order any person appearing to the court to be an employer of the defendant to give to the court, within such period as may be specified by the order, a statement signed by him or on his behalf of such particulars as may be specified by the order, of all earnings of the defendant which are to be paid by that person during such period as may be so specified. [Emphasis added.] [17] I found the Plaintiff’s contention bereft of merit for the following reasons. [18] Firstly, section 8 of the Married Women and Children (Enforcement of Maintenance) Act expressly vests the Court with discretionary authority, a principle unambiguously conveyed through the use of the phrase "the court may." This phrase is a clear indication of the legislature's intent to empower the Court with flexibility in determining the need for an employer’s appearance, rather than imposing an obligation upon the Court. [19] Such interpretation was essential to uphold the Court's authority and autonomy, ensuring that its powers are not needlessly constrained by rigid procedural obligations when there is no compelling justification. I, therefore, had to reject any alternative reading that imposed an obligatory duty upon the Court to summon the Plaintiff’s employer. Particularly, any interpretation that insists the Court "must" direct the employer to appear for the sole purpose of clarifying authorisation of payment deductions from the Plaintiff’s earnings would be inconsistent with the discretionary scope found in section 8 of the Married Women S/N TiuxPAjHd0eYy1mUoc9paA 17 November 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 8 and Children (Enforcement of Maintenance) Act. Such a constraining interpretation would misrepresent the legislative intent and unjustly restrict the Court’s ability to exercise sound judgment based on the circumstances before it. Section 8 of the Married Women and Children (Enforcement of Maintenance) Act, therefore, does not contemplate any blanket mandate on the Court to require employer attendance; rather, it recognises that the necessity for such an appearance must be assessed on a case-by-case basis, respecting the Court’s prudence and discretion in deciding if and when an employer's presence is actually warranted. [20] Furthermore, the Court's attention was brought to the fact that the Defendant had, in fact, taken steps to serve this Application upon the Plaintiff's employer in accordance with procedural requirements. The employer, upon receipt of this Application, promptly responded by email, indicating a clear willingness to comply with any instructions issued by the Court. Specifically, the employer had confirmed their preparedness to either attend the proceedings in person or take any alternative action the Court might deem necessary. [21] In light of this correspondence, the employer’s stance clearly signalled that, should the Court find their involvement necessary, they stood prepared to comply fully and provide any clarification or documentation required. This affirmative response by the employer reinforced the fact that, while their participation was available to the Court if deemed necessary, it remained entirely within the Court’s purview to decide whether their appearance was warranted. The Court retained full discretion to determine if the matter could be adequately addressed S/N TiuxPAjHd0eYy1mUoc9paA 17 November 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 9 based on existing evidence, without placing any undue burden on the employer’s time or resources unless absolutely required for the administration of justice in this case. [22] The Court’s decision not to summon the Plaintiff’s employer was fortified by the confirmation of both the Plaintiff’s employment status with Citigroup Transaction Services (M) Sdn Bhd, and the details of his monthly earnings. Notably, there was no contestation or ambiguity regarding the Plaintiff’s employment, nor was there any dispute over the income derived from this employment. The Plaintiff’s bank statements for the months of March, April, and May 2024 clearly demonstrated consistent monthly deposits approximating MYR19,000, thereby confirming his earnings with concrete financial documentation. This unambiguous evidence dispelled any necessity for further verification from the employer, as the information on record was both complete and undisputed. [23] As such, the Court’s decision to refrain from mandating the employer’s appearance was rooted in both prudence and judicial efficiency. Requiring the employer’s attendance without a pressing need would impose an unnecessary burden on third parties, in this case, the Plaintiff’s employer, who has already demonstrated a willingness to cooperate if required. The purpose of summoning witnesses or any other party is to clarify uncertainties, provide essential information, or resolve areas of factual dispute that are central to the proceedings. Here, however, there existed no such dispute or ambiguity; the Plaintiff’s earnings were well-documented and uncontested. As such, S/N TiuxPAjHd0eYy1mUoc9paA 17 November 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 10 compelling the employer’s attendance would serve no practical or evidentiary purpose in advancing the case. [24] The cases of Geh Thuan Hooi v. Serene Lim Paik Yan [2012] CLJU 132, and Thelagavathi A/P Murugesu v Karuppusamy @ Selvaraj A/L K. Munisamy [2010] MLJU 1887 that the Plaintiff had relied on were distinguishable from the present case. [25] In Geh Thuan Hooi v. Serene Lim Paik Yan, the judge chose to exercise her discretionary authority by requiring the employer’s attendance in court. This decision was primarily motivated by the petitioner-husband’s assertion that his employment contract had come to an end, a claim that raised questions regarding his employment status and thus warranted further clarification from the employer. The intervention by this Court, in that case, was essential to ensure that accurate and complete information regarding the petitioner’s employment conditions was provided, given the potential impact on the case’s outcome. [26] By contrast, in the present case, the circumstances did not necessitate the employer's attendance. Here, there was no disagreement about the identity of the Plaintiff’s employer, nor was there any contention regarding the specific amount owed by the employer to the Plaintiff. These facts were clearly established and undisputed by either party, making the employer’s presence superfluous. Consequently, the Court determined that summoning the employer was unnecessary, as there were no ambiguities that required further evidence or clarification. S/N TiuxPAjHd0eYy1mUoc9paA 17 November 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 11 [27] In Thelagavathi a/p Murugesu v. Karuppusamy @ Selvaraj A/L K. Munisamy, the plaintiff-wife included a request for an attachment of earnings order within her application to vary the existing court order concerning maintenance payments the defendant-husband was obligated to provide for their child. This prayer was part of her broader appeal for modifications to the maintenance order, which aimed to secure a more reliable and direct method of payment by attaching a portion of the husband’s income. However, the Court in that case, dismissed this specific relief for an attachment of earnings on procedural grounds, as the plaintiff-wife had not followed the correct procedure as prescribed by law. Under the Married Women and Children (Enforcement of Maintenance) Act, an attachment of earnings order must be sought explicitly under section 5, which provides a dedicated legal mechanism for enforcing maintenance orders through direct deductions from the payer’s income. The Court in that case, noted that section 5 of the Married Women and Children (Enforcement of Maintenance) Act requires a separate application specifically for an attachment of earnings, distinct from a general application to vary an existing maintenance order. [28] In insisting that this Application was irregular, the Plaintiff further contended that the Defendant had failed to move the Court pursuant to rules 72 and 73 of the Divorce and Matrimonial Proceedings Rules 1980 (“Divorce and Matrimonial Proceedings Rules”). [29] In my opinion, this argument was unpersuasive because rule 72 of the Divorce and Matrimonial Proceedings Rules, which governs the enforcement of orders for payment of money, explicitly references S/N TiuxPAjHd0eYy1mUoc9paA 17 November 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 12 Order 46 of the Rules of Court 2012 (“Rules of Court”). Order 46 of the Rules of Court outlines specific enforcement mechanisms such as a writ of seizure and sale, a writ of possession, and a writ of delivery. These instruments are designed to facilitate the enforcement of monetary judgments and ensure compliance by allowing the creditor to seize or take possession of the debtor's property if necessary. However, it is notable that Order 46 of the Rules of Court makes no mention of an attachment of earnings order as an enforcement option within this framework. [30] Instead, an attachment of earnings order, which mandates deductions directly from the debtor's income to satisfy the payment order, is governed by separate legal provisions, typically found under statutes specifically designed for enforcing maintenance or similar payments. [31] Conversely, rule 73 of the Divorce and Matrimonial Proceedings Rules deals with judgment summonses under general provisions. Judgment summonses provide a separate route for compelling compliance with a judgment, often used to summon the judgment debtor to court to explain their failure to satisfy the order. Rule 73 of the Divorce and Matrimonial Proceedings Rules emphasises procedural requirements for judgment summonses but, like rule 72 of the Divorce and Matrimonial Proceedings Rules, it does not provide for the mechanism of an attachment of earnings order. [32] Therefore, both rules 72 and 73 of the Divorce and Matrimonial Proceedings Rules are limited in scope to particular enforcement methods and do not extend to an application for attachment of S/N TiuxPAjHd0eYy1mUoc9paA 17 November 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 13 earnings. This legal framework reinforces that an application for attachment of earnings should be pursued under specific statutory provisions dedicated to attachment of earnings rather than through general procedural rules for enforcement of judgments. [33] Rules 72 and 73 of the Divorce and Matrimonial Proceedings Rules, therefore, had no application to the present case. [34] Even if I agreed with the Plaintiff regarding rules 72 and 73 of the Divorce and Matrimonial Proceedings Rules, it would not be sufficient to dismiss this Application for the following reasons. [35] At this juncture, it was crucial to reaffirm the well-established legal principle that courts are generally disinclined to allow technicalities to hinder the administration of substantive justice, especially when such technical errors do not cause prejudice to the opposing party. This approach reflects a broader commitment to justice, where the primary goal is to resolve disputes based on the substantive rights and obligations of the parties involved. It recognises that procedural rules, while important, should not be used as instruments of injustice or as obstacles to the fair determination of a case. Where no harm or disadvantage is suffered by the opposing party, the courts are more likely to permit the correction of procedural irregularities, thereby facilitating a just outcome that reflects the true merits of the case. [36] This jurisprudential trend is discernible in numerous precedents, including Redang Paradise Vacation Sdn Bhd v. Yap Chuan Bin & Other Appeals [2017] 10 CLJ 296; Maril-Rionebel (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor S/N TiuxPAjHd0eYy1mUoc9paA 17 November 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 14 v. Perdana Merchant Bankers Bhd & Other Appeals [2001] 3 CLJ 248; and United Malayan Banking Corp Bhd v. Ernest Cheong Yong Yin [2001] 2 CLJ 31. [37] Considering the principle that the 'relation of the rules of practice to the work of justice is intended to be that of “handmaid” rather than a mistress"'; as articulated by Lord Collins MR in Re Coles And Ravenshear [1907] 1 KB 1, there was no justification in the present case for raising technicalities that had no bearing to the substance of this Application, especially since the Plaintiff had the knowledge of the payments he had willfully refused to make. [38] Moreover, it had been aptly stated by Hamid Sultan Abu Backer JCA (as he then was) in Reebok (M) Sdn Bhd v. CIMB Bank Bhd [2019] 9 CLJ 230 that "procedural skirmishes ought not to prevail, to defeat substantive justice". [39] As such, the objections raised by the Plaintiff regarding rules 72 and 73 of the Divorce and Matrimonial Proceedings Rules did not hold water. Whether this Application was unjustified [40] In urging the Court to dismiss this Application, the Plaintiff argued that issuing an order for the attachment of earnings would be unjust. He emphasised that the Court had the authority to assess the fairness and merits of the case, as outlined in section 4(1) of the Married Women and Children (Enforcement of Maintenance) Act. The Plaintiff contended that this provision granted the Court discretion to consider S/N TiuxPAjHd0eYy1mUoc9paA 17 November 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 15 the overall circumstances and to determine whether such an order would be equitable in light of the specific facts of the case. [41] The Plaintiff relied on a case decided by this Court, namely Yong Jia Hui v Chan Seh Wai [2023] CLJU 762, where it was stated in the following passage: [25] It must also be borne in mind that an attachment of earnings order is a severe form of enforcement as it involves the Court ordering the Respondent's employer to make monthly deductions, which in turn would reduce the Respondent's income. It is also a form of declaration of the Respondent's financial conundrum which may be embarrassing and damaging to his reputation. Furthermore, I had to note that the Respondent had been regular in making the monthly payment of MYR2,000. [Emphasis added.] [42] The issue, therefore, was whether justice of the case dictated that this Application should be allowed. While it was accurate to assert that an attachment of earnings order represents a stringent form of enforcement, the circumstances of Yong Jia Hui v. Chan Seh Wai are notably distinguishable from the present case. [43] In Yong Jia Hui, the respondent-husband consistently adhered to the monthly payment obligation of MYR2,000, demonstrating regularity and commitment in fulfilling his financial responsibilities. This stands in contrast to the current case, where the Plaintiff had not maintained such consistency in meeting his payment obligations. Consequently, the respondent’s compliance in Yong Jia Hui reflected a significantly different context, justifying a more restrained approach to enforcement, S/N TiuxPAjHd0eYy1mUoc9paA 17 November 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 16 unlike the present matter where stricter measures may be deemed necessary to ensure regular support payments. [44] To reinforce his position that granting this Application would be inequitable, the Plaintiff argued that he was currently facing significant financial hardship. He claimed that his financial situation made it impossible for him to meet the combined monthly obligation of MYR 5,000 for both spousal and child maintenance. In an effort to substantiate his assertion, the Plaintiff provided an itemisation of his monthly expenses, highlighting the specific costs he incurs to demonstrate that he lacks the financial capacity to fulfill the maintenance obligations. The breakdown of his expenses was as follows: No Butiran Jumlah 1. Gaji bersih 19,100 2. Sewaan rumah 1,500 3. Caj utiliti 600