(ii) the proposed winding-up petition has no reasonable prospect of success. [28] It is essential to note that both conditions outlined in (i) and (ii) must be satisfied for an applicant to succeed under this branch. Second Branch of the Principle [29] Under the second branch, an applicant will succeed if they can convince the court that a more appropriate alternative remedy exists for the would-be petitioner, rendering the winding-up petition unnecessary. [30] However, for this branch to apply, the debt or claim asserted by the intended petitioner must be genuinely disputed. Additionally, the filing of the winding-up petition must be shown to pose a risk of irreparable harm to the company in question. Application of the Principles to the Present Case [31] This Court shall first deal with the Plaintiff’s contention that it is solvent. [32] There is no merit in such a submission. A debtor, once proven to be one, remains a debtor regardless of their financial standing. It is irrelevant whether the debtor is a financially robust company. If the company fails to settle its debts, the creditor has the right to invoke the relevant provisions under the Companies Act 2016 and file a petition to wind up the company. This, of course, is contingent on the existence of an undisputed debt. [33] In HSC Logistics Sdn Bhd v Teong Tiek Wah [2023] 7 AMR 35; [2023] 7 CLJ 916; [2023] MLJU 1184 (“HSC Logistics”) this Court remarked as follows: [2] The very nature of a Fortuna injunction provides companies with an avenue to seek protection from the courts against vile attempts by their adversaries to present unwarranted winding up petitions with their attendant grave consequences”. However, it must be remembered that not every presentation of a petition to wind up a company is without a strong legal basis. … [34] It thus remains incumbent for this Court to consider if the present case is one where the winding up petition is unwarranted or one with strong legal basis. [35] The present case requires this Court to examine and apply the first branch of the principle. [36] The onus is thus on the Plaintiff to satisfy this Court that the filing of a winding-up petition against it is likely to cause irreparable harm to the company and the proposed winding-up petition has no reasonable prospect of success. [37] On the first prerequisite of irreparable harm, this Court in HSC Logistics observed as follows: [24] It is a given, and this has long been recognised by the courts, that the presentation of a petition to wind up a company might cause irreparable damage to a company seeking to stop a winding up petition from being presented. Instances of irreparable damage or detriment are aplenty and varied. In this regard, it would be most surprising if a company seeking a Fortuna injunction is not able to satisfy the court of this requirement mandated in both branches of the principle. [38] The Defendants are not questioning the ability of the Plaintiff in establishing this prerequisite. Hence the question pertaining to irreparable does not arise. [39] That said, this Court in HSC Logistics also went on to state as follows: [25] However, it is imperative for prospective applicants seeking a Fortuna injunction to note that evidence of irreparable damage alone will not entitle such prospective applicants the desired order or injunction. Such is the case whether an applicant intends to rely on the first or second branch of the principle. [40] The core issue in this present application is centred on the second prerequisite under the first branch, that is, whether it can be shown that the proposed winding-up petition has no reasonable prospect of success. [41] A winding up can fail due to various grounds or circumstances. [42] As the Defendants in the present case will be relying on section 465(1)(e) of the Companies Act 2016, that is, the Plaintiff is unable to pay its debts, the central issue is whether there is a disputed or an undisputed debt (of at least RM50,000) due and owing by the Plaintiff to the Defendants. [43] If there is an undisputed debt (of at least RM50,000), the Defendants are entitled to invoke the Statutory Notice in section 466(1)(a) of the Companies Act 2016. The winding up process must be allowed to take its usual course under the Companies Act 2016. The process should not be hindered through the granting of a Fortuna injunction. To do so would be curtailing the legitimate rights of would-be petitioners. To do so would be permitting applicants for Fortuna injunctions to abuse the process of the court. [44] However, the situation is altogether different if the debt is disputed. Under such circumstances, to permit a would-be petitioner such as the Defendants to proceed to file a petition to wind up the Plaintiff company, when together with evidence that the petition will cause irreparable damage to the Plaintiff company, would be to condone an abuse of the process by the would-be petitioners/Defendants. [45] There is no denying that there was a judgment sum entered in favour of the Defendants. As noted by Supang Lian J (as her Ladyship then was) in Hock Peng Realty: Once there is a valid and enforceable judgment, there is no longer a disputed debt and the security of that judgment means that such a petition if filed is not bound to fail. Hence, whether the petition would cause irreparable damage to the company would no longer be a relevant consideration anymore. [46] However, the said judgment sum has been satisfied. [47] The present dispute centres on what the Defendants claim as outstanding interest due and owing on the judgment sum. [48] Is the sum claimed by the Defendants one that is undisputed? That is the central question. [49] If the answer is in the affirmative, the Plaintiff’s application for Fortuna Inunction should be dismissed. [50] If the answer is in the negative, the Plaintiff’s application in Enclosure 1 should be allowed. [51] There is no doubt that the phrase “dan masih berterusan” appears in the Senior Assistant Registrars Order of 17 September, 2019. [52] However, questions have been raised and these include whether the interest have been paid and thus “tidak lagi berterusan” and whether the claim for over RM1.7 million in interest by the Defendants is “interest over interest”. [53] The claim by the Defendants may well be justified but this does not detract from the fact that the debt is one that is disputed. [54] As in Hock Peng Realty, there is a serious and bona fide dispute as to the claim of the Defendants for interest. [55] This Court has considered the case of SBSK Plantations. The High Court correctly noted that as there was in existence a valid and enforceable judgment, which had not been stayed nor set aside on appeal, the defendant in that case was entitled as of right to present a winding-up petition against the plaintiff. However, the factual matrix in the present case differs from those in SBSK Plantations. [56] For the avoidance of doubt, this Court’s finding does not affirmatively state that no sum is due or owing from the Plaintiff to the Defendants. It merely concludes that the debt is disputed. Coupled with the irreparable harm that would be caused to the Plaintiff, the granting of a Fortuna Injunction is justified. [57] The Defendants are not prejudiced in any way. They remain entitled to pursue appropriate legal remedies to enforce the debt they claim is due and owing through other means permitted by law. [58] The effect of this decision is simply to deny the Defendants the use of the winding-up procedure, as it contradicts the rationale and foundation for granting a Fortuna Injunction. [59] The application is Enclosure 1 is allowed with costs. [60] The Defendants to pay costs of RM8,000 to the Plaintiff. Dated: 25 March, 2025 sgd [CHOONG YEOW CHOY] Judicial Commissioner High Court of Malaya Shah Alam Counsel: Ben Lee Kam Foo and Nur Amalin Shahida binti Sabidi for the Plaintiff (Messrs. Ben Lee Sharen) Harwinder Kaur a/p Harbhajan Singh, Keshvinder Kaur a/p Harvinder Singh and Dhanesh a/l Subramaniam Nair for the Defendants (Messrs. A J Ariffin Yeo & Harpal)