PRESGO GATEWAYS SDN BHD v Majlis Bandaraya Johor Bahru (JA-22NCC-25-04/2026)

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT JOHOR BAHRU IN THE STATE OF JOHOR DARUL TA’ZIM MALAYSIA CIVIL SUIT NO. : JA-22NCC-25-04/2026 BETWEEN PRESGO GATEWAYS SDN BHD [201401011432 (1087508-T)] … PLAINTIFF AND MAJLIS BANDARAYA JOHOR BAHRU … DEFENDANT GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Enclosure 11) INTRODUCTION

1. The application before me is the Defendant’s Notice of Application dated 23 April 2026 (Enclosure 11) to set aside the ex parte Interim 21/05/2026 12:52:31 JA-22NCC-25-04/2026 Kand. 31 **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 Injunction Order dated 15 April 2026 (Enclosure 8) granted to the Plaintiff.

2. The NOA filed with the Certificate of Urgency was originally fixed by the registry on 30 April 2026, without referring to me. Only after the date had been fixed was the matter referred to me and I gave instructions to bring the hearing forward to 27 April 2026. The Plaintiff counsel, however, requested an adjournment because he was overseas and the Defendant counsel strongly objected to such an application. Considering the nature of the urgency, I instructed the Plaintiff to file an Affidavit in Reply by 28 April 2026 and thereafter, followed by the filing of the written submissions by both parties on 29 April 2026. The matter is fixed for decision or clarification, if any, on 30 April 2026.

3. Having considered the affidavits, the written submissions of both parties and the authorities cited, I now deliver my decision and my reasons. BACKGROUND

4. The Plaintiff and the Defendant entered into a Car Park Lots Management Agreement dated 25 April 2016 ("the Agreement"), under which the Plaintiff was appointed as managing agent for the parking system within the Defendant’s area for an initial term of 10 years, from 1 May 2016 to 30 April 2026. Clause 7 of the Agreement **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 gave the Plaintiff an option to extend the term for a further 5 years, subject to certain conditions.

5. The Plaintiff argued that it had validly exercised that option by notice dated 15 October 2025. The Defendant, by letter dated 26 February 2026 (received by the Plaintiff on 11 March 2026), declined the request for extension and indicated its intention to appoint a new service provider.

6. On 10 April 2026, the Plaintiff commenced this action by Writ of Summons (Enclosure 1) and Statement of Claim (Enclosure 2). On the same day, the Plaintiff filed a Notice of Application (Enclosure 3) supported by an Affidavit in Support (Enclosure 4) seeking interim injunctive relief, ex parte.

7. On 15 April 2026, after hearing the ex parte application, I allowed it and issued Enclosure 8. I recorded in the Court's minute on that day that the Order was granted ad interim until the disposal of the inter partes application. I also fixed a full timetable for the filing of affidavits and submissions, with the decision/clarification date set for 18 June 2026.

8. On 23 April 2026, eight days after Enclosure 8 was issued, the Defendant filed Enclosure 11 to set aside Enclosure 8, supported by its Affidavit in Support (Enclosure 12) and Certificate of Urgency (Enclosure 13). **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 ANALYSIS

9. The Defendant rests its application on six principal grounds –

10. The Defendant’s argument is that Enclosure 8, in particular paragraph 2(a) of Part B (Injunksi Mandatori), which orders the Defendant to “confirm in writing … that the extension of the Plaintiff’s appointment for the Extended Term of 5 years … is valid and effective”, is final in character and amounts to specific performance of clause 7.

11. In my view this ground is answered by the Court’s minute of 15 April 2026 itself. On the day Enclosure 8 was granted, I recorded contemporaneously and expressly : “Mah : ad-interim sehingga **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 pelupusan inter partes”. I then proceeded to fix a complete timetable for the Defendant’s affidavit in reply, the Plaintiff’s affidavit in response, written submissions and reply submissions, with the date for decision/clarification on 18 June 2026.

12. In my judgment, the true character of Enclosure 8 as an ad interim order pending inter partes disposal is therefore plain on the face of the Court’s own record. That conclusion is reinforced by the wording of the sealed Order itself, which at paragraph [1] expressly orders the interim injunction to operate "sehingga pelupusan permohonan ini secara inter partes", and is headed "PERINTAH AD INTERIM UNTUK INJUNKSI INTERIM [Ex-Parte]”. Whatever may be implied from the wording of the sealed Order, the substance of what the Court ordered was a holding measure, not a final five-year decree of specific performance. To that extent, Ground 1 alone does not provide a basis to set aside Enclosure 8.

13. I record that the Defendant cited a number of authorities in support of Ground 1, including Abercrombie & Fitch Co & Anor v Fashion Factory Outlet KL Sdn Bhd & Ors [2008] 4 MLJ 127, Datuk Bandar Majlis Bandaraya Shah Alam & Anor v Yusuf bin Awang & Ors [2007] 7 MLJ 327, Dhaya Maju LTAT Sdn Bhd v. Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors [2021] 1 LNS 1110, S L Ng Trading Agency Sdn Bhd v Tohtonku Sdn Bhd [2025] 9 MLJ 946, and Tinta Press Sdn Bhd v Bank Islam Malaysia Bhd [1987] 2 MLJ 192 on the threshold for interlocutory mandatory injunctions, on the principle that an interim order tantamount to final specific performance is beyond jurisdiction. The principle is uncontroversial. The question on Ground 1 is whether Enclosure 8 is in substance such an order and that question is **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 answered in the negative by the Court’s contemporaneous minute of 15 April 2026. Ground 2 : Jurisdiction (Section 54(d) Specific Relief Act 1950 [Act 137] and Section 29 Government Proceedings Act 1956 [Act 359])

14. Ground 2 is, in my view, the most substantial. I note that only section 54(d) of Act 137 and section 29 of Act 359 are pleaded in the Notice of Application (Enclosure 11) and section 54(f) and section 20(1)(g) of Act 137 are developed in the Defendant's skeletal submissions (Enclosure 17). I address all four provisions for completeness.

15. The Defendant submits that as a local authority, MBJB is a “department of any Government” within section 54(d) of Act 137 and/or “the Government” within section 29 of Act 359 and that no injunction whether interim or perpetual, can be granted against it. The Defendant places reliance on a substantial body of authority, including Government of Malaysia v Lim Kit Siang [1988] 2 MLJ 12, Datuk Bandar Majlis Bandaraya Shah Alam & Anor v Yusuf bin Awang & Ors [2007] 7 MLJ 327, Tan Bun Teet & Ors v Menteri Sains, Teknologi dan Inovasi Malaysia & Ors [2013] 3 MLJ 676, Superintendent of Lands and Surveys, Kuching Division & Ors v Kuching Waterfront Development Sdn Bhd [2009] 5 MLJ 607, Yap Ea Teck v Yang Dipertua Majlis Daerah, Kota Tinggi, Johor [1995] MLJU 55, Ganad Media Sdn Bhd v Dato’ Bandar Kuala Lumpur (No 2) [2002] 1 MLJ 508 and Veerasingam a/l Subramaniam & Ors v Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur [2012] 8 MLJ 479. The Defendant **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 additionally relies on Badiaddin bin Mohd Mahidin & Anor v Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd [1998] 1 MLJ 393 for the proposition that an order made in contravention of statute and in excess of jurisdiction is a nullity which the Court has inherent power to set aside.

16. The Plaintiff, in its written submission and through its Bundle of Authorities, advances a structured response with three layers, supported in oral submissions by reliance on Bungy Malaysia Sdn Bhd v Menara Kuala Lumpur Sdn Bhd [2011] 2 MLJ 801 –

17. I deal with each layer in turn, before addressing two further points raised by the Plaintiff : the Federal Court decision in Subashini a/p Rajasingam v Saravanan a/l Thangathoray and other appeals [2008] 2 MLJ 147, on the propriety of deciding jurisdictional points at the interim injunction stage and the constitutional argument under Articles 8(1) and 69(2) of the Federal Constitution.

18. In Tan Suan Choo, Edgar Joseph Jr J (as His Lordship then was) held that section 54 of Act 137 applies only to perpetual injunctions, by reason of the statutory architecture of the Act, Chapter IX dealing with general and temporary injunctions, Chapter X with perpetual injunctions and section 51(1) of Act 137 providing that temporary injunctions are regulated by the law relating to civil procedure. Ganad Media expressly disagreed. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10

19. That disagreement was, however, considered by the Court of Appeal in Keet Gerald Francis. Gopal Sri Ram JCA, delivering the judgment of the Court, expressly endorsed Tan Suan Choo on the chapter-structure point. His Lordship summarised the holding in Tan Suan Choo as being that "the statutory bar encapsulated in section 54(d) of the Act is confined to perpetual or final injunctions and has no application to temporary injunctions which are governed by section 51 of the Act", described "the judicial reasoning in Tan Suan Choo" as "faultless" and concluded : "In our considered opinion, both Tan Suan Choo and Bina Satu correctly state the law".

20. That is binding Court of Appeal authority on the proposition that section 54(d) of Act 137 does not, on its terms, apply to interlocutory or temporary injunctions.

21. Bungy, on which the Plaintiff relied in oral submissions, in my considered view, deserves more careful treatment. The Plaintiff's oral submission, as I understood it, is that Bungy is authority for the proposition that section 20(1)(g) of Act 137 is not engaged by the mere fact that a contract runs for more than three years. The trigger for the section is whether the contract involves the performance of a “continuous duty”. That is a separate, fact-sensitive enquiry from the simple length of the contract, and one that requires proper particularisation on affidavit.

22. Mah Weng Kwai JC at paragraphs [28] - [29] of Bungy expressly held that “To decide whether the provisions of s 20(1)(g) apply in this case, the court will have of necessity to determine whether the contract **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 sought to be extended by the plaintiff will involve "the performance of a continuous duty" by the defendant” and that “without stating the nature of the "continuous duty" on affidavit”, the court was not in a position to determine whether the duty/duties would be too onerous or difficult for the defendant to perform, regardless of the duration of the contract”.

23. On that reading, the Defendant's submission at paragraph 22 of Enclosure 17, that the Agreement, as renewed, “requires MBJB to perform continuous obligations for a further period of five years, which plainly exceeds the three-year period prescribed by s. 20(1)(g)”, in my judgment equates duration with continuous duty in a way that Bungy does not permit.

24. I accept the Plaintiff's submission on this point. The mere fact that a contractual extension runs for five years does not, of itself, engage section 20(1)(g) of Act 137. Whether the Agreement requires the performance of a “continuous duty” in the relevant sense is a separate question that has not been properly particularised by the Defendant on affidavit. To that extent, the Defendant's reliance on section 20(1)(g) of Act 137 (and consequently on section 54(f)) does not, on the present material, support discharge.

25. I should also note, for completeness, that Bungy itself applied the chapter-structure reasoning first developed in Tan Suan Choo, treating sections 20(1)(g) and 54(f) of Act 137 as part of the same statutory architecture that distinguishes interlocutory from perpetual relief. To that extent Bungy reinforces the analysis I have set out above, although it is the chapter-structure point, endorsed at **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 appellate level by Keet Gerald Francis, that does the heavy lifting on section 54(d) of Act 137.

26. While Bungy concerned a private defendant and so does not address the public-authority dimension that lies at the heart of Ground 2, the s. 20(1)(g) of Act 137/ continuous-duty point that the Plaintiff draws from it is independent of the public/private status of the defendant. The Defendant's continuous-duty objection therefore is not made out on the present material, regardless of MBJB's status as a local authority.

27. To that extent, I accept that the Plaintiff has the better of the argument so far as section 54(d) of Act 137 is concerned. The Order in Enclosure 8 is interim in character. On the authority of Keet Gerald Francis, section 54(d) of Act 137 does not, by its own terms, apply to interim injunctive relief. The Defendant’s reliance on section 54(d) of Act 137 cannot independently support discharge of Enclosure 8.

(ii) Section 29 Government Proceedings Act 1956 [Act 359] and the local-authority status

28. That, however, is not the end of the analysis. Two questions remain.

29. The first concerns section 29 of Act 359. The Supreme Court in Lim Kit Siang held expressly that section 29 of the Government Proceedings Ordinance 1956 applies to interim injunctions against the Government. Salleh Abas LP held at page 19 that – **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 “the issue of the interim injunction against UEM is absolutely contrary to the expressed words of section 29 of the Government Proceedings Ordinance 1956, as it has in effect indirectly restrained the Government”.

30. That holding is binding on this Court so far as section 29 of Act 359 is concerned. The chapter-structure argument cannot defeat it. What it does not settle, however, is whether the definition of “Government” in section 2 of Act 359, which on its face encompasses the Federal Government and the State Governments only, extends to a local authority. That is a question of statutory construction that, on the authorities cited before me, has not been finally and conclusively resolved at the precise level of an interim injunction against a local authority acting in a contractual capacity.

31. The second concerns the second ground in Tan Suan Choo, that a local authority, although a “public authority”, is not a “department of any Government of Malaysia” applying the “functions and control” test in Trendtex Trading Corpn v Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] 1 All ER 881 and Mellenger v New Brunswick Development Corpn [1971] 1 WLR 604. Keet Gerald Francis is silent on this second ground. The defendants in that case were private parties, a bankrupt individual and his family and the “department of any Government” question simply did not arise. The second ground in Tan Suan Choo therefore does not have Court of Appeal endorsement. There is High Court authority on both sides, with the Plaintiff drawing on Saw Seng Eng, Abdul Aziz bin Mohamed Ginan, Bandar Utama City Corp Sdn Bhd and Ronald Philip Devereux and the Defendant drawing **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 on Yap Ea Teck, Ganad Media and Veerasingam a/l Subramaniam. The conflict at High Court level remains genuine and unresolved.

32. I observed that the Defendant’s reliance on Yusuf Awang requires careful consideration. The Court of Appeal there held at paragraph [41] that a local authority is a “public authority” exercising “public functions” and that in considering an injunction against a public authority “it is the duty of the court to consider the injury or the inconvenience which may result to the public or whether it would be detrimental to public interest and welfare in case an injunction is granted”. On its facts, however, Yusuf Awang concerned a perpetual injunction against the demolition of squatter huts under Regulation 10 of the Essential (Clearance of Squatters) Regulations 1969, a purely regulatory exercise of statutory power. The Court of Appeal held that the perpetual injunction was beyond jurisdiction because it would have the effect of nullifying regulations the local authority had a statutory duty to enforce. Yusuf Awang therefore decides that a perpetual injunction will not lie to prevent a local authority from discharging a statutory duty under regulations. It does not squarely decide that an interim injunction in a contractual dispute against a local authority acting in its contractual capacity is barred by section 54(d) or section 29 of Act 359. The proposition is much narrower than the Defendant’s submission requires.

33. The Court of Appeal in Tan Bun Teet does state that “An injunction, interim/interlocutory or permanent, cannot be granted against the government under s 29 of the GPA and under s 54 of the SRA”. That observation, however, was made in the context of a challenge against **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 the Federal Government concerning the Lynas rare-earth refinery, a federal regulatory matter. The case did not concern a local authority and did not consider whether the definition of “Government” in section 2 of Act 359 extends to a local authority. The same is true of Kuching Waterfront, which concerned the State Government of Sarawak. To that extent, neither decision squarely resolves the precise question now before this Court.

(iii) The contractual-characterisation argument

34. The Plaintiff’s contractual characterisation argument has, on the materials before the Court, real force. The Agreement was entered into under section 36 of Act 171, which expressly authorises a local authority to enter into contracts. The dispute concerns the Defendant’s decision to refuse to extend that contract under clause 7. On one view, this is a private-law dispute between contracting parties to which neither section 54(d) of Act 137 nor section 29 of Act 359 applies, because the bar in those provisions is directed at injunctions that interfere with the public duties of a department of Government, not contracts freely entered into by a body corporate exercising its commercial capacity. On another view, the management of public parking is itself a public function discharged through a contractual vehicle and the underlying decision to extend or not to extend that contract may itself be characterised as the exercise of a public function. Which characterisation is correct is a serious question on which I have heard only summary argument in the written **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 submissions and it is precisely the kind of question that requires full inter partes ventilation.

(iv) The Federal Court decision on Subashini a/p Rajasingam v Saravanan a/l Thangathoray and other appeals [2008] 2 MLJ 147

35. The Plaintiff relies on the Federal Court decision in Subashini a/p Rajasingam v Saravanan a/l Thangathoray and other appeals [2008] 2 MLJ 147 for the proposition that, at the interim injunction stage, a defendant is not entitled to have its jurisdictional point decided ahead of all other points. The Federal Court at paragraph [8] held – “The question of whether a court, in an application for an interim injunction, should decide the issue of jurisdiction as opposed to a decision of only the existence of a serious issue, depends on the facts of each case. Where the evidence upon which challenge to jurisdiction is made is of such a quality that renders a trial unnecessary, a court may proceed to make findings based upon that evidence, if not, the court may order the matter to be tried”.

36. I have given this submission careful consideration. Subashini is authority that a Court is not bound, at the interim stage, to decide jurisdiction in advance of the substantive merits. It is not authority that a Court is precluded from declining to maintain an ex parte order **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 where the jurisdictional foundation is contested. My disposition does not decide the jurisdictional question. It decides, narrowly, that the question is sufficiently substantial and sufficiently unresolved on the materials before the Court that an ex parte order resting on it should not be sustained when the Defendant has come promptly with a substantial challenge. That is consistent with Subashini, not in conflict with it. Indeed, Subashini itself contemplates that “the court may order the matter to be tried”, which is, in effect, what the discharge with liberty to apply afresh permits.

37. The Plaintiff also advances a constitutional argument under Articles 8(1) and 69(2) of the Federal Constitution, submitting that section 54(d) of Act 137 and section 29 of Act 359, as pre-Merdeka enactments must be read subject to the supreme law and that the equal-protection principle in Article 8(1) of the Federal Constitution requires injunctive relief to be available against the government as it is between private parties. The Plaintiff places reliance on B Surinder Singh Kanda v The Government of the Federation of Malaya [1962] 1 MLJ 169, George Wimpey & Co Ltd v British Overseas Airways Corporation [1955] AC 169, Choo Fah Fatt & Anor v Che Rus bin Othman & Ors [1977] 1 MLJ 230, Re Tan Boon Liat @ Allen & Anor Et Al; Tan Boon Liat v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri & Ors; Chuah Han Mow v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri & Ors; Subramaniam v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri & **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 Ors [1977] 2 MLJ 108, and R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame Ltd (No 2) [1991] 1 AC 603.

38. This is a significant argument that has not been engaged with by the Defendant. I do not need to decide it today and I do not. It is preserved for full inter partes argument at any fresh application the Plaintiff may be advised to file, or at the substantive trial. I record only that the argument has been made, that it is supported by substantial authority and that nothing in this decision forecloses it.

39. Drawing the threads of Ground 2 together, the position is as follows –

40. I am satisfied that the Defendant’s challenge under Ground 2 raises a substantial and unresolved question of jurisdiction in respect of section 29 of Act 359 as it bears on a local authority acting in a contractual capacity, alongside an unresolved second question as to whether the second ground in Tan Suan Choo or the contrary line should be followed. These questions go directly to the power of the Court to grant injunctive relief against the Defendant. They have been raised promptly, within eight days of Enclosure 8 being granted and substantively. They are not, on the authorities cited before me, conclusively resolved.

41. In my judgment, an ex parte Order which rests on a contested jurisdictional foundation of this kind ought not to be sustained when the Defendant has raised a substantial challenge promptly and the **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 questions cannot be conclusively answered on the materials before me. The proper course is to set aside Enclosure 8 and to leave the Plaintiff at liberty to apply afresh inter partes on a complete record, where the jurisdictional question can be properly considered alongside the contractual-characterisation argument, the constitutional argument and the substantive merits.

42. I emphasise that this decision does not decide the section 54(d) of Act 137 question conclusively as it bears on perpetual injunctive relief, nor the section 29 of Act 359 question against a local authority, nor the contractual-characterisation question, nor the constitutional argument. I have not chosen between Tan Suan Choo’s second ground and the contrary view in Ganad Media. I decide, much more narrowly, that the questions are too substantial, too unresolved and too central to the Court’s power to grant injunctive relief against the Defendant to permit the ex parte Order to be sustained when it is now substantially challenged. All such questions remain open for full inter partes ventilation or at the substantive trial. The Other Grounds

43. In light of my disposition of Enclosure 11 on Ground 2, it is unnecessary for me to make conclusive findings on Grounds 3, 4, 5 and 6. I record the following observations. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21

44. The Plaintiff demonstrates in its Affidavit in Reply (Enclosure 16, paragraph 32) that the letters of 26 February 2026 and 6 March 2026, including the proposed 50:50 revenue-sharing model, were in fact exhibited in the original Affidavit in Support (Enclosure 4 at pp 117 - 119 and 111 - 115). The Defendant’s complaint cannot therefore properly be characterised as concealment of documents, but rather as a complaint about whether the legal significance of those documents was adequately drawn to the Court’s attention. That is a narrower and more nuanced complaint than the one initially advanced. I do, however, accept the Defendant’s point that no jurisdictional objection under section 54(d) of Act 137 or section 29 of Act 359 was drawn to the Court’s attention on the ex parte application. Whether that alone amounts to material non-disclosure is debatable, but in the context of my approach to Ground 2 it is a consideration which supports the disposition I have reached. On the principles set out in the authorities relied on by the Defendant, (including Arthur Anderson & Co v Interfood Sdn Bhd [2005] 6 MLJ 239) failure to disclose material facts may warrant discharge even if the order would have been made on full inquiry. I do not, however, find it necessary to make any conclusive finding on Ground 3 in light of my disposition on Ground 2. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22

45. The 30-day period between the Plaintiff’s receipt of the rejection letter (11 March 2026) and the filing of the application (10 April 2026) was explained by the Plaintiff as the time needed to gather documents and obtain legal advice. I accept the explanation as reasonable in the circumstances. I make no specific finding on urgency in this disposition.

46. Order 29 rule 1(2B) of the ROC 2012 is self-executing. Enclosure 8 would in any event have lapsed on 6 May 2026 by operation of law. More importantly, a complete inter partes timetable was set on 15 April 2026 and the hearing of this application took place on 27 April 2026, well within the 21-day window. In any event, in light of my findings on Ground 2 above, this point no longer arises directly. I make no conclusive finding on the 14-day requirement under rule 1(2BA), as it does not arise in light of my disposition on Ground 2.

47. The Defendant separately complains that the Plaintiff did not adequately draw attention to the New Straits Times article dated 16 March 2026 (exhibited at page 121 of Enclosure 4) reporting that Southmax Sdn Bhd (a subsidiary of ITMax System Bhd) had been appointed by the Defendant as smart parking operator. Both entities are named in paragraph 1(c) of Part A (Injunksi Prohibitori), of **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 Enclosure 8. The point is noted. As with the other Ground 3 complaints, I do not find it necessary to make a conclusive finding in light of my disposition on Ground 2, and the matter is preserved for any fresh inter partes application. COURT’S DECISION

48. For the reasons above, I make the following orders –

49. In light of my decision above and following its delivery, parties have agreed for Enclosure 3 to be treated inter partes on the existing papers, without need for a fresh application. The directions vacated under paragraph 48(c) above are accordingly replaced. I will give fresh directions accordingly. Dated : 30 April 2026 -signed-YA Dr Noradura Binti Hamzah Judicial Commissioner High Court Civil 2 Johor Bahru **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 Solicitor for the Plaintiff : : Dato Dr Abd Shukor Ahmed, Dato Baljit Singh Sidhu, Nor Shahidah Saari Messrs. Adi Radlan & Co. Solicitor for the Defendant : : Fadhil Ihsan bin Mohamad Hassan together with Khairulazwad Bin Sariman, Mohammad Syahmi Bin Nawawi, Dennis Yueah, Celine Lim Messrs. Azwad Ihsan & Co. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal