Punitha A/P Meniyandi v Suthagar A/L Darmalingam @ Dharmar (BA-33-205-04/2022)

This was a petition for divorce filed by the Petitioner Wife (PW) and cross petition filed by the Respondent Husband (RH).

The parties have mutually agreed to dissolve their marriage and prayed for Decree Nisi to be made absolute immediately.

Although they did not contest the divorce itself they each individually made claims for division of the matrimonial assets, spousal maintenance, outstanding debts owed, liability towards cost of freezing embryo and IVF treatment and other claims. Background Facts 4. The PW and RH were legally married 16 years ago on 30.8.2009.

The parties last lived together at No. 5A, Lorong Sungai 6, Jalan Tepi Sungai, Klang, Selangor (the matrimonial home).

There are no children of the marriage.

The matrimonial home was purchased in 2009 just shortly after the marriage and was registered solely in the name of the RH. The housing loan, however, was taken in the joint names of the PW and the RH. Initially, the loan was obtained from Malaysian Building Society Berhad (MBSB). The matrimonial home was subsequently refinanced again on two separate instances, first in 2014 and again in 2019, both times with OCBC Bank.

In order to meet the substantial costs arising from the renovation of the matrimonial home, several loans had to be obtained, as the parties did not have sufficient independent means or savings to finance the expenses.

During the course of the marriage, the parties jointly underwent fertility treatment, embryo freezing and in-vitro fertilisation (IVF) in their attempt to conceive a child, but these efforts were unsuccessful and the couple remained childless.

The PW took out these personal loans:

RM40,849.60 from Yayasan Ihsan Rakyat (YIR);

(ii) RM27,120.00 from Koperasi Wawasan Pekerja-Pekerja Berhad (KOWAJA);

(iii) RM165,000.00 from Bank Rakyat.

In her Witness Statement, the PW asserted that she obtained these loans at the insistence and under undue pressure from the RH. The PW further stated that the monies borrowed were utilised by the RH towards the renovation of the matrimonial home, to finance his business which was in difficulties, to settle the outstanding car loan and to meet the costs of IVF treatment.

Amidst mounting financial difficulties, the marriage between the parties became increasingly strained and ultimately broke down in June 2019 at which point the PW was forced to leave the matrimonial home. The parties reconciled briefly in August 2021 but the marriage once again broke down and the PW left the matrimonial home for good on 23.1.2022.

On 23.5.2025 after a two day trial and submissions from parties this Court allowed the PW’s claim in part and pronounced that the marriage be dissolved and Decree Nisi be made absolute immediately. The matrimonial assets were divided accordingly.

The RH has filed a Notice of Appeal dated 10.6.2025 appealing on the following issues:

Division of the Matrimonial home;

Liability towards the loan taken by the PW under YIR, KOWAJA and Bank Rakyat;

Jewellery;

Reimbursement of Insurance Premium payment;

Costs.

Since those were the only issues appealed by the RH, there is no reason for this Court to enquire into the reasons for the breakdown of the marriage. Decision of the Court Division of the Matrimonial Home 16. The power for the Court to order division of matrimonial assets is prescribed under section 76 of the Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act 1976 (LRA) which provides as follows: “76. Power for court to order division of matrimonial assets

the Court shall have power, when granting a decree of divorce or judicial separation, to order the division between the parties of any assets acquired by them during the marriage or the sale of any such assets and the division between the parties of the proceeds of sale.

In exercising the power conferred by subsection

the Court shall have regard to: -

the extent of the contributions made by each party in money, property or work towards acquiring of the assets or payment of expenses for the benefit of the family; (aa) the extent of the contributions made by the other party who did not acquire the assets to the welfare of the family by looing after the home or caring for the family;

any debts owing by either party which were contracted to their joint benefit;

the needs of the minor children, if any, of the marriage;

the duration of the marriage and subject to those considerations, the court shall incline towards equality of division.” (emphasis added)

It is well settled that the Court will not be concerned with the degree of responsibility for the breakdown of the marriage when deciding matters on division of matrimonial assets under section 76 of the LRA. Reference is made to the case of SS v HJK [1991] CLJU 99 where the court held as follows: “Indeed, it should be noted that the regard a Malaysian Court is required to have to the degree of responsibility for the breakdown of marriage under section 78 of the Act does not occur in section 76 of the Act. In other words, this is a factor only in maintenance application and not in a division of matrimonial assets.”

This principle was reiterated in the case of Lim Bee Cheng v Christopher Lee Joo Peng [1996] 2 CLJ 697 where the Court held: “The power of the Court to order division of matrimonial assets under s.76 LRA is subject and subject only to those considerations prescribed therein and that the conduct of parties is and has always been irrelevant.”

With those principles in mind this Court will proceed to determine the division of the matrimonial home based only on the statutory considerations under Section 76 of the LRA.

It is not in dispute that the Matrimonial Home was purchased during the subsistence of the marriage. Although it was registered under the sole name of the RH, the housing loan was under both their names. The matrimonial property is currently still under loan repayment.

The RH contends that he was the sole contributor towards the acquisition of the matrimonial home and that he provided substantial financial input to secure the asset. On that score he maintains that as he alone serviced the housing loan, it is only fair and equitable that the division of the matrimonial property should reflect his greater financial contribution. On this basis, the RH submits that he is entitled to a larger proportion of the matrimonial property in recognition of his primary financial role in acquiring the asset. He suggests that the appropriate division of the matrimonial property should be in the ratio of 80% in favour of him and the remaining 20% to the PW.

The RH further asserts that despite his attempts, he has been unable to obtain the Redemption Statement from the bank and he blames the PW for her refusal to cooperate to go to the bank to verify the current outstanding loan amount. In light of this, the RH proposes an alternative arrangement whereby he agrees to pay the PW the sum of RM20,000 by way of monthly instalments of RM500 per month over a period of 40 months to the PW which he contends represents her rightful entitlement. Consequent upon such payment, the RH seeks an order that the PW’s share in the matrimonial property be transferred to him.

The PW, on the other hand, vehemently challenges the RH’s version of events and maintains that she too made significant and meaningful contributions of her own towards the acquisition of the matrimonial home. She argues that her role was not confined merely to monetary input but also extended to non-financial contributions such as carrying out household responsibilities and the personal sacrifices she undertook in support of the RH and their family unit.

The PW argued that her contribution and efforts be it financial or otherwise ought to be duly recognised and acknowledged and be accorded proper weight as it formed an integral part for which their dream of a matrimonial home came into realization.

She asserted that she had carried out her responsibilities as a wife and partner to the RH without complaint and managed the household while carrying out her job as a nurse in the government hospital throughout the 16 years they were married.

The PW testified that both parties had contributed equally towards the costs associated with the purchase of the matrimonial home and had jointly borne the monthly instalments for the housing loan. She stated that she assisted in paying for the utility bills and household expenses. Reference is made to her testimony during examination in chief as follows: “PW 2 : Rumah matrimoni adalah hadiah perkahwinan kami sebelum kami berkahwin secara traditional. Dalam rumah ini, kalau Encik Suthagar membuat bayaran ansuran, lain-lain expenses seperti astro bil, TNB bil, elektrik bil, adalah saya yang buat. Mencantikkan rumah, mencat rumah. Dan juga saya pun seperti yang dinyatakan mengambil loan untuk renovation rumah ini. Apa-apa leaking atau kerosakan, saya yang selalunya akan memperbaiki dengan duit saya sendiri. Mengemaskan rumah masa perayaan semuanya saya yang akan buat. Selain itu juga semasa Encik Suthagar kekekangan duit, saya bagi duit secara cash untuk bayaran ansuran perumahan pinjaman kami juga.”

Under challenge during cross-examination the PW told the court this: “PW 2 : Seperti yang semua orang tahu, rumah ini sebelum ada transaksi dalam talian, kita buat bayaran pinjaman melalui CDM, Cash Deposit Machine. Lepas gaji saya masuk hujung bulan, baru Encik Suthagar awal bulan akan dapat gaji dia. Jadi sebelum 7 haribulan dia akan dapat gaji. Jadi ada kala saya akan bayar dulu dengan gunakan gaji saya dulu. Selepas itu, Suthagar akan bayar utility bill macam itu. Dan bulan keduanya, mungkin dia akan dapat duit awal dan dia akan bayar dulu dan saya akan buat perbelanjaan lain. Kami sebagai suami isteri tidak pernah berkira dan dia sebagai suami dan saya sebagai isteri sentiasa berkongsi semua harta pencarian bersama tiap bulan untuk membayar loan-loan yang kami ambil dan juga perbelanjaan Bersama rumah.”

On this basis she maintains that she is entitled to an equal share in the property not withstanding that it is registered solely under the RH’s name.

The PW pointed out that the housing loan was under both their names because the RH was blacklisted under CTOS and hence he was prohibited from obtaining housing loan from MBSB which imposed higher interest rates compared to other banks. The PW added that the fact that the RH was listed under CTOS clearly showed that he was financially not stable to purchase the matrimonial home on his own without contribution by the PW. For the same reason, the PW was also precluded from applying for a government housing loan which would have enabled the parties to benefit from lower interest rates. Hence in order to overcome this difficulty, the parties mutually resolved to obtain financing from MBSB Finance, which, although subject to a higher interest rate, permitted both of them to be co-borrowers.

Having considered the contentions raised by both parties, I find the PW’s version to be more persuasive. The fact that the housing loan was taken jointly under both their names is itself a strong indicator that both parties assumed responsibility and liability towards repayment of the same. It is also significant that the RH’s financial standing, as evidenced by his CCRIS blacklisting, made it impossible for him to obtain the loan on his own. In such circumstances, the PW’s inclusion as a joint borrower was not merely nominal but a substantive contribution that enabled the acquisition of the matrimonial home.

Further it is pertinent to observe that during cross-examination the RH candidly conceded that his net salary, at the material time, was considerably lower than his monthly commitments. The evidence before the Court shows that the monthly instalment for the housing loan alone amounted to RM2,210. In addition, he was servicing a car loan of RM475 and a personal loan of RM925. These three commitments taken together came to RM3,610 per month. This amount plainly exceeded his earnings and this figure did not even take into account his other living and household expenses. In such circumstances, it is highly improbable that the RH could have shouldered the burden of these financial obligations on his own.

In light of these figures the Court finds it most unlikely that the RH could have borne the weight of these obligations single-handedly. It is far more reasonable to conclude that the PW’s financial support and contributions were necessary and in fact instrumental in sustaining the household and in ensuring the loan obligations were met.

Upon a careful and thorough evaluation of the evidence adduced, this Court makes a firm finding of fact that the PW had on her part made substantial contributions and in all probability equal contributions towards the acquisition of the matrimonial property. It is not in dispute that both parties were gainfully employed prior to and throughout the marriage. The PW was employed in a stable and secure position within the Malaysian public service, while the RH was engaged in employment in the private sector. Given their respective financial capacities, the Court finds it more probable than not that the burden of meeting their financial responsibilities was shared between them. This would encompass the day to day household expenses, the general upkeep and maintenance for themselves and most critically the servicing of the monthly housing loan instalments.

The factual matrix strongly supports the conclusion that the PW’s contributions, both direct and indirect, played a material and indispensable role in the acquisition and preservation of the matrimonial home. The Court is of the view that the RH could not have been able to bear the expenses all by himself without the assistance of the PW.

Apart from her tangible financial contributions, it cannot be disputed that the PW bore the primary responsibility for the care and upkeep of the matrimonial home. She undertook these responsibilities throughout the duration of their marriage. It was not denied that she undertook the household chores, including grocery shopping, cooking, laundry and keeping the matrimonial home in a neat and tidy condition. The RH did not have to worry about the management and upkeep of the matrimonial home as the PW took care of that aspect.

This Court must have due regard to the long duration of the marriage in reaching a fair decision. The parties were married for a period of 16 years and during which the PW remained a loyal and dutiful wife balancing her responsibilities in her job as a nurse and her obligations to the RH in their life together. It is significant to note that she even underwent painful and emotionally draining IVF treatment in the hope of conceiving a child to complete their family.

This Court must give weight to the PW’s sacrifices in maintaining the home, caring for the family and striving to achieve a balance between her career and her responsibilities at home. There can be no doubt that such efforts demanded considerable time, patience and commitment on her part.

It is of particular significance that for a period of approximately twelve and a half years, the PW had, on her part, contributed towards the payment of the monthly housing loan instalments. The evidence also shows that there were occasions when she assumed responsibility for meeting the household expenses and settling the utility bills, thereby easing the overall financial burden on the family unit. The Court finds corroboration of these contributions in the documentary exhibits contained in the agreed Common Bundle marked as C2.

The Court is unable to agree with the RH’s contention that the PW ought to be awarded with only 20% or RM20,000 by way of the apportionment upon division of the matrimonial property. Such a division would in my view be manifestly unfair and inequitable and fails to reflect any measure of recognition and gratitude for the PW’s considerable contributions and sacrifices for the benefit of the family.

It must be borne in mind that the PW is now 42 years of age. At this stage of her life it would be highly improbable and financially oneorus for her to secure fresh financing to purcahse a property for herself. To leave her with scuh a meagre share would in effect deprive her of the security and stability she once shared with the

In deciding the portion each party is entitled to, this Court shall have regard to the considerations listed out in section 76 LRA. It is trite and settled law that subject to the considerations stated in section 76(2)(a) to (d) LRA, this Court shall incline towards equality of division.

In relation to this matter the case of Koay Cheng Eng v Linda Herawati Santoso [2008] 4 CLJ 105 is referred to where the Court of Appeal held the view: “[36] We are in agreement with the learned judge that the respondent cannot be said to have not contributed financially to the said property. The respondent had used her salaries towards the upkeep of the household as well as to buy groceries. To us, this would be the contribution by the respondent and she is entitled for the share of the property. Therefore, it is not wrong for the judge to decide that No. 111, Queen’s Court is to be regarded as matrimonial property. In Lee Yu Lan v Lim Thain Chye [1983] 1 LNS 41, the wife had claimed that she had contributed to the matrimonial home by “caring and raring the children at home” and “other general duties attendant” to her “housewifely” duty. In that case, the house was bought by the husband, and he had sold it for RM191,000 of which RM41,000 was paid by the purchaser to the husband as deposit. The court considered the debts the husband had to pay, the possibility of creditors pressing for payment for some of his liabilities, and the court’s proposal to make an order for maintenance for the wife. The court decided that she be given RM60,000, which was about 1/3 of the full purchase price of RM191,000.” [39] From the passages above, it is clear to us that the learned trial judge, in making the order, had considered the contribution made by the respondent in total. It is our view that the respondent is entitled to her share of the assets for her contributions to the assets. I would like to quote what Abdul Hamid Mohamad JCA said (as he then was) in Sivanes Rajaratnam v Usha Rani Subramaniam [2002] 3 CLJ 300 at p. 306….This view, in my opinion is consistent with the wording and spirit of s.76. That section talks of “division” of assets acquired during the marriage and provides the factors that should be taken into account when making the division. Besides (I am speaking generally here) in marriage, both spouses share everything, both contribute towards the home and family in one way or another, to a bigger or smaller extent. Where both spouses work and earn income, each of them inevitably spends his or her own income for the family. Similarly, where there is income from an asset purchased during the subsistence of the marriage, say rent, even though it may be paid into the account of one spouse, eventually it will go to the family, may be all and may be part of it. No one keeps an account, indeed no one should, as a marriage is not a business venture. So, if and when the marriage breaks up, it is unreasonable that the court should undertake an accounting of their income and expenditure during the period the marriage subsists. The function of the court is to make a fair and equitable division of the matrimonial assets that exist at the time of the divorce, taking into account the factors provided by s.76. [40] In the circumstances, in our view, taking all the factors into account, including the direct financial contribution by the respondent towards the purchase of the properties, the fact that the appellant must have utilised the proceeds of the sales of the properties to purchase other properties, a reasonable division would be that the respondent is entitled to half the current value of the properties. In other words, we would confirm the order made by the learned trial judge.”

Based on the foregoing, this Court is of the considered view that the PW is entitled to nothing less than an equal share in the matrimonial home, notwithstanding that the said property is registered solely in the name of the RH. Support for this view can be drawn from the decision of Lim Bee Cheng v Christopher Lee Joo Peng [1996] 2 CLJ 697, wherein the Court held that registration of property in the sole name of one spouse does not, in itself, negate the other spouse’s right to an equitable share where substantial contributions both financial and non-financial have been established. The learned judge concluded as follows: “[6] Where the dispute between the husband and wife concerns a particular and singular property and the Court holds that both are entitled to a share of the same, the Court would have no alternative but to order the sale of the property to a third party or by one party to the other. In such an event it would be neither sensible nor practical for the Court to order that the property be sold at a price other than the current market price. [7] The said property is to be divided between the petitioner and the respondent equally and be sold within 3 months from the date hereof at the current market value to be determined by a reputable licensed valuer appointed by the Senior Assistant Registrar. The parties are at liberty to buy the other out of the half share of the said property; provided that if same shall be sold to third parties, the petitioner and respondent shall each partake in ½ share of the proceeds of its sale after deduction of expenses. It is also ordered that the petitioner be compensated to the extent of half of RM47,094.06 expended b her on the redemption of the said property.”

This Court found guidance in the case of Annathurai Venkidasalam v Vani Welluven [2023] 1 LNS 2191, the Court of Appeal gave further enlightenment to matters in relation to the equitable division of matrimonial property. The Court of Appeal held as follows: “[18] In re-visiting s. 76 LRA, and we make the following observations:

Albeit it is stated in s. 76(2) LRA that the court shall incline towards equality, it is however not mandatorily 50%-50% in dividing the matrimonial property and assets;

(ii) The division is at the discretion of the court but the court must take into account the factors listed in s. 76(2)(a) to (e) LRA;

(iii) There is no prohibition on the court to also take into account other relevant or appropriate circumstances because the aforesaid factors have not been expressly specified in s. 76(1) and (2) LRA as exclusive and/or exhaustive, see Dean v. Wiesengrund [1955] 2. Q.B. and S (a minor) v. Special Education Needs Tribunal [1996] 1 All ER 171; and

(iv) The division is not an exercise of strict financial accounting but a fair and equitable distribution of the matrimonial property and assets as determined by the court [19] Therefore, there is no strait-jacket solution. Each and every case has to be determined on its peculiar facts and circumstances.” (emphasis added)

Guided by the provisions and principles of the law as set out in the preceding paragraphs, this Court is persuaded that an equal division between the parties is the most appropriate and just outcome. The Court further finds that the PW’s contributions both financial and non-financial stand on equal footing with the RH’s financial contributions. The emphasis on the key word used in s. 76 LRA is “equality of division which reflects the legislative intent to achieve fairness in the distribution of matrimonial assets.

Having regard to the provisions of section 76(2) LRA the Court finds that both the PW and RH are entitled to equal rights and apportionment of share and interest in the matrimonial home. The Court further holds that such an approach is just and reasonable in the circumstances. Hence an order for equal division of the matrimonial home is made accordingly. The Court orders that the matrimonial property shall be sold at the current market value within 6 months from the date of the Decree Nisi. The net proceeds of sale, after deduction of all necessary statutory outgoings and expenses, shall be shared equally between the PW and the RH. For the purpose of ascertaining the current market value, a valuation report shall be obtained from a licensed valuer. Both parties shall bear equally the costs and expenses incurred for the appointment of the valuer and the preparation of the said report. Liability towards the Loans taken by the PW

It is significant to note that all three loans were obtained during the subsistence of the marriage. The first, a KOWAJA loan in the sum of RM27,120, was taken on 31.5.2010. This was followed by a YIR loan amounting to RM40,849.60 on 28.4.2015, and thereafter a Bank Rakyat loan taken on 19.3.2018.

In her evidence, the PW maintained that she obtained these loans under pressure and at the insistence of the RH, who required the funds for various purposes, namely, the renovation of the matrimonial home, his business ventures, payment for the IVF treatment, and settlement of the car loan.

The Court has given careful consideration to the circumstances and find it of particular significance that all three loans in question were obtained during the subsistence of the marriage. This timing cannot be overlooked, as it strongly indicates that the borrowings were connected with and intended for the benefit of the parties in the marriage. Furthermore, the Court observes that the matrimonial property was acquired in 2010, which is notably the very year the parties solemnised their marriage. This coincidence in timing underscores the nexus between the acquisition of the property and the commencement of their marriage. It is also of relevance that both parties, in their testimonies, confirmed that renovations and improvements to the said property were undertaken in that same year, thereby reflecting their joint efforts to establish and enhance the matrimonial home from the very inception of their married life.

At the same time, the RH admitted that, at the time of the purchase of the matrimonial property, his name was blacklisted under CTOS and, as a result, he was unable to secure a housing loan in his name from any financial institution. The PW stated that she had no choice but to obtain a housing loan with MBSB, which, however, was only prepared to extend financing on the condition that a higher rate of interest be imposed compared to other financial institutions.

As noted earlier, the parties had agreed to carry out renovations to the matrimonial home, for which additional funds were required. The RH, however, was unable to rely on his earnings as his income was already insufficient after deductions. Under cross-examination, he admitted that his monthly commitments exceeded his take home salary.

From the testimony adduced and the facts placed before it, the Court finds that the RH was in persistent financial difficulty at the material time and that he was heavily dependent upon the PW for financial assistance. He had no means to extricate himself out from his financial problems and only the PW was in the position to help him out of it. From the financial records the Court could not find that the debts incurred by the PW were for personal indulgences or liabilities undertaken for her exclusive benefit. Rather, they were inextricably linked to the joint matrimonial obligations, namely the acquisition of the matrimonial home, the decision to renovate the home and also the mutually agreed decision to undergo IVF treatment. From the statements and records gleaned from the bank account and credit card statements it showed that the PW had done her best to assist the PH to rise up from the debts he had incurred and the unsound financial decisions he had taken.

It is equally pertinent to note that the RH’s business was, during the material time, struggling and unable to sustain itself. The Court accepts the PW’s testimony that a sizable portion of the loan monies obtained was channelled directly into supporting and sustaining his business.

Added to this was as both parties had admitted, agreed to pursue IVF treatment which was an expensive undertaking. Hence the necessity of taking those loans was not done at the whims and fancy of the PW but rather a joint decision made in furtherance of their shared marital plans for their future.

The PW by reason of her ‘good’ financial standing and unblemished credit rating was the only one between the both of them who qualified to apply for and obtain loans. The RH was in no position to do so due to his poor credit rating. Based on all the reasons stated above, the Court would have to reject any suggestion that it was a mere coincidence that the PW undertook the responsibility of securing loans during the marriage. The probabilities clearly point unerringly to the fact that these loans were undertaken at the encouragement and with the knowledge of the RH and that the funds obtained were utilised, in substantial part for his benefit.

In the circumstances, the Court finds it improbable to conclude that the debts incurred by the PW were for her personal use or benefit alone as alleged. On a balance of probabilities, the evidence supports the finding that the PW’s action of obtaining these loans were directly connected and motivated by the financial needs of the RH and her commitment to their marriage partnership. The Court further finds that the PW undertook these responsibilities out of genuine love and devotion in order to support and sustain the RH during their marriage. These are sacrifices which any married couple would naturally undertake for each other. Taking those 3 loans reflected her commitment and willingness to sacrifice in order to assist the RH so that he could raise himself out of his financial abyss. Unfortunately, the RH did not appreciate the magnitude of her sacrifice. Despite all these efforts and financial burden, she bore for the sake of the marriage and his well-being, the RH chose to lock her out of the matrimonial home and hide her important documents and personal belongings. Such conduct was deeply unjust and deeply heart breaking to the PW.

On this issue, the Court had the opportunity to closely observe the demeanour, consistency, and overall credibility of both the PW and the RH during the course of their oral testimony. Upon careful evaluation, the Court finds the PW to be a credible and reliable witness. Her evidence was cogent and persuasive, and she remained unshaken under cross-examination. While it is acknowledged that she was handicapped by the absence of extensive contemporaneous documentation, her testimony nonetheless bore the ring of truth and was not inherently improbable. The Court finds no reason to disbelieve any part of her evidence. On the balance of probabilities, the Court accepts the PW’s version of events as more credible and probable than the RH’s explanation and accordingly prefers her submissions.

Regrettably the same cannot be said for the RH. His evidence was self-serving and frequently marred by material contradiction. Notably when confronted with his earlier remarks and testimony, his offered explanations were misleading and demonstrably evasive. The Court finds it improbable that he alone paid the full housing loan and for all expenses when at the same time he had agreed that his business was floundering. With having to pay the housing loan instalments, insurance premiums, bills and utilities, it is implausible that he shouldered the full burden of the payments. It is more probable that the PW assisted and supplemented the RH financially thus thereof by alleviating some of his financial burden.

Learned counsel for the PW has contended that this is a fit and proper case for this Court to draw an adverse inference against the RH under s. 114(g) Evidence Act 1950 for giving contradictory statements in his evidence and being not truthful about the housing loan payments.

The Court saw no necessity to invoke an adverse inference against the RH but it nevertheless exercised caution in assessing his evidence, having found his testimony to be unreliable and unconvincing. In this regard, guidance is drawn from the Court of Appeal decision in Sediabena Sdn Bhd v China Comservice (Hong Kong) Limited [2017] CLJU 2042 where it was held as follows: “... The learned trial Judge preferred the evidence of the plaintiff whom she viewed as 'more credible' in support of their contention, as compared to the witnesses of the Defendant who were 'evasive and blowing hot and cold in responding to questions... portraying untruthfulness and lack of transparency as parties to the agreement...”

All said and done this Court believed the PW’s version on a balance of probabilities more than the version put forth by the

To conclude, having carefully considered the chronology of events, the sequence of the marriage registration, and the financial circumstances of the RH which ultimately culminated in the breakdown of the marriage, the Court is satisfied that the evidence overwhelmingly points in one direction. The timing of the loans, when examined against the backdrop of RH’s precarious financial position, strongly indicates that these borrowings could not reasonably have been undertaken for any purpose other than to support and facilitate the RH in the pursuit of his personal and financial plans.

Since these loans were contracted during the subsistence of the marriage, they naturally fall within the ambit of matrimonial obligations imposed on the parties. In the same way that both parties are entitled to an equal share of the matrimonial assets, they must likewise bear an equal share of responsibility for repaying the loans apportioned equally between them.

Accordingly, the Court orders that the RH shall be responsible for repaying half of the outstanding loan amounts while the PW shall remain liable for the other half until full settlement. Reimbursement of Insurance Premium Paid 65. The evidence adduced at trial, which remained unchallenged, established that the PW had in fact purchased two insurance policies in the name of the RH, one in June 2016 and another in December 2016. The documentary evidence is clear in showing that although the RH was designated as the policy owner, it was the PW who made the premium payments.

It was further admitted by the RH that he had unilaterally surrendered the said insurance policies prior to their maturity and had received a pay out of RM16,500, all without the knowledge or consent of the PW. While the RH sought to maintain that he was the one who had borne the cost of the premium payments, he failed to produce any documentary evidence to substantiate this assertion. In contrast, the contemporaneous records clearly indicate that the PW was the party responsible for the payments.

This conclusion is borne out by the bank statements produced by the PW in Bundle C2, specifically at pages 18, 19, 22, 23, 25, 26, 29, 30, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38, 41, 42, 45, 46, 47, 49, 51–55, 57, 62, 64–66, 74, 76, 77, 79, 81 and 83. These statements provide cogent and compelling documentary proof which fully corroborates the PW’s evidence that she had, through her Maybank account, made the online payments towards the insurance premiums from 2016 until 2020. In the face of such clear and contemporaneous evidence, it is manifestly apparent that the RH was not being truthful in his assertion that he had borne the cost of the said premiums.

On the facts before this Court it is found that the RH had prematurely surrendered the insurance policies prior to their maturity, and further, that the premiums in respect thereof had in fact been paid by the PW. In so doing, the RH had unjustly enriched himself at the expense of the PW. It would be plainly inequitable to permit the RH to retain the benefit of the policy proceeds in these circumstances. Accordingly, the Court orders that the RH shall refund to the PW the sum of RM40,000. Jewellery 69. The PW claims the sum of RM22,000 as reimbursement for the monies she expended to redeem her jewellery that had been pawned by the RH. At trial, the RH testified that whenever he encountered financial difficulties, he would pawn not only his own jewellery but also items belonging to the PW. The PW maintains that the jewellery in question were gifts personally given to her by the RH during the course of the marriage. This assertion is supported by the RH’s own admission in his Reply to the Petition (Bundle A, paragraph 24, pages 40–41), wherein he expressly acknowledged having presented jewellery to the PW as gifts on various occasions, including a gold locket for her birthday, a ring for their wedding anniversary, and several other items.

It is further observed that the RH has not disputed the actual cost of redeeming the jewellery, as can be seen in paragraph 10, page 45 of Bundle A. His position, however, is that he, and not the PW, had made the redemption payments. The Court is unable to accept this contention. In light of the RH’s well-documented financial difficulties during the marriage, it would have been highly improbable that he had the means to undertake the redemption himself. On the balance of probabilities, it is far more likely that the PW, being the party intending to wear the jewellery to important functions, was the one who bore the financial burden of redeeming it. It is most improbable that the jewelleries pawned were retrieved by the RH from his own funds.

Accordingly, the Court is satisfied that the PW has successfully discharged her burden of proof in establishing her claim, while the RH has failed to adduce any credible evidence to challenge or rebut her assertions. In the circumstances, the Court holds that the RH is liable to reimburse the PW for the sum of RM22,000, being the amount rightfully due to her in respect of the redemption of her jewellery. Conclusion 72. Based on the totality of the evidence and findings above, this Court pronounced the dissolution of the marriage on 23rd May 2025 as well as the consequential reliefs as stated above and awarded costs of RM12,000 to the PW. Dated 12 September 2025 (JULIE LACK) Judge High Court of Malaya Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan (SELANGOR) Counsel for the Petitioner : Naliny Nallayan (Messrs M Megalai & Co.) Counsel for the Respondent : Kiretheega A/P Mahalingam (Messrs Rastam Singa & Co.)