Public Bank Berhad v 1. ) Mdsa Development Sdn. Bhd. (Dahulunya Dikenali Sebagai Fuyuu Development Sdn. Bhd.) (MA-22NCC-13-08/2025)

MDSA DEVELOPMENT SDN. BHD. (formerly known as "FUYUU DEVELOPMENT SDN. BHD.") [Company No.: 200801003772 (805056-A)]

TAN PING HUANG EDWIN @ CHEN BINGHUANG (Singapore NRIC No.: S8224254F)

TAN JUNE TENG COLIN @ CHEN JUNTING (Singapore NRIC No.: S8323775I)

MAYATRADE SDN. BHD. [Company No.: 201401005457 (1081536-U)] ... DEFENDANTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Plaintiff's application under Section 8(1)(a) of the Insolvency Act 1967 for leave to continue civil proceedings against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants who have been adjudged bankrupts in Singapore - Enclosure 29) A. INTRODUCTION [1] This is an application by the Plaintiff for leave of Court under Section 8(1)(a) of the Insolvency Act 1967 ("the Act") to continue this civil suit against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants notwithstanding the bankruptcy orders made against them by the High Court of the Republic of Singapore on 30 October 2025. The application is contained in the Notice of Application dated 26 March 2026 (Enclosure 29), and is supported by the Affidavit of Lim Chee Hwa affirmed on 25 March 2026 (Enclosure 30). [2] The underlying action is a banker-borrower claim for sums said to be due under a Fixed Loan Facility of RM3,350,000.00 and an Overdraft Facility of RM2,500,000.00 granted by the Plaintiff to the 1st Defendant as borrower, the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Defendants having stood as security parties. The Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim are dated 8 August 2025, both being prior in date to the Singapore bankruptcy orders. [3] Two threshold questions arise before the merits of the application can be approached. The first is whether this Court as the Court seised of the civil suit and not the Court that adjudged the 2nd and 3rd Defendants bankrupt is the proper forum to entertain an application for leave under Section 8(1)(a). The second is whether Section 8(1)(a) is engaged at all, given that the bankruptcies in question were declared in Singapore and not in Malaysia. Only once those questions are resolved does the discretionary question whether leave ought, on the materials, to be granted properly arise. [4] The application proceeded on the strength of the Affidavit of Service of Melissa Ong Bee Ying affirmed on 23 April 2026 (Enclosure 32), which records service of Enclosure 29 on the 2nd and 3rd Defendants. No affidavit in reply was filed by, or on behalf of, the 2nd or 3rd Defendants. M/s Asadullah Sharveen & Co., the former solicitors for the 2nd and 3rd Defendants, intimated by letter dated 13 February 2026 (exhibit LCH-1 to Enclosure 30) that they no longer act for them in consequence of the Singapore bankruptcies. The application is therefore unopposed in form, but the absence of opposition does not relieve the Court of its independent duty to be satisfied that the statutory threshold is met and that leave should, in principle, issue. [5] These are the Court's grounds for the order made on Enclosure 29. B. MATERIAL FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY [6] The material facts, taken from the Statement of Claim (Enclosure 2) and the Affidavit of Lim Chee Hwa affirmed on 25 March 2026 (Enclosure 30), are not in serious dispute and may be stated shortly. [7] By the Facilities Agreement dated 11 February 2015, the Plaintiff granted to the 1st Defendant the Fixed Loan Facility under Account No. 2-1186921-05 (Note No. 00010) in the sum of RM3,350,000.00, and the Overdraft Facility under Account No. 3192837809 in the sum of RM2,500,000.00. The 2nd, 3rd and 4th Defendants are pleaded as security parties to those facilities. The Plaintiff alleges default in repayment, and commenced this action accordingly. [8] The Writ and Statement of Claim were filed on 8 August 2025 and dispatched by registered post on 18 August 2025 pursuant to Clause 53.2 of the Facilities Agreement, which provides for deemed service forty-eight hours after posting. Service was accordingly deemed effected on 20 August 2025. The last date for entry of appearance was 3 September 2025; no appearance was entered within time. The Plaintiff filed the Certificate of Non-Appearance on 4 September 2025 (Enclosure 5) and, on 19 September 2025, the Notice of Application under Order 83 rule 4(1) of the Rules of Court 2012 for leave to enter judgment in default (Enclosure 6). [9] The Memorandum of Appearance was filed by the Defendants on 2 October 2025, twenty-nine days out of time, and was followed on 7 October 2025 by an Order 12 application for leave to file a Defence out of time (Enclosure 13). Written submissions in respect of Enclosures 6 and 13 had, as at the date of the present application, been exchanged. Both were on the verge of disposal when the bankruptcy of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants intervened. [10] On 30 October 2025, the High Court of Singapore made bankruptcy orders against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants. Certified copies of those orders are exhibited at pages 18-19 and 20-21 of exhibit LCH-1 to Enclosure 30. The Plaintiff was informed of the bankruptcies on 13 February 2026 by M/s Asadullah Sharveen & Co. by way of the letter at page 17 of the same exhibit. [11] Searches conducted by the Plaintiff with the Malaysian Department of Insolvency (Jabatan Insolvensi Malaysia) on 13 April 2026 confirm that no bankruptcy petition has been presented and no bankruptcy order has been made against either the 2nd or 3rd Defendant in Malaysia. The bankruptcies are therefore Singaporean and Singaporean alone, but for the effect, if any, conferred upon them by Section 104 of the Act. [12] Enclosure 29 was filed on 26 March 2026 and served, as confirmed by Enclosure 32, on 23 April 2026. C. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION [13] The application gives rise to four issues, which I take in the order of logical priority:

Whether the High Court of Malaya at Melaka — being the Court seised of the civil suit but not the Court that adjudged the 2nd and 3rd Defendants bankrupt — has jurisdiction to hear an application for leave under Section 8(1)(a) of the Act ("the jurisdiction issue");

(ii) Whether the bankruptcy orders made by the High Court of Singapore on 30 October 2025 engage Section 8(1)(a) of the Act, by virtue of the reciprocal provisions in Section 104 of the Act ("the engagement issue");

(iii) Whether the Plaintiff's claim against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants is a claim in respect of a "debt provable in bankruptcy" within the meaning of Sections 2, 8(1)(a) and 40 of the Act, such that leave is in fact required ("the provability issue"); and

(iv) If leave is required and this Court has jurisdiction to grant it, whether, on the materials, leave ought to be granted ("the discretion issue"). D. STATUTORY AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK [14] The architecture of the Act, so far as relevant, is straightforward. Section 8(1)(a) imposes the statutory moratorium that attaches upon the making of a bankruptcy order: "On the making of a bankruptcy order — (a) except as provided by this Act, no creditor to whom the bankrupt is indebted in respect of any debt provable in bankruptcy shall have any remedy against the property or person of the bankrupt in respect of the debt, or shall proceed with or commence any action or other legal proceeding in respect of such debt unless with the leave of the court and on such terms as the court may impose..." [15] The phrase "debt provable in bankruptcy" is defined in Section 2 as "any debt or liability by this Act made provable in bankruptcy". The substantive content of that phrase is supplied by Section 40. Section 40(1) excludes from provability demands "in the nature of unliquidated damages arising otherwise than by reason of a contract, promise or breach of trust". Section 40(3) declares, conversely, that saving the exclusions in Sections 40(1) and 40(2] — "all debts and liabilities present or future, certain or contingent, to which the debtor is subject at the date of the receiving order, or to which he may become subject before his discharge by reason of any obligation incurred before the date of the receiving order shall be deemed to be debts provable in bankruptcy". [16] Section 104 provides for reciprocity with the Republic of Singapore and designated countries. Section 104(1) imposes a duty on the High Court of Malaysia to act in aid of, and be auxiliary to, the courts of Singapore in matters of bankruptcy. Section 104(5) provides that production of an order of adjudication certified under the seal of the Singapore court (or of a notice of such an order in the Singapore Gazette) "shall be conclusive proof in all courts in Malaysia of the order having been duly made and of its date". [17] These provisions must be read together. Section 104 governs recognition; Section 8(1)(a) governs effect. The principles of recognition tell the Court that there is a foreign bankruptcy of which judicial notice must be taken. The principles in Section 8(1)(a) determine what, if anything, that recognised bankruptcy precludes a creditor from doing without leave. The case-law on these provisions is examined in the analysis that follows. E. ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION

The jurisdiction issue [18] The first matter to be settled is whether this Court sitting in Melaka and seised of the civil suit has jurisdiction to entertain an application for leave under Section 8(1)(a) when the bankruptcy orders were made in Singapore and when, in any event, the 2nd and 3rd Defendants are not the subjects of any pending Malaysian bankruptcy proceeding. [19] The starting point is the text. Section 8(1)(a) requires "the leave of the court". The expression "the court" is defined in Section 2 as "the court having jurisdiction in bankruptcy under this Act", and Section 88 provides in plain terms that "The High Court shall be the court having jurisdiction in bankruptcy under this Act". The statute therefore identifies the High Court — and does not, in its text, single out any particular Registry. [20] The matter is addressed by the decision of the High Court (Kuala Lumpur) in BBMB Securities Sdn Bhd v Tan Lay Hiong & 10 Others [2002] MLJU 166 (High Court). There a receiving order had been made against the eleventh defendant by the High Court at Kota Kinabalu; the Plaintiff applied for leave under Section 8(1) at that time of the Bankruptcy Act 1967, now in materially identical terms reproduced in the Insolvency Act 1967 in the Kuala Lumpur action. The eleventh defendant objected on the very ground now in issue: that the application could only be heard by the Court that made the receiving order. That objection was rejected. Mohd Ghazali J held that Section 88 does not "define or provide that 'the High Court' is the court in which the bankruptcy petition was filed or refer to it as a High Court of local territorial jurisdiction". The natural and full effect of the language is that the Court seised of the substantive action is competent to grant leave under Section 8(1). [21] I respectfully adopt that reasoning. It accords with the text of Sections 2, 8(1)(a) and 88. It also accords with practical good sense: the Court seised of the civil suit is the Court already familiar with the pleadings, the procedural history and the issues. To require a creditor to apply for leave to the Court and a fortiori a foreign court that made the bankruptcy order would inject needless complication into a procedural rule whose purpose is administrative protection of the bankrupt's estate, not the relitigation of jurisdiction. The present application concerns the continuation of this action; it does not seek to disturb the Singapore bankruptcy, to participate in its administration, or to dispute the validity of the adjudication. [22] The jurisdiction issue is accordingly resolved in favour of the Plaintiff: this Court has jurisdiction to entertain Enclosure 29.

(ii) The engagement issue [23] The next question is whether Section 8(1)(a) is engaged at all, given that the bankruptcies in question were not declared in Malaysia. [24] Section 104(1) requires the High Court to act in aid of, and be auxiliary to, the courts of Singapore in matters of bankruptcy, so long as Singapore law requires its courts to extend a like aid to Malaysian courts. Section 104(5) goes further: a certified Singapore adjudication, or notice of it in the Singapore Gazette, is to be "conclusive proof in all courts in Malaysia of the order having been duly made and of its date". [25] The effect of Section 104 and the equivalent provision in the repealed Bankruptcy Act 1967 was considered in Dato' Kuah Tian Nam v Lee Siok Poh [2009] MLJU 655 (High Court, Zabariah Mohd Yusof J). The plaintiff in that action had been adjudicated bankrupt by the Singapore court; he resisted a striking-out application on the basis that he was not a bankrupt in Malaysia. The Court rejected that contention, holding that the reciprocal provision is engaged on the fact of a Singapore adjudication and that the consequences which flow from bankruptcy in Malaysia must, accordingly, also flow. The Federal Court decision in Amos William Dawe v Development & Commercial Bank Ltd Berhad [1981] 1 MLJ 230 (Federal Court), referred to in Dato' Kuah Tian Nam, is to similar effect: a Singapore bankrupt cannot, without the sanction of the appropriate authority, prosecute or be the subject of proceedings in Malaysia of the kind ordinarily caught by the moratorium. [26] Two points follow. First, the certified Singapore bankruptcy orders dated 30 October 2025, exhibited as part of LCH-1 to Enclosure 30, must be received as conclusive proof of the fact and date of adjudication. The 2nd and 3rd Defendants stand, for present purposes, in the position of bankrupts. Secondly, the statutory consequences of that status including the moratorium in Section 8(1)(a) must be given effect by this Court. It is precisely because Section 8(1)(a) is engaged that the Plaintiff has come for leave; were it not engaged, no leave would be needed and the action could simply continue. [27] The engagement issue is therefore resolved in the affirmative: Section 8(1)(a) applies, and the Plaintiff is correct to have sought leave.

(iii) The provability issue [28] Section 8(1)(a) is not engaged by every claim against a bankrupt; it is engaged only where the claim is in respect of a "debt provable in bankruptcy". If the claim is not provable, the creditor does not require leave for the simple reason that the moratorium does not apply to it. [29] That distinction was applied by the High Court (Kuala Lumpur) in Dr Tikfu Gee v Kalthom bt Ithnin [2022] MLJU 2489. There the applicant sought leave under Section 8(1)(a) to commence a defamation action against a bankrupt. The Court refused leave not on the merits, but on the ground that no leave was needed: the proposed claim, being for unliquidated damages in tort, was within the exclusion in Section 40(1) and so was not a debt provable in bankruptcy. The reasoning relied, correctly, on the Federal Court's decision in Tengku Dato' Kamal Ibni Sir Sultan Abu Bakar & Ors v Bursa Malaysia Securities Bhd [2022] 4 CLJ 854 (Federal Court), which makes clear that the prohibition in Section 8(1) is addressed to a creditor pursuing a debt provable in bankruptcy and is not to be extended beyond that frame. [30] The present claim is, however, plainly of a different character. The Plaintiff's cause of action is for sums due under written banking facilities the Fixed Loan Facility of RM3,350,000.00 and the Overdraft Facility of RM2,500,000.00 pursuant to the Facilities Agreement dated 11 February 2015. The 2nd and 3rd Defendants are sued as security parties under the same contractual matrix. The claim is in contract, the sums are liquidated, and the obligation was incurred long before the date of the Singapore bankruptcy orders. The claim falls squarely within Section 40(3): it is a debt or liability "to which [the bankrupt] is subject at the date of the receiving order... by reason of any obligation incurred before the date of the receiving order". It is therefore a debt provable in bankruptcy. [31] Section 8(1)(a) is on that footing engaged. Leave is required, and the Plaintiff is right to have made the application.

(iv) The discretion issue [32] There remains the question whether leave should, in the exercise of the Court's discretion, be granted. The matters to which the Court should have regard were identified in BBMB Securities Sdn Bhd (supra) as three: the nature of the plaintiff's claim ("sifat tuntutan plaintiff"), the balance of convenience ("imbangan kesesuaian") and the justice of the case ("keadilan kes"). The categories are not closed and overlap to a degree, but they provide a useful and principled framework. I take them in turn.

Nature of the claim [33] The Plaintiff's claim is contractual, documentary, and liquidated. It is founded upon written banking facilities and a written Facilities Agreement. It is not a speculative or unliquidated claim. The 2nd and 3rd Defendants are sued in their capacity as security parties, and the place of the loan, the location of the charged properties, and the currency of dealing are all Malaysian; the only Singaporean element in the matter is the personal bankruptcy of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants themselves. The claim is, on its face, of a kind that is properly determinable in this jurisdiction and on the materials already before this Court. [34] This is a relevant consideration. Where, as here, the Court is in a position to enter judgment on substantially documentary materials and the foreign trustees in bankruptcy will require proof of debt founded on a judgment, the grant of leave assists rather than disturbs the orderly administration of the bankrupt estate. Refusal of leave would, conversely, force the Plaintiff to relitigate the entirety of its claim before the foreign trustees, with the additional burden of demonstrating its proof of debt from first principles.

Balance of convenience [35] The action was commenced on 8 August 2025, well before the Singapore bankruptcy orders of 30 October 2025. Service was effected, a Certificate of Non-Appearance was filed, and two interlocutory applications the Plaintiff's application for judgment in default (Enclosure 6) and the Defendants' Order 12 application for leave to file Defence out of time (Enclosure 13) had reached the stage of completed written submissions when the bankruptcies intervened. Continuation, in those circumstances, involves carrying through to disposal a matter that is already in train; refusal involves duplicating the proceeding in another forum, with attendant cost and delay. [36] The position of the Plaintiff in this regard is precisely what was contemplated by in Leong Wei Sheong v Malayan Trustees Berhad [2015] MLJU 830 (High Court), where it was explained that, by virtue of Section 8(1), a receiving (now bankruptcy) order "does not restrict the remedies against the property or person of the Debtor in respect of any debt provable in bankruptcy or the right to proceed with or commence any action or other legal proceeding in respect of such debt 'except as directed by the Act itself' or 'with the leave of court'". The leave mechanism is, in other words, a controlled gateway, not a prohibition. Where the substantive proceeding is advanced, properly constituted, and useful to the orderly proof of debt, the gateway should ordinarily be opened. [37] The balance of convenience plainly favours continuation.

Justice of the case [38] The justice of the case is to similar effect. The Plaintiff is a secured creditor whose claim, on the pleaded facts, accrued before the Singapore bankruptcy and which it has prosecuted with diligence. The 2nd and 3rd Defendants have not opposed the application, and their former solicitors have indicated by their letter of 13 February 2026 that they no longer hold instructions. The grant of leave deprives the 2nd and 3rd Defendants of nothing to which they are entitled: their estates remain protected by the Singapore bankruptcy administration; the moratorium continues to operate save in the limited respect for which leave is given; and any judgment obtained must be proved as a debt in Singapore in the ordinary way. [39] Refusal, by contrast, would prejudice the Plaintiff materially. Without a judgment in personam against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants, the Plaintiff's proof of debt before the foreign trustees would be encumbered by the very questions that this action was commenced to resolve. The justice of the case requires that the Plaintiff be permitted to bring its action to judgment so that, upon judgment, it may take its place among the creditors in the Singapore administration on a properly established footing. [40] It bears emphasis that the grant of leave is procedural and protective only. It does not, of itself, decide the merits of the action. It does not affect the operation of the moratorium in respect of execution against the persons or property of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants in Singapore. It does not authorise any step against the bankrupt estates other than the obtaining of judgment and the lodging of a proof of debt. Those limits should be reflected in the order. F. CONCLUSION [41] Drawing the threads together, this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the application; Section 8(1)(a) of the Act is engaged through the operation of Section 104; the Plaintiff's claim is for a debt provable in bankruptcy; and, on the materials, the discretion to grant leave should be exercised in the Plaintiff's favour. The application in Enclosure 29 must accordingly be allowed. G. ORDERS OF THE COURT [42] The Court accordingly makes the following orders:

Leave is granted to the Plaintiff under Section 8(1)(a) of the Insolvency Act 1967 to continue with Civil Suit No. MA-22NCC 13-08/2025 against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants notwithstanding the bankruptcy orders made against them by the High Court of the Republic of Singapore on 30 October 2025;

The leave granted is limited to the conduct of these proceedings to judgment and to the use of any judgment so obtained for the purpose of lodging a proof of debt in the bankruptcy administrations of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants in Singapore. No execution shall issue against the persons or property of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants without further order of this Court;

The costs of and incidental to this application shall be costs in the cause, payable out of the bankrupt estates of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants in due course of administration; and

Liberty to apply. (MELAKA) Lawyer For Plaintiff : En. Chew Wee Kian bersama Cik Melissa Ong Bee Ying Tetuan H.S. Chew & Co. Peguambela dan Peguamcara, 543-A, (1ST Floor), Taman Melaka Raya, 75000 Melaka. Lawyer For Defendent : En. Reuben Ong Shen Myn Tetuan Asadullah Sharveen & Co. Peguambela dan Peguamcara No. 662-A, Jalan Melaka Raya 8, Taman Melaka Raya, 75000 Melaka.