(a) In Item 2(d) of the “Particulars of Claim” in the Payment Claim, CEDY had deducted the sum of RM4,045,250.40 as the “Total amount previously valued and/or certified by consultants”. In Items 11 (l) and (m) of the Payment Response, RA Suria contends that it has paid RM3,032,192.66 on a goodwill basis and that CEDY’s claim for payment is premature (see too, sub-para 12(a) and para 14, Adjudication Response). In the Adjudication Claim, CEDY does not dispute that it has received the sum of RM3,032,192.66 but it takes the position that there is a certified sum of RM1,103,057.74 which remains unpaid by RA Suria. Copies of the certificate of progress payment issued by the Architect for the Project, KAZ Akitek Sdn Bhd (‘KAZ’), recommendation for interim payment by the consultant and tax invoice by CEDY to RA Suria were attached to the Adjudication Claim as “Schedule AC-8”. CEDY’s retort that its claim is not premature can be seen in paras 4 to 16 of the Adjudication Reply. Hence, one of the live issues before the Adjudicator was whether CEDY’s claim is premature, and this involves a consideration of Clause 6 of the LoA on the “Term of Payment” and the method or process of claims and payments as evidenced by the contemporaneous documents produced by CEDY. Based on paras 57 to 63 of the AD on the issue of “Whether to allow the Claimant’s claim for the balance of unpaid certified sum under the Interim Certificates? (Refer to D.1 of the Adjudication Claim)”, the Adjudicator clearly appreciated the arguments of the parties. Earlier, the Adjudicator’s Question was posed to the parties. Whilst the Adjudicator’s Question could have been more elegantly phrased, the underlying poser which the Adjudicator was seeking to resolve relates to payment i.e. what was the basis for RA Suria’s payment of more than RM3 million prior to the submission of the Payment Claim. In para 64 of the AD, the Adjudicator said: “Having perused the arguments put forth by the parties, it is appeared to me and obviously that the Claimant asserted is the balance of certified sum under the Interim Certificates which is issued by the Project Architect shall be pay by the Respondent according to the above principle enunciated. In opposing, the Respondent's contention is that they have paid to the Claimant more than the amount stipulated in the Clause 6.1 of the LOA and any further payment shall subject to the Clause 6.2 of the LOA which is allegedly the Claimant fail to complete its works. As a matter of fact, and in my considered view, since the parties have opted to the Clause 30.1 of PAM 2006 from the beginning of the 1st payment, the Respondent shall oblige to make the payment pursuant to the Interim Certificates issued by their Project Architect which the Project Architect has been delegated and empowered to do so under the PAM 2006.”. He thus found that CEDY’s claim was for the balance of sums of money which had been certified by KAZ vide the Interim Certificates and it is Clause 30.1 of the PAM Contract that governs “Payment application and issuance of Architect’s certificate”. Clause 2.1 LoA provides that the LoA will be based on the PAM Contract 2006. RA Suria itself accepts that the provisions of the PAM Contract shall apply (see, sub-para 7(a) in the Adjudication Response and the contentions in the other parts of the Adjudication Response wherein, among others, reliance was placed on Clauses 15.2, 24.1 and 24.3 of the PAM Contract 2006). The order of precedence of the contract documents for the works is set out in Clause 2.2 LoA and Clause 3.1 of the Conditions of Contract (‘CoC’; see too, the definition of “Contract” or “Contract Documents” in Article 7(q) of the Articles of Agreement) where basically, the LoA takes precedence over the CoC. This was recognised by the Adjudicator in para 49 AD. However, the Adjudicator then addressed his mind to the differing payment provisions under the LoA and the PAM Contract 2006 and he concluded that by the conduct of the parties, they had chosen the mode of payment as provided under Clause 30.1 of the PAM Contract 2006 as KAZ and the Quantity Surveyor had issued five Interim Certificates and RA Suria had made payments or part payments pursuant thereto (see paras 53 and 54 AD). In my opinion, the Adjudicator acted well within his jurisdiction as the main issue before him was whether CEDY’s claimed amounts can be allowed and in answering this question, the Adjudicator would need to deal with RA Suria’s defence on the prematurity of the claim and this in turn involves the issue of the applicability of Clause 6.2 LoA. 2nd Issue: Whether there is a denial of natural justice when the Adjudicator allegedly failed, neglected and/ or refused to consider and/ or appreciate the evidence, records and/ or documents submitted by the parties [27] The duty of the adjudicator to comply with the principles of natural justice is expressly provided under s 24(c) CIPAA. In the discussion on this provision, the learned authors Lam Wai Loon and Ivan YF Loo in Construction Adjudication In Malaysia, Third Edition, Sweet & Maxwell 2022 at pp 227 - 232 had traced the English, Australian, Singaporean and Malaysian cases which have expounded on the common law rules of natural justice or procedural fairness before neatly summarising the principles relating to the rules of natural justice as applied in adjudication proceedings in these words: “… there are two pillars of natural justice. The first is that an adjudicator must be disinterested and unbiased, or in the Latin maxim, nemo judex in causa sua (the “First Rule”). The second is that the parties must be given adequate notice and opportunity to be heard, or in the Latin maxim, audi alteram partem (the “Second Rule”). The adjudicator has to conduct the proceedings in accordance with the rules of natural justice or as fairly as possible within the limitations imposed by the CIPA Act 2012. In this regard, the adjudicator has to be conscious that, whilst the procedure provided by the CIPA Act 2012 is quick and rough and therefore carries with it the risk of injustice, the adjudicator has to maintain a firm grip upon the principles of natural justice and apply them without fear or favour so that the risk can be minimised. Specifically with regard to the Second Rule, even if there is proof that an adjudicator has breached the Second Rule, the court will not set aside an adjudication decision under section 15(b) of the CIPA Act 2012 if (1) there is no “real possibility” that, without the breach, the adjudicator would have reached a different decision in favour of the objector; and (2) the breach is not “decisive” or “material” to the adjudication decision which warrants the court setting aside the adjudication decision.”. [28] In Samado Sdn Bhd v. Kerajaan Malaysia & Another Case [2020] 5 MLRH 165 at p 171, this Court said: “[22] It is trite that the courts will not review any adjudication decision on its merits. To quote the words of Ravinthran Paramaguru J (now JCA) in Bina Puri Construction Sdn Bhd v Hing Nyit Enterprise Sdn Bhd [2015] 8 CLJ 728 at p 733: “[10] It must be noted that under CIPAA, there is no right of appeal against the decision of the adjudicator which is interim in nature or of temporary finality only. Section 15 has provided limited grounds on which the decision of the adjudicator may be set aside. Since an application under s. 15 is not an appeal, the decision of the adjudicator cannot be reviewed on merits. In the instant case, the applicant has relied on the ground of breach of natural justice and excess of jurisdiction to set aside the decision of the adjudicator. In the premises, the criticism of the adjudication decision by the applicant must clearly point to a breach of natural justice or a jurisdictional error in the adjudication process. Otherwise, the instant proceeding would be converted to a full blown appeal or a rehearing of the adjudication process.” (emphasis added).”. [29] RA Suria submitted that there is a denial of natural justice on the following grounds: