procedural defect.

Here, the ad interim order is patently defective for failing to provide for the presence of an independent supervising solicitor, which is a fundamental safeguard in the execution of an Anton Piller - type order or a delivery up - type order. Such omission renders the ad interim order non compliant with the mandatory safeguards recognised in Arthur Anderson (supra). P compounded this defect by proceeding to execute the ad interim order in the absence of any supervising solicitor. Instead, P unilaterally demanded immediate and unsupervised access on 10.2.2026, in disregard of his own prior recognition of the need to have supervising solicitor.

Critically, the present committal proceedings are premised on P's own unilateral account of events during this unsupervised execution. This is precisely the mischief that the requirement of a supervising solicitor is intended to prevent. In the absence of such independent supervision, P's version of events ought to be treated with circumspection. Allegations of imposition of oppressive conditions

P alleges that WLE imposed additional restrictions before access to the statutory records can be provided, i.e. as a "prerequisite for co operation". I consider that P's allegations of the Defendants' imposition of oppressive conditions before access to the statutory records can be granted constitutes a manipulation of the facts designed to engineer a contrived basis for committal against the Defendants. At the risk of repetition, and as evidenced from the correspondences exchanged, P communicated with WLE on the execution of ad interim order, not with the Defendants in their personal capacities.

WLE, despite not being a party in these proceedings, did not seek to deny P reasonable access to the statutory records. On the contrary, in addition to facilitating such access, WLE invited P to make copies of the statutory records so as to enable continued access without the need for repeated attendances. This was particularly necessary in light of P's unannounced and demanding visits, which were disruptive and caused concern among WLE's employees. This was communicated to P.

WLE's letter dated 10.2.2026 stated: "For the purposes of the inspection today, kindly let us have a list of the specific documents your client requires, together with a brief description of the tasks he intends to carry out at the premises, so that the necessary logistical arrangements can be made. Kindly allow time for us to make logistical arrangements. Separately, your client is invited to liaise with us to arrange a mutually convenient time to inspect and make copies of the relevant statutory documents at his own cost. All copying shall be conducted at the premises of the Company, and no original documents are to be removed from the Company as the Company remains the registered office".

WLE's letter dated 23.2.2026 stated: "As a company secretary of the relevant client companies, Pook may make copies of the Documents at his own cost, as the Company is not obliged to fund the copying exercise. Please fix an appointment with the Company within fourteen (14) days from the date of this letter to proceed with the copying of the Documents. As Pook was terminated for misconduct, he is not allowed free and unsupervised access to the Company's premises and / or documents. Therefore, to avoid any further inconvenience and issues, please make copies of all Documents. Our proposed terms of the copying process ("Process") below :...”

P was never denied reasonable access to the statutory records. Nor were any conditions imposed as pre-requisites to such access. WLE's position was simply that:- (a) P would be granted access, subject to reasonable notice to enable WLE to make the necessary logistical arrangements, including arranging supervision and a suitable working space; and (b) P was invited to make copies of the statutory records, thereby affording him continued access without the need to attend at WLE's premises.

These matters demonstrate that WLE acted in a cooperative and accommodating manner towards P. Notably, WLE went further by permitting P to make copies of the statutory records - an indulgence not contemplated or required under the ad interim order. In the circumstances, WLE and its directors or employees could not have breached the ad interim order. Abuse of process and no full and frank disclosure

As discussed earlier, the OS bears an ulterior or collateral purpose, which is to inconvenience and disrupt the Defendants or WLE's operations instead of genuinely enforcing any right of access, especially in the midst of the ongoing Ta family's dispute. P's institution of the present committal proceedings is, in itself, a clear indicator that these proceedings constitute an abuse of the process of the court. No reasonable litigant, genuinely seeking access to documents, would have acted in the manner P has.

In particular:

P precipitously commenced committal proceedings without first ensuring proper personal service on the Defendants. A reasonable litigant would, at the very least, have taken steps to effect proper service or applied for substituted service where necessary; and

P proceeded with committal despite being put on notice that the wrong party was named and that the Defendants do not have possession of the statutory records. In any case, third parties, including WLE and its employees, had acted in a cooperative and accommodating manner, indeed, going beyond the scope of the ad interim order in facilitating access.

Such conduct lays bare P's true objective. The committal proceedings are not brought to vindicate any legitimate right, but are instead deployed as a tactical device to disrupt the Defendants or WLE's operations. The committal proceedings are rendered academic

In Tan Mei Li & Ors v Bluefire Development Sdn Bhd & Anor [2025] MLJU 2975, the High Court held that continuing with committal proceedings after the conclusion of the main trial would be academic and serve no practical purpose. Here, the committal leave application is rendered academic as the OS is heard on the same day and would be decided therein. Conclusion

For the reasons above, I dismissed the OS as well as the committal leave application in Enclosure 18. I awarded global costs of RM 30,000 to D1 and D2, and RM 20,000 to D3. Dated 1 July 2026 Quay Chew Soon Judge High Court of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur Commercial Division (NCC 2) Counsels Tharminder Singh, Terrence Lee Rohui, Avely Tan Ling Hui and Jayeswary a/p Agilandeswaran (Messrs. Terrence Lee & Co) for the Plaintiff Donovan Cheah Swee Kin, , Hooi Chung Wai, Sabrina Chang Hui San, Chris Lim Yen Hao and Darshainee a/p R. Santhiran (Messrs. Ying & Partners) for the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ and $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ Defendants Abd Azim bin Abd Razak and Tan Chuan Yi (Messrs. Rahmat Lim & Partners) for the 3rd Defendant Case reference

CBM Construction Sdn Bhd v Builtcon and Development Sdn Bhd & Anor [1999] CLJU 2

Tahan Steel Corp Sdn Bhd v Bank Islam Malaysia Bhd [2004] 6 MLJ 1

Golden Plus Holdings Bhd v Teo Sung Ngiap [2019] MLJU 1850

TR Hamzah & Yeang Sdn Bhd v Lazar Sdn Bhd [1985] 2 MLJ 45

Aron Salomon v A. Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22

Lee Eng Eow (as director of Lee Guat Cheow & Co Sdn Bhd) v Mary Lee (as executrix of the estate of Low Ai Lian) & Ors [1993] 3 MLJ 481

Lee Thye (as president and office bearer of the Selangor Yan Keng Benevolent Dramatic Association) v Tan Sri Ngan Ching Wen (as president and office bearer of the Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall) [1999] 6 MLJ 390

Redland Bricks Ltd v Morris [1970] AC 652, the UK House of Lords

Mayban Allied Bhd (formerly known as Phileo Allied Bank (M) Bhd) v Kenneth Godfrey Gomez & Anor [2011] 5 MLJ 219

Jasa Keramat Sdn Bhd & Anor v Monatech (M) Sdn Bhd [1999] 4 MLJ 637

Malaysia Building Society Bhd v Tan Sri General Ungku Nazaruddin bin Ungku Mohamed [1998] 2 MLJ 425

Manjung Aqua Farming Sdn Bhd v Yong Kwai Heong & satu lagi [2020] CLJU 1416

Natseven TV Sdn Bhd v Television New Zealand Ltd [2001] 4 CLJ 722

Chin Wai Hong & Anor v Lim Guan Hoe & Anor [2014] MLJU 1948

Damayanti Kantilal Doshi & Anor v Jigarlal Kantilal Doshi [2004] 1 MLJ 456

Salcon Engineering Sdn Bhd v PRM Energy Systems (M) Sdn Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 64

Bakmawar Sdn Bhd v Malayan Banking Bhd [1992] 1 MLJ 67

Mukhriz Mahathir v Datuk Seri Mohd Najib bin Tun Hj Abdul Razak (suggested contemnor) & Anor [2018] 3 MLJ 715

Kosma Palm Oil Mill Sdn Bhd & Ors v Koperasi Serbausaha Makmur Bhd [2004] 1 MLJ 316

Arthur Anderson & Co v Interfood Sdn Bhd [2005] 6 MLJ 239

OAG Engineering Sdn Bhd & Ors v Ng Hoe Keong & Ors [2023] 1 LNS 2321

Tan Mei Li & Ors v Bluefire Development Sdn Bhd & Anor [2025] MLJU 2975 Legislation reference

Sections 50 to 54 of the Specific Relief Act 1950

Section 47 of the Companies Act 2016

Order 7 rule 3 (1); Order 10 rule 1; Order 10 rule 5; Order 52 rule 3 (2) and Order 62 rule 5 of the Rules of Court 2012