JA-29PB-216-05/2024
High Court of Malaysia13 Nov 2024
The written judgment as the court issued it, with the coram, case number, and source links. Every paragraph has its own anchor.
What the court ordered
Citations and treatment detected automatically from later judgments and the authorities this decision relies on.
Later cases and laws citing this decision
Not yet cited by a later decision.
Earlier cases and laws this decision relies on
“24. Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada buku "LexisNexis Guide to Litigation: Criminal Procedure Code" (2015) di mana pengarang di muka surat 72 menyatakan bahawa:- "The forms prescribed by this Act and included as part of the Act in”
“luded that Rule 139 read together with Form 53 is an exception to Rule 17 which requires every application to be made by way of a Summons in Chambers. [30] In addition to the above, Section 2 of the Insolvency Act of 1967 interprets general rules to include forms. In this circumstance, Form 53 fortifies the requirement”
“in Schedule A shall be used where applicable with such variations as the circumstances of the particular case require. In the case of Genisys Intergrated Engineers Pte Ltd v UEM Genisys Sdn Bhd & Ors [2001] AMR 1752 at p 1756 [2001] MLJU 11; the High Court at Kuala Lumpur held as follows with regard to O 1 r 7 of the R”
“kan KPI berkenaan tarikh sebenar penerimaan Notis 51B oleh JC, Mahkamah mengambil panduan dari kes Ruhimin Adzim @ Ruhimin Bin Ajim v Tan Sri Bernard Dompok & Ors [2005] 1 MLJ 345; [2004] 5 MLRH 224; [2004] CLJU 461; [2013] 3 BLR 766 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “In support of his contention that a registered l”
“rapan telah dilaksanakan selama sekurang-kurangnya 5 tahun. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah dalam kes Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Bassanio Teo Yang [2009] MLJU 313; [2009] 2 MLRH 668; [2009] 9 CLJ 413; [2009] AMEJ 0407 memutuskan bahawa:- S/N CHikvELg3Umsza2EqLd8sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the origin”
“an keperluan untuk hanya memastikan pentadbiran kebankrapan telah dilaksanakan selama sekurang-kurangnya 5 tahun. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah dalam kes Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Bassanio Teo Yang [2009] MLJU 313; [2009] 2 MLRH 668; [2009] 9 CLJ 413; [2009] AMEJ 0407 memutuskan bahawa:- S/N CHikvELg3Umsza2EqLd8sw **”
“could not be invoked for the purposes of encl. 46.” 29. Prinsip kes tersebut kemudiannya dirujuk dan digunapakai dalam kes Ravichantiran Ganesan v Mat Shah Sapuan [2021] MLJU 517; [2021] MLRHU 321; [2021] CLJU 377 di mana Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan bahawa:- “[26] It was my view that section 93(3) of the Insolvency Act”
“resent case s. 93(3) of the BA 1967 could not be invoked for the purposes of encl. 46.” 29. Prinsip kes tersebut kemudiannya dirujuk dan digunapakai dalam kes Ravichantiran Ganesan v Mat Shah Sapuan [2021] MLJU 517; [2021] MLRHU 321; [2021] CLJU 377 di mana Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan bahawa:- “[26] It was my view that”
“(3) of the BA 1967 could not be invoked for the purposes of encl. 46.” 29. Prinsip kes tersebut kemudiannya dirujuk dan digunapakai dalam kes Ravichantiran Ganesan v Mat Shah Sapuan [2021] MLJU 517; [2021] MLRHU 321; [2021] CLJU 377 di mana Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan bahawa:- “[26] It was my view that section 93(3) of”
“d where applicable with such variations as the circumstances of the particular case require. In the case of Genisys Intergrated Engineers Pte Ltd v UEM Genisys Sdn Bhd & Ors [2001] AMR 1752 at p 1756 [2001] MLJU 11; the High Court at Kuala Lumpur held as follows with regard to O 1 r 7 of the RHC which is in pari materi”
Auto-detected from judgment text; not a substitute for a citator check.
Content
1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI JOHOR BAHRU DALAM NEGERI JOHOR DARUL TAKZIM, MALAYSIA DALAM PASCA KEBANKRAPAN NO.JA-29PB-216-05/2024 BERKENAAN : MOHD ZAMBRY BIN HARON EX-PARTE : PUBLIC BANK BERHAD ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ S/N CHikvELg3Umsza2EqLd8sw Pengenalan
1
Pada 18.11.2008, satu
para
Penerimaan dan Perintah Penghukuman telah direkodkan terhadap Penghutang Penghakiman (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “JD”) atas permohonan Pemiutang Penghakiman (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “JC”). JC telah memfailkan Borang Bukti Hutang bagi kes kebankrapan ini bagi jumlah hutang RM207,214.78.
2
Ketua Pengarah Insolvensi (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “KPI”) telah mengeluarkan Notis kepada JC tentang niat untuk mengeluarkan perakuan pelepasan bankrap daripada kebankrapannya bertarikh 27.11.2023 (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “Notis 51B”) kepada JC melalui pos berdaftar pada 21.3.2024.
3
Pada 16.4.2024, KPI telah menerima Notis Bantahan Pemiutang (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “Notis 51C”) bagi membantah Notis 51B yang dikeluarkan oleh KPI atas alasan JD masih belum menyelesaikan kesemua baki hutang kepada JC. Susulan itu, KPI telah mengeluarkan surat penolakan Notis 51C bertarikh 30.4.2024 kepada JC pada 3.5.2024 melalui pos berdaftar. Dalam surat yang sama, JC dimaklumkan bahawa JC boleh mengemukakan permohonan ke Mahkamah dalam tempoh 21 hari dari tarikh dimaklumkan tentang penolakan bantahan untuk menghalang KPI daripada mengeluarkan Sijil Pelepasan kepada JD.
4
Setelah itu, JC memfailkan Saman Dalam Kamar dalam lampiran 1 yang menjadi subjek pertikaian di hadapan Mahkamah. S/N CHikvELg3Umsza2EqLd8sw Analisis dan keputusan Mahkamah:- Sama ada Notis Bantahan 51C JC telah difailkan di luar tempoh masa?
5
Seksyen 33A Akta Insolvensi 1967 (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “Akta Tersebut”) memberi kuasa budi bicara kepada KPI untuk melepaskan seseorang bankrap melalui Sijil Pelepasan KPI. Mahkamah merujuk kepada seksyen 33A Akta Tersebut yang memperuntukkan bahawa:- “(1) The Director General of Insolvency may, in his discretion but subject to section 33B, issue a certificate discharging a bankrupt from bankruptcy.
2
The Director General of Insolvency shall not issue a certificate discharging a bankrupt from bankruptcy under subsection (1) unless a period of five years has lapsed since the date of the bankruptcy order.
3
Notice of every discharge under subsection (1) shall be given by the Director General of Insolvency to the Registrar and the Director General of Insolvency shall advertise the notice in a local newspaper as prescribed…”
6
Sebagaimana diperuntukkan dalam seksyen tersebut, tiada sebarang garis panduan tertentu yang perlu diikuti KPI dalam menjalankan kuasa budi bicara beliau dalam memutuskan untuk mengeluarkan Perakuan Pelepasan Ketua Pengarah, melainkan keperluan untuk hanya memastikan pentadbiran kebankrapan telah dilaksanakan selama sekurang-kurangnya 5 tahun. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah dalam kes Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Bassanio Teo Yang [2009] MLJU 313; [2009] 2 MLRH 668; [2009] 9 CLJ 413; [2009] AMEJ 0407 memutuskan bahawa:- S/N CHikvELg3Umsza2EqLd8sw “[11] Very interestingly, unlike s. 33 under which a bankrupt seeks reprieve from the bankruptcy, s. 33A does not provide any guideline for the DGI to consider in granting a discharge. The only precondition is that five years must have elapsed since the commencement of the bankruptcy…”
7
Namun, dalam menjalankan kuasa budi bicara tersebut, KPI dibimbing oleh Garis Panduan Jabatan. Perkara ini ada dijelaskan dalam kes Re Endon Tamseran; Ex P Parkash Singh Wasawa Singh [2009] 2 MLRH 200; [2009] 8 CLJ 379 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[13] In this case the KP JIM purportedly exercised his discretionary powers under s. 33A(1) of the Act to discharge the bankrupt of her bankruptcy. Here the KP's powers is also unfettered, subject only to the rights of the creditors to object. He is guided by his standard Departmental Guidelines…”
8
KPI berhujah bahawa KPI telah mematuhi seksyen 33B(1) Akta Tersebut apabila KPI mengeluarkan Notis 51B kepada JC secara pos berdaftar pada 21.3.2024. Namun, KPI berhujah bahawa JC telah gagal mengemukakan Notis 51C dalam tempoh 21 hari kerana Notis 51C hanya dikemukakan kepada KPI pada 16.4.2024. Maka, KPI berhujah bahawa JC telah gagal mematuhi seksyen 33B(2) Akta Tersebut kerana memfailkan Notis 51C di luar tempoh masa. Dengan demikian, KPI berhujah bahawa menurut seksyen 33B(3) Akta Tersebut, JC dianggap tiada bantahan terhadap pelepasan tersebut dan dengan demikian, KPI telah mengeluarkan surat penolakan bantahan JC. S/N CHikvELg3Umsza2EqLd8sw
9
JC berhujah bahawa Notis 51B bertarikh 27.11.2023 hanya diterima JC pada 26.3.2024. Maka, tarikh akhir pemfailan bantahan Notis 51C adalah pada 16.4.2024. JC berhujah bahawa KPI tidak boleh mengira tempoh 21 hari dari tarikh pengeluaran Notis 51B dan tempoh 21 hari wajar diambil kira dari tempoh penerimaan notis oleh JC. Memandangkan Notis 51C difailkan dalam tempoh masa yang ditetapkan iaitu pada 16.4.2024, KPI tidak wajar menolak bantahan JC.
10
Mahkamah merujuk kepada seksyen 33B(1) dan (2) Akta Tersebut yang memperuntukkan bahawa:- “(1) Before issuing a certificate of discharge under section 33A, the Director General of Insolvency shall serve on each creditor who has filed a proof of debt a notice of his intention to issue the certificate.
2
A creditor who has been served with a notice under subsection (1) and who wishes to object to the issuance of a certificate discharging the bankrupt shall, within twenty-one days from the date of service of the notice, furnish a notice of the objection stating the grounds of his objection.”
11
Berdasarkan peruntukan tersebut, dalam menentukan tempoh 21 hari bagi pemfailan Notis Bantahan oleh JD dari tarikh penyampaian Notis 51B oleh KPI, Mahkamah tidak sepatutnya mengira dari tarikh penghantaran pos oleh KPI, malah sepatutnya mengambil kira dari tarikh penerimaan sebenar Notis tersebut. Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa memandangkan peruntukan seksyen 33B Akta Tersebut tidak mewajibkan penyampaian Notis kepada Pemiutang secara kediri, maka KPI boleh menyampaikan notis tersebut secara Pos Berdaftar sebagaimana dilakukan dalam kes ini. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada seksyen 130(1) Akta Tersebut yang memperuntukkan bahawa:- S/N CHikvELg3Umsza2EqLd8sw
1
All notices and other documents for the service of which no special mode is prescribed may be sent by prepaid registered post letter to the last known address of the person to be served therewith or by electronic communication in accordance with the prescribed rules.”
12
Apabila KPI menghantar surat tersebut secara Pos Berdaftar sebagaimana diperuntukkan dalam seksyen 130 Akta Tersebut, maka anggapan yang boleh dipatahkan wujud sebagaimana diperuntukkan di bawah seksyen 12 Akta Tafsiran 1948 & 1967 seperti berikut:- “12. Where a written law authorises or requires a document to be served by post, then, until the contrary is proved, service:
a
shall be presumed to be effected by properly addressing, prepaying and posting by registered post a letter containing the document; and
b
shall be presumed to have been effected at the time when the letter would have been delivered in the ordinary course of the post.”
13
Dalam mentaksirkan peruntukan ini, Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Goh Teng Whoo & Anor v Ample Objectives Sdn Bhd [2021] 3 MLJ 159; [2021] 2 MLRA 682; [2021] 4 CLJ 348; [2021] 3 AMR 881 memutuskan bahawa:- “[31]Section 12 of the Interpretation Acts must be read in its proper context. What it says is that where a document is served by registered post, service and time of service are "presumed" "until the contrary is proved". There is nothing in the section to say that posting by registered post is conclusive proof of service. What is clear is that it is a rebuttable presumption of law that can be displaced by evidence to the contrary. It is not an irrebuttable presumption that shuts out all forms of defence to the proof of posting. [32]Thus, if there is evidence that the defendant has not been served with the document, the presumption is rebutted and the court will make a finding that there has been no service of the document in an application for setting aside. It is anathema to the concept of justice and fair play that a defendant who has no knowledge of the action is attached with liability without being given the opportunity to explain why the default judgment should not be entered against him.” S/N CHikvELg3Umsza2EqLd8sw
14
Maka, berdasarkan nas-nas tersebut, penyampaian melalui pos dianggap disempurnakan pada tarikh penyampaian secara lazim sesuatu penyampaian secara pos disempurnakan. Dalam ketiadaan sebarang bukti yang dikemukakan KPI berkenaan tarikh sebenar penerimaan Notis 51B oleh JC, Mahkamah mengambil panduan dari kes Ruhimin Adzim @ Ruhimin Bin Ajim v Tan Sri Bernard Dompok & Ors [2005] 1 MLJ 345; [2004] 5 MLRH 224; [2004] CLJU 461; [2013] 3 BLR 766 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “In support of his contention that a registered letter posted from Kota Kinabalu Sabah to Putrajaya would be delivered in the ordinary course of the post within four working days after posting, the 1st respondent produced a letter from one Encik Ahsim Jamat, Head of Mail Operation, Pos Malaysia Berhad in which he said that Pos Malaysia had set a service standard which is the time taken between posting and delivery of mail, to measure the performance of delivery internally only. The service standard for registered post adopted by Pos Malaysia was as follows:- CATEGORY 1 1) Within the same state a) Local Delivery b) Between Town c) Between Outskirt Town D + 2 D + 3 CATEGORY 2 2) Between States a) Between Major Towns b) Between Other Towns c) Between Outskirt Towns D + 3 D + 5 S/N CHikvELg3Umsza2EqLd8sw CATEGORY 3 I) II) Between Peninsular, Sabah & Sarawak Between Sabah (Kota Kinabalu) / Sarawak (Kuching) and Peninsular (Major Town) Between Sabah (other Town) / Sarawak (other Towns) and Peninsular (other Town) D + 5 III) Between Sabah (Outskirt Town) / Sarawak (Outskirt Town) and Peninsular (Outskirt Town) D + 6 The measurement manner of the service standard mentioned above is as follows: D meaning the day the posting is made D+1 meaning delivery one day after the posting is made D+2 meaning delivery two days after the posting is made D+3 meaning delivery three days after the posting is made D+4 meaning delivery four days after the posting is made and so on Nevertheless, this service standard is measured on working days only and does not include gazetted Public Holidays. Based on the evidence produced by the 1st respondent I accept that a registered letter posted from Kota Kinabalu Sabah to Putrajaya will be received four working days after posting in the ordinary course of post...”
15
Dalam kes ini, Notis 51B dihantar KPI ke alamat JC di Kuala Lumpur. Maka, berdasarkan garis panduan dalam kes tersebut, penyampaian secara pos berdaftar di antara Johor Bahru ke Kuala Lumpur akan mengambil masa 3 hari untuk disampaikan kepada JC dalam keadaan biasa. Memandangkan Notis 51B dihantar pada 21.3.24, maka dalam keadaan biasa, Notis tersebut sepatutnya telah disampaikan kepada JC pada 24.3.24. Namun, sebagaimana dinyatakan dalam kes tersebut, prosedur pengiraan penyampaian yang dinyatakan tersebut hanya terpakai pada hari bekerja biasa dan tidak mengambil kira keadaan di mana terdapat cuti umum. S/N CHikvELg3Umsza2EqLd8sw
16
Semakan Mahkamah mendapati Hari Keputeraan Rasmi Duli Yang Maha Mulia Sultan Johor jatuh pada 23.3.24. Dalam keadaan ini, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa pendirian JC bahawa Notis 51B yang dihantar KPI pada 21.3.24 hanya diterima pada 26.3.24 adalah bukan sesuatu yang diluar batasan logik dan disokong lanjut melalui Eksibit NMN-2 Afidavit Sokongan JC. Maka, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa Notis Bantahan JC iaitu Notis 51C yang difailkan pada 16.4.24 adalah dalam tempoh masa yang dibenarkan menurut seksyen 33B(2) Akta Tersebut dan dengan demikian, keputusan KPI dalam menolak Notis 51C JC melalui surat bertarikh 30.4.24 atas alasan difailkan di luar tempoh masa yang dibenarkan adalah salah di sisi undang-undang.
17
Berdasarkan alasan-alasan ini, Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa bantahan KPI adalah tidak bermerit dan dengan demikian wajar ditolak. Sama ada Permohonan Bantahan JC adalah selaras dengan Akta Tersebut dan Kaedah-kaedah Insolvensi 2017?
18
KPI merujuk kepada Kaedah 196 Kaedah-kaedah Insolvensi 2017 (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “Kaedah Tersebut”) yang memperuntukkan bahawa:- “Every application by a creditor under subsection 33B(4) of the Act shall be in Form 98 and supported by affidavit.” S/N CHikvELg3Umsza2EqLd8sw
19
KPI berhujah bahawa Permohonan Bantahan JC telah gagal menggunakan mod permohonan selaras dengan borang 98 dan dengan demikian Permohonan Bantahan JC adalah cacat dan tidak sah.
20
Mahkamah merujuk kepada borang 98 yang memperuntukkan bahawa:- No. 98 In the High Court in Malaya/Sabah and Sarawak at…………………………………………. In Bankruptcy No……………………. of…………………………..20…... BETWEEN
1
THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF INSOLVENCY
2
NAME OF THE BANKRUPT APPLICATION OF CREDITOR FOR ORDER PROHIBITING THE DRECTOR GENERALOF
4
(r. 196) I/We ..................... a creditor/the creditors object to the discharge of the bankrupt from bankruptcy under (Name) subsection 33B (4) of the Act prohibiting the Director General of Insolvency from issuing a certificate of discharge under Section 33A. AND FURTHER TAKE NOTICE that any objection you may have against his discharge from bankruptcy shall, within twenty-one days from the date of being informed by the Director General of Insolvency. Dated this .......................day of ..........., 20…….... ........................ (Creditor's signature) ......................... ......................... (Address) S/N CHikvELg3Umsza2EqLd8sw
21
Mahkamah dapati permohonan yang difailkan JC jelas tidak mengikuti borang 98 yang dinyatakan di atas. Undang-undang adalah mantap bahawa perkataan “shall” dalam peruntukan Kaedah 196 tersebut adalah mandatori. Malah, seksyen 2 kepada Akta Tersebut memperuntukkan bahawa “general rules” adalah termasuk borang-borang. Dalam mentaksirkan peruntukan ini, Mahkamah Tinggi dalam kes New Ru Eng v Lew Chee Hwa [JB-29PB-290-08/2023] [Unreported] memutuskan bahawa:- “[25] Rule 17 of the Insolvency Rules 2017 states except where the Rules or the Act otherwise provide, every application to the Court shall, unless the Chief Judge directs be made by summons in chambers supported by affidavit. [26] In my opinion, the wording “where the Rules otherwise provide” allows an application to annul a Bankruptcy Order to be made by way of a Notice of Application. [27] This is because Rule 139 of the Insolvency Rules 2017 which concerns an application to annul a Bankruptcy Order in its heading itself refers to a Notice of Application. [28] Next, Form 53 which is the prescribed form under the Insolvency Rules 2017 for an application to annul a Bankruptcy Order under Section 105 also refers to the word “Application” and not to a “Summons”. For easy reference, Form 53 is reproduced below: -… [29] In the circumstance, I find the learned SAR had correctly concluded that Rule 139 read together with Form 53 is an exception to Rule 17 which requires every application to be made by way of a Summons in Chambers. [30] In addition to the above, Section 2 of the Insolvency Act of 1967 interprets general rules to include forms. In this circumstance, Form 53 fortifies the requirement in Rule 139 that the mode to annul a Bankruptcy Order is by way of a Notice of Application.” S/N CHikvELg3Umsza2EqLd8sw
22
Tambahan lagi, Kaedah 296(1) Kaedah Tersebut dengan jelas memperuntukkan bahawa:- “(1) The forms in the Schedule, where applicable, and where they are not applicable, forms of the like character, with such variations as circumstances may require shall be used.”
23
Keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi tersebut adalah konsisten dengan keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Lim Eng Chuan Sdn Bhd v Malayan Banking Corporation & Anor [2013] 3 MLJ 161; [2013] 3 MLRA 275; [2013] 5 CLJ 425; [2023] 3 AMR 760 yang memutuskan bahawa borang yang dilampirkan dalam Jadual kepada sesuatu Akta adalah sebahagian daripada Akta itu sendiri, dan perlu diberi kesan penuh seakan peruntukan Akta itu. Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan bahawa:- "[60] It might be mentioned here that the inclusion of a schedule(s) to an Act of Parliament is commonplace and that it is now an established legislative drafting practice to do so. This is especially true where specific forms are prescribed for the purpose of carrying into effect the sections set out in the main body of the Act. Thus, the schedule is to be read and construed as an integral, essential and operative part of the Act. (See Attorney General v. Lamplough [1878] 3 Ex D 214, 229)."
24
Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada buku "LexisNexis Guide to Litigation: Criminal Procedure Code" (2015) di mana pengarang di muka surat 72 menyatakan bahawa:- "The forms prescribed by this Act and included as part of the Act in
Schedule
Schedule 2 have the same force of law as the Act itself, ie, they have the same legal effect and authority as the Act itself..." S/N CHikvELg3Umsza2EqLd8sw 25. Dalam menjelaskan kesan ketidakpatuhan borang yang diperuntukkan dalam Jadual kepada Kaedah Tersebut, Mahkamah dalam kes Soda KL Plaza Sdn Bhd v Noble Circle (M) Sdn Bhd [2002] 2 MLJ 367; [2001] 8 MLRH 444 memutuskan bahawa:- “It can be seen that the aforesaid case authorities had consistently interpreted the word ‘shall’ or ‘must’ in the RHC as a mandatory provision which must be strictly complied with wherein a breach of the same cannot be cured because no discretion can be exercised. A fortiori, it is trite law that the Forms of the RHC ought to be strictly adhered to and any ‘variation’ would only be allowed where ‘the circumstances of the particular case require’. Order 1 r 8 of the SCR provides: The Forms in Schedule A shall be used where applicable with such variations as the circumstances of the particular case require. In the case of Genisys Intergrated Engineers Pte Ltd v UEM Genisys Sdn Bhd & Ors [2001] AMR 1752 at p 1756 [2001] MLJU 11; the High Court at Kuala Lumpur held as follows with regard to O 1 r 7 of the RHC which is in pari materia with O 1 r 8 of the SCR: The word ‘shall’ as used in O 56 r 1(2) of the RHC indicates the mandatory nature of the requirement. In Yu Oi Yong & Anor v Ho Toong Peng & Ors [1977] 1 MLJ 120, Chang Min Tat J, held that the rules and prescribed forms thereunder are primarily to be followed unless departure justifies it. This case was cited with approval by the Federal Court in TR Hamzah & Yeang Sdn Bhd v Lazar Sdn Bhd [1985] 2 MLJ 45. In this context, I fully agree with Abdul Malik Ishak J, in Dato’ Wong Gek Meng's case when he said: In my judgment, strict and dutiful adherence to forms and rules especially to the RHC will, in the long run, ensure an efficient bar and with it, hopefully, a speedy and efficient administration of justice. Objections to technicalities must be viewed prima facie as non-compliance with the rules and the defaulters must pay dearly for it. It is obsolete now to adopt the old-fashioned attitude that the rules of the RHC are intended to facilitate and not impede the administration of justice. In the contrary, the administration of justice would be curtailed if the rules embodied in the RHC are not religiously followed. With the advent of the Multimedia Superior Corridor, lawyers cannot afford to adopt a lackadaisical attitude nor can they wring their hands [2002] 2 MLJ 367 at 374and say that the courts would show mercy to them. As a code of procedure, the RHC should be strictly followed to the letter. I would also like to refer to O 1 r 7 of the RHC which says: S/N CHikvELg3Umsza2EqLd8sw The Forms in Appendix A shall be used where applicable with such variation as the circumstance of the particular case require. Again, the word ‘shall’ used thereunder indicates the mandatory nature of the requirement. Variations can only be accepted as the circumstances of the particular case require. In the circumstances, I am of the view that the plaintiff had breached two mandatory provisions, namely: Order 1 r 8 of the RHC (‘shall’) and O 5 r 1 of the SCR (‘must’).” 26. Malah, keputusan-keputusan Mahkamah atasan telah dengan jelas memutuskan bahawa kesilapan mod permulaan akan menggugat akar umbi permohonan tersebut dan dengan demikian akan terbatal. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Rayuan Azman Jufri v Medtronic Australasia Pty Ltd & Another Appeal [2015] 6 MLJ 841; [2015] 4 MLRA 312; [2015] 5 CLJ 1026; [2015] 4 AMR 45 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- " In the circumstances, the filing of a notice of application by the JC as opposed to a summons in chambers is a clear breach of a mandatory provision. The breach is not a mere irregularity or formal defect capable of being cured. The application is in a sense the originating process upon which the JC seeks to obtain an order for substituted service. As such the wrong mode adopted by the JC undermines the very stratum of the application for substituted service itself and consequently, any order obtained thereunder must be equally tainted and rendered null and void". 27. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah tidak terlepas pandang dengan hujahan JC bahawa Mahkamah ini mempunyai budi bicara untuk menerima Saman Dalam Kamar yang difailkan JC menurut seksyen 93(3) Akta Tersebut yang memperuntukkan bahawa:- “(3) The court may at any time amend any written process or proceeding upon such terms, if any, as it thinks fit to impose.” S/N CHikvELg3Umsza2EqLd8sw 15 28. Dalam mentaksirkan peruntukan ini, Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Ambank (M) Bhd & Ors v Lim Sue Beng [2019] 4 MLJ 701; [2019] 4 MLRA 433; [2019] 7 CLJ 289; [2019] 3 AMR 829 memutuskan bahawa:- “[22] This brings us to s. 93(3) of the BA 1967, which under the legislation is the only provision that allows for any amendment to the "written process or proceeding". However, the exercise of the High Court's powers under the provision is limited to clerical or minor errors that cause no prejudice to the judgment debtor. This can be seen in the cases cited by learned counsel for the respondent. …In our opinion, the proposed amendments in the present case go to the substance of the bankruptcy notice and creditor's petition and could not be regarded as a technical one or a mere slip. Hence, in the present case s. 93(3) of the BA 1967 could not be invoked for the purposes of encl. 46.” 29. Prinsip kes tersebut kemudiannya dirujuk dan digunapakai dalam kes Ravichantiran Ganesan v Mat Shah Sapuan [2021] MLJU 517; [2021] MLRHU 321; [2021] CLJU 377 di mana Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan bahawa:- “[26] It was my view that section 93(3) of the Insolvency Act cannot be used as a carte blanche by the Court to make amendments. I drew guidance from the Federal Court case of AmBank (M) Bhd Ors v. Lim Sue Beng...” 30. Keputusan-keputusan tersebut dengan jelas menunjukkan bahawa remedi di bawah seksyen 93(3) Akta Tersebut hanya dapat digunakan bagi kesilapan perkeranian yang kecil dan tidak terpakai bagi pindaan yang substantif. Berdasarkan pemerhatian ini, permohonan JC dalam lampiran 1 telah memohon relif berikut:- S/N CHikvELg3Umsza2EqLd8sw 31. Penelitian permohonan JC dengan jelas menunjukkan bahawa permohonan JC bukan semata-mata bertentangan dengan format borang 98, malah kandungan permohonan JC itu sendiri memohon relif yang tidak berkaitan dengan pelepasan seseorang bankrap melalui sijil pelepasan KPI di bawah seksyen 33A Akta Tersebut. Sebagaimana permohonan JC, JC memohon melalui lampiran 1 supaya Borang Bukti Hutang yang difailkan JC diterima oleh KPI. 32. Dalam hal ini, undang-undang yang mengawal selia penerimaan dan penolakan Borang Bukti Hutang adalah menurut seksyen 42 Akta Tersebut yang memperuntukkan bahawa:- “The rules in Schedule C shall be observed with respect to the mode of proving debts, the right of proof by secured and other creditors, the admission and rejection of proofs and other matters.” 33. Permohonan JC adalah berdasarkan perenggan 28 Jadual C kepada Akta Tersebut yang memperuntukkan bahawa:- “If a creditor is dissatisfied with the decision of the Director General of Insolvency in respect of a proof, the court may on the application of the creditor reverse or vary the decision.” 34. Dalam kes ini, sebagaimana dideposkan oleh KPI dalam perenggan 9 Afidavit Jawapan KPI, KPI telah menerima dan memperakui Borang Bukti Hutang yang telah difailkan oleh Public Bank Berhad sebanyak RM207,214.78. Maka, disamping format permohonan yang dipohon JC melalui lampiran 1, relif yang dipohon JC juga langsung tidak berkaitan memandangkan KPI telah memperakui Borang Bukti Hutang yang difailkan JC. Berdasarkan kertas-kertas kausa yang difailkan JC S/N CHikvELg3Umsza2EqLd8sw disamping permohonan dalam lampiran 1, Mahkamah percaya JC sebenarnya berhasrat untuk mefailkan permohonan untuk menghalang KPI dari mengeluarkan Sijil Pelepasan untuk melepaskan JD dari kebankrapan menurut seksyen 33A Akta Tersebut. Sebagaimana dihujahkan KPI, permohonan tersebut adalah sebenarnya dikawal selia menurut seksyen 33B(4) dan 6 Akta Tersebut yang memperuntukkan bahawa:- “(4) A creditor who has furnished a notice of his objection and the grounds of his objection in accordance with subsection (2) may, within twenty-one days of being informed by the Director General of Insolvency that his objection has been rejected, make an application to the court for an order prohibiting the Director General of Insolvency from issuing a certificate of discharge…. (6) On an application made under subsection (4), the court may, if it thinks it just and expedient- (a) dismiss the application; (b) make an order that for a period not exceeding two years a certificate of discharge shall not be issued by the Director General of Insolvency. 35. Berdasarkan peruntukan-peruntukan tersebut, permohonan yang dihasratkan JC dan permohonan yang telah sebenarnya difailkan JC adalah dua permohonan berbeza menurut Akta Tersebut dan relif yang dipohon langsung tidak berkaitan antara satu sama lain. Kedua-dua permohonan tersebut melibatkan pertimbangan Mahkamah yang berbeza dan tidak berkait langsung antara satu sama lain. Maka, seksyen 93(3) Akta Tersebut tidak dapat digunakan bagi memulihkan defek dalam permohonan JC tersebut kerana seandainya Mahkamah berbuat demikian, maka perkara tersebut akan mengubah karakter atau sifat permohonan JC, yang tidak seharusnya dibenarkan menurut nas Lim Sue Beng (Supra). S/N CHikvELg3Umsza2EqLd8sw 36. Dalam apa jua keadaan, Mahkamah dapati JC langsung tidak membuat sebarang permohonan formal untuk meminda lampiran 1 sehingga tarikh perbicaraan lampiran 1 walaupun KPI telah memaklumkan semasa memfailkan Afidavit Jawapan KPI bahawa KPI telah sebenarnya menerima dan memperakui Borang Bukti Hutang yang telah difailkan JC dan permohonan JC adalah tidak selaras dengan Borang 98 Kaedah Tersebut. 37. Maka, berdasarkan alasan-alasan yang dinyatakan di atas, Mahkamah membenarkan bantahan awal KPI berkenaan ketidakaturan permohonan JC dalam lampiran 1. Kesimpulan: 38. Berdasarkan alasan-alasan yang dinyatakan di atas, Mahkamah membatalkan permohonan JC tanpa mempertimbangkan merit permohonan JC dengan kebebasan untuk memfailkan semula. Mahkamah menggunakan budi bicara untuk tidak membuat sebarang perintah terhadap kos. Bertarikh: 13 November 2024 Disediakan oleh, …………………………………. ARUN A/L NOVAL DASS Timbalan Pendaftar Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya Johor Bahru S/N CHikvELg3Umsza2EqLd8sw Pihak-pihak: 1. Tetuan Lee Fook Leong & Co Peguambela & Peguamcara Peguam bagi Pemiutang Penghakiman No.29, 31 & 33, Tingkat 1 Jalan Kekwa 85000 Segamat, Johor (Ruj: PBC/N/18/05) … Puan Norizawati Bt Md Noor 2. Ketua Pengarah Insolvensi Aras 12, Menara Tabung Haji, Jalan Ayer Molek, Johor Bahru, Johor [No Ruj:-] … Encik Abdul Muqsit Bin Sani S/N CHikvELg3Umsza2EqLd8sw Kes-kes yang dirujuk: 1. Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Bassanio Teo Yang [2009] MLJU 313; [2009] 2 MLRH 668; [2009] 9 CLJ 413; [2009] AMEJ 0407 2. Re Endon Tamseran; Ex P Parkash Singh Wasawa Singh [2009] 2 MLRH 200; [2009] 8 CLJ 379 3. Goh Teng Whoo & Anor v Ample Objectives Sdn Bhd [2021] 3 MLJ 159; [2021] 2 MLRA 682; [2021] 4 CLJ 348; [2021] 3 AMR 881 4. Ruhimin Adzim @ Ruhimin Bin Ajim v Tan Sri Bernard Dompok & Ors [2005] 1 MLJ 345; [2004] 5 MLRH 224; [2004] CLJU 461; [2013] 3 BLR 766 5. Lim Eng Chuan Sdn Bhd v Malayan Banking Corporation & Anor [2013] 3 6. MLJ 161; [2013] 3 MLRA 275; [2013] 5 CLJ 425; [2023] 3 AMR 760 Soda KL Plaza Sdn Bhd v Noble Circle (M) Sdn Bhd [2002] 2 MLJ 367; [2001] 8 MLRH 444 7. New Ru Eng v Lew Chee Hwa [JB-29PB-290-08/2023] 8. Azman Jufri v Medtronic Australasia Pty Ltd & Another Appeal [2015] 6 MLJ 841; [2015] 4 MLRA 312; [2015] 5 CLJ 1026; [2015] 4 AMR 45 9. Ambank (M) Bhd & Ors v Lim Sue Beng [2019] 4 MLJ 701; [2019] 4 MLRA 433; [2019] 7 CLJ 289; [2019] 3 AMR 829 10. Ravichantiran Ganesan v Mat Shah Sapuan [2021] MLJU 517; [2021] MLRHU 321; [2021] CLJU 377 S/N CHikvELg3Umsza2EqLd8sw
Wrong text, a broken link, out-of-date content, or a removal request — tell us and we'll check it against the official source.