Proventus Bina Sdn Bhd v Aspen Vision Builders Sdn Bhd (PA-24C-13-03/2026)

At the heart of these four Originating Summonses being heard together is an Adjudication Decision dated 12.11.2025 in Adjudication Reference No: AIAC/D/ADJ-5976 ("Adjudication Decision") that Proventus Bina Sdn Bhd ("PB") had obtained against Aspen Vision Builders Sdn Bhd ("AVB") under the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act, 2012 ("Act").

By Originating Summons No: PA-24C-20-12/2025 ("OS 20"), AVB is applying under section 15(b) of the Act to set the Adjudication Decision aside.

By Originating Summons No: PA-24C-21-12/2025 ("OS 21"), AVB is applying under section 16(1) of the Act for an unconditional stay the Adjudication Decision:

(i) pending the disposal of OS 20; or

By Originating Summons No: PA-24C-13-03/2026 ("OS 13"), PB is applying under section 28 of the Act to enforce the Adjudication Decision against AVB.

By Originating Summons No: PA-24NCvC-1571-12/2025 ("OS 1571") , AVB is essentially applying to injunct PB from filing or advertising any winding-up petition based on a Notice dated 27.11.2025 that PB had issued to AVB under section 466 of the Companies Act 2016 dated 27.11.2025 ("Section 466 Notice"). That Section 466 Notice was for payment of the sums payable by AVB to PB under the Adjudication Decision.

As a matter of prudence, I will decide OS 20 first, i.e. whether AVB has made a case for setting the Adjudication Decision aside under section 15(b) of the Act. After all, if the Adjudication Decision is set aside, then there will be nothing left to enforce or stay, and the basis for the Section 466 Notice will also fall.

Should I decide OS 20 against AVB, I will then decide OS 13. If there are grounds to deny PB the order allowing it to enforce the Adjudication Decision, then a stay - unconditional or otherwise - will not be necessary.

If PB is by order allowed to enforce the Adjudication Decision, I will then decide whether the enforcement of the Adjudication Decision should be stayed. At that juncture, it will be left to decide whether AVB has made a case for staying the Adjudication Decision pending the disposal of the Civil Suit or conditionally. Staying the Adjudication Decision pending the disposal of AVB's application to set the Adjudication Decision aside would have become redundant. Salient facts

By a Letter of Award dated 6.6.2018, AVB appointed PB as the main contractor for a construction project involving the construction of a 29-storey building comprising of, inter alia, shoplots, residential units and public facilities in Georgetown, Penang ("Project").

Notwithstanding that the construction of the Project was completed sometime in mid-2021 and that the Certificate of Practical Completion ("CPC") was issued on 19.7.2021, PB alleged that there were still considerable sums of monies due and owing to it by AVB.

By a Payment Claim dated 22.4.2025 ("Payment Claim"), PB claimed from AVB the sum of RM5,295,291.46 that it alleged was due and payable to it by AVB. That sum consisted of certified sums, the retention sum and the final account sum.

AVB contested PB's claims in the ensuing adjudication proceedings ("Adjudication Proceedings") under the Act. The following cause papers were submitted by the parties to the Adjudicator:

(i) PB's Adjudication Claim dated 25.8.2025 ("PB' Adjudication Claim");

By a letter dated 19.9.2025, AVB submitted a request to the Adjudicator to submit a Rejoinder to the PB's Adjudication Reply.

In an email dated 24.9.2025, the Adjudicator requested AVB to give its reasons justifying its request to submit a Rejoinder to the PB's Adjudication Reply, which AVB did in its letter dated 25.5.2026.

By his letter dated 9.10.2025, the Adjudicator allowed AVB to submit a rejoinder only on the issue of costs.

On 27.11.2025, AVB commenced the Arbitration Proceedings by issuing the Notice for Arbitration.

On 12.11.2025, the Adjudicator delivered his Adjudication Decision, under which AVB was to pay to PB the following:

AVB filed OS 20 and 21 on 5.12.2025 and OS 1571 on 15.12.2025. PB filed OS 13 on 17.3.2026.

AVB has not paid any of the sums under the Adjudication Decision to PB.

Section 15 of the Act is the provision under the Act for setting an adjudication decision aside. This section 15 also confines the Court's powers for setting an adjudication decision aside to one or more of the four instances set out in limbs (a), (b), (c) and (d) thereof. Section 15 of the Act provides: "15. Improperly procured adjudication decision An aggrieved party may apply to the High Court to set aside an adjudication decision on one or more of the following grounds:

(a) the adjudication decision was improperly procured through fraud or bribery;

(b) there has been a denial of natural justice;

(c) the adjudicator has not acted independently or impartially; or

(d) the adjudicator has acted in excess of his jurisdiction."

Though an applicant may apply to set an adjudication decision aside under more than one of those limbs, each limb is distinct and separate, with their own characteristics and requirements. Suffice to say that none of them are synonymous or interchangeable.

It is thus incumbent on a party invoking section 15 of the Act to be clear in is application to set an adjudication aside which limb it is invoking and the reasons why. It is insufficient for an applicant to simply make allegations and cite one or more limb, and expect the Court to make out which limb the allegations fall under.

As I had said at the outset, AVB is applying to set the Adjudication Decision aside under limb (b) of section 15 of the Act, i.e. that there has been a denial of natural justice. As a starting point of the analysis, it may be therefore be expedient to set out what making a case under that limb (b) entails. Limb (b): allegation of a denial of natural justice

In Ireka Engineering and Construction Sdn Bhd v PWC Corp Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2019] MLJU 35, Tengku Maimun JCA (later CJ) said: "There are two limbs of the rules of natural justice, the first is that a man should not be the judge in his own cause (rule against bias) and the second is that the judge must hear both sides of the dispute (rule of audi alteram partem/right to be heard). Here we were concerned with the second limb which requires that both parties be accorded the opportunity to advance their case. In the context of section 15(b) of the CIPAA, the function of the court is to look at the manner in which the adjudicator conducted the hearing and whether he had accorded procedural fairness to the appellant."

In ACFM Engineering & Construction Sdn Bhd v Esstar Vision Sdn Bhd and Another Appeal [2016] 1 LNS 1522, David Wong Dak Wah JCA (later CJ Sabah & Sarawak) said of natural justice: "When one speaks of natural justice, it is nothing more than what we call the concept of "procedural fairness" which needs to be accorded to the parties in a dispute of a hearing..."

In Econpile (M) Sdn Bhd v IRDK Ventures Sdn Bhd and another case [2017] 7 MLJ 732, Lee Swee Seng J (now FCJ) said (in paragraph [57] of his Judgment: "From this and other cases, I conclude as follows in relation to breaches of natural justice in adjudication cases:

(a) It must first be established that the Adjudicator failed to apply the rules of natural justice;

(b) Any breach of the rules must be more than peripheral; they must be material breaches;

(c) Breaches of the rules will be material in cases where the adjudicator has failed to bring to the attention of the parties a point or issue which they ought to be given the opportunity to comment upon if it is one which is either decisive or of considerable potential importance to the outcome of the resolution of the dispute and is not peripheral or irrelevant;

(d) Whether the issue is decisive or of considerable potential importance or is peripheral or irrelevant obviously involves a question of degree which must be assessed by any judge in a case such as this. It is only if the adjudicator goes off on a frolic of his own, that is wishing to decide a case upon a factual or legal basis which has not been argued or put forward by either side, without giving the parties an opportunity to comment or, where relevant put in further evidence, that the type of breach of the rules of natural justice with which the case of Balfour Beatty Construction Company Ltd v The Camden Borough of Lambeth was concerned comes into play. It follows that, if either party has argued a particular point and the other party does not come back on the point, there is no beach of the rules of natural justice in relation thereto."

It is clear from these cases that an allegation of denial of natural justice cannot be founded on the mere dissatisfaction or disagreement with an adjudication decision. An allegation of denial of natural justice requires more.

It is also crucial to bear in mind that the Court does not sit as an appellate body to review and set aside an adjudication decision on its merits. In Bina Puri Construction Sdn Bhd v Hing Nyit Enterprise Sdn Bhd [2015] 8 CLJ 728, Mary Lim J (later FCJ) said: "It must be noted that under CIPAA, there is no right of appeal against the decision of the adjudicator which is interim in nature or of temporary finality only. Section 15 has provided limited grounds on which the decision of the adjudicator may be set aside. Since an application under s.15 is not an appeal, the decision of the adjudicator cannot be reviewed on merits. In the instant case, the applicant has relied on the ground of breach of natural justice and excess of jurisdiction to set aside the decision of the adjudicator. In the premises, the criticism of the adjudication decision by the applicant must clearly point to a breach of natural justice or a jurisdictional error in the adjudication process. Otherwise, the instant proceeding would be converted to a full blown appeal or a rehearing of the adjudication process."

In further clarification of that established principle, in Alpha Galaxy Sdn Bhd v Euro Destar (M) Sdn Bhd and Another Case [2021] MLJU 767, Wong Kian Kheong J (now JCA) listed out some of the matters which do not warrant setting an adjudication decision aside. He said: "A Setting Aside Application is not an appeal to the High Court against an adjudication decision. Nor is a Setting Aside Application a Judicial Review of an adjudication decision. Accordingly, the court in a Setting Aside Application cannot review the merits of an adjudication decision and cannot set aside an adjudication decision merely on any one or more of the following grounds-

(a) an error of law has been committed by an adjudicator (unless the adjudicator has answered a "wrong" question of law which does not arise from the dispute to be adjudicated upon) - please see the judgment of Lee Swee Seng J (as he then was) in the High Court case of Econpile (M) Sdn Bhd v IRDK Ventures Sdn Bhd & another case [2016] 5 CLJ 882, at [71];

(b) an adjudicator has interpreted erroneously a provision in the construction contract - Econpile, at [67];

(c)an adjudicator has misconstrued relevant documents;(d)relevant evidence has been wrongly excluded by an adjudicator;(e)an adjudicator has erroneously admitted irrelevant evidence;(f)an adjudicator has failed to attach due weight to relevant evidence, oral or documentary;(g)undue weight has been given by an adjudicator to any piece of evidence;(h)an adjudicator has assessed erroneously the evidence presented to the adjudicator;(i)a plain error regarding a finding of fact has been made by an adjudicator;(j)an adjudicator has omitted to make a finding of fact which can be adequately supported by evidence;(k)an erroneous finding of mixed fact and law has been arrived at by an adjudicator - please refer to Lee Swee Seng J's decision in the High Court in Syarikat Bina Darul Aman Bhd & Anor v Government of Malaysia[2017]4 AMR 477, at[60];(l)an adjudicator has made a wrong inference from the evidence;(m)an adjudicator has erroneously omitted to make the right inference from the evidence;

(n) errors have been made in the reasons given by an adjudicator in support of the adjudication decision; and

(o) an adjudicator has erred in his or her reasoning with regard to the adjudication decision. The above errors and omission by an adjudicator can be remedied by an arbitration or litigation (whichever the case may be) regarding the dispute in question [as provided in s 13(c) CIPAA] - Econpile, at [67]."

In addition, an applicant seeking to set an adjudication decision aside must depose to those grounds in its affidavit in support of the application. See Order 69A rule 3 (1) and (2) of the Rules of Court, 2012.

Having set out those general principles of law relating to an application under section 15 (b) of the Act, I will now go on to deal with the two grounds that AVB contends warrant the Adjudication Decision being set aside. In summary, they are:

(i) that there was a denial of natural justice in the Adjudicator rejecting its request to submit a Rejoinder to PB's Adjudication Reply ("Rejoinder Issue"); and

The Adjudicator actually recorded his rejection of AVB's request to submit a Rejoinder to PB's Adjudication Reply in Section [B 15] encompassing paragraphs [97] to [108] of the Adjudication Decision. In summary, the Adjudicator:

(i) noted AVB's request on 22.9.2025 for him to exercise his powers under sections 25 (a) and/or (j) of the Act to allow the AVB to file a reply to PB's Adjudication Reply to address purported new issues, documents and authorities submitted by PB in the Adjudication Reply;

(v) noted that, by a letter dated 25.9.2025, AVB had responded to that Adjudicator's request;

Against the backdrop of these facts (which AVB does not dispute), I find that it is clear that the Adjudicator had sought PB's response to AVB's request, had given AVB the opportunity to explain and justify that request, and had exercised his discretion and had made a reasoned decision not to grant that request save for the issue of costs.

In these circumstances, I find that it is not for this Court to secondguess that determination or determine whether that determination was correct or not. It may have been different had the Adjudicator determined that request summarily without giving any reasons at all. But that was certainly not the case here.

With that, I correspondingly find that there was no issue of a denial of natural justice by the Adjudicator in rejecting its request to submit a Rejoinder to PB's Adjudication Reply.

20.3.2024 Letter Issue

AVB's submission on this in paragraphs 27-29 of its Written Submissions may be summarized as follows:

(i) the Adjudicator had referred to that letter dated 20.3.2024 in paragraph 216 of the Adjudication Decision even though letter was never relied upon, put into issue or formed part of PB's pleaded case, and without affording AVB any opportunity to rebut that letter or raise its defences to it; and

I also find no denial of natural justice on this issue either. For three main reasons.

First, if the allegation is that the Adjudicator had in considering that letter dated 20.3.2024 gone beyond the perimeters of what PB had 'pleaded', then that would fall under limb (d), i.e. the Adjudicator having acted in excess of his jurisdiction. Yet, OS 20 did not involve any allegation of the Adjudicator having acted in excess of his jurisdiction. By OS 20, AVB had elected to confine its challenge to the Adjudication Decision solely under limb (b) of Section 15 of the Act.

Secondly, the Adjudicator mentioned that letter dated 20.3.2024 in paragraph [216] of the Adjudication Decision as part of the chronology for his finding and reasons for Issue 2. Paragraph [113] of the Adjudication Decision identifies Issue 2 as being: "Whether the Claimant is entitled to the Retention Sum of RM 3,577,574.67 (Ringgit Malaysia: Three Million Five Hundred Seventy Seven Thousand Five Hundred Seventy Four and Sens Sixty Seven Only) and if in affirmative, what would be the payment due date?"

The retention sum was indeed one of the claims that PB had made in the Payment Claim. That letter dated 20.3.2024 was obviously one of the documents adduced before the Adjudicator in the Adjudication Proceedings. Thus, considering one of the documents in relation to that claim for the retention sum and making a finding thereon could not have been a case of the Adjudicator going on a frolic.

Thirdly, even if the Adjudicator had made an error or had drawn the wrong conclusion vis a vis that 20.3.2024 Letter, this Court does not under the Act set the Adjudication Decision aside on that ground.

I accordingly find that AVB has failed to establish that there was a denial of natural justice by the Adjudicator in the Adjudication Proceedings or in making the Adjudication Decision.

Having found that there was no denial of natural justice, it follows that AVB has failed to raise any grounds to set the Adjudication Decision aside.

I therefore dismiss OS 20 with costs of RM10,000.00 subject to an allocator.

As mentioned at the outset, PB is applying under section 28 of the Act to enforce the Adjudication Decision against AVB.

Section 28 of the Act provides: "(1) A party may enforce an adjudication decision by applying to the High Court for an order to enforce the adjudication decision as if it is a judgment or order of the High Court.

In Tan Eng Han Construction Sdn Bhd v Sistem Duta Sdn Bhd [2018] 2 MLJ 395, Lee Swee Seng J (now FCJ) said: "In a case where there is no application to set aside an adjudication decision, the court upon being asked to enforce the adjudication decision would ordinarily grant an order in terms of the application to enforce unless there is patent non-compliance with the requirements of the CIPAA..."

In Inai Kiara Sdn Bhd v Puteri Nusantara Sdn Bhd [2019] 2 MLJ 362, Mary Lim JCA (later FCJ) said in paragraphs [24]-[26] of the Judgment: "Section 28 confers discretion on the High Court. Although there are no express terms as to how that discretion is to be exercised, in our opinion, the discretion must be exercised judiciously, having regard to the underlying facts and the applicable principles under the CIPAA 2012. We must also bear in mind principles of statutory interpretation; that we cannot read into s 28 terms which are not there, or give s 28 a construction which cannot bear up when the other provisions in the Act are read and taken into consideration. From a reading of the CIPAA 2012, in particular, ss 13, 15, 16, 27 and 31, it is plain that though s 28 vests the High Court with discretionary power, it does not extend to requiring the applicant to show that there are no grounds for setting aside the adjudication decision under s 15. All that the applicant needs to do is to satisfy the High Court that there is an adjudication decision that has been rendered in the applicant's favour, that there has been non-payment of the adjudicated sum by the date specified in the adjudication decision, and that there is no prohibition to the grant of the order that is sought. By this, we mean that the adjudication decision has not been set aside or stayed, that there is no written settlement of the subject matter between the parties, or that there is no final decision rendered on the payment claim, whether made in arbitration or by a court of law. Once these matters are established as matters of fact, the order to enforce ought to be granted. When making the order, the High Court may also make appropriate orders in respect of the whole or part of the adjudicated sum including make orders on interest see sub-s 28(2)."

I find that the deadlines for payment of the sums under the Adjudication Decision had passed when OS 15 was filed and that there was no evidence of AVB having paid any of it.

I find from AVB's affidavits opposing OS 13 that AVB is essentially relying on the same grounds it had raised in OS 20 to oppose OS 13.

In having already found that AVB has failed to raise any grounds to set the Adjudication Decision aside under OS 20, then there is really no impediment to this Court allowing OS 13, save for whether its enforcement should be stayed as sought by AVB under OS 21, which I shall deal with next.

As I had pointed out earlier, in OS 21, AVB is applying under sections 16(1)(a) and/or 16(1)(b) of the Act to stay the Adjudication Decision either pending the disposal of OS 20, or pending the disposal of the Arbitration Proceedings.

By my decision to dismiss AVB's application under OS 20 to set the Adjudication Decision aside, and in allowing PB's application under OS 13 to enforce the Adjudication Decision, we are then left with deciding whether the enforcement of the Adjudication Decision should be stayed pending the disposal of the Arbitration Proceedings under section 16(1)(b) of the Act. Deciding a stay under section 16(1)(a) of the Act, i.e. pending the disposal of OS 20, is no longer necessary.

Section 16(1)(b) of the Act provides: "A party may apply to the High Court for a stay of an adjudication decision in the following circumstances:

(b) The subject matter of an adjudication decision is pending final determination by arbitration or the court."

It can never be the case that a subsisting or concurrent civil suit or arbitration proceedings of the same subject matter as an adjudication decision alone is enough in itself to stay the enforcement of the adjudication decision. If that were so, then upon receipt of an adjudication decision (or in anticipation of an adverse adjudication decision or as 'insurance'), the respondent to an adjudication proceeding and adjudication decision will simply rush to Court or commence a civil suit or an arbitration so as to thwart the successful claimant, and thereby defeat the underlying purpose of the Act.

In fact, that is exactly what AVB did; it commenced the Arbitration Proceedings just weeks after the Adjudication Decision.

In View Esteem Sdn Bhd v Bina Puri Holdings Bhd [2018] 2 MLJ 22, the Federal Court held that a court may exercise its discretion to grant a stay under s. 16(1)(b) of CIPAA where:

(i) There are clear errors in the Adjudication Decision; or

In ASM Development (KL) Sdn Bhd v Econpile (M) Sdn Bhd [2023] 4 MLJ 720, Abu Bakar Jais JCA (now PCA) said in paragraph 47 of the Judgment: "The cases above, demonstrate that it is quite a task for an applicant in his application for a stay of the adjudication decision. Although there can be no doubt the stay of an adjudication decision can be allowed, the cases as highlighted above laid down serious requirements for the same to succeed. These conditions can be summarised as follows:

(a) there are only two grounds to support the application of a stay of the adjudication decision;

(b) the two grounds as explained, must be stringently complied;

(c) in respect of the first ground, there must not be just a simple error but clear error on the part of the adjudicator in respect of his adjudication decision;

(d) the clear error must be grave to prick the conscience of the court hearing the application to stay the adjudication decision;

(e) the adjudicator's decision must be upheld even if he has wrongly answered the right questions or issues including on the adequacy or otherwise of adduction of evidence before him; and

(f) the court is not to look into or review the merits of the case or to decide the facts of the case."

In Subang Skypark Sdn Bhd v Arcradius Sdn Bhd [2015] 10 CLJ 801, Mary Lim J (later FCJ) said: "Since the defendant has itself issued a notice of arbitration in which it raised the very same matters that it had raised in the adjudication, sub s. 16(2) operates. That is not to say that simply because the dispute or subject matter of the adjudication decision is now in the arbitration mode regime, the grant of stay is automatic. It is not, let alone as of right or as a matter of course. Being in arbitration merely puts the plaintiff's case as one within s.16 for consideration; or one which has crossed the threshold. The existence of concurrent proceedings merely prequalifies the plaintiff for this application. At all times, the court retains the discretion as to whether or not to grant a stay and that is obvious from the language and terms of s.16. In fact, sub-s.16(2) vests the court with discretion whether to grant the stay sought; whether to order the adjudicated amount or part of it to be deposited with the Director of KLRCA; or make any other order as the court thinks fit. Upon overcoming the threshold test in sub-s.16(1), the plaintiff still has to show how the discretion is to be exercised in its favour."

In its affidavits in support of OS 51, AVB essentially advances just three grounds for a stay of the Adjudication Decision, which may be summarized as follows:

(i) the pending Arbitration Proceedings;

I find that the pending Arbitration Proceedings is in itself not a ground for a stay of the Adjudication Decision.

Even though AVB's claims against PB in the Arbitration Proceedings are for a higher amount, I find that that in itself if not a ground for staying an adjudication decision. It is also not a ground recognized by View Esteem and Econpile as being a ground for staying an adjudication decision.

Further, even if the decision by the Arbitral Panel in the Arbitration Proceedings is imminent or just around the corner, or just months down the road, I find that that would not be a ground for staying the adjudication decision. The underlying purpose of the Act, as per its long title, is: "To facilitate regular and timely payment, to provide a mechanism for speedy dispute resolution through adjudication, to provide remedies for the recovery of payment in the construction industry and to provide for connected and incidental matters"

In Herschel Engineering Ltd v Breen Property Ltd [2000] BLR 272, Dyson J said: "the parties to a construction contract should not have to wait many months, if not years, before his dispute passed through the various hoops of a full blown action or arbitration."

In Martego Sdn Bhd v Arkitek Meor & Chew Sdn Bhd and Another Appeal [2020] 6 MLJ 224, Mohd Zawaei Salleh FCJ said: "It is clear from the materials mentioned above that the primary objective of the CIPAA 2012 is to alleviate cash flow issues by providing an effective and economical mechanism. The courts are consistent on the finding that the CIPAA 2012 is intended to alleviate cash flow issue. Therefore, the mischief that the CIPAA 2012 intends to cure is none other the cash flow in the construction industry through effective and economical mechanism; for deciding otherwise would run counter to the legislative purpose of creating an expedited adjudication process."

In Foster Wheeler E & C (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd v Arkema Thiochemicals Sdn Bhd and another case [2015] CLJU 632; [2015] MLJU 1952, Mary Lim J (later FCJ) said: "It is often said that Parliament in its wisdom has seen it fit to enact CIPAA 2012 in its present form. In recognising that adjudication only offers temporary finality to the resolution of the payment dispute and that the subject matter of the adjudication decision can still be finally determined in arbitration or the Court, Parliament has implicitly and firmly endorsed the principle of 'pay now talk later'. In other words, the parties pay now against the adjudication decision; and talk later at the arbitration to finally resolve the issue."

An adjudication decision is essentially a temporal finding on the viability of an applicant's claim, and a finding that the respondent should pay-up. Under almost all adjudications under the Act, the adjudicator is appointed by the AIAC under section 21(b) of the Act, unless the adjudicator happens to be selected by the parties under section 21(a), which then makes it their mutual choice. The AIAC would endeavour to select the adjudicator for each adjudication it is asked to from its list/register of adjudicators, by diligently trying its best to match someone suitably qualified to adjudicate the particular claim. That list/register of adjudicators does not consist exclusively of lawyers, but also other professionals like architects, quantity surveyors, engineers, etc, who are all eminently qualified to have been enrolled by AIAC onto that list/register in the first place.

What this means for an adjudication decision is that someone eminently professionally qualified has already decided that the claimant is entitled to some payment. Though that adjudication decision may only be temporal in nature given arbitration proceedings or a court action that will finally decide the claims between the parties, some measure of weight must be given to it. After all, Parliament decided that adjudication proceedings should exist in Malaysia, and Parliament cannot have enacted in vain.

In Sazean Engineering & Construction Sdn Bhd v Bumi Bersatu Resources Sdn Bhd [2016] MLJU 1371, Lee Swee Seng J (now FCJ) said (in paragraphs [75] to [77] of the Judgment: "Sazean Engineering must show special circumstance as in that should they pay now to Bumi Bersatu, they would not reasonably be able to get their money back. Nothing close to that has been shown. The Claimant is certainly not insolvent and if it is a case where the Claimant's account is not too healthy, that is partly attributed to the adjudicated sum of about RM3.2 million outstanding which has not been paid by Sazean Engineering. The following guidelines propounded by Justice Peter Coulson QC in the Wimbledon Construction Company 2000 Ltd v Vago [2005] EWHC 1086 (TCC) are helpful in deciding how discretion for stay of an adjudication decision ought to be exercised having in mind always the special circumstances of each case: "26. In a number of the authorities which I have cited above the point has been made that each case must turn on its own facts. Whilst I respectfully agree with that, it does seem to me that there are a number of clear principles which should always govern the exercise of the court's discretion when it is considering a stay of execution in adjudication enforcement proceedings. Those principles can be set out as follows: a) Adjudication (whether pursuant to the 11446 Act or the consequential amendments to the standard forms of building and engineering contracts) is designed to be a quick and inexpensive method of arriving at a temporary result in a construction dispute. b) In consequence, adjudicators' decisions are intended to be enforced summarily and the claimant (being the successful party in the adjudication) should not generally be kept out of its money. c) In an application to stay the execution of summary judgment arising out of an Adjudicator's decision, the Court must exercise its discretion under Order 47 with considerations a) and b) firmly in mind (see AWG). d) The probable inability of the claimant to repay the judgment sum (awarded by the Adjudicator and enforced by way of summary judgment) at the end of the substantive trial, or arbitration hearing, may constitute special circumstances within the meaning of Order 47 rule 1(1)(a) rendering it appropriate to grant a stay (see Herschell). e) If the claimant is in insolvent liquidation, or there is no dispute on the evidence that the claimant is insolvent, then a stay of execution will usually be granted (see Bouygues and Rainford House). f) Even if the evidence of the claimant's present financial position suggested that it is probable that it would be unable to repay the judgment sum when it fell due, that would not usually justify the grant of a stay if:

(i) the claimant's financial position is the same or similar to its financial position at the time that the relevant contract was made (see Herschell); or

In Subang Skypark, supra, Mary Lim J (later FCJ) said: "It is this court's view that in the exercise of discretion of whether to grant the stay or make an order for payment to the Director of KLRCA, the court must weigh into play in a fairly extensive way, the object of CIPAA; and that it is for a speedy disposal of a payment dispute. This is regardless of the fact that this is a payment dispute that arose in the final days of the construction contract, a point which the parties appear to have no issue with and there is no challenge in this respect anyway. Having gone through the hoops of adjudication, there is now decision in the defendant's favour. This court is of the view that the defendant should not be deprived of the very benefit of why it resorted to adjudication in the first place; save if satisfactory reasons are present for a stay of that adjudication decision. It is my further view that stay should only be granted in exceptional circumstances; and such circumstances must necessarily refer to the financial status of the other party. The merits of the case before the arbitration or the court; or even the chances of success in setting aside the adjudication decision are not relevant considerations. The grant of any stay must always weigh in the primary object of the CIPAA 2012; that it is to ensure a speedy resolution of a payment dispute; that it is to inject much needed cashflow into the contractual arrangements between parties that saw progressive payments of claims as the recognised and accepted way of doing business in construction contracts. It would be futile to encourage parties to resort to adjudication and then deprive a successful claimant of its claim by staying the access to the cash simply because there is another proceeding of the nature described in sub-s 16(1) which is pending. The whole concept of temporary finality would be lost and the object of the Act defeated if such was the consideration."

As I had said earlier, a stay of an adjudication decision under the Act must be considered in the light of the objects of the Act to alleviate cash flow issues of parties and entities partaking in the construction industry. The balance is still between the successful applicant enjoying the spoils of its temporal victory - one of the battles, but not necessarily the war - versus the rights of the loser (but not the vanquished) to be able to recover those spoils in the event it succeeds on the final outcome, either in Court or in the halls of arbitration.

I find that the balance here is in allowing PB to enjoy the fruits of its victory (albeit temporal) in the successful adjudication proceedings.

On that bases, I find that the balance of justice lies in PB's favour and in not staying the Adjudication Decision.

As for AVB's allegations of clear and unequivocal errors, I find that there are none. Having already found that AVB has failed to establish any grounds to set the Adjudication Decision aside, I find that there are no errors in the Adjudication Decision, and certainly none to warrant staying the Adjudication Decision.

I also find no merit in AVB's allegation that, based on its search on PB, there is a possibility that AVB will not be able to recover the sums it pays under the Adjudication Decision from PB should it succeed in the Arbitration Proceedings. That is a selective reading of the search on PB at the Companies' Commission of Malaysia.

Furthermore, in Capitol Avenue Development Sdn Bhd v Gamwon Properties Sdn Bhd [2021] MLJU 403,4 AMR 1, Hasnah Mohammed Hashim JCA (as Her Ladyship then was) said: "The summary of financial information extracted from a company search cannot be the basis for granting a stay."

Even though that decision involved an appeal against the stay of execution of a judgment allowing a claim for liquidated ascertained damages, I see no reason that principle equally applies for a stay of an adjudication decision.

I therefore find that AVB has failed to establish the prerequisite special circumstances to warrant any stay of the Adjudication Decision.

In conclusion, I find that AVB has failed to raise any ground to stay the Adjudication Decision under section 16(1)(b) of the Act, thereby warranting the dismissal of OS 21 with costs of RM10,000.00.

As I had said earlier, by OS 1571, AVB is essentially applying to injunct PB from filing or advertising any winding-up petition based on a Section 466 Notice that PB had issued to AVB for payment of the sums payable by AVB to PB under the Adjudication Decision.

Having now decided:

(i) that AVB has not made any case for setting the Adjudication Decision aside;

I accordingly make the following Orders on OS 20, OS 13, OS 21, and OS 1571:

(i) Originating Summons No. PA-24C-20-12/2025 is dismissed with costs of RM10,000.00, subject to an allocatur;