Prosmier Construction Sdn Bhd v 1. ) Tradewinds Plantation Management Sdn Bhd (JA-12A-18-06/2021)

TRADEWINDS PLANTATION MANAGEMENT SDN BHD …RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN [DALAM MAHKAMAH SESYEN DI JOHOR BAHRU DALAM NEGERI JOHOR DARUL TAKZIM SAMAN PEMULA NO. JA-B54-01-02/2021 ANTARA TRADEWINDS PLANTATION MANAGEMENT SDN BHD …PLAINTIF

PROSMIER CONSTRUCTION SDN BHD …DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN] 04/07/2022 08:01:10 Kand. 32 S/N sc4If2mfp0qv/enjD1lMg ___________________________________________________________________________________________ 2 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Preliminary [1] For ease of reference, parties will be referred to as they were in the proceedings before the Sessions Court. [2] This is the 2nd Defendant’s appeal against the Sessions Court Judge’s decision on 24.5.2021 in allowing the Interpleader Originating Summons filed by the Plaintiff and ordered a sum of RM618,010.31 to be paid by the Plaintiff to the 1st Defendant. [3] As a background, by way of a Letter of Award dated 26.11.2018, the 2nd Defendant was awarded civil and construction works and mechanical and electrical works for the Plaintiff’s tissue culture laboratory at Kota Tinggi, Johor. [2] In connection with the Letter of Award, the 2nd Defendant from time to time made progressive claims and subsequently the Plaintiff had paid as follows:

the payment of the first until the fourth progressive claims had been made to the 2nd Defendant’s CIMB Bank Berhad Account No. 8006288651 (“the 2nd Defendant’s 1st Account”) as instructed verbally by the 2nd Defendant to the Plaintiff;

by way of a letter dated 7.8.2019 from the 2nd Defendant to the Plaintiff, the latter made the payments for the fifth until seventh progressive claims to the 2nd Defendant’s CIMB Bank Berhad S/N sc4If2mfp0qv/enjD1lMg ___________________________________________________________________________________________ 3 Account No. 8010083763 (“the 2nd Defendant’s 2nd Account”); and

by way of a letter dated 17.3.2020 from the 2nd Defendant to the Plaintiff, the former requested the latter to make all future payments to the 2nd Defendant’s 1st Account. [3] On 19.12.2019, the 2nd Defendant had issued Invoice No. PCSB/IV/P/0050 (“Invoice 50”) amounting to RM1,118,010.31 that is the eighth and the last progressive claim for the said works. However, there was no payment made by the Plaintiff for Invoice 50. [4] The 2nd Defendant by way of a letter dated 1.4.2020 to the Plaintiff, requested the payment of a sum of of RM1,118,010.31 under an Invoice No. PCSB/IV/P/0048 (“Invoice 48”) together with interest amounting to RM103,928.91. In this Invoice 48, the principal amount claimed by the 2nd Defendant was similar to Invoice 50. [5] As such the Plaintiff by way of a letter dated 3.4.2020 had requested the following, inter alia:

the 2nd Defendant to clarify whether the amount claimed was based on Invoice 48 or Invoice 50;

the sum of RM1,118,010.31 to be paid in two instalments wherein RM500,000.00 would be paid on or before 15.4.2020 and the balance of RM618,010.31 would be paid on or before 30.4.2020; and

the interest of RM103,928.91 be waived. S/N sc4If2mfp0qv/enjD1lMg ___________________________________________________________________________________________ 4 [6] The 2nd Defendant by way of a letter dated 15.4.2020 to the Plaintiff had replied as follows:

Invoice 50 has been cancelled and the correct invoice is Invoice 48;

the 2nd Defendant agreed with the Plaintiff’s proposal for settlement on the following terms:

the Plaintiff is required to pay the 2nd Defendant a sum of RM500,000.00 on or before 15.4.2020;

(ii) the Plaintiff is required to pay the 2nd Defendant the balance of RM618,010.31 which to be paid on or before 30.4.2020;

(iii) the Plaintiff is required to release the retention sum of RM231,750.00 to the 2nd Defendant on or before 15.5.2020; and

(iv) the interest of RM103,928.91 will be waived. [7] Based on the 2nd Defendant’s letter, the Plaintiff paid the first instalment of RM500,000.00 to the 2nd Defendant’s 1st Account. [8] After the first instalment was made, the 1st Defendant had by way of its letter dated 21.4.2020 to the Plaintiff, claimed that Invoice 48 had been factored and assigned to the 1st Defendant and requested the Plaintiff to pay the sum of RM1,118,010.31 to the 1st Defendant’s account i.e the S/N sc4If2mfp0qv/enjD1lMg ___________________________________________________________________________________________ 5 Ambank (M) Berhad Account No. 8881025325839 (“the 1st Defendant’s Ambank Account”). [9] The Plaintiff by way of an email dated 21.4.2020 had sent to the 1st Defendant the proof of the payment of the first instalment of RM500,000.00. [10] The 1st Defendant then replied to the Plaintiff by way of an email dated 22.4.2020 requesting a clarification whether the payment made by the Plaintiff was for Invoice 48 or Invoice 50. On the same day, the Plaintiff replied the email by explaining that Invoice 50 had been cancelled by the 2nd Defendant although both invoices stated a similar amount. The Plaintiff also explained that the sum of RM500,000.00 was paid for Invoice 48 and the balance of RM618,010.31 would be paid on or before 30.4.2020. [11] The 1st Defendant by way of a letter dated 22.4.2020 to the Plaintiff stated the following:

the 1st Defendant did not recognise the payment of RM500,000.00 as for Invoice 48 as the payment was made for

Invoice 48 was assigned to the 1st Defendant and demanded the Plaintiff to pay the sum under Invoice 48 to the 1st Defendant’s Ambank Account on or before 30.4.2020, failing which a legal action will be taken against the Plaintiff. [13] Due to this uncertainty, the Plaintiff via an email dated 22.4.2020 to the 2nd Defendant informed the latter on the 1st Defendant’s claim and S/N sc4If2mfp0qv/enjD1lMg ___________________________________________________________________________________________ 6 asserted that the Plaintiff had no knowledge regarding the arrangement between the 1st and 2nd Defendants as all the payments had been paid to the 2nd Defendant’s account as instructed. Thus, the Plaintiff requested the 2nd Defendant to resolve the issue with the 1st Defendant and come to a consensus. [14] On 26.4.2020, the Plaintiff sent another email to the 2nd Defendant noticing the latter that the balance of RM618,010.31 would be retained by the Plaintiff until the dispute between the 1st and 2nd Defendants had been resolved. [15] However the 2nd Defendant via its solicitor denied the assignment of Invoice 48 to the 1st Defendant. The 2nd Defendant also demanded the Plaintiff to make the payments to the 2nd Defendant’s account on the ground that the 1st Defendant could not claim the payments from the Plaintiff as the 2nd Defendant has no privity of contract with the Plaintiff. [16] The 2nd Defendant also via its solicitor sent a letter dated 27.4.2020 to the 1st Defendant stated that the latter has no right to claim any payment from the Plaintiff. [17] On 27.4.2020, the 1st Defendant sent a Mareva Injunction Order dated 27.4.2020 to the Plaintiff wherein paragraph 5 of the Order reads – “PIHAK KETIGA: Ia merupakan suatu penghinaan mahkamah sekiranya sesorang pihak ketiga dengan sengaja membantu atau membenarkan seseorang Defendan (Prosmier Construction Sdn Bhd) melanggari mana-mana syarat dalam Perintah ini, dan seseorang yang menghina Mahkamah boleh dikenakan denda dan/atau hukuman penjara.” S/N sc4If2mfp0qv/enjD1lMg ___________________________________________________________________________________________ 7 [18] Based on the Order, the Plaintiff believed that any payment to the 2nd Defendant’s account would be treated as an assistance to dispose of the 2nd Defendant’s assets. [19] Since the 1st and 2nd Defendants could not come to a consensus, the Plaintiff put a notice to the both Defendants via a letter dated 10.4.2020 stating that the balance of RM618,010.31 had been paid to the Plaintiff’s solicitor’ account as a stakeholder pending the resolution of the dispute between the 1st and 2nd Defendants or interpleader proceedings. [20] However, the 2nd Defendant via a letter dated 6.5.2020 informed the Plaintiff that the Mareva Injunction Order dated 27.4.2020 had been amended on 5.5.2020 wherein paragraph 5.1 of the amended Order states that – “Perintah ini dalam apa-apa keadaan tidak menghalang pelanggan Defendan Pertama [Prosmier Construction Sdn Bhd] untuk terus membuat bayaran kepada Defendan Pertama mana-mana bayaran yang seharusnya dibayar kepada Defendan Petama”. [21] Therefore, the 2nd Defendant claimed that the balance of RM618,010.31 should be paid to the account as instructed by the 2nd Defendant. [22] This position was not agreed by the 1st Defendant. Via a letter dated 7.5.2020 to the Plaintiff’s solicitor, the 1st Defendant claimed that although paragraph 5.1 of the amended Order did not hinder payment to the 2nd Defendant, as Invoice 48 has been assigned to the 1st Defendant, any payment made regarding to Invoice 48 to the 2nd Defendant is a fraudulent S/N sc4If2mfp0qv/enjD1lMg ___________________________________________________________________________________________ 8 act and depriving of the 1st Defendant’s right on Invoice 48 and breach of responsibility of the Plaintiff’s solicitor as a stakeholder. [23] On 8.5.2020, the Plaintiff issued a letter to the 1st and 2nd Defendants that if the issue cannot be resolved or a clear order obtained from court latest by 10.5.2020, the Plaintiff will proceed with the filing of an interpleader proceeding. [24] On 14.5.2020, the Plaintiff filed the Interpleader Originating Summons and on 24.5.2021, the Sessions Court ordered that a sum of RM618,010.31 to be paid by the Plaintiff to the 1st Defendant. Interpleader proceedings [25] The interpleader proceedings is governed by O. 17 of the Rules of Court 2012 which reads – Entitlement to relief by way of interpleader (O. 17, r. 1)

1.

Where —

a person is under a liability in respect of a debt or in respect of any money, goods or chattels and he is, or expects to be, sued for or in respect of that debt or money or those goods or chattels by two or more persons making adverse claims thereto; or

a claim is made to any money, goods or chattels taken or intended to be taken by the Sheriff in execution under any process, or to the proceeds or value of any such goods or chattels, by a person other than the person against whom the process is issued, S/N sc4If2mfp0qv/enjD1lMg ___________________________________________________________________________________________ 9 the person under liability or, subject to rule 2, the Sheriff may apply to the Court for relief by way of interpleader.

Reference in this Order to a Sheriff shall be construed as including references to any other officer charged with the execution of process by or under the authority of the Court. [26] In Tetuan WY Chan Roy v. Modular Techcorp Holdings Bhd & Anor [2015] 5 CLJ 1105, Harmindar Singh J (now FCJ) held that – [12] The duty of the court in an interpleader proceeding is without controversy. The provisions relating to such proceedings are well set out in O. 17 of the RC

The Federal Court in Tetuan Teh Kim Teh, Salina & Co v. Tan Kau Tiah & Anor [2013] 5 CLJ 161 followed the lucid explanation of an interpleader proceeding in the old English case of De La Rue v. Hernu, Peron & Stockwell, Ltd, De La Rue, Claimant [1936] 2 All ER 411 where Greene LJ in a separate judgment observed as follows: What, in substance, all along, both under the old equitable procedure and under the modern procedure, is being decided, is claims by two claimants against the person interpleading. What really happens is that whereas there are two claimants who are harassing a person desirous of interpleading, that person is interpleading by the inter-pleader proceedings calling upon the claimants to come out into the open and formulate their claims against him. In substance, when an inter-pleader issue is tried, two actions against the person interpleading are being dealt with, and interpleader proceedings is the method of compelling the parties-either one, or both, or neither of whom may have actually issued a writ-to prosecute their claims. As it is the essence of interpleader proceedings that the person who has interpleaded has no title himself. He naturally drops out of the suit. But in effect the entire matter is tried out in the presence of all the parties concerned, and the real claimants are compelled to put forwards S/N sc4If2mfp0qv/enjD1lMg ___________________________________________________________________________________________ 10 their claims and have them adjudicated upon. The reason for that is not for their own benefit. It is for the relief of the person interpleading. When it is once appreciated that is the true nature and history of inter-pleader proceedings, I take the view that it is quite wrong to treat an issue directed under the interpleader rules as though it were an action of tort. It is a method to enable the court to decide the claims between two persons present at the proceedings, and to decide those claims so that the person interpleading will get the relief to which he is entitled. [13] With these observations in mind, it was really the duty of the claimants to put forward their claims so that the court can decide who is entitled to the relief sought by the interpleader. It was not the function of the court to try the matter as if it was action in tort or contract between the claimants. [27] In its memorandum of appeal, the 2nd Defendant contended that the Sessions Court Judge erred in making the decision based on the following grounds, inter alia:

there is no privity of contract between the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant and no assignment of Invoice 48 was made by the 2nd Defendant;

the 2nd Defendant is entitled to receive the payment from the Plaintiff for Invoice 48 based on the amended Mareva Injunction Order dated 5.5.2020;

there is an on-going proceeding in another court between the 1st and 2nd Defendants resulting in a double claim by the 1st Defendant; and S/N sc4If2mfp0qv/enjD1lMg ___________________________________________________________________________________________ 11

the 2nd Defendant had on 1.7.2020 paid RM906,655.81 into court resulting in the interpleader proceedings being academic. Whether Invoice 48 assigned to the 1st Defendant [27] For the first ground mounted by the 2nd Defendant, I find that the 1st Defendant averred that its claim for the balance payment under Invoice 48 is not premised upon any contract between the 1st Defendant and the Plaintiff. But it is premised upon the assignment of Invoice 48 by the 2nd Defendant which was duly notified by the 1st Defendant to the Plaintiff on numerous occasions via three letters dated 21.4.202 and 22.4.2020. [28] The existence of the assignment can be evidenced through documents filed in the court as follows:

a letter of offer dated 7.8.2019 from the 1st Defendant duly accepted by the 2nd Defendant (pages 294-310 of the Record of Appeal) whereby the 2nd Defendant had accepted an invoice factoring facility offered by the 1st Defendant;

the Collection Account Agreement dated 18.6.2019 entered into by the 1st and 2nd Defendants to which the 2nd Defendant was required to open a bank account to be called “Collection Bank Account” under the 2nd Defendant’s name but operated by the 1st Defendant (pages 312-317 of the Record of Appeal).

the Selective Invoice Factoring Programme Rules (pages 319- 336 of the Record of Appeal) are the rules governing an online digital platform operated by Bay Supply Chain Technology Sdn Bhd (a company related to the 1st Defendant). The submission by the 2nd Defendant of all invoices to be factored to the 1st Defendant shall be done via this online digital platform. [29] Pursuant to the Agreement, the 2nd Account was opened as the Collection Bank Account. Subsequently the 2nd Defendant proceeded to inform the Plaintiff via a letter dated 7.8.2019 that all future payments are to be remitted into the 2nd Account (page 100 of the Record of Appeal). [30] On 15.1.2020, the 2nd Defendant factored and assigned Invoice 48 to the 1st Defendant via the said online digital platform and received a payment of RM707,812.33 on the same date (pages 359-366 of the Record of Appeal). This was followed by the 1st Defendant’ Ambank Account transfer of RM935,044.61 for Invoice 48 and two other invoices (page 367 of the Record of Appeal). [31] An email from the 2nd Defendant (Ms Wong) to the 1st Defendant acknowledging the receipt of the payment can be found in page 368 of the Record of Appeal. [32] In an email dated 11.3.2022 (page 422 of the Record of Appeal), the 1st Defendant informed the 2nd Defendant that the scheduled repayment Invoice 48 is on 26.2.2020 and due to the non-payment of the Plaintiff, the 1st Defendant requested the 2nd Defendant to demand the Plaintiff to make the payment by 18.3.2020 failing which the 2nd Defendant shall be required to repurchase Invoice 48. Upon receipt of this email, the 2nd Defendant via S/N sc4If2mfp0qv/enjD1lMg ___________________________________________________________________________________________ 13 a letter dated 16.3.2020 (pages 422-423 of the Record of Appeal) replied the email by informing the 1st Defendant that it had notified the Plaintiff and requested the 1st Defendant to allow an extension of time until 18.4.2020 for the remittance of payment. [33] After sending the reply letter to the 2nd Defendant, on 1.4.2020 the 1st Defendant proceeded to send a letter of demand to the Plaintiff confirming the factoring arrangement of Invoice 48 with the 1st Defendant as well as the Collection Account Agreement dated 18.6.2019. [34] In the upshot, I find that the above material evidence is more than sufficient to establish the factoring relationship between the 1st and 2nd Defendants and Invoice 48 was duly assigned by the 2nd Defendant to the 1st Defendant. It is crystal clear that the 2nd Defendant admitted the existence of the factoring arrangement and assignment of Invoice 48. [35] By having Invoice 48 assigned to the 1st Defendant, the 2nd Defendant has absolutely assigned all rights, title and interest under Invoice 48 to the 1st Defendant. This, in my view has complied with s. 4(3) of the Civil Law Act 1956 which says –

Any absolute assignment, by writing, under the hand of the assignor, not purporting to be by way of charge only, of any debt or other legal chose in action, of which express notice in writing has been given to the debtor, trustee or other person from whom the assignor would have been entitled to receive or claim the debt or chose in action, shall be, and be deemed to have been, effectual in law, subject to all equities which would have been entitled to priority over the right of the assignee under the law as it existed in the State before the date of the coming into force of this Act, to pass and transfer the legal right to the debt or chose in action, from the date of the notice, and all legal and S/N sc4If2mfp0qv/enjD1lMg ___________________________________________________________________________________________ 14 other remedies for the same, and the power to give a good discharge for the same, without the concurrence of the assignor. [36] In the light of the above, I agree with learned counsel for the 2nd Defendant that the 1st Defendant’s claim is based on the assignment of Invoice 48 and not on a contract. Whether the 2nd Defendant is entitled to receive the payment based on the amended Mareva Injunction Order [37] On the second ground raised by the 2nd Defendant, I find that although the amended Mareva Injunction Order requested the 2nd Defendant customers to make payments to the 2nd Defendant directly, I find the payments are meant for normal payments and do not include Invoice 48. This is due to the fact that Invoice 48 has been duly assigned and factored by the 2nd Defendant to the 1st Defendant. Thus, the 2nd Defendant’s claim that the amended Order is to cater for all payments that the 2nd Defendant would be entitled to receive from its customers irrespective of the assignment of Invoice 48, in my view, is totally misconceived. Whether on-going proceeding in another court resulting in a double claim [38] On the ground raised by the 2nd Defendant that there is an on-going proceeding in another court between the 1st and 2nd Defendants resulting in a double claim by the 1st Defendant, I find that this present suit was originally filed at the Kuala Lumpur Sessions Court and thereafter was transferred to the Johor Bahru Sessions Court. S/N sc4If2mfp0qv/enjD1lMg ___________________________________________________________________________________________ 15 [39] At the same time the 1st Defendant filed a suit at the Johor Bahru High Court (JA-22NCC-16-04/2020) which was subsequently transferred to the Johor Bahru Sessions Court (JA-B52NCC-53-06/2020). [40] On 5.2021, the Johor Bahru Sessions Court had decided on the interpleader originating summons (in which the 2nd Defendant is appealing before the court now) and there is no doubt that the order given by the Sessions Court is well within its jurisdiction. As the 1st Defendant’s suit is still pending before the same Sessions Court judge, I find, the judge will take cognizance about the decision on the interpleader originating summons and the payment received by the 1st Defendant from the Plaintiff based on his decision as to avoid any double claim. The 2nd Defendant also has the opportunity to raise up this issue when the suit is heard. Whether the payment of RM906,655.81 by the 2nd Defendant into court on 1.7.2020 resulting in the interpleader proceedings being academic [41] For the last ground raised by the 2nd Defendant, I find that the payment of RM906,655.81 by the 2nd Defendant into court does not tantamount to the payment to the 1st Defendant relating to Invoice 48. The 1st Defendant is still entitled to claim for payment under Invoice 48 which has been factored and assigned by the 2nd Defendant. Thus there is no merit on this issue. Suitability of the present case be disposed of by way of interpleader [42] The Court of Appeal in Tan Kau Tiah @ Tetuan Teh Kim The, Salina and Co [2010] 4 CLJ 914; [2010] 3 MLJ 589 held that in order to succeed in an interpleader application, the applicant must show that there is a real S/N sc4If2mfp0qv/enjD1lMg ___________________________________________________________________________________________ 16 foundation or expectation of being sued. Abdul Malik Ishak JCA when delivering the judgment of the court said – [22] Order 17 of the RHC confers a wide power on the court to grant relief by way of interpleader proceedings. Likewise Item 5 of the Schedule to the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (Act 91) gives the High Court additional powers to grant an interpleader relief. Interpleader proceedings are proceedings to assist the applicant to extricate himself from the embarrassment of being sued, or likely to be sued by more than one party in respect of the same subject matter and, at the same time, it would enable the claimants to be put in a situation where they can insist upon their claims. [23] … [24] … [25] … [26] And the expression "is, or expects to be, sued for or in respect of that debt or money or those goods or chattels by two or more persons" appearing in r. 1(1)(a) of O. 17 of the RHC must necessarily mean that the applicant is being, or is expected to be, sued by at least two persons. The requirement here is this. That the applicant must have some real expectation of being sued (Watson v. Park Royal (Caterers), Ltd. [1961] 2 All ER 346). And the claim must be actual and not something in anticipation (Chin Leong Soon & Ors. v. Len Chee Omnibus Co. Ltd. & Anor. [1969] 1 LNS 28, FC). [43] In RHB Bank Bhd v. Comax Sdn Bhd & Anor [1999] 3 CLJ 552, Zainun Ali J (as Her Ladyship then was) held that – It is essential that before the applicant is granted relief, he is, or genuinely expects to be, sued by two or more persons, and there must be some real foundation for the said expectation. A mere anticipation, without any intimation having been received is not sufficient. (Watson v. Park Royal Caterers Ltd) [1961] 2 All ER 146. S/N sc4If2mfp0qv/enjD1lMg ___________________________________________________________________________________________ 17 The conflict between the claimants must be real in the sense that each claim, if proven, would give a good cause of action against the applicant, so that where the applicant is not under any obligation to one of the claimants, or where he can, without incurring any liability, pay the subject matter of the claim to one of the claimants, he is not entitled to relief (of interpleader). [44] Also in Hong Leong Bank Berhad v. Manducekap Hi-Tech Sdn Bhd & Ors [2008] 1 LNS 371, Rohana Yusuf J (Now PCA) held that –

Before a relief can be sought under O. 17 r. 1 it is essential that the Applicant must be genuinely faced with a potential suit by one or more persons. Thus there must be in existence a real conflict between Claimants. A mere anticipation of a legal suit would not suffice, (see Watson v. Park Royal Caterers Ltd [1961] 2 All ER 146.) [44] As alluded to earlier, it is clear that in this present case, there were two competing instructions and two competing claims from the 1st and 2nd Defendants to the Plaintiff which resulted the sum of RM618,010.31 been placed with the Plaintiff’s solicitors as a stakeholder. Not only that, the both parties have threated to take legal action against the Plaintiff if their instructions are not followed (pages 154-155, 206-207 & 227-228 of the Record of Appeal). This definitely put the Plaintiff in an awkward position as to whom the money should be paid to. Thus, it is no doubt that the threat of being sued faced by the Plaintiff in is not a mere expectation but is genuine. Thus, the present case was correctly disposed of by way of interpleader proceedings. Conclusion [45] In the upshot, based on the aforesaid reasons, and after careful consideration of all the evidence before this Court, and written and oral S/N sc4If2mfp0qv/enjD1lMg ___________________________________________________________________________________________ 18 submissions of the parties, the Appellant/2nd Defendant had failed to satisfy the Court that there is any merit to disturb or intervene with the finding of the Sessions Court Judge. Premised on the discussions alluded to in the above, this Court dismiss the Appellant’s appeal with costs. Dated: 3.7.2022 - signed - (SHAMSULBAHRI BIN HAJI IBRAHIM) Judicial Commissioner, High Court, Johor Bahru Counsels: For the Appellant/2nd Defendant – Dinesh Kanavaji: Messrs Melissa Ram For the 1st Respondent/1st Defendant – Danny Yap Sin Leng; Messrs KS Lim & Ong For the 2nd Respondent/Plaintiff – Hasmaliza binti Othman; Messrs Ng Yeoh & Kit Cases referred to: • Hong Leong Bank Berhad v. Manducekap Hi-Tech Sdn Bhd & Ors • RHB Bank Bhd v. Comax Sdn Bhd & Anor [1999] 3 CLJ 552, • Tan Kau Tiah @ Tetuan Teh Kim The, Salina and Co [2010] 4 CLJ 914; [2010] 3 MLJ 589 • Tetuan WY Chan Roy v. Modular Techcorp Holdings Bhd & Anor [2015] 5 CLJ 1105 S/N sc4If2mfp0qv/enjD1lMg ___________________________________________________________________________________________ 19 Legislation referred to: • Civil Law Act - s. 4(3) • Rules of Court 2012 - O. S/N sc4If2mfp0qv/enjD1lMg