Public Bank Berhad v Umapagan A/L K Ampikaipakan (WA-22NCC-598-09/2024)

UMAPAGAN A/L K AMPIKAIPAKAN (NRIC No.:801231-14-6083)

AMPIKAIPAKAN A/L S. KANDIAH (NRIC No.:460920-10-5321)

ARUBUGAM A/L SUPPIAH (NRIC No.:521016-08-5621)

SIVAKAMASUNDARI NARAYANI A/P K AMPIKAIPAKAN (NRIC No.:730528-10-5500) …DEFENDANTS JUDGMENT Introduction [1] The 3rd Defendant (“D3”) is one for three guarantors who had executed guarantees for various loans extended by the Plaintiff to the 1st Defendant (“D1”). In addition to the guarantees, a property located at Damansara Heights was also charged to the Plaintiff as security. [2] The Plaintiff has commenced this civil action against D1 and the guarantors. At the same time, the Plaintiff also commenced foreclosure proceedings against the charged property. [3] Enclosure 10 is the application filed by D3 for a stay of the present proceedings against him until the disposal of the foreclosure proceedings. Specifically, D3 sought for the following order: “that all further proceedings in this civil suit be stayed until the land held under H.S. (D) 32344, P.T. No. 1140, Mukim Kuala Lumpur, District of Kuala Lumpur, Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur is sold by a Court-sanctioned Public Auction, pursuant to an application by the Plaintiff for an Order for the sale of the said land charged to the Plaintiff under Section 256 of the National Land Code, 1965 or sold by other means, and the sale proceeds paid to the Plaintiff”. [4] After hearing oral submissions from counsel, this Court found no merits to D3’s application under Enclosure 10 and dismissed the same with costs. Background Facts [5] The background facts below are based on D3’s narratives in his written submission. The Parties [6] The 2nd Defendant, Dr. Ampikaipakan Kandiah, (“Dr. Ampi”), is a respiratory specialist at Pantai Hospital, Kuala Lumpur and a renowned philanthropist. [7] The 1st Defendant, Umapagan A/L K Ampikaipakan (“D1”), a former radio host, is Dr. Ampi’s son. [8] The 4th Defendant, Sivakamasundari Narayani a/p K Ampikaipakan (“D4”), is Dr. Ampi's daughter. [9] Dr Ampi is the registered proprietor of the property with the street address, 55, Jalan Beka, Damansara Heights, Bukit Damansara, 50490 Kuala Lumpur, located on freehold land and held under H.S.

(D) 32344, P.T. No. 1140, Mukim Kuala Lumpur, District of Kuala Lumpur, Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur (“the Property”). He lives in an upmarket bungalow at the Property, with his wife Thamayanthi Devi Ampikaipakan (“Thamayanthi”) and D1. [10] D3, Arubugam a/l Suppiah was a longstanding friend of Dr. Ampi. [11] Around 1982, the D3 began consulting Dr. Ampi as a lung specialist. He had been the D3’s personal physician for over 30 years. Circumstances Leading to the Signing of Guarantees [12] Sometime in 2010, Dr. Ampi invited the D3 for tea at the Property, and requested D3 to act as a guarantor for a bank loan. Contrary to Dr Ampi’s assertion, D3 did not volunteer to be a guarantor. Dr Ampi represented to D3 that he intended to finance the reconstruction of his house into a 3-storey bungalow, and went on to state that he had secured a loan from the Plaintiff (“Bank”) to finance the building works. D3 was told by Dr. Ampi that the Bank required 3 guarantors for the loan, and his son-in-law (D4’s husband) had refused to sign as a guarantor. [13] D3 assumed that Dr. Ampi was the borrower of the loan as the Property belonged to him, and he was the largest earner and the most financially stable, given his medical practice in that family. Most importantly, Dr Ampi did not tell D3 that anyone apart from him (Dr. Ampi) would be the borrower. Completely trusting Dr. Ampi, D3 agreed to be a guarantor. [14] In 2010, D3 signed 2 letters of guarantee on 2 separate occasions at the Property, with no copies of the guarantees provided to him either by the Bank or Dr. Ampi. Neither were copies of the loan agreement provided to D3. [15] Sometime in 2011, Dr. Ampi’s wife, Thamayanthi, informed D3 that a third guarantee was required. D3 signed the further guarantee at the Property. On this occasion, no Bank representatives were present, unlike in the past. Again, a copy of the guarantee was never provided to D3. [16] Over the following 14 years, D3 was not kept informed by the Bank about the status of the loan or the yearly status of the loan accounts. No notices were sent about any missed payments or defaults of the loan. He was kept entirely in the dark by both the Bank, and Dr Ampi and his family. [17] However, 14 years later, on 16-1-2024, one Ms. Lo, a representative from the Credit Control Centre of the Bank, informed D3 that there had been default of instalment payments on the loan. This was the first instance D3 knew that there was such a default. [18] By way of email dated 12-1-2024 (retrieved from D3’s junk folder), D3 discovered that there had in fact been default by D1 of instalment payments on the loan facilities from 30-4-2023, amounting to RM102,318-2914. [19] D3 was further surprised to discover that the borrower was D1, and not Dr Ampi. This was the first time, D3 realized that Dr Ampi was not the borrower. D3 immediately called Dr. Ampi’s wife, Thamayanthi, for an explanation on this. She reassured him that the situation would be resolved, and that she had already cautioned the Bank to avoid getting the D3 involved. [20] On 22-1-2024, the said Ms Lo informed D3 that the Bank had attempted to reach the other Defendants, but there had been no response. Ms Lo requested D3 to speak with Dr Ampi’s family to arrange for a minimum payment of RM67,200-00 by 30-1-2024. [21] Between 29-1-2024 and 31-1-2024, D3 and Dr Ampi’s wife, Thamayanthi exchanged multiple WhatsApp messages, where Thamayanthi claimed that she was in the midst of raising funds. She informed D3 that Dr Ampi and her were trying to sell the Property. [22] On 24-1-2024, D3 received a letter from the Bank dated 22-1-2024, sent via WhatsApp from Ms Lo to him. The letter was addressed to D1, but copied to Dr Ampi and D3. The said letter purported to reply to a previous letter dated 18-1-2024 from D1 (which D3 never received), requesting for the Bank’s indulgence to withdraw legal action. The Bank however denied D1’s request in its letter of 22-1- 2024 on the grounds that:

the Bank had ‘diligently reviewed the numerous Repayment Assistance provided to you [D1] since April 2020 to October 2023 and it is with regret that we find the financial difficulties persist despite extended time granted for resolution’; and

(ii) the Bank would commence legal action for the arrears stated in its letter of demand dated 12-1-2024, as ‘The Bank has afforded ample opportunity for you to address the challenges faced since 2020 but there has been no distinct improvement’ [23] On the same day, by way of letter dated 22-1-202421, the Bank wrote to inform D3 that the Bank intended to exercise its rights to suspend or earmark the outstanding sum of RM 64,363-00 from his personal account, in settlement of the liabilities under the loan facilities, without further notice to him. D3’s account was briefly suspended in late January 2024, but it had since been lifted. [24] On 29-1-2024, D3 sent an email to the Bank expressing his concerns about the Bank and D1’s failure to inform him of the default for 14 years, the Bank’s failure to ensure that the account was maintained properly, the Bank’s lack of disclosure, the absence of loan documents provided by the Bank, and the Bank’s failure to treat him appropriately as a guarantor. As there was a Charge over the Property, D3 also contended that the Bank should pursue foreclosure proceedings against Dr Ampi before turning to him for repayment. [25] The Bank did not respond to D3’s email of 29-1-2024. On or about 19-2-2024, D3 telephoned one Ms Michelle Ma, the Branch Manager at Damansara Heights for the Bank. The Bank via Ms Ma, assured D3 that he would not be sued. The Letters of Guarantee [26] By email dated 19-2-2024, Ms Michelle Ma forwarded D3 copies of the Letters of Guarantee. This was the first time D3 had sight of the 3 Guarantees signed by him. [27] Upon reading the guarantees, D3 noted that:

the Letter of Guarantee dated 7-6-2010 stated in its Schedule of Facilities that 2 facilities were being granted by the Bank to the customer, D1, viz:

‘MORE Plan 10 – Housing Loan (Redraw) of RM 2,500,000- 00’; and

‘MORE Plan 10 – Overdraft of RM 500,000-00’.

(ii) the second Letter of Guarantee dated 6-7-2010 was for the sum of RM 2,500,000-00. The Schedule of Facilities to this letter of guarantee stated that 1 facility was granted by the Bank to its customer, D1 namely: ‘Home Plan 10 – Housing Loan (HL)(Redraw)’. No specific monetary sum of this loan facility was specified in the Schedule; and

(iii) the Letter of Guarantee dated 14-7-2011 28 stated in the Schedule of Facilities that the facility granted by the Bank to its customer, D1 was: ‘Home Plan 10 – Housing Loan (HL)(Redraw) of RM 700,000-00’. [28] Contrary to earlier representations in 2010, D3 discovered that the D4 did not sign as a guarantor for the earlier loans, as the relevant loans were only guaranteed by Dr Ampi and himself. This is contrary to what was represented by Dr Ampi to D3 in 2010. D3 discovered that D4 had stood as guarantor for additional loans taken out on the Property. The Bank and the other Defendants had not informed D3 of this. [29] The Letters of Guarantee dated 7-6-2010, 6-7-2010 and 14-7-2011 are identical. Under Clause 9, in addition to being a guarantor, D3 was to be treated by the Bank as a ‘principal debtor’. Clause 9 reads: “though as between me and the Customer, I the sureties only for the Customer, yet as between me and you [the Plaintiff Bank], I and each of us shall be deemed to be principal debtors for all the moneys the payment of which is hereby guaranteed […]” Service of Writ and Discovery of the Multiple Loan Facilities on the Property [30] On 19-9-2024, D3 was served with the Writ and Statement of Claim. According to the Statement of Claim, 5 facilities totalling a sum of RM 6,650,000-00 were extended to D1:

A Housing Loan Facility amounting to RM2,500,000.00 (“Housing Loan Facility (1)”) and an Overdraft Facility amounting to RM500,000.00 (“Overdraft Loan Facility”) to refinance the Property, with the remaining amount for personal use;

(ii) A Housing Loan Facility amounting to RM2,500,000.00 (“Housing Loan Facility (2)”) to finance the construction of a 3-storey bungalow with a basement on the said Property;

(iii) A Housing Loan Facility amounting to RM700,000.00 (“Housing Loan Facility (3)”) to finance the construction of a 3-storey bungalow with a basement on the said Property;

(iv) A Housing Loan Facility amounting to RM800,000.00 (“Housing Loan Facility (4)”) for personal use; and

A Fixed Loan Facility amounting to RM150,000.00 (“Fixed Loan Facility”) for personal needs. (the “Loan Facilities”). [31] According to the Statement of Claim, the documents evidencing these facilities are:

Letters of Offer dated 26-4-2010, 11-6-2010, 19-11-2010, 1- 4-2013 and 23-10-2014;

(ii) 3 Facility Agreements dated 12-7-2010, 15-7-2010, and 14-7- 2011; and

(iii) A Third-Party Charge in favour of the Bank via Charge Presentation 26260/2010, executed by Dr Ampi over the said Property. (the “Loan Agreements”). [32] On 1-10-2024, D3 finally secured the Loan Agreements, upon service of a Notice to Produce Documents referred to in Pleadings dated 24-9-2024 on the Bank’s solicitors by D3’s solicitors. D3 only received the Loan Agreements on 1-10-2024, which is 14 years after he signed the first guarantee. D3 was not informed of the terms of the Loan Facilities at the time of the signing of the Letters of Guarantee, nor at any point up to the service of the Statement of Claim. Foreclosure Proceedings [33] On 13-8-2024, foreclosure proceedings were commenced by the Bank against Dr Ampi, as the registered proprietor of the Property secured under the Charge in Kuala Lumpur High Court Suit No. WA- 24FC-1175-08/202437. [34] The details of the said Foreclosure Proceedings were discovered through a file search following the case management of this Suit on 9-9-2024, when the Bank’s counsel informed this Court that foreclosure proceedings have been commenced. This was the first time that D3 was informed of such proceedings. [35] Subsequently, D3‘s counsel wrote to the Bank’s counsel to request for details of the Foreclosure Proceedings, and for it to be heard as soon as possible. No response has been given by the Bank, except for the case reference number of the Foreclosure Proceedings. [36] Apparently, the hearing of the Foreclosure Proceedings has been fixed on 28.1.2025. Grounds for Stay of Proceedings under Enclosure 10 [37] Premised on the aforesaid facts, D3’s stay application under Enclosure 10 was anchored on the following grounds, which D3 contended amounted to “Special Circumstances”:

by its actions and omissions, the Bank deceived and or induced D3 into executing the 3 Guarantees;

(ii) the 3 Guarantees were void and or invalid in law, pursuant to Sections 19, 95 and or 96 of the Contracts Act, 1950;

(iii) the Bank had voluntarily granted extended time to D1 to repay and make up for his default on the Loan Facilities, without D3’s knowledge and consent;

(iv) accordingly, D3 was discharged from his liability under the 3 Guarantees by reason of Sections 86 and 88 of the Contracts Act, 1950;

further and or alternatively, D3 was discharged from his liability under the 3 Guarantees pursuant to Section 92 and 94 of the Contracts Act, 1950 as the Bank in its capacity as creditor had acted inconsistently with the rights of D3 as surety to the benefit of the Charged Property by failing to promptly commence foreclosure proceedings to recoup the outstanding debt against D1 arising from the latter’s default on the Loan

(vi) an order for Stay would not prejudice the Bank, which has already commenced Foreclosure Proceedings; and

(vii) in any event, D3 is a “Social Guarantor” within the meaning of Sections 2 and 5(3) of the Insolvency Act, 1967, and had executed the 3 Guarantees not for the purpose of making a profit, but for a personal friend. Court’s Considerations [38] The Court’s power to grant a stay of proceedings is derived from its inherent jurisdiction under Order 92 Rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012 (“ROC 2012”). It is a discretion that must be exercised judiciously and in accordance with established legal principles to ensure justice and fairness between parties. The Court will only grant a stay of proceedings if valid grounds are demonstrated by the applicant. The key considerations for the evaluation are as follows: i) there is the existence of special circumstances that must be exceptional and compelling, such that it would be unjust or inequitable for the case to proceed; ii) the balance of justice, which requires the Court to weigh whether granting a stay would prejudice the opposing party or cause unnecessary delay, compared to the potential harm to the applicant if the stay is not granted; iii) the prevention of abuse of process such that if the Court finds that the application is frivolous, vexatious or intended to solely to delay proceedings, the stay will be refused. [See: Jagdis Singh Banta Singh v Outlet Rank (M) Sdn Bhd [2013] 3 MLRA 104; Kosmo Palm Oil Mill Sdn Bhd & Ors v Koperasi Serbausaha Makmur Bhd [2003] 1 MLRA 536] [39] In the present case, one must begin with the general and accepted principle that Bank is fully entitled to commence both the Foreclosure Proceedings and civil actions concurrently in order to recover the outstanding debt. In other words, the Bank is not precluded from pursuing multiple legal avenues in its quest for the recovery and repayment of the debt. [40] The aforesaid principle is entrenched in the case of Co-operative Central Bank Bhd v Belaka Suria Sdn Bhd [1990] 3 MLRH 241 where Lim Beng Choon J held as follows: “[9] In considering the defendant 's application to stay the present action of the plaintiff and all further proceedings arising therefrom, I am not convinced by the suggestions of the defendant that simply because there is a pending action in the commercial division of the Kuala Lumpur High Court where judgment had been made in favour of the defendant and the matter has gone on appeal to the Supreme Court , this Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction to stay the present action. I say so for these reasons. As stated in Fisher & Lightwood's Law of Mortgages, 1977, 9th edn, pp 270- 271 (I need to quote only the part of the commentaries which is relevant): As soon as the mortgagor has made default in payment of the mortgage debt . . . the mortgagee is entitled to pursue any or all of his remedies against the debtor or his assets or the incumbered estate. . . For contrary to the general rule that a person liable to be sued is not to be harassed by a multiplicity of actions, it is the right of the mortgagee, or other secured creditor, so long as any part of the debt remained unpaid to pursue any or all of his remedies at the same time. Hence, he may at the same time sue for payment on the covenant to pay the principal and interest, for possession of the mortgaged property and for foreclosure and he can combine these claims in the same action. (emphasis is ours) [41] Following the aforesaid principle, D3 must be able to demonstrate that there are special circumstances in his case to warrant this Court to stay the Bank’s action herein until the Foreclosure Proceedings have been concluded. [42] With respect to learned counsel for D3, all the grounds canvassed before this Court which go towards the merits of D3’s defence against the Bank’s claims under the guarantees cannot amount to special circumstances to justify a stay of proceedings. This is because D3 is not precluded at all from raising these grounds to oppose the Bank’s application against D3 for summary judgment or for that matter at the trial of this action. In particular, D3’s novel contention that because D3 is a principal debtor, the Bank has a legal duty to provide him with all the relevant loan documents and correspondences and that the breach of the said duty meant that the Bank had forfeited its rights to rely on Clause 9 of the Guarantee which treats D3 as a principal debtor – this contention can be taken to oppose the Plaintiff’s claim but is not a special circumstance to justify a stay of proceedings. [43] To my mind, D3’s main argument for the stay of proceedings in this Suit until the final disposal of the Foreclosure Proceedings and any appeal arising therefrom is premised on the following facts:

being prime property in the prosperous suburb of Damansara Heights, the Property will be sold quickly and at market value; and

as the family had benefited from the Loan Facilities, should there be any shortfall following the sale of the Property, the Bank is free to pursue such outstanding sums against Dr Ampi, who is a successful medical practitioner. [44] Put it simply, it is D3’s case that he should not be called upon to meet the obligations under the 3 Guarantees for the amounts due and owing under the Loan Facilities, as the sale proceeds from the Charged Property would be more than sufficient to settle the first RM 6,200,000-00 that D3 is liable under the 3 Guarantees and in any event that the Bank should pursue its remedies against Dr Ampi and his family first as they had benefitted from the Loan Facilities. [45] The aforesaid is all the more so since the Bank has already commenced the Foreclosure Proceedings which are now currently being heard and likely to be concluded soon. [46] In support, D3 relied on the Federal Court’s decision of Ng Yik Seng v Perwira Habib Bank Malaysia Bhd [1980] 2 MLJ 83 [FC] (“Ng Yik Seng”), where the bank brought a writ action against 4 directors in their capacity as guarantors for an overdraft secured by a legal charge on a piece of property. When the borrower defaulted on the repayment, the bank did not realise the charge on the property but instead brought an action against the guarantors for the repayment of the sum, in addition to an Order 14 summary judgment application. [47] Chang Min Tat FJ in delivering the judgment of the Federal Court upheld the guarantors unconditional leave to defend the action. Noting on the fact that the charged property in that case was readily realisable and more than enough to repay the said overdraft, it was decided that the guarantors should not be called upon to pay the borrower’s debt. “One salient fact that emerged at the hearing. It was before the lower court but no point was taken on it. The overdraft had been secured by a legal charge on a piece of property by M/s. Ho Wai Seng Bhd. This charge constituted therefore the first and real security for the repayment of the loan and was a readily realisable security. The maximum limit of the security provided in the charge was $280,000, which would mean that in the opinion of the Bank the property was worth considerably more. In the time that had elapsed since the execution of the charge, properties in and around Kuala Lumpur have appreciated greatly in value — a fact so notorious that in our view courts can take judicial notice of it. The amount outstanding on the overdraft was only $251,091.64. Prima facie, therefore, the realisation of the charge would more than repay the overdraft. In these circumstances the appellants contended that “in law and equity” they should only be called on to meet their guarantee if there should be any deficit after the sum to be realised from the sale of the charged property had been determined. (emphasis added) [48] The Federal Court further highlighted that it was an abuse of process of courts where the plaintiff bank had no substantial interest in the litigation and had suffered no damage that could not be easily rectified (i.e by way of realising the charge in that instance). In that regard, the Federal Court held that a stay of proceedings is required for justice to be done: “This contention is not without attraction. We have not heard any substantial submissions at length on this point which was not ruled on in the court below, but while it is uncertain that the claim against the appellants in the circumstances of a charge is bad "in law and equity", it is, in our view, clear that in such circumstances an action to obtain judgment against the guarantors which would open avenues of execution to the chargee and even bring the guarantors into the Bankruptcy Court when in the final accounting, the appellants needed not to be called to honour their guarantee, would be an abuse of the process of courts. Where the plaintiff had no substantial interest in the subject of the litigation, had suffered no damage which could not easily be rectified and the action was a useless piece of litigation, the court dismissed it: see Webster v Bakewell R.D.C. (No.2). That was a case where the facts were present at the issue of the writ. The present case may not be so but may well turn out to be effectively a case of, to echo the words used, a useless piece of litigation, so that a court may very well in the exercise of its discretion stay, not dismiss the action until after the completion of the sale of the property that has been charged to the Bank. A stay (or even dismissal) of proceedings may "often be required by the very essence of the justice to be done", per Lord Blackburn in Metropolitan Bank v. Pooley , so as to prevent parties being harassed and put to expense by frivolous vexatious or hopeless litigation” (emphasis added) [49] With respect, the Federal Court decision in Ng Yik Seng was a case where unconditional leave to defend was granted in an application for summary judgment. It was not a case dealing with an application for stay of proceedings. Indeed, as I have alluded to above, D3 is not precluded from raising the same arguments here at the hearing of the Bank’s application for summary judgment. [50] More significantly, Ng Yik Seng was not followed by subsequent decision by our apex court. Lee Hun Hoe CJ in delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bank Bumiputra Malaysia v Esah bte Abdul Ghani [1986] 1 MLJ 16 (“Esah bte Abdul Ghani”) has found that a guarantor has no special right to demand that the bank should call upon the principal debtor to pay off the debt and for foreclosure proceedings to be exhausted first. [51] Indeed, if this Court were to allow D3’s application to stay on the grounds contended, it will open a floodgate where all guarantors will seek to stay the action filed against them by financial institutions where there are also properties charged to secure the debts of the borrowers. Under the law as it currently stands, there is no prohibition against the financial institutions availing themselves to concurrent proceedings against the guarantors and foreclosure proceedings against the charged assets to recover the outstanding debts due. [52] It was further contended by D3 that the Supreme Court in Esah bte Abdul Ghani had not disposed the invocation of Sections 92 and 94 of the Contracts Act, 1950 which deals with the right of the surety against the principal debtor due to any action or inaction of the creditor. This was pointed out by VC George J in D & C Bank v. Almas Motor Corporation [1988] 3 MLJ 22 [HC]. [53] Whilst the aforesaid may be true, the arguments relating to Sections 92 and 94 of the Contracts Act 1950 go to the merits of D3’s defence against the Bank’s claims and cannot constitute special circumstances for stay of proceedings. [54] Accordingly, in our case, just because the Bank has commenced Foreclosure Proceedings and the same is soon to be heard by the High Court, cannot without more be a justification to stay the proceedings in this action against D3. This is quite apart from the fact that the proceeds of the Court sanctioned sale may be likely to be sufficient to repay the outstanding debt under the Loan, a fact which incidentally the Bank is disputing. [55] In any case, Sections 92 and 94 of the Contracts Act 1950 deal with cases where due to negligence of the creditor the security given by the principal debtor is lost and the right of the surety against the principal debtor is impaired due to any action or inaction of the creditor. There is no suggestion that D3’s right as guarantor vis-à- vis the Charged Property and or the other guarantors in this case has been impaired. [56] Finally, as regards the claim that D3 is a ‘Social Guarantor’ within the meaning of sections 2 and 5(3) of the Insolvency Act 1967, there is nothing in the provisions of the said Act stipulating that civil proceedings against any social guarantors must be stayed as long as the creditor has available other remedies to recover its debt. Section 5(3) of the Insolvency Act 1967 only applies to the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings against a social guarantor. Conclusion [57] In the premises, it is the judgment of this Court that there are no special circumstances shown by D3 in this case to merit the granting of a stay of proceedings on the terms set out in Enclosure 10. [58] Accordingly, Enclosure 10 is dismissed with costs. Dated the 25th day of February 2025 ONG CHEE KWAN Judge of the High Court of Malaya High Court of Kuala Lumpur, NCC2 & Admiralty Counsel:

Counsel for Plaintiff: Ms. Amirtheyeswary A/P Mayachandrapirapu together with Ms. Chang Jo Ee (Messrs. Iza Ng Yeoh & Kit)

Counsel for 1st; 2nd; and 4th Defendant: Mr. Ivan Teng Jun Hong (Messrs. Thomas Philip)

Counsel for 3rd Defendant: Tan Sri Tommy Thomas together with Ms. Alicia Sabrina Gomez (Messrs. Tommy Thomas)

Jagdis Singh Banta Singh v Outlet Rank (M) Sdn Bhd [2013] 3 MLRA 104 2. Kosmo Palm Oil Mill Sdn Bhd & Ors v Koperasi Serbausaha Makmur Bhd [2003] 1 MLRA 536 3. Co-operative Central Bank Bhd v Belaka Suria Sdn Bhd [1990] 3 MLRH 241 4. Ng Yik Seng v Perwira Habib Bank Malaysia Bhd [1980] 2 MLJ 83 [FC]

Bank Bumiputra Malaysia v Esah bte Abdul Ghani [1986] 1 MLJ 16 6. D & C Bank v. Almas Motor Corporation [1988] 3 MLJ 22 [HC]

Sections 19, 86, 88, 92, 94, 95 and / or 96 of the Contracts Act, 1950 2. Sections 2 and 5(3) of the Insolvency Act, 1967