/akn/my/judgment/high-court/2026/325cb2be-4ff6-418a-8a94-d68c6b5a877c
High Court of Malaysia26 Apr 2026KA-23NCvC-1-02/2024
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“riginality of this document via eFILING portal 4 b) Special damages for travelling expenses amounting to RM10,000.00. c) Bereavement damages amounting to RM30,000.00 pursuant to Section 7(3A) of the Civil Law Act 1956; d) General damages amounting to RM1,000,000.00; e) Aggravated damages amounting to RM1,000,000.00; f)”
“eakage, and the Residual Current Circuit Breaker (RCCB) was fully functional. Since the Energy Commission found no elements of electrocution and confirmed the Defendant’s complete compliance with the Electricity Supply Act 1990, the Defendant argued there is zero basis to sustain an allegation of breach of duty. **Note”
“inevitable accident, or volenti non fit injuria), which they failed to do. Additionally, the Plaintiff urges this Court to invoke adverse inferences against the Defendant under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 for the alleged concealment of material documents, specifically the Fire and Rescue Department report a”
“v Holst & Co Ltd [1958] 3 All ER 33 Yeohata Machineries Sdn Bhd & Anor v Coil Master Sdn Bhd & Ors [2015] 6 MLJ 810 Yong Shui Tian v Majlis Perbandaran Langkawi Bandaraya Pelancongan [2026] 3 MLJ 20 Statutes Civil Law Act 1956 Electricity Regulations 1994 Electricity Supply Act 1990 Evidence Act 1950 **Note : Serial nu”
“es are strictly confined by statute. The law limits the Plaintiff's personal recovery to loss of support, funeral expenses, and a statutorily fixed bereavement sum of RM30,000.00 under Section 7(3A). The Civil Law Act 1956 does not recognise a separate, overarching head of aggravated damages for the personal emotional”
“35. This absolute restriction against departing from pleaded boundaries is further reinforced by the House of Lords in Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Southport Corporation [1956] AC 218, which establishes that a plaintiff cannot be permitted to rely on **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this docu”
“n of proving both the facts and the amount of damages lies strictly on the party seeking them. In this regard, the Defendant correctly relied on the case of PB Malaysia Sdn Bhd v Samudra (M) Sdn Bhd [2008] MLJU 785, which emphasises that a plaintiff has the duty to produce relevant documentary evidence to support his c”
“59. In evaluating these evidential gaps, this Court is guided by the decision in Joseph a/l Sinnappan v Public Prosecutor [2024] MLJU 3271, which mandates the rejection of a post-mortem report where significant diagnostic gaps exist due to a failure to conduct foundational confirmatory tests. Parallel to the medical of”
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1 IN THE MATTER OF HIGH COURT OF MALAYA IN THE STATE OF KEDAH DARUL AMAN, MALAYSIA CIVIL SUIT NO.: KA-23NCvC-1-02/2024 BETWEEN R SIVAKUMAR A/L RAJOO (NRIC NO.: 690626-06-5289) (Suing as the Administrator of the Estate of Vinosiny A/P R Sivakumar (NRIC NO. : 010910-05-0496) --- PLAINTIFF AND UNIVERSITI UTARA MALAYSIA --- DEFENDANT Grounds of Judgment (After trial) Introduction
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1. This case tasks the Court to answer one pivotal and deeply tragic question: was the lifeless body of a young student found in her dormitory the result of the university's hidden electrical negligence, or a tragic misadventure devoid of fault? 24/06/2026 08:21:58 KA-23NCvC-1-02/2024 Kand. 83 **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 Brief Facts of the Case
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2. The Plaintiff is the father of the late Vinosiny A/P R Sivakumar (the "Deceased") and brings this action in his personal capacity and as the administrator of her estate. The Deceased was a student pursuing a Bachelor of Accounting (Information Systems) with Honours at the Defendant's university, Universiti Utara Malaysia (UUM).
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3. On 14.05.2022, the Deceased registered for her dormitory and began occupying Room 316, Block 6D, INASIS Sime Darby UUM. The sequence of events leading to the tragic discovery of the Deceased on 21.05.2022 is as follows: a) At approximately 2:30 p.m. – 2:45 p.m., the Deceased's friends reported to the INASIS Sime Darby management that she had been unresponsive to phone calls and knocks on her door since the previous day, noting a known medical history of seizures; b) Personnel from the Defendant's Security Department unlocked the door with a duplicate key, discovering the Deceased lying unconscious on the floor near her study desk; **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 c) Between 3:00 p.m. and 3:37 p.m., two Assistant Medical Officers from the UUM Health Centre conducted an initial scene assessment; d) At approximately 3:37 p.m., a Medical Officer from the UUM Health Centre (SD2) examined the Deceased and formally pronounced her deceased; e) The Royal Malaysia Police arrived between 4:10 p.m. and 7:05 p.m. to secure the scene and initiate investigations; f) At 7:05 p.m., forensic officers from IPK Alor Setar transported the body to the Forensic Department of Hospital Sultanah Bahiyah for a post-mortem examination.
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4. On 25.01.2023, a Sessions Court Coroner, following an inquest, recorded a finding that the Deceased died due to a misadventure caused by electrocution.
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5. Premised on the event of the Deceased's death, the Plaintiff initiated this civil action against the Defendant. The Plaintiff prays for the following reliefs from this Court: a) Special damages for funeral expenses amounting to RM10,000.00. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 b) Special damages for travelling expenses amounting to RM10,000.00. c) Bereavement damages amounting to RM30,000.00 pursuant to Section 7(3A) of the Civil Law Act 1956; d) General damages amounting to RM1,000,000.00; e) Aggravated damages amounting to RM1,000,000.00; f) Exemplary damages amounting to RM1,000,000.00; and g) Costs of the action. The Plaintiff’s Case 6. Learned counsel for the Plaintiff advanced his case primarily on the premise that while the duty of care is admitted by the Defendant, the Defendant had severely breached this duty, both at common law and statutorily, resulting in the Deceased’s fatal electrocution. The Plaintiff’s submissions are anchored on four main legal and factual thrusts.
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7. First, the Plaintiff submits that it is indisputable that the Deceased died of electrocution. To establish causation, the Plaintiff relies heavily on the Post-Mortem Report prepared by SP1, which conclusively recorded "electrocution" as the cause of death. The learned counsel emphasised that the Defendant failed to call any **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 independent forensic pathologist to rebut SP1's medical findings. Furthermore, the Plaintiff relies on the findings of the Sessions Court Coroner’s inquest and the police investigation, which both pointed to electrocution. The Plaintiff highlighted that the Defendant took no legal steps to review or quash the Coroner’s findings at the material time.
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8. Secondly, the Plaintiff contends that the Defendant exercised complete and exclusive control over the INASIS Sime Darby dormitory and its electrical installations. The Plaintiff points to the defective wall lamp in Room 316, which was allegedly lacking a cover and hanging by a wire, as the source of the lethal current.
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9. Premised on the Defendant's exclusive control of the premises, the Plaintiff submits that the maxim of res ipsa loquitur applies. Consequently, the evidential burden shifts to the Defendant to prove that the electrocution occurred without their negligence, a burden the Plaintiff argues the Defendant has failed to discharge.
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10. Thirdly, the learned counsel fiercely criticised the Defendant’s pleaded case, categorising it as a mere bare denial. The Plaintiff submitted that, in a tort of negligence, the Defendant ought to have **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 pleaded specific substantive defences (such as contributory negligence, inevitable accident, or volenti non fit injuria), which they failed to do. Additionally, the Plaintiff urges this Court to invoke adverse inferences against the Defendant under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 for the alleged concealment of material documents, specifically the Fire and Rescue Department report and the routine maintenance records of the electrical installations.
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11. Finally, on the issue of quantum, beyond the special damages claimed for funeral and travel expenses, the Plaintiff vigorously pressed for aggravated damages of no less than RM250,000.00. The learned counsel submitted that such an award is justified due to the Defendant’s oppressive post-incident conduct and litigation strategy, namely, fighting the case tooth and nail, baselessly denying the electrocution, and accusing the Deceased's mother (SP5) of lying regarding the unidentified repairman. To circumvent the legal restrictions on estates claiming aggravated damages, as established in appellate authorities like Bukit Tinggi Hospital Sdn Bhd & Anor v Navin Sharma a/l Karam Chand (suing as administrator of the estate of Suman Rampal a/p Hardyal Rampal, deceased) & Anor and another appeal [2026] 1 MLJ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 172 1, the Plaintiff argued that this specific claim is also brought in the father's personal capacity for his own pain, suffering, and emotional distress.
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12. The Plaintiff prayed for punitive/exemplary damages and high costs to send a strong deterrent message to universities regarding the paramount importance of student safety. The Defence 13. The crux of the Defendant’s submission is that the Plaintiff has wholly failed to discharge the legal burden of proving causation and breach of duty on a balance of probabilities. The Defendant’s case is anchored on the premise that the university took all reasonable care to ensure the safety of its premises and that the Deceased's tragic passing was not the result of any electrical defect or negligence on their part.
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14. The Defendant vehemently disputes the conclusion that the Deceased died of electrocution, characterising the post-mortem report prepared by SP1 as fundamentally flawed, inconclusive, and unreliable. The Defendant highlighted SP1’s admissions during cross-examination, specifically her limited experience with **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 electrocution cases and the fact that she formed a preliminary opinion of electrocution before conducting a site visit or comprehensive testing.
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15. Furthermore, the Defendant emphasised that SP1 admitted no metallization testing was done, and that the histological cell changes she relied upon are not strictly specific to electrocution and could arise from other traumas.
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16. In contrast to the Plaintiff’s reliance on medical assumptions, the Defendant relies on the technical investigation conducted by the independent statutory regulator, the Energy Commission, presented through SD4. The Defendant submitted that SD4’s investigation conclusively established that all electrical appliances were in good condition, there was no electrical leakage, and the Residual Current Circuit Breaker (RCCB) was fully functional. Since the Energy Commission found no elements of electrocution and confirmed the Defendant’s complete compliance with the Electricity Supply Act 1990, the Defendant argued there is zero basis to sustain an allegation of breach of duty. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9
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17. The Defendant submitted that the Plaintiff's attempt to introduce evidence regarding a "Malay male" who allegedly repaired the wall lamp must be rejected as this material fact was never pleaded in the Statement of Claim.
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18. On the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Defendant argued it is legally inapplicable. Relying heavily on the precedent set in Sim Chiang Lee & Another v Lee Hock Chuan & Others [2003] 1 SLR 122, the Defendant submitted that once a Plaintiff chooses to plead specific allegations regarding the cause of the incident, in this case, the defective wall lamp, the burden remains strictly on the Plaintiff to prove those specific assertions, thereby precluding them from using res ipsa loquitur to shift the evidential burden back onto the Defendant.
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19. Furthermore, drawing on the principles of Walsh v Holst & Co Ltd [1958] 3 All ER 33, the Defendant argued that any presumption of negligence is completely rebutted since the Defendant adduced positive, technical evidence that the electrical systems were safe and all reasonable care had been taken. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10
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20. On the issue of quantum, the Defendant submitted that even if liability is established, the estate is statutorily and legally barred from claiming exemplary and aggravated damages. Applying the strict statutory interpretation of Section 8(2)(a) of the Civil Law Act 1956 as enforced by the Federal Court in Koperal Zainal bin Mohd Ali & Ors v Selvi a/p Narayan [2021] 3 MLJ 365, the Defendant emphasised that an estate is absolutely precluded from recovering exemplary damages.
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21. Similarly, relying on the Court of Appeal’s decision in Bukit Tinggi (supra), the Defendant argued that a claim for aggravated damages dies with the claimant. The Defendant highlighted that an estate is not a sentient being capable of suffering worsened emotional injury, and therefore cannot claim aggravated damages based on the Defendant's post-incident litigation conduct. Issues for Determination 22. The pre-trial case management had been comprehensively conducted prior to the commencement of the trial, during which the Parties expressly recorded that they had no objection to this Court presiding as the trial coram. The Parties had agreed that the issues for the determination by the Court are as follows: **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 a) Whether the Plaintiff has proven on a balance of probabilities that the Deceased's death was caused by electrocution, particularly when weighing the Post-Mortem Report against the Energy Commission's independent findings; b) Whether the Defendant breached its duty of care and statutory duties under the Electricity Supply Act 1990, and whether the alleged defective wall lamp was the operative cause of the Deceased's death; c) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to presume negligence, despite having explicitly pleaded specific acts of negligence in the Statement of Claim; d) Whether the Plaintiff is precluded from adducing and relying on evidence regarding an unidentified "Malay male" who allegedly repaired the wall lamp, as this material fact was never pleaded; and e) In the event liability is established, whether the Plaintiff, suing as the administrator of the estate, is legally barred from claiming exemplary and aggravated damages under Section 8 of the Civil Law Act 1956 and established appellate precedents. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 The Trial 23. The Plaintiff called a total of six (6) witnesses during the trial: a) Medical Officer, Forensic Department, Hospital Sultanah Bahiyah, Dr Wan Zafirah Zamaliana Amalina (SP1) (Subpoenaed Witness); b) The Deceased’s sister, Losiny A/P R Sivakumar (SP2); c) The Deceased’s brother, Ssharvien Kumar A/L R Sivakumar (SP3); d) The Deceased’s roommate, Tharshiny Dhevi A/P R. Jegathesan (SP4); e) The Deceased’s mother, Santhi A/P Raman (SP5); and f) The Deceased’s father, R. Sivakumar A/L Rajoo (SP6).
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24. Meanwhile, the Defendant called a total of five (5) witnesses during the trial: a) Security Assistant, Security Department of UUM, Zariq Eqmal bin Zakaria (SD1); **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 b) Medical Officer of UUM Health Centre, Dr Jafri bin Lebai Ahmad (SD2); c) Engineer, Department of Infrastructure Development & Management of UUM, Ir. Radzaini B Abdullah (SD3); d) Assistant Director/Investigating Officer, Energy Commission, Ir. Ts. Ahmed Azad bin Ismail (SD4) (Subpoenaed Witness); and e) Vice-Chancellor, UUM (formerly Deputy Vice-Chancellor of Student Affairs), Prof. Dr Ahmad Martadha bin Mohamed (SD5). Decision and Findings of the Court 25. Having given the matter a thorough consideration, and after weighing the oral testimonies of the witnesses against the backdrop of the extensive documentary evidence, I find that the Plaintiff has failed to discharge the burden of proving his case on a balance of probabilities. While the Plaintiff’s narrative and reliance on the post-mortem findings were initially persuasive, they ultimately lacked the definitive forensic and engineering evidentiary support necessary to overcome the objective findings **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 of the independent statutory regulator, the Energy Commission, which confirmed the safety of the electrical systems. Consequently, this Court decides in favour of the Defendant and dismisses the Plaintiff’s claim in its entirety.
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26. Before delving into the factual analysis of the incident, it is pertinent to establish the legal principles governing this claim. The Defendant does not dispute that it owes a duty of care to take reasonable steps to ensure the safety of its students. However, the existence of a duty of care does not automatically establish a breach. The burden of proving that the Defendant breached this duty lies strictly on the Plaintiff.
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27. Under Section 101 of the Evidence Act 1950, whoever desires the court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. The standard of proof required of the Plaintiff is on a balance of probabilities, as established by the Court of Appeal in Yeohata Machineries Sdn Bhd & Anor v Coil Master Sdn Bhd & Ors [2015] 6 MLJ 810 as Vernon Ong JCA (as he then was) ruled that the evidential burden of proof is only shifted to the opposing party once the plaintiff has discharged its original burden **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 of establishing a case; if the plaintiff fails to do so, the claim must necessarily fail.
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28. In other words, the onus of proof lies on the party who alleges a fact, and a plaintiff's case must stand or fall upon the evidence adduced by him. Therefore, to succeed in this action, the Plaintiff must adduce cogent evidence to show that the Defendant failed to comply with the required standards of reasonable care (See also Apex Court judgment in Letchumanan Chettiar Alagappan v Secure Plantation Sdn Bhd [2017] 4 MLJ 697).
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29. It is undisputed that the Plaintiff heavily relied on Section 22(2) of the Electricity Supply Act 1990 and Regulation 110 of the Electricity Regulations 1994, arguing that the Defendant breached its statutory duty to maintain the electrical installations safely. Applying the principle in Yeohata Machineries and Letchumanan Chettiar Alagappan, the burden is vested upon the Plaintiff to prove that the Defendant had failed to comply with its statutory duties under Section 22(2) of the Electricity Supply Act 1990 and Regulation 110 of the Electricity Regulations 1994. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 Preliminary Issue: Unpleaded Material Facts and the "Malay Male" Repairman 30. As a threshold matter, this Court must resolve a critical evidentiary and procedural objection raised by the Defendant. During the trial, the Plaintiff sought to introduce a novel factual narrative through the oral testimony of SP5 (the Deceased's mother), who asserted that upon registering into the dormitory on 14.05.2022, an unidentified "Malay male" wearing a t-shirt, long pants, and a pouch bag arrived at Room 316 to inspect and repair the allegedly defective wall lamp. According to SP5, this individual merely tightened a wire with a screw, remarked that the lamp was functional but missing a component, and left the repair incomplete, promising to return. The Plaintiff heavily relies on this narrative to establish that the Defendant possessed actual or constructive knowledge of the hazardous installation and subsequently failed to rectify it.
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31. The Defendant vigorously objected to the admission of this evidence on the ground that this material fact was completely omitted from the Plaintiff's Statement of Claim. A meticulous perusal of the Statement of Claim (found at pages 5 to 12 of the **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 Bundle of Pleadings) confirms a total absence of any pleading concerning this incident, the existence of this repairman, or any incomplete maintenance works executed on 14.05.2022.
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32. This omission was expressly and detrimentally conceded by the Plaintiff himself (SP6) during cross-examination, where he unequivocally admitted that these pivotal assertions were never pleaded [See NOP, pp. 82–83, and structurally mirrored at p. 98]: Apa yang disebut oleh isteri kamu tentang lelaki Melayu datang ke bilik baiki tertinggal barang, fakta-fakta ini tidak dimasukkan dalam Ikatan Pliding bermula daripada muka surat 5 hingga 12 Bundle IP. Tidak disebut di mana-mana? Ya, betul.
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33. The law on pleadings is trite, unyielding, and foundational to the administration of civil justice. Under Order 18 Rule 7(1) of the Rules of Court 2012, every pleading must contain a statement in summary form of the material facts on which the party relies for their claim or defence. It is a cardinal principle that parties are **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 strictly bound by their pleadings; they must stand or fall by them, and the court cannot adjudicate upon a case not explicitly set out therein (See the Supreme Court authority of State Government of Perak v Muniandy [1986] 1 MLJ 490).
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34. This Court is guided by the foundational principles enunciated in The Chartered Bank v Yong Chan [1974] 1 MLJ 157, where Raja Azlan Shah FJ (as he then was) illuminated the underlying rationale of this rule at page 159: "Now the function of pleadings is to give fair notice of the case which is to be made so that the opposing party may direct his evidence to the issue disclosed by them... If we are to maintain a high standard in our trial system, it is indubitably not to treat reliance upon forms of pleadings as pedantry or mere formalism." [Emphasis added]
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35. This absolute restriction against departing from pleaded boundaries is further reinforced by the House of Lords in Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Southport Corporation [1956] AC 218, which establishes that a plaintiff cannot be permitted to rely on **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 unpleaded negligence discovered late in the day. To allow a party to spring an unpleaded material fact of this magnitude mid-trial amounts to nothing short of trial by ambush, a practice completely antithetical to our adversarial system. As reaffirmed by the Federal Court in Letchumanan Chettiar (supra), a litigant is structurally barred from raising a completely new case or adducing unpleaded material facts at the trial stage.
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36. On the other hand, the Plaintiff’s counsel attempted to excuse this glaring omission by arguing that the arrival of the repairman was merely 'evidence' and therefore did not need to be pleaded under Order 18 Rule 7(1).
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37. This Court finds this argument conceptually flawed. It is trite law that a distinction must be drawn between facta probanda (material facts) and facta probantia (evidence). While the physical description of the repairman, such as his race, his attire, or his pouch bag, constitutes mere evidence, the foundational assertion that an agent of the Defendant attended the room, acquired actual knowledge of a defect, and executed an incomplete, hazardous repair constitutes a core material fact. It forms the very crux of the **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 alleged breach of duty. By entirely omitting this foundational event from the pleadings, the Plaintiff failed to plead the material facts necessary to ground this specific allegation of negligence, thereby depriving the Defendant of fair notice.
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38. Even if the Court were to entertain this unpleaded narrative momentarily, the Plaintiff wholly failed to discharge the burden of proof under Section 101 of the Evidence Act 1950. Applying the Apex Court's decision in Letchumanan Chettiar (supra), the onus lies on the party who alleges a fact. During cross-examination, SP5 conceded that the man wore merely a t-shirt and long pants, with no uniform or identification. More crucially, when specifically questioned, SP5 explicitly agreed that there were absolutely no signs or markers to confirm that the individual was indeed a technician or staff member of UUM, the Defendant. [See NOP, p.71] Q Kalau melihat kepada laporan polis yang kamu buat kamu kata bahawa (rujuk mukasurat 13 – lihat barisan keempat daripada bawah). Kamu kata kami nampak seorang kakitangan lelaki UUM yang berlalu di koridor **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 depan bilik anak saya. Itu yang kamu tulis dalam laporan polis. Saya nak kamu rujuk kepada Mukasurat 7 Pernyataan saksi kamu Soalan dan Jawapan 32. Di jawapan 32 kamu kata yang lelaki itu berpakaian T shirt dan seluar panjang. Jadi sebenarnya tiada sebarang tanda-tanda atau untuk kenalpasti sememangnya lelaki tersebut adalah kakitangan UUM/Defendan? A Setuju.
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39. Coupled with her admission that she had no documentary evidence to prove this Malay man's identity, her assertion that a UUM staff member repaired the lamp is exposed as a mere unverified assumption.
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40. The entire narrative rested solely on the bare, uncorroborated oral assertion of SP5. During cross-examination, SP5 admitted there was zero documentary evidence to support her claim. While she attempted to rely on a police report she made, she conceded that the report was lodged on 11.03.2023, nearly 10 months after the incident, and was done strictly upon the advice of her counsel. This Court views such a delayed report as an afterthought orchestrated to build a case against the Defendant. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22
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41. This glaring lack of evidence is severely compounded by the admissions of the Plaintiff himself, SP6. During cross-examination, SP6 conceded that he was waiting in his car at the parking lot on 14.05.2022 while his wife and daughter were in the dormitory. He unequivocally admitted that he had no personal knowledge of the room's condition on that date and had not personally witnessed the alleged repair work. His testimony on this issue is therefore reduced to mere hearsay, relying entirely on his wife's unverified assumptions.
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42. Not only that, SP6 testified during trial that despite communicating with his daughter daily over the phone during those seven days, the Deceased never once complained to him about any problems, defective wall lamps, or issues in the room.
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43. The narrative is utterly devoid of corroboration from the Plaintiff's own witnesses or the Defendant's documentary records. The Deceased's own roommate, SP4, who occupied the room from 14.05.2022 to 16.05.2022, candidly testified that she experienced no issues during her stay. SP4 even confirmed that neither she **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 nor the Deceased ever lodged a complaint regarding a defective wall lamp to the management nor filled out the Complaint Logbook.
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44. This aligns perfectly with the evidence of the Defendant's engineer (SD3), who confirmed based on their records that UUM’s engineering department (JPPI) never received any defect report regarding the electrical system in Room 316 and did not dispatch any maintenance staff to the room before the incident. Given that the Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case as required by law, and considering that this allegation only surfaced in a police report lodged by SP5 approximately ten months after the incident, this Court finds that the assertion of a UUM staff member repairing and leaving the wall lamp in a dangerous state is a legally baseless and uncorroborated afterthought (See also Yeohata Machineries (supra)).
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45. Therefore, this Court finds that the Plaintiff's assertion that the Defendant possessed actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged defect is completely unsubstantiated. The Defendant cannot be held liable for failing to rectify a defect that was never **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 reported, and whose very existence during those seven days remains unproven. Cause of Death & Evaluation of Medical Evidence 46. Having disposed of the preliminary evidentiary issue, the first substantive issue for this Court's determination is whether the Plaintiff has successfully proven, on a balance of probabilities, that the cause of the Deceased's death was electrocution. To support this assertion, the Plaintiff relies entirely on the Post-Mortem Report dated 22.05.2022 and the oral testimony of SP1 (Dr Wan Zafirah), which concluded that the death was caused by electrocution.
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47. However, upon a thorough scrutiny of SP1's evidence during cross-examination, this Court finds that her medical findings and conclusions suffer from fundamental methodological flaws, lack scientific objectivity, and cannot be safely relied upon to establish causation on a balance of probabilities.
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48. First, SP1 testified before this Court purely as a subpoenaed factual witness—as the maker of the post-mortem report—and not as an expert witness compliance-vetted under Order 40A of the **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 Rules of Court 2012. During cross-examination, SP1 candidly admitted that she is a medical officer rather than a consultant forensic pathologist (See NOP, p. 12). Crucially, she confessed to possessing extremely limited empirical exposure to electrical injuries, having handled fewer than five electrocution cases throughout her entire career out of approximately 2,000 post-mortems conducted [See NOP, p. 13]: From 2000 post mortem done, how many of it involve cases of electrocution. Did you recall the number? I did not recall the number. Any gauge? Let say less than five, less then ten... I would say less than five.
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49. Given the highly technical and nuanced forensic profiles required to diagnose fatal electrocution definitively, SP1's lack of specialised sub-speciality qualifications, combined with her minimal empirical exposure to this specific mechanism of death, substantially diminishes the expert weight and judicial reliability of her diagnostic conclusions. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26
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50. Secondly, the Court notes SP1’s concession during cross-examination that she had informed the Deceased's family of a "probable electrocution" on 22.05.2022, before visiting the incident site or obtaining concrete evidence of electrical leakage. During re-examination, SP1 clarified that providing a preliminary opinion to grieving family members is a standard forensic pathology practice and that the official burial permit initially stated "pending laboratory analysis". While this Court accepts the administrative and compassionate necessity of such preliminary briefings, a judicial concern arises when this initial hypothesis becomes the definitive final conclusion despite a lack of subsequent corroborating evidence.
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51. This Court observes that SP1 formed her definitive diagnostic thesis of electrocution before executing a comprehensive forensic evaluation of the physical scene. SP1 admitted communicating a finding of "probable electrocution" to the Deceased's family on 22.05.2022, whereas her scene visit was only conducted much later on 01.06.2022 [See NOP, p. 39]: Okay, so, to clarify, on the 22nd of May 2022, your preliminary opinion was electrocution, is it? **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 Correct, probable electrocution. [NOP, p. 39]
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52. Approaching a post-mortem with an anchoring bias or a preconceived hypothesis, rather than allowing the diagnostic conclusion to be driven by objective forensic and scientific empirical facts, renders the final medical opinion legally unsafe. This is particularly critical where, as detailed below, independent technical testing subsequently disproved any localised electrical failure or leakage.
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53. Thirdly, this Court finds that SP1’s conclusion heavily relied on the histological findings of the Deceased’s skin samples, specifically from the medial malleolus. However, the evidentiary weight of these findings was fundamentally undermined during cross-examination. When confronted with authoritative medical literature (See Bundle B5), SP1 unequivocally agreed that the histological features she relied upon, specifically “nuclear elongation”, are not strictly specific to electrocution, and can easily be misdiagnosed, as it also occurs in thermal burns and blunt traumatic injuries. She admitted: **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 Referring to bundle B5 at Tab A and Tab B, you will agree with me that, let's see if we look at using nuclear elongation to say that there is a presence of electric shock. Is has been stated that its debatable to use that because nuclear elongation can also happen in thermal burns, blunt traumatic skin injuries and the other cause. I agree with that statement. [NOP, pp 21- 22] … The presence of nuclear elongation doesn’t just exist or its not specific to cases of electrocution, it can also occur for causes of death from thermal burns, blunt traumatic skin injury and a few others that is quoted at page 7 of bundle b5, Agree? Agree [NOP, p 22]
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54. She explicitly conceded that such cellular changes could also result from other incidents, such as thermal burns and blunt traumatic skin injuries. Furthermore, SP1 agreed with the medical literature that there is a known risk of misdiagnosing impact abrasions as electrocution marks due to their similar histological presentation. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29
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55. More detrimentally to the Plaintiff’s case, SP1 confirmed that no specific metallization test on the skin, nor Energy Dispersive X-ray microanalysis with Scanning Electron Microscopy (EDX-SEM), was conducted on the Deceased to prove the entry of an electric current conclusively. During re-examination, SP1 attempted to explain this critical omission by stating that a metallization test is not strictly mandatory for diagnosing electrocution. She testified that in the absence of such tests, forensic pathologists can instead rely on the gross examination of the body coupled with "circumstantial evidence" surrounding the death.
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56. While this Court has carefully considered SP1's explanation regarding the absence of metallization testing, her subsequent reliance on "circumstantial evidence" proves fatal to her own conclusion. The specific circumstantial evidence she relied upon was her observation that the Deceased was found near a horizontal metal bar under the study desk, postulating that electrocution was caused through this bar.
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57. However, the objective and independent technical investigation executed by the Energy Commission structurally dismantled this **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 medical hypothesis. SD4 testified that an insulation resistance test performed specifically on that exact horizontal metal bar yielded a reading of 2 megohms, conclusively proving that there was zero electrical leakage or current migration bypassing the insulation. [See NOP, p.168] Q Ikut keterangan daripada pasukan forensic Hospital Sultanah Bahiyah iaitu Dr. Wan Zafirah semasa beliau pergi ke Lokasi kemalangan pada 1/6/2022 pihak kamu ada di lokasi kemalangan. Boleh beritahu apa yang telah dibuat oleh kamu dan pasukan di lokasi kemalangan pada 1/6/2022 ? A Pada 1/6/2022 saya dan pasukan telah membuat ujian Rintangan Penebatan terhadap katil mangsa, meja mangsa, kerusi mangsa dan galang meja mangsa. Ujian rintangan penebatan ini adalah untuk mengesan kebocoran arus pada objek-objek logam yang berpenebat. Adalah didapati bacaan yang kita perolehi adalah 2 megohm menunjukkan tiada kebocoran arus **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 pada objek-objek yang saya nyatakan tadi. Jika ada kebocoran arus bacaan pada pengujian rintangan penebatan adalah di bawah 1 megohm.[Emphasis added]
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58. Since the independent statutory regulator confirmed the absolute absence of any electrical source or leakage on the metal bar, the "circumstantial evidence" SP1 relied upon to support her non-specific histological findings completely collapses. Therefore, relying solely on non-specific histological features, without definitive forensic trace evidence (such as metallization) and without corroborating technical circumstantial evidence, renders SP1's conclusion of electrocution legally unsafe, speculative, and unreliable.
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59. In evaluating these evidential gaps, this Court is guided by the decision in Joseph a/l Sinnappan v Public Prosecutor [2024] MLJU 3271, which mandates the rejection of a post-mortem report where significant diagnostic gaps exist due to a failure to conduct foundational confirmatory tests. Parallel to the medical officer in Joseph, SP1 omitted definitive testing—such as metallization analysis or Energy-Dispersive X-ray microanalysis (EDX-SEM)— **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 relying instead on nonspecific cellular changes that she admitted could mimic thermal or blunt-force trauma.
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60. While appellate courts generally refer to expert consensus pursuant to Majuikan Sdn Bhd v Barclays Bank Plc [2015] 1 MLJ 171, such deference is wholly unmerited where the medical opinion is demonstrably unsupported by physical facts. Guided by the Federal Court in Dr Shanmuganathan v Periasamy s/o Sithambaram Pillai [1997] 3 MLJ 61, this Court must judicially weigh conflicting specialised evidence; accordingly, the uncorroborated hypotheses of a medical officer cannot override the definitive, objective statutory findings of the Energy Commission, which possesses exclusive institutional expertise over electrical infrastructure.
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61. Furthermore, the Court notes that SP1 was evasive and occasionally contradicted her own testimony during cross-examination, particularly regarding her lack of experience in handling electrocution cases.
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62. Applying the principles set out in Mas Haini bt Mohd Zaini v Public Prosecutor [2022] 10 MLJ 183, a witness who is evasive **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 and lacks accuracy in their testimony cannot be deemed reliable. Therefore, the Court is unable to place any significant weight on SP1's oral evidence.
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63. Fourthly, the Post-Mortem Report itself recorded a medical finding from the internal examination that the Deceased suffered from a pre-existing medical condition, namely Myocardial Fibrosis. This condition is scientifically acknowledged in the report itself to reduce the Deceased's threshold for fatal cardiac arrhythmia.
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64. Crucially, when questioned during cross-examination regarding the technical findings of the electrical systems, SP1 candidly admitted that the Energy Commission is more experienced, more skilled, and possesses the requisite expertise in determining the presence of electricity leakage compared to herself.
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65. This Court agrees. When a medical officer postulates an electrical fault, but the statutory electrical regulator confirms the system is entirely safe, the Court must accept the objective technical findings of the regulator. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 34
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66. SP1 confirmed in her report and oral testimony that the presence of myocardial fibrosis reduces the threshold for lethal arrhythmia. Given that no definitive electrical entry point was scientifically proven, the possibility that the Deceased succumbed to a sudden lethal arrhythmia triggered by her pre-existing condition remains a highly probable alternative cause of death.
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67. The Plaintiff has therefore failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the cause of the Deceased's death was electrocution.
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68. Fifthly, the Plaintiff’s specific pleaded case is that the electrocution was caused by a defective wall lamp. To support this, the Plaintiff attempted to link the "thermal injury" found on the Deceased's right upper arm to the wall lamp. However, SP1 explicitly testified that she could not prove or disprove that the thermal injury was caused by electrocution, and her report confirmed that the thermal injury was not fatal. Thus, the medical evidence actively contradicts and destroys the Plaintiff's pleaded theory of the defective wall lamp. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 35
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69. Furthermore, the Plaintiff heavily relied on the Sessions Court Coroner’s inquest, which recorded a finding of electrocution. This Court finds that the Coroner's finding is neither binding nor determinative of civil liability in this suit. As submitted by the Defendant, the inquest was conducted without calling representatives from UUM or the Deceased's family, rendering it an incomplete inquiry. More importantly, the Coroner merely adopted SP1's Post-Mortem Report. Since this Court has found SP1's methodology fundamentally flawed and legally unsafe to be relied upon, the Coroner's finding must inevitably collapse with it.
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70. To elaborate further, in the present case, SP1's conclusion is demonstrably indefensible. SP1 herself admitted that she lacked expertise in electricity. She further made a devastating concession that the Energy Commission (Suruhanjaya Tenaga)—which found zero electrical leakage at the scene—possesses superior experience and expertise in determining the presence of electricity leakages: I am suggesting to you that SE [Suruhanjaya Tenaga] is more experienced, more skilled, and they have the required expertise when it comes to determining whether **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 36 there is any element or presence of electricity leakage that can cause electrocution. They are the ones who are more experienced, skilled, and expert. Do you agree? Agree. [NOP, p 42]
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71. This Court emphasises that when a medical officer merely postulates an electrical fault, but the statutory electrical regulator explicitly confirms the system is safe and compliant, the Court is bound to accept the objective technical findings of the regulator. Applying the principles regarding witness credibility set out in Mas Haini (supra), where a witness gives evasive answers or their testimony is demonstrably undermined by physical facts, the court must scrutinise their evidence with heightened care. The cumulative effect of SP1's lack of specialised experience, premature hypotheses, failure to conduct critical confirmatory tests, and her own devastating concession regarding the Energy Commission's superior expertise renders her diagnostic conclusion wholly unreliable.
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72. Therefore, this Court rejects the conclusion of the Post-Mortem Report and finds that the Plaintiff has failed to establish, on a **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 37 balance of probabilities, that electrocution was the operative cause of the Deceased's death. Breach of Duty & Causation 73. Even if this Court were to accept the Plaintiff’s assertion that the Deceased died of electrocution, which it does not, the Plaintiff still bears the legal burden of proving that the electrocution was caused by the Defendant's breach of its duty of care. The Plaintiff’s pleaded case specifically alleged that a defective wall lamp caused the fatal incident. However, the Plaintiff failed to adduce any technical or engineering evidence to support this assertion. Furthermore, SP1’s own theory postulated that the electrocution was channelled through a horizontal metal bar under the study desk. As conceded by SP1 during cross-examination, a metal bar is merely a conductor, not a source of electricity. The Plaintiff failed to establish the crucial forensic link between any alleged electrical leakage and the Deceased.
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74. In stark contrast to the Plaintiff’s assumptions, the Defendant adduced compelling, independent technical evidence to prove that the premises were entirely safe. This Court places immense weight on the testimony of SD4, the Investigating Officer from the **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 38 Energy Commission (Suruhanjaya Tenaga), which is the statutory regulator for electrical safety in Malaysia.
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75. SD4 testified that exhaustive testing was conducted on the electrical systems and the surrounding objects in Room 316. Crucially, SD4 testified that on 01.06.2022, his team conducted an insulation resistance test on the Deceased's bed, study table, chair, and the horizontal metal bar. The test yielded a reading of 2 megohms, conclusively proving there was no electrical leakage from any of these objects. Furthermore, electrical items seized from the room, including the extension socket and chargers, were sent to SIRIM QAS for testing, and all were found to be in perfect working order.
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76. Crucially, both SD4 and SD3 testified regarding the safety protection system. Tests conducted on the Residual Current Circuit Breaker (RCCB) confirmed that it was in excellent working condition. SD3 testified that the RCCB tripped within 43 milliseconds, while SD4's independent test recorded a trip at 46.9 milliseconds. This means that had there been any fatal electrical leakage in the room, the safety device would have instantly severed the power supply to prevent an electrocution. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 39
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77. Based upon these exhaustive technical assessments, SD4 concluded that the Defendant’s domestic installations strictly conformed with the safety mandates of the Electricity Supply Act 1990 and the Electricity Regulations 1994. Had any structural non-compliance or systemic leakage been detected, the Energy Commission would have issued a statutory Notice 49 to suspend the power supply immediately and initiate criminal prosecution. No such enforcement action was ever warranted or taken against the Defendant. As SD4 categorically summarised [See NOP, p. 189]: "Adalah dapat disimpulkan keenam-enam peralatan kelengkapan elektrik ini tidak menyebabkan kemalangan kepada mangsa."
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78. Faced with the devastating technical findings of the Energy Commission, the evidential burden rested squarely on the Plaintiff to rebut these findings. The Plaintiff could have done so by calling an independent electrical engineering expert. They did not.
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79. As mentioned earlier, during cross-examination, SP1 (the Plaintiff's own medical witness) conceded the superior expertise of the Energy Commission in determining electrical faults. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 40
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80. During re-examination, the Plaintiff (SP6) candidly admitted that he did not engage an expert because an engineer had quoted an estimated inspection cost of RM50,000, stating, "Saya tak mampu" (I could not afford it).
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81. While this Court deeply sympathises with the Plaintiff's financial constraints and his profound grief, the law is unequivocally clear: the legal burden of proof rests strictly on the party alleging negligence. Financial inability does not absolve the Plaintiff of the evidentiary duty to establish causation, especially when confronted with the definitive technical findings of a statutory regulator.
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82. Consequently, the Plaintiff failed to properly challenge the technical findings of SD4 during cross-examination. As submitted by the Defendant, such failure amounts to the evidence being treated as unchallenged and thus accepted by the Court, as held in Munnusamy v Public Prosecutor [1987] 1 MLJ 492.
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83. Although the Plaintiff relies on the case of Yong Shui Tian v Majlis Perbandaran Langkawi Bandaraya Pelancongan [2026] **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 41 3 MLJ 20 to assert that the Defendant is liable for a breach of statutory duty, this Court finds that the Plaintiff's reliance is misplaced. While the legal principles in Yong Shui Tian are undisputed, the application of those principles strictly requires the Plaintiff to first establish an actual non-performance of the statutory duty. Given the independent and objective findings by SD4 that the Defendant’s electrical systems fully complied with the Electricity Supply Act 1990, the foundational requirement of non-performance is absent, rendering the Plaintiff's authority entirely inapplicable.
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84. In their written submissions, the Plaintiff attempted to introduce a new allegation, contending that the Defendant breached its statutory duty under Section 33(1) of the Electricity Supply Act 1990 by allegedly failing to report the incident to the Energy Commission. This Court rejects this argument outright as it is a cardinal principle of civil litigation that parties are strictly bound by their pleadings. The Plaintiff’s Statement of Claim is completely devoid of any pleading regarding Section 33(1) or any facts leading to it, making this an impermissible attempt to raise unpleaded material facts at the submission stage. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 42
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85. For the sake of completeness, even if this Court were to look past this fatal pleading defect—which it does not—a rigorous examination of the trial matrix reveals that the Plaintiff’s allegations regarding Section 33(1) are entirely devoid of substantive merit. During cross-examination, the Plaintiff’s counsel aggressively suggested to the Defendant's engineer (SD3) that UUM intentionally breached its statutory duty to immediately report the loss of life under the Act to conceal a defective wall lamp deliberately, "Saya cadangkan UUM tidak membuat apa-apa laporan kepada Suruhanjaya Tenaga sepertimana yang diwajibkan dalam Akta Bekalan Elektrik kerana ingin menyembunyikan kerosakan lampu dinding itu?"
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86. SD3 unequivocally and firmly disagreed with this base suggestion. The trial record shows that the Plaintiff produced zero objective evidence to substantiate this high-level conspiracy narrative of structural concealment, leaving the allegation as mere hollow speculation.
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87. The absolute death knell to the Plaintiff's argument on this point is found in the testimony of the independent statutory regulator’s own Investigating Officer, SD4 (Ir. Ts. Ahmed Azad bin Ismail). **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 43 When pressed by the Plaintiff's counsel on the alleged absence of a formal statutory report, SD4 clarified that the Energy Commission had received an official notification (pemakluman) of the accident from the university. SD4 testified explicitly that this notification was entirely sufficient for the Commission to step in and independently exercise its statutory investigative powers immediately. SD4 flatly rejected the suggestion that the Defendant was under a strict obligation to submit a separate, full-scale report prior to the Commission commencing its works. Far from exposing a university cover-up, the cross-examination of the independent regulator structurally proved that the technical authorities were properly notified, mobilised immediately, and executed their investigation with total structural integrity. Consequently, the Plaintiff's attempt to construct a case of statutory non-compliance under Section 33(1) fails catastrophically on both the law and the recorded facts.
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88. The Plaintiff further attacked the adequacy of the Energy Commission’s investigation, criticising SD4 for not reviewing SP1’s Post-Mortem Report and alleging that the Defendant compromised the incident scene. This Court finds these criticisms **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 44 entirely misconceived. SD4 is a technical electrical expert whose mandate was to objectively determine the physical presence of electrical leakage, not to diagnose a medical cause of death. His decision not to review the medical report ensures his technical findings remained untainted by medical hypotheses. Furthermore, SD4 clarified during re-examination that the initial tests conducted by the Defendant on 22.05.2022 were performed on the neighbouring room and the riser room, not inside the Deceased's room. Thus, the integrity of the incident scene was fully preserved, and the Energy Commission's objective findings remain unassailable.
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89. Additionally, the Plaintiff invited this Court to invoke Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950, arguing that an adverse inference should be drawn against the Defendant for allegedly concealing regular maintenance records and Fire Department reports. During oral submissions, the Plaintiff’s counsel contended that because the Defendant had complete control over the premises, they were obliged to produce these documents proactively, and their failure to do so implies the documents would be unfavourable to their defence. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 45
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90. This Court firmly rejects this contention. It is trite law that an adverse inference cannot be used as a tool to cure a party’s own procedural lethargy. The Plaintiff had every legal avenue to compel the production of these documents before trial, most notably through an application for Discovery under Order 24 of the Rules of Court 2012, Interrogatories, or a formal Notice to Produce. The Plaintiff admittedly took none of these steps. Relying on the Federal Court's decision in Mohd Said bin Samad v Public Prosecutor [1998] 2 MLJ 294, an adverse inference cannot be drawn for the non-production of evidence where the complaining party had the means and opportunity to obtain such evidence legally but wholly failed to do so.
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91. Furthermore, guided by the Supreme Court in Munnusamy (supra), the threshold for Section 114(g) requires proof of deliberate and intentional suppression of material evidence. Given that the Defendant granted full access to independent statutory bodies, namely the Energy Commission and the Royal Malaysia Police, to conduct exhaustive investigations of the electrical installations, this Court finds absolutely no evidence of mala fide concealment or suppression by the Defendant. The Plaintiff's **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 46 attempt to invoke Section 114(g) is therefore entirely devoid of merit.
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92. The Court is bound by the strict application of the law. Under Section 101 of the Evidence Act 1950, the legal burden of proof rests strictly on the party alleging negligence. Financial inability does not relieve a plaintiff of the evidentiary duty to establish causation, especially when faced with conclusive, objective technical findings from a statutory regulator that directly exonerate the Defendant.
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93. Premised on the objective technical findings of the Energy Commission, this Court finds as a fact that the Defendant’s electrical systems were safe, compliant, and free from any leakage. Consequently, the Plaintiff has failed to prove any breach of duty by the Defendant. Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur 94. The Plaintiff has pleaded and heavily relied upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, asserting that since the Defendant was in complete control of the electrical installations in the dormitory, the **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 47 mere occurrence of the fatal incident raises an automatic presumption of negligence. This Court finds that the Plaintiff's reliance on this doctrine is legally flawed and inapplicable to the factual matrix of this case.
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95. Firstly, it is a settled principle of law that a plaintiff cannot invoke res ipsa loquitur if they have pleaded specific acts of negligence. In the present case, the Plaintiff specifically pleaded that the negligence and the cause of the electrocution stemmed from a defective wall lamp. Applying the High Court's decision in Sim Chiang Lee (supra), once a plaintiff advances specific allegations as to the cause of the incident, the burden remains strictly on the plaintiff to prove those allegations. The doctrine cannot be used as a fallback mechanism to shift the burden of proof when the plaintiff fails to prove their specific assertions.
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96. Secondly, even if the Court were to consider the doctrine, the mere involvement of electricity is insufficient to invoke res ipsa loquitur. As established in PT Mainstream Indonesia Anor v Seri Modalwan Sdn Bhd [2015] 7 MLJ 858, Douglas Sikayun JC (as he then was) expressly declined to apply the presumption of negligence despite the proven occurrence of "electrical arcing", **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 48 holding that the doctrine cannot apply without proof linking the electrical incident to a specific fault attributable to the defendant.
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97. The present case falls entirely short of this threshold. Unlike PT Mainstream, where an electrical fault was at least proven to exist, the Plaintiff herein has failed to establish the existence of any electrical defect whatsoever. On the contrary, the independent experts from the Energy Commission (Suruhanjaya Tenaga), as testified by SD4, conclusively established that there were no electrical defects, irregularities, or leakage in the Deceased's room. Given that exhaustive statutory and technical investigations confirmed the absolute safety of the electrical installations, the Plaintiff cannot rely on a mere uncorroborated allegation of electrocution to ground a presumption of negligence against the Defendant.
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98. Finally, as held in the English Court of Appeal case of Walsh (supra), even where an incident gives rise to a prima facie inference of negligence, the defendant will not be held liable if they can demonstrate that they had taken all reasonable care. To hold otherwise would effectively render the Defendant an absolute insurer of the Plaintiff’s safety, which the law does not permit. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 49 Here, the Defendant has successfully rebutted any inference of negligence by adducing clear, positive, and independent technical evidence (via SD3 and SD4) proving that the electrical systems were safe, fully compliant with statutory requirements, and properly functioning. Therefore, any presumption of negligence is wholly defeated. Damages 99. Having found that the Defendant is not liable for the death of the Deceased, the Plaintiff’s claim for damages must necessarily fail. However, for the sake of completeness, this Court will briefly address the quantum of damages claimed by the Plaintiff.
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100. It is a trite principle of law that the burden of proving both the facts and the amount of damages lies strictly on the party seeking them. In this regard, the Defendant correctly relied on the case of PB Malaysia Sdn Bhd v Samudra (M) Sdn Bhd [2008] MLJU 785, which emphasises that a plaintiff has the duty to produce relevant documentary evidence to support his claim.
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101. The Plaintiff pleaded for special damages amounting to RM10,000 for funeral expenses and RM10,000 for travelling expenses. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 50
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102. During cross-examination, the Plaintiff (SP6) gave contradictory evidence, stating the total was RM15,000, and candidly admitted that there were absolutely no receipts or documentary evidence tendered in Court to substantiate these expenses. Consequently, these claims for special damages would have been dismissed for lack of proof.
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103. Had liability been established, the Court would only have awarded the statutorily fixed bereavement sum of RM30,000 pursuant to Section 7(3A) of the Civil Law Act 1956.
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104. The Plaintiff also claimed an exorbitant sum of RM1,000,000 in exemplary damages. The Defendant rightfully objected to this claim. Under Section 8(2)(a) of the Civil Law Act 1956, damages recoverable for the benefit of an estate shall not include exemplary damages. This statutory bar was definitively affirmed by the Federal Court in Koperal Zainal (supra), which held that an estate has no right to such damages as the victim of the punishable behaviour is not the one suing. Therefore, this claim is legally unsustainable. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 51
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105. The Plaintiff further seeks RM1,000,000.00 in aggravated damages, asserting that the Defendant's aggressive litigation strategy, rejection of settlement terms during mediation, and rigorous cross-examination of SP5 caused profound emotional trauma. This claim is legally untenable. As settled by the Court of Appeal in Bukit Tinggi Hospital Sdn Bhd & Anor v Navin Sharma a/l Karam Chand [2026] 1 MLJ 172, a claim for aggravated damages is compensatory and requires a living claimant capable of experiencing enhanced distress; an estate is not a sentient entity and cannot perceive or process post-incident litigation conduct. Furthermore, the manner in which a defendant conducts its defence or pursues its constitutional right to full litigation cannot ground an independent award of aggravated damages.
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106. The Plaintiff’s attempt to confine the holding of Bukit Tinggi strictly to medical negligence cases is legally incorrect and conceptually flawed. The statutory and conceptual boundaries governing estate claims are of general application across all **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 52 tortious causes of action, regardless of whether the defendant is a healthcare provider or an educational institution.
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107. This position is reinforced by the Federal Court in Koperal Zainal (supra). While the Apex Court in Koperal Zainal (supra) substituted an award of exemplary damages with an award of aggravated damages for the benefit of the estate, it did so strictly to compensate for the documented pain, suffering, and loss of amenities experienced by the deceased victim while still alive.
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108. In stark contrast, the Plaintiff in the present suit seeks aggravated damages anchored entirely upon the Defendant’s post-incident litigation conduct, mediation strategies, and cross-examination tactics. Because the Deceased’s estate is an artificial, non-sentient entity structurally incapable of perceiving or processing emotional distress inflicted after the date of death, the restrictive principle enunciated in Bukit Tinggi applies with absolute force. Consequently, the statutory framework of the Civil Law Act 1956 leaves no room for this Court to award post-mortem aggravated damages, and no exception can be carved out simply because the Defendant is an educational institution. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 53
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109. The Plaintiff further attempted to circumvent this restriction by arguing that the claim for aggravated damages is also brought in his personal capacity as the father, citing his own pain, suffering, and emotional distress. This Court must firmly reject this contention. It is trite law that for a claim brought in a personal capacity for the wrongful death of a family member under Section 7 of the Civil Law Act 1956, the damages are strictly confined by statute. The law limits the Plaintiff's personal recovery to loss of support, funeral expenses, and a statutorily fixed bereavement sum of RM30,000.00 under Section 7(3A). The Civil Law Act 1956 does not recognise a separate, overarching head of aggravated damages for the personal emotional distress of surviving family members.
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110. Furthermore, relying on the principles in Dato’ Stanley Isaacs (suing by himself and as the administrator of the estate of To’ Puan Suzanne Thomas, deceased) v The Government of Malaysia & Ors [2019] 8 MLJ 331, aggravated damages are only awarded for conduct that is offensive, malicious, or spiteful. The Defendant's exercise of its lawful right to file a defence, to test the **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 54 Plaintiff's evidence through cross-examination, and to decline a settlement during mediation does not amount to malicious or oppressive conduct. Therefore, the claim for aggravated damages is entirely devoid of legal merit. Others 111. During the trial, the Plaintiff’s counsel attempted to invoke the "eggshell skull rule" (or “thin skull rule”) in relation to the Deceased’s pre-existing condition of myocardial fibrosis, suggesting that the Defendant is still liable even if the shock would not have killed a person with a normal heart. This Court finds the invocation of this rule fundamentally misconceived. It is a basic tenet of tort law that the eggshell skull rule relates strictly to the remoteness of damage. It dictates that a tortfeasor must take their victim as they find them, but it only applies after liability—namely, a breach of duty and causation—has been firmly established. Because the Plaintiff has failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that an electrical leakage occurred or that the Defendant breached its duty of care, the issue of remoteness of damage does not arise, and the “eggshell skull rule” has no application here. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 55
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112. This Court also notes a disturbing pattern by the Plaintiff in attempting to introduce irrelevant and unpleaded issues to prejudice the Defendant. During the cross-examination of SD5, the Plaintiff’s counsel attempted to adduce evidence regarding an alleged prior fire at a UUM hostel in July 2020. The Defendant’s counsel rightfully objected. This alleged incident was entirely outside the scope of the pleadings. A civil trial is not a fishing expedition, and this Court strictly disregarded this unpleaded line of questioning as it holds no relevance to the pleaded cause of action regarding the Deceased. Conclusion 113. This Court expresses its deepest and most sincere condolences to the Plaintiff for the tragic and untimely loss of his daughter. The grief of a parent losing a child is immeasurable, and the Court is not devoid of sympathy for the Plaintiff’s predicament.
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114. However, a court of law is bound by its solemn oath to adjudicate disputes based on established facts, admissible evidence, and settled legal principles, rather than on sympathy or speculation. As established by the apex court, the burden of proof lies strictly on the Plaintiff to prove his claim on a balance of probabilities, and a **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 56 plaintiff's case must stand or fall upon the evidence adduced by him.
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115. In the present suit, the Plaintiff’s claim fundamentally collapses on the essential elements of breach of duty and causation. The Plaintiff's reliance on the uncorroborated, non-specific assumptions in the medical evidence was entirely dismantled by the objective, independent, and exhaustive statutory investigations conducted by the Energy Commission. The technical findings conclusively proved that the Defendant's premises were absolutely safe and free of any electrical defects or leakage.
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116. Since the Plaintiff has failed to adduce any cogent evidence to establish that the Defendant had breached its duty of care, or that any such breach caused the demise of the Deceased, the Plaintiff's claim must necessarily fail.
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117. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s claim is hereby dismissed. Dated: 21st June, 2026 **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 57 -------------------------------------------------------------------- YA Dr. Hj. JOHN LEE KIEN HOW @ MOHD JOHAN LEE JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA ALOR SETAR Table of Authorities Cases Bukit Tinggi Hospital Sdn Bhd & Anor v Navin Sharma a/l Karam Chand (suing as administrator of the estate of Suman Rampal a/p Hardyal Rampal, deceased) & Anor and another appeal [2026] 1 MLJ 172 Dato’ Stanley Isaacs (suing by himself and as the administrator of the estate of To’ Puan Suzanne Thomas, deceased) v The Government of Malaysia & Ors [2019] 8 MLJ 331 Dr Shanmuganathan v Periasamy s/o Sithambaram Pillai [1997] 3 MLJ 61 Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Southport Corporation [1956] AC 218 Joseph a/l Sinnappan v Public Prosecutor [2024] MLJU 3271 Solicitor for the Plaintiff : M Manoharan & M.Hariharan Messrs. M. Manoharan & Co. Advocates & Solicitors Solicitors for the Defendant : Barvina Ponnusamy & Sathisharajah Yuvarajah Messrs. Jayadeep Hari & Jamil Advocates & Solicitors **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 58 Koperal Zainal bin Mohd Ali & Ors v Selvi a/p Narayan [2021] 3 MLJ 365 Letchumanan Chettiar Alagappan v Secure Plantation Sdn Bhd [2017] 4 MLJ 697 Majuikan Sdn Bhd v Barclays Bank Plc [2015] 1 MLJ 171 Mas Haini bt Mohd Zaini v Public Prosecutor [2022] 10 MLJ 183 Mohd Said bin Samad v Public Prosecutor [1998] 2 MLJ 294 Munnusamy v Public Prosecutor [1987] 1 MLJ 492 PB Malaysia Sdn Bhd v Samudra (M) Sdn Bhd [2008] MLJU 785 PT Mainstream Indonesia & Anor v Seri Modalwan Sdn Bhd [2015] 7 MLJ 858 Sim Chiang Lee & Another v Lee Hock Chuan & Others [2003] 1 SLR 122 State Government of Perak v Muniandy [1986] 1 MLJ 490 The Chartered Bank v Yong Chan [1974] 1 MLJ 157 Walsh v Holst & Co Ltd [1958] 3 All ER 33 Yeohata Machineries Sdn Bhd & Anor v Coil Master Sdn Bhd & Ors [2015] 6 MLJ 810 Yong Shui Tian v Majlis Perbandaran Langkawi Bandaraya Pelancongan [2026] 3 MLJ 20 Statutes Civil Law Act 1956 Electricity Regulations 1994 Electricity Supply Act 1990 Evidence Act 1950 **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal
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