Radin Irwan Iskandar Bin Isagani ….Perayu (W-05(M)-46-01/2017)

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA DI PUTRAJAYA [BIDANGKUASA RAYUAN] RAYUAN JENAYAH NO: W-05(M)-46-01/2017 ANTARA RADIN IRWAN ISKANDAR BIN ISAGANI ….PERAYU DAN PENDAKWA RAYA ….RESPONDEN [Dalam Perkara Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur Perbicaraan Jenayah No: 45A-46-09/2016 Antara Pendakwa Raya Lawan Radin Irwan Iskandar Bin Isagani] KORUM: MOHD ZAWAWI SALLEH, HMR IDRUS HARUN, HMR KAMARDIN HASHIM, HMR 2 ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Pendahuluan [1] Ini ialah rayuan Perayu terhadap sabitan dan hukuman mati yang telah dijatuhkan oleh Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur (‘Hakim bicara’) atas kesalahan memperedarkan dadah berbahaya di bawah Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 (‘Akta’) [2] Butir-butir pertuduhan terhadap Perayu ialah seperti berikut: “Bahawa kamu pada 13 Julai 2015, jam lebih kurang 11.00 malam di rumah beralamat C-8-6, Mutiara Apartment, Jalan Klang Lama, Taman Pasir Permata, di dalam Daerah Brickfields, di dalam Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, telah didapati mengedar dadah berbahaya iaitu Cannabis seberat 3,139 gram. Oleh itu kamu telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 39B(1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 39B(2) Akta yang sama.” [3] Kami telah mendengar rayuan Perayu pada 25.8.2017 dan dengan sebulat suara kami telah membenarkan rayuan Perayu. Sabitan dan hukuman mati diketepikan dan Perayu diperintah untuk dibebaskan dengan serta merta. Kini kami memperincikan alasan-alasan membenarkan rayuan Perayu. 3 Kes Pendakwaan [4] Bertindak atas maklumat, pada 13.7.2015 jam lebih kurang 11.00 malam, Inspektor Mohamad Sukri bin Hat (SP6) bersama satu pasukan polis telah membuat pemerhatian dan serbuan ke atas premis sebagaimana yang terdapat dalam pertuduhan. SP6 mendapati pintu gril hadapan premis tersebut dalam keadaan sedikit terbuka dan pintu papan dalam keadaan tidak berkunci. Setelah masuk ke dalam premis tersebut, SP6 melihat seorang lelaki (kemudiannya dicamkan sebagai Perayu) sedang duduk di atas sofa bersama dengan seorang kanak-kanak perempuan. Perayu dan kanak-kanak perempuan tersebut ialah orang yang sama yang SP6 lihat menaiki lif sebelum serbuan itu dilakukan. [5] Pemeriksaan badan Perayu oleh SP6 tidak menjumpai sebarang barang salah. SP6 dan anggota pasukannya seterusnya telah membuat pemeriksaan dalam tiga buah bilik dalam premis tersebut. Dalam bilik ketiga, SP6 telah menemui dan merampas sebuah beg berwarna biru belang kuning bertulis ‘New York’ (P6). SP6 menemui 3 ketulan mampat daun-daun kering disyaki ganja (P14A, P14B dan P14C) berada di dalam beg P6 tersebut. 4 [6] Pada jam lebih kurang 11.30 malam dan semasa SP6 dan pasukannya masih berada dalam premis tersebut, seorang wanita sampai dan masuk ke dalam premis tersebut dengan memperkenalkan dirinya sebagai penyewa premis tersebut. SP6 telah mengarahkan wanita itu untuk masuk ke dalam bilik tidur utama bersama dengan kanak-kanak perempuan dan menunggu di dalam bilik sehingga SP6 dan pasukannya selesai menjalankan pemeriksaan. Wanita itu kemudiannya dikenali sebagai Nor Azura binti Jumri (SP1) dan kanak-kanak perempuan yang berada bersama Perayu ialah anak perempuan kepada Perayu dan SP1. Siasatan mendapati bahawa Perayu adalah merupakan bekas suami kepada SP1 dan kehadiran Perayu di premis tersebut adalah untuk melawat anak perempuannya. [7] Tiga (3) ketulan mampat daun-daun kering (P14A, P14B, dan P14C) telah dihantar kepada ahli kimia, Dr. Vanita a/p Kunalan (SP3), untuk dianalisis. Hasil analisis yang dijalankan, SP3 mengesahkan bahawa barang-barang kes iaitu (3) ketulan mampat daun-daun kering tersebut mengandungi Cannabis dengan jumlah berat 3,139 gram, hal perkara dalam pertuduhan. SP3 turut mengesahkan bahawa Cannabis 5 adalah sejenis dadah berbahaya yang tersenarai dalam Jadual Pertama Akta. Dapatan Hakim bicara diakhir kes pendakwaan [8] Di akhir kes pendakwaan, Hakim bicara mendapati pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan semua elemen pertuduhan. Hakim bicara telah menerima keterangan ahli kimia (SP3) mengenai analisis yang telah dijalankan bagi mencapai keputusan bahawa 3 ketulan mampat daun-daun kering yang dirampas adalah Cannabis seberat 3,139 gram dan tersenarai dalam Jadual Pertama Akta sebagai dadah berbahaya. Hakim bicara juga mendapati tidak ada keraguan mengenai identiti barang kes dan rantaian keterangan terhadap barang kes dadah yang dipertuduhkan juga tidak terputus. [9] Mengenai elemen kawalan dan jagaan terhadap barang kes dadah yang dipertuduhkan, Hakim bicara telah menerima keterangan lisan SP1 yang menyatakan bahawa beliau melihat Perayu telah membawa masuk beg yang mengandungi dadah ke dalam premis yang disewa oleh SP1 pada sehari sebelum kejadian dan disimpan dalam bilik ketiga. Hakim bicara telah menggunapakai anggapan di bawah seksyen 37(d) Akta 6 terhadap Perayu untuk membuktikan elemen pemilikan dan pengetahuan Perayu ke atas dadah yang dipertuduhkan. [10] Untuk elemen pengedaran, Hakim bicara telah menggunapakai anggapan di bawah seksyen 37(da)(vi) Akta oleh kerana berat dadah yang terlibat melebihi had berat minima 200 gram yang ditetapkan di bawah perenggan tersebut. Setelah berpuashati pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan satu kes prima facie, Perayu telah diperintahkan untuk membela diri atas pertuduhan yang dihadapkan. Pembelaan Perayu [11] Perayu telah memilih untuk memberi keterangan membela diri secara bersumpah dari kandang saksi. Hanya Perayu sahaja memberi keterangan untuk menyokong kes pembelaan. Pembelaan Perayu dapat dilihat dalam Penghakiman Hakim bicara yang secara ringkasnya seperti berikut (di m/s 82 – 85 Rekod Rayuan 1): “(a) Selepas bercerai dengan isterinya (SP1), Tertuduh tidak tinggal di Apartment tersebut kerana bergaduh dan tidak dapat melihat anaknya lagi;

MENURUT SEKSYEN 39(B)(1)(a) AKTA DADAH BERBAHAYA, 1952 MANA MEMBAWA HUKUMAN MATI MANDATORI SEKIRANYA DISABITKAN KESALAHAN TERSEBUT. JUSTERU ITU, SAYA MEMERINTAHKAN AGAR TERTUDUH DIBAWA DAN DITAHAN DI PENJARA YANG SAH SELEPAS DARIPADA INI SEHINGGA KEMUDIANNYA DIBAWA KE SUATU TEMPAT KHAS BAGI MENJALANI HUKUMAN GANTUNG DI LEHER SAMPAI MATI MANDATORI.” Alasan Rayuan Perayu [14] Peguam bela terpelajar Perayu telah membangkitkan 4 alasan rayuan dalam penghujahannya untuk menggesa Mahkamah ini membenarkan rayuan Perayu, iaitu:

2.30 petang Kes Sambung Bicara pihak-pihak yang sama. DPP : Pohon untuk memanggil semula saksi (SP1) Mahkamah: Saksi (SP1) dipanggil semula. Saksi diingatkan atas ikrar sumpah terdahulu. 19 Pemeriksaan utama (sambungan) : Saya tanya sekali lagi, boleh puan ingat sama ada OKT ada bawa apa-apa pada hari dia datang ke Apartment tersebut? : Sekarang saya ingat, pada 12 Julai 2015 pada sebelah petang, semasa OKT datang ke Apartment saya, dia ada membawa satu beg.” [penekanan ditambah] [25] SP1 sebagai penyewa dan juga sebagai penghuni premis tersebut mengakui statusnya sebagai seorang saksi yang mempunyai kepentingan. Fakta ini juga gagal dipertimbangkan langsung oleh Hakim bicara. Sebaliknya, Hakim bicara membuat dapatan yang tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan kukuh apabila beliau membuat dapatan bahawa Perayu mempunyai kawalan dan jagaan terhadap premis tersebut dengan andaian Perayu mempunyai kunci premis tersebut. Hakim bicara langsung gagal untuk membuat pertimbangan akan keterangan SP1 yang menyatakan SP1 telah memberi kunci premis tersebut kepada Perayu untuk Perayu masuk ke dalam premis bersama anak mereka sementara SP1 pergi memakir keretanya. Keterangan pembelaan Perayu turut menyatakan bahawa kunci premis yang berada pada Perayu sebelum kejadian telah diserahkan semula kepada SP1 melalui “Fizi Gemuk”. Keterangan ini juga langsung tidak dihargai oleh Hakim bicara dalam menilai pembelaan Perayu. Malahan 20 keterangan pembelaan Perayu telah ditolak sepenuhnya atas alasan satu rekaan, penafian semata-mata dan sebagai satu pemikiran terkemudian oleh Hakim bicara. Setelah menilai pembelaan Perayu, kami sekali lagi tidak bersetuju dengan dapatan Hakim bicara tersebut. [26] Dalam soal-balas, SP1 mengakui bahawa dia bersetuju bahawa keterangan yang diberikan bertujuan adalah untuk melindungi diri sendiri. Dengan itu tidak dapat disangkal bahawa SP1 sebenarnya adalah saksi yang mempunyai kepentingan. Undang-undang mantap menyatakan bahawa keterangan saksi berkepentingan hendaklah diterima dan dinilai berhati-hati. Keterangan SP1 mengenai perkara ini kami petik di m/s 29 – 30 RR Jld.2, seperti berikut: : Awak saksi berkepentingan? : Ya, tidak setuju saya merupakan saksi yang berkepentingan. DPP : Bantahan. Saksi ini tidak tahu maksud saksi berkepentingan. J : Soalan dibenarkan. AF : Dalam bahasa mudah, awak nak protect diri sendiri? : Setuju.”. [27] Pegawai Penyiasat (SP7) dalam keterangannya turut bersetuju bahawa SP1 adalah orang yang disyaki dan sepatutnya turut dipertuduhkan bersama dengan Perayu. Keterangan SP7 semasa 21 disoal-balas dan semasa pemeriksaan semula di m/s 127 dan 130 RR Jld.2, seperti berikut: : Selepas rakam percakapan Azura, awak dapati pada hari kejadian dia ada di tempat kejadian? : Ya, setuju. : Dia inform dia penghuni yang sewa rumah itu? : : Dia ada kata dia ada satu set kunci? : : Azura ada kawalan dan jagaan terhadap keseluruhan rumah itu? : : Secara spesifik, Azura ada kawalan dan jagaan terhadap bilik ketiga? : Setuju. : Azura ada pengetahuan terhadap barang-barang dalam rumah dan bilik ketiga? Betul? : Setuju. : Azura juga perlu menjadi suspek? : Setuju. : Azura tidak ditangkap? : Ya” : Azura ada kepentingan? : Setuju, Azura ada kepentingan. : Azura yang meletakkan beg itu? Ada kemungkinan? : Saya tidak pasti dan ada kemungkinan Azura letakkan beg itu. : Kes ini adalah set up? : Saya tidak pasti.” 22 Re-Examination of SP7 : Sepatutnya Azura adalah suspek? : Dia adalah penghuni rumah dan ada kawalan dan jagaan. : Kenapa Azura selepas siasatan tidak dinamakan sebagai suspek? : Hasil siasatan apabila statement penghuni diambil, dia memberitahu bahawa OKT sudah tidak tinggal bersama dengan Azura dan pada saya sendiri Azura ini sepatutnya dituduh bersama-sama. [28] Dalam keadaan kes ini, Hakim bicara tidak sewajarnya menerima keterangan SP1 secara bulat-bulat. Hakim bicara sewajarnya mengambil peringatan yang telah diberikan oleh Edgar Joseph Jr. HMP dalam kes Arulpragasan a/l Sandaraju v. PP [1997] 1 MLJ 1, seperti berikut: “I must add, lest I be accused of an oversight, that I have not overlooked the fact that there was also the evidence about the recovery of the appellant’s Bank Simpanan Nasional savings book, from the brown bag. It will be recalled that the appellant’s story was that his bag was not the brown bag but the yellow bag. The driver Kabir contradicted this. The appellant may well have been lying about this. On the other hand, so may Kabir who was an obvious suspect – at least, the police thought so, for otherwise they would not have arrested and detained him for 14 days. But, assuming that the ppellant has lied when he denied ownership of the brown bag, that does not necessarily conclude the case against 23 him, for the question remains: was the recovery of the rolls of cannabis and the Bank Simpanan Nasional Savings Book from the brown bag, only consistent with the appellant’s guilt? What if the rolls of cannabis had been planted there by someone else? There was ample time and opportunity for this for the brown bag lay unattended in the pondok and later in the driver’s cabin for quite a while. These was no suggestion that either the brown bag or the compartment in the driver’s cabin from which it was recovered was locked. According to Insp Ismail bin Dan, the police party which consisted of five men, had proceeded to the factory in two vehicles – Insp Ismail in his own car accompanied by Det/Cpl Amir while Insp Wan Rashid, Det Murad and Det Saad, travelled in a police van. On arrival at the factory, the police party did not proceed straightaway to the lorry; instead, Insp Ismail accompanied by Insp Wan Rashid, proceeded to the office near the factory to seek the permission of its manager to conduct a search of the lorry but before doing so, Insp Ismail had instructed his three men above-named to keep the lorry and those on it under observation. However, none of his three men were called to say that they had in fact carried out that instruction and, if so, what was the result of their observation. It was only after making that detour at the office that the police party approached the lorry. By which time, whoever the culprit was – the appellant or Kabir – would have had early warning of an amminent police strike, for how could they have missed noticing the arrival of the police van. There was no suggestion that the behavior of the appellant was in any way abnormal at or about the time of his arrest. This was a case where there were at least three persons on the scene, namely, the appellant, the security guard Ravi Shankar and the driver 24 Kabir. Of the trio, the appellant was the youngest and the most vulnerable, being a lad of just 18 years, while Ravi Shankar and Kabir were mature men aged 23 and 38 years respectively. And although Ravi Shankar and the appellant were perfect strangers, the former did know Kabir. Clearly, the judge adopted an oversimplistic and Nelsonian approach to the case for the prosecution, in that he failed to take into account and/or to give proper weight to and/or to draw proper inferences from every fact which told in favour of the appellant, and thus, failed to review the evidence from all angles, with the result that a miscarriage of justice may well have occurred. In these circumstances, the circumstantial evidence did not exclusively and inevitably connect the appellant to the cannabis, the subject matter of the charge and so the proverbial cap did not exclusively fit the appellant.”. [29] Begitu juga dalam kes Gooi Loo Seng v. PP [1993] 2 MLJ 137, Hakim Mahkamah Persekutuan yang sama telah memberikan pandangan dan peringatan yang sama agar Hakim bicara tidak melihat keterangan saksi berkepentingan hanya dengan “sebelah mata” (“Nelsonian approach”). Di muka surat 141 – 142 kes itu, Edgar Joseph Jr HMP menyatakannya seperti berikut: “We note also that the trial judge accepted at full face value the testimony of Tan Ah Kwai that although she had a seto of keys to the bedroom she never ever entered it when the appellant was not in. In 25 thus accepting the testimony of Tan Ah Kwai, the trial judge does not seem to have recognized that Tan Ah Kwai might have had every possible to suppress the truth and to lie, if necessary, at the expence ot the appellant, bearing in mind that she was an obvious suspect. In any event, we consider that Tan Ah Kwai’s testimony on this point was, to put it mildly, and improbable story. The fact of the matter was that she could have had access to the bedroom, and if necessary, with her friends, without attracting the attention of the appellant, if she so wished. The trial judge however adopted a Nelsonian approach to Tan Ah Kwai’s testimony, and as a result, rejected the crucial part of the defence case which was that the heroin was concealed in his bedroom without his knowledge. But, of equal importance, was the point that the trial judge failed to recognize the significance of the contents of the search list; in particular, as we have already remarked, that it told a materially different story to that deposed to by Insp. Nordin regarding the circumstances under which the heroin was recovered, and as a result, he inferred that the appellant had custody and control of the heroin and knew of its nature. The search list, prepared by Insp. Nordin himself, virtually on the spot, was entirely consistent with the appellant’s version that it was not he but Insp. Nordin who had found the heroin at the bottom of the plastic cupboard, and so flatly contradicted Insp. Nordin’s version that it was the appellant who had prevented Wahid from conducting a search of the plastic cupboard, and had then obligingly recovered the heroin from the bottom of the cupboard and handed it over to Insp. Nordin. And Wahid, though available, was not called by the prosecution. Had the trial judge approached the prosecution case in the manner we have indicated, we cannot confidently say that he would or must inevitably have rejected the appellant’s version that he had no 26 knowledge of the presence of the heroin in the bedroom and that it could have been hidden there by others having access to the bedroom in his absence. We need hardly add, that even if the appellant had known of the presence of the heroin in his bedroom, that by itself would not have been sufficient to establish that he was in possession or in control of it given the fact that others too, and certainly his girlfriend Tan Ah Kwai, had access to the bedroom and could have concealed the heroin there. At the end of the day, this was a case of the proverbial cap which might have fitted not just the head of the appellant but that of others as well. Clearly, therefore, the trial judge, was bound to, but did not view the whole of the evidence objectively and from all angles, with the result that the appellant had lost the chance which was fairly open to him of being acquitted. On this point, we consider that non-direction amonts to a misdirection, for in the words of Pickford J in R v Bundy: ‘…the trial was not satisfactory, and the case was not put to the jury in a way to ensure their due appreciation of the value of the evidence’. We must treat the failure of a trial judge sitting alone, to direct himself correctly in the same way as a failure to direct a jury correctly. In these circumstances, a miscarriage of justice may well have occurred. Accordingly, we had no alternative but to allow the appeal, quash the conviction and to substitute in lieu thereof, an order of acquittal and discharge.”. [30] Kami berpandangan bahawa Hakim bicara terkhilaf apabila telah gagal untuk membuat pertimbangan dengan secukupnya terhadap 27 pembelaan Perayu yang menafikan sebarang pengetahuan terhadap dadah yang dipertuduhkan. Pertimbangan sewajarnya patut juga diberikan terhadap kemungkinan bahawa dadah yang dipertuduhkan telah diletakkkan oleh SP1 sendiri di dalam bilik ketiga. Kemungkinan ini tidak boleh diketepikan sama sekali berdasarkan kepada keadaan animositi dan motif dipihak SP1 untuk memerangkap Perayu. Pandangan sama telah diutarakan oleh Azahar Mohamed HMR dalam kes Shahrizal bin Said dan satu lagi Lwn. PR [2013] 5 MLJ 464 di m/s 472 – 473, seperti berikut: “[18] Berbalik kepada kes di hadapan kami, bukan sahaja SP5 mempunyai akses kepada bilik kedua tersebut, malahan keterangan seterusnya menunjukkan bahawa SP5 telah terjun melalui tingkap di bilik kedua. Nampaknya, SP5 telah berani menggadaikan nyawanya dengan terjun dari tingkat enam kerana hendak melarikan diri daripada ditangkap oleh pihak polis. Dalam hal keadaan yang sedemikian, pada hemat kami, hakim bicara sepatutnya meneliti dan memberi pertimbangan yang sewajarnya bahawa kedua-dua perayu tidak mempunyai sebarang pengetahuan mengenai kewujudan dadah berbahaya tersebut dalam bilik yang berkenaan dan bahawa dadah berbahaya itu mungkin disembunyikan di situ oleh SP5 sendiri. Hakim bicara kelihatan menerima penafian SP5 yang dadah berbahaya tersebut bukan milik beliau. Hakim bicara dalam menerima penafian SP5 itu nampaknya tidak terfikir bahawa SP5 mungkin mempunyai sesuatu motif untuk melindungi kebenaran dan berbohong sewaktu memberi keterangan di mahkamah dengan mengambil kira bahawa SP5 sendiri merupakan orang yang disyaki dengan jelasnya apabila 28 beliau sanggup menggadaikan nyawanya dengan terjun dari tingkat enam. [19] Pada hemat kami, hakim bicara telah gagal mengarahkan diri beliau dengan betul kerana tidak melihat keseluruhan keterangan secara objektif dan dari segala sudut, di mana berkesudahan dengan kedua-dua perayu telah kehilangan peluang yang terbuka kepada mereka untuk dibebaskan dan dilepaskan. Pada hemat kami, ketidakarahan ini terjumlah kepada kesalaharahan dan dalam hal ini, suatu salah laksana keadilan mungkin telah berlaku. Dalam hubungan ini, Edgar Joseph Jr HMS dalam kes Gooi Loo Seng v Public Prosecutor itu telah berkata: Clearly, therefore, the trial judge, was bound to, but did not view the whole of the evidence objectively and from all angles, with the result that the appellant had lost the chance which was fairly open to him of being acquitted. On this point, we consider that non-direction amounts to a misdirection, for, in the words of Pickford J in R v Bundy 5 Cr App R 270: the trial was not satisfactory, and the case was not put to the jury in a way to ensure their due appreciation of the value of the evidence. We must treat the failure of a trial Judge sitting alone, to direct himself correctly in the same was a failure to direct a jury correctly. In these circumstances, a miscarriage of justice may well have occurred.”. [31] Keterangan yang diterimapakai oleh Hakim bicara dalam mensabitkan Perayu hanya bersadarkan kepada keterangan SP1 sahaja semata-mata. SP1 jelas merupakan seorang saksi yang berkepentingan. Hakim bicara telah gagal untuk mengikuti keputusan 29 kes-kes terdahulu yang memutuskan bahawa keterangan sokongan yang diperlukan terhadap keterangan saksi berkepentingan dalam mensabitkan seseorang tertuduh. Dalam kes Rozmi bin Yusof v. PP [2013] 5 MLJ 66, Mahkamah ini telah menekankan akan peri pentingnya keterangan sokongan dalam siatuasi kes seperti ini. Di m/s 72 – 73 kes itu, Hamid Sultan HMR menyatakannya seperti berikut: “[10] In the instant case SP8 the brother of accused was an interested witness and he did participate in the fight. His evidence ought to be treated with caution and was not done so in the instant case. We have dealt with this area of jurisprudence in great detail in Public Prosecutor v Thenegaran a/l Murugan [2013] 3 MLJ 328, we do not wish to repeat the same. In Magendran a/l Mohan v Public Prosecutor [2011] 6 MLJ 1; [2011] 1 CLJ 805 the Federal Court had this to say: It is clear to us that from her testimony she was an interested witness with a grudge against the appellant and had a purpose of her own to serve. In our judgment her evidence must be treated with caution and requires corroboration. [11] In our considered view the failure by the trial judge to follow the directions set out in Magendran’s case in respect of caution and corroboration makes the decision perverse and not according to law. This will also attract art 5(1) of the Federal Constitution to order an acquittal as the evidence to convict was based solely on PW8’s evidence which is not safe and according to law. The court has no jurisdiction to deprive the life and liberty of the subject unless the decision is made according to law. Article 5(1) stated as follows: 30 No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty save in accordance with law.”. [32] Dalam penghakimannya, Hakim bicara menyatakan keterangan SP1 disokong oleh keterangan SP6 mengenai identiti beg P6. Dengan hormatnya, keterangan SP6 mengenai identiti beg P6 yang berisi dadah yang dipertuduhkan bukanlah merupakan keterangan sokongan yang sewajarnya dicari oleh mahkamah untuk mensabitkan Perayu. Keterangan sokongan sepatutnya adalah terhadap keterangan matan SP1 yang mendakwa beg P6 tersebut telah dibawa oleh Perayu dan diletakkan dalam bilik ketiga rumah yang disewa dan didiami oleh SP1. Setelah meneliti Rekod Rayuan, kami tidak ada menemui walau secebis keteranganpun yang dapat menyokong keterangan SP1 atas perkara matan tersebut. Komen berlawanan oleh Hakim bicara [33] Bantahan peguam bela terpelajar adalah terhadap komen yang tidak wajar yang dibuat oleh Hakim bicara yang dihujahkan sehingga menyebabkan ketidakadilan terhadap Perayu serta melanggar Perkara 5(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan yang menghendakki satu perbicaraan yang adil diadakan. Komen-komen yang berlawanan yang dibantah 31 oleh peguam bela terpelajar adalah seperti yang terkandung dalam Rekod Rayuan Tambahan (“RRT”) di m/s 12 – 16, seperti berikut: “Mahkamah : Saya bercadang kita habiskan dia. Takde saksi lain lagi? Panggil la Lan Cina dan Fizi Gemuk? Peguam : Fizi Gemuk saya percaya apa yang dimaklumkan ada di dalam tahanan. Mahkamah : Why don’t you put to your defence? Betul tak Fizi Gemuk kena tangkap dengan polis? Jadi put la pada Fizi Gemuk tu. Baru la kemas sikit. Peguam : Dalam Notes ada kalau Yang Arif tengok pada SP6. Mahkamah : Did you put to the police, Fizi Gemuk one of the suspect in the case involving drugs. Betul ke tak? Peguam : Yang Arif kami dimaklumkan berkenaan FIzi Gemuk ditangkap oleh SP6 dalam kandang. Kami tahu berkenaan fakta yang dia dah ditangkap dimaklumkan oleh SP6 ketika perbicaraan Mahkamah : Dalam Notes of Evidence ke? Ada ke? Peguam : Kalau boleh disemak oleh rakan bijaksana saya, dimaklumkan di muka surat 79 – “Fizi Gemuk ditangkap dibawah LLPK.” Mahkamah : Ada ke? Nothing in my record. Saya tak pernah dengar pun saksi ini cakap. But not in my record yang you are put question to the raiding officer berkenaan Fizi Gemuk kena tangkap ni. Peguam : Ada Yang Arif. Buleh rujuk CRT, ada dimaklumkan. Mahkamah : Itu je. Tak de fakta lain. Kalau fakta lagi, you boleh lepaskan dia ni. Peguam : Yang Arif, berkenaan Fizi Gemuk, kami percaya kami dah put kepada semua witness dan kewujudan dia 32 dipastikan oleh SP6 yang kata dia ditangkap dibawah LLPK dalam keterangan. Mahkamah : Tak pa. It’s up to you if you feel that you want to produce Fizi Gemuk get the court’s order. Then we can produce Fizi Gemuk. Tiada masalah. Peguam : Baik Yang Arif. Mahkamah : If you think Fizi Gemuk relevant to your case, kita boleh panggil dia untuk bagi keterangan. At least you can save hislife. Until and unless Fizi Gemuk come and appear, takde bende…pasal Azizan tu dah takde bende dah, kita nakkan satu benda yang mencurigakan. Come and creat some doubt and I’m very happy to release him. Peguam : Yang Arif, about Fizi Gemuk ada access to the house, I believe SP1 pun dah sahkan bende tu Yang Arif, Dalam keterangan SP1. Mahkamah : Betul lah, Fizi Gemuk dia ada. Tapi nobody can confirm dia ada pergi rumah tu, ada accessible ke rumah tu. Nobody can confirm, except the name. Tapi, since dah ada dalam LLPK ni, you can get the court’s order. Kita boleh produce dia. Peguam : We will consider that. Mahkamah : Other than you just let go jer bende tu, kita tak dapat nak pastikan. Cuba bincang balik. If you feel that Fizi Gemuk can help this case, otherwise kita hanya dengar dia punya story jer. Sekarang ni dia all the time jumpa anak dekat rumah bapa dia. Jadi kalau hari itu dia jumpa pertama kali, dia balik lah. Peguam : We have to check on the daughter juga Yang Arif. Because I believe the daughter pun can confirm. 33 Mahkamah : The daughter tu budak kecil. Budak kecil ni payah. Kita cakap “Ya”..“Ya”. “Awak makan ais krim?”. “Makan.”. Peguam : Ya, everything can be tested. Mahkamah : Budak kecil ni payah sikit, because umur dia ni below age. Dia ikut apa kita cakap. Tapi kalau macam ni, now the question dia used to see the daughter, all the time dekat rumah bapa dia. Hari tu dia jumpa anak dia sekali, dah la. Balik la. Why take you to wait until malam-malam, call several time buat apa. Anak dekat rumah bapa. Go, jumpa anak dekat rumah bapa. Pasal apa tunggu Azura. This is something.. Peguam : Dia takde tunggu Azura, Yang Arif. Takde cakap tunggu Azura. Mahkamah : Dalam telefon Azura kata anak kat rumah abah. Peguam : That’s why dia tunggu, Yang Arif. Mahkamah : Buat apa tunggu Azura, pergi la rumah abah. Peguam : Saya rasa dia dah explain. Mahkamah : Tak pa, that’s your story. You’ll be in danger. Pasal selalu dia jumpa dekat rumah abah dia. Jadi bila Azura bagi tau dia, pukul 6.30 tu anak kat mana? Anak kat rumah Abah ni. Lepas tu dia call-call Azura lagi banyak kali tak dapat. Sampai lah malam kan. Baru dapat call Azura. Baru dapat jumpa Azura. Azura kata tunggu la kat bawah. Betul tak? Peguam : Betul, Yang Arif. Mahkamah : Jadi maknanya by that time Azura dah pergi ambil anak kat rumah abah. Peguam : That is the story. 34 Mahkamah : Persoalannya disini, within that time tu, tunggu sampai 2 jam, tunggu Azura dari jam 8.30 sampai 10.30 malam, Azura dah bagi tau dah 6.30 tadi anak kat rumah abah. Peguam : Baik, Yang Arif. I’ll do that, Yang Arif. Mahkamah : These are the things yang saya nampak. Saya tidaklah rasa gentar untuk mengambil tindakan yang kemuncak itu. Tapi kalau ada jalan lain, saya nak lepaskan dia. Saya tak mahu ambil tindakan yang akhir itu. Tapi the way you’re putting your case, you are putting him to the gallows. Peguam : Baik, Yang Arif. Mahkamah : Saya cukup risau benda ni, cuba cari jalan, but if you feel that Fizi Gemuk can help, call him. Kalau tidak, saya tak de choice. My hands are tight. Only one punishment. You got to think about it. So macam mana? Sekarang kalau nak postpone, bila? Panjang lagi? Minggu depan tak boleh? But if you want to call Fizi Gemuk, give me the detail, then we can issue order to produce him and we see how tha thing goes. Peguam : Baik Yang Arif. Mahkamah : Saya ingat DPP pun boleh bantu la kalau dia kat mana-mana pun. TPR : Baik Yang Arif. Mahkamah : Tapi En. Lokman, just think about it, baca balik keterangan tu, apabila keterangan tu dah ada kat situ, the court has already form its mind towards him. It is serious punishment. So, kalau kita postpone, kita put next week, boleh? dan 6 boleh? 35 Peguam : Pada 5 hb saya ada kes di Mahkamah Persekutuan, Kes: Liang Weng Heng v. Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri (05-18408-2016) Mahkamah : Kes Sambung Bicara pada 9 Januari 2017 jam 9 pagi t.t. (YA DATO’ HAJI MOHAMAD SHARIFF BIN HAJI ABU SAMAH)”. [34] Kami faham tentang kegusaran serta kebimbangan peguam bela terpelajar apabila komen-komen Hakim bicara menampakkan dapatan “prejudged” Hakim bicara yang memprejudiskan Perayu. Hakim bicara seolah-olah telah dari awal lagi menolak pembelaan Perayu. Ini dapat dilihat dengan jelas dalam Penghakiman Hakim bicara tersebut seperti di m/s 85 – 94 RR Jld.1 yang kami simpulkan seperti berikut: “Adakah benar tujuan Perayu untuk berjumpa dengan anaknya? Sekiranya Perayu ingin berjumpa dengan anaknya, mengapakah perlu berjumpa di Apartment (SP1). Kalaulah Perayu sudah berjumpa dengan anaknya pada 12 Julai 2015, mengapakah perlunya berjumpa untuk kali kedua pada 13 Julai 2015?” [35] Hakim bicara seterusnya mempertikaikan niat sebenar Perayu untuk berjumpa dengan anaknya di rumah SP1. Sebaliknya, Hakim bicara menyatakan sekiranya benar tujuan Perayu untuk berjumpa dengan anaknya adalah lebih baik untuk berbuat demikian di rumah 36 bapa SP1 (bekas bapa mertua Perayu). Hakim bicara menolak sama sekali keterangan Perayu dan keterangan sokongan SP1 bahawa wujud perselisihan faham diantara Perayu dengan bekas bapa mertuanya mengenai hak lawatan Perayu terhadap anaknya di rumah bekas bapa mertuanya. Di m/s 94 RR Jld.1, Hakim bicara menolak pembelaan Perayu dengan membuat kesimpulan yang memprejudiskan seperti berikut: “Justeru, pada hemat saya keterangan Tertuduh untuk berjumpa dengan anaknya hanyalah suatu helah dan alasan yang sangat tidak masuk akal bagi mengecapi “hidangan istimewa” yang terdapat dalam Apartment tersebut dan pada hakikatnya Tertuduh tahu akan perbuatannya. Misteri tindakan Tertuduh ini terbongkar apabila dadah-dadah berbahaya ditemui dalam beg biru yang dibawanya.” [36] Kami bersetuju dengan hujahan peguam bela terpelajar bahawa hak keperlembagaan Perayu di bawah Perkara 5.1 untuk mendapat perbicaraan dengan adil telah tercalar. Kami berpegang kepada Penghakiman Mahkamah Persekutuan mengenai isu yang sama diputuskan dalam kes Lee Kwan Woh v. PP [2009] 5 MLJ 301 seperti berikut: “[17] …………………” Accordingly, the rule of law in all its facets and dimensions is included in the expression ‘law’ wherever used in the Constitution. Hence, the expression ‘law’ in art 5(1) includes written law 37 and the common law of England, that is to say the rule of law and all its integral components and in both its procedural and substantive dimensions. For, it is now settle that the rule of law has both procedural and substantive dimensions. See Pierson v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1997] 3 All ER 577, where where at p 606, Lord Steyn said: ‘The rule of law in its wider sense has procedural and substantive effect.’ [17] We also find support for the view we have expressed from the judgment of Lord Diplock in Ong Ah Chuan v Public Prosecutor [1981] 1 MLJ 64, where, when dealing with arts 9 and 12 of the Singapore Constitution which are identical to arts 5 and 8 respectively he said: In a constitution founded on the Westminister model and particularly in thart part of it that purports to assure to all individual citizens the continued enjoyment of fundamental liberties or rights, references to ‘law’ in such contexts as ‘inaccordance with law’, ‘protection of the law’ and the like, in Their Lordships’ view, refer to a system of law which incorporates those fundamental rules of natural justice that had formed part and parcel of the common law of England that was in operation in Singapore at the commencement of the Constitution. It would have been taken for granted by the makers of the Constitution that the ‘law’ to which citizens could have recourse for the propection of fundamental liberties assured to them by the Constitution would bt a system of law that did not flout those fundamental rules. It is clear from this passage that the rules of natural justice, which is the procedural aspect of the rule of law, is an integral part of arts 5(1) and 8(1). In short, procedural fairness is incorporated in these two articles. [18] Drawing, the threads together, it is clear from the authorities that it is a fundamental right guaranteed by art 5(1) that a person’s life (in its 38 widest sense) or his or her personal liberty (in its widest sense) may not be deprived save in accordance with state action that is fair both in point of procedure and substance. Whether an impugned state action is substantively or procedurally fair must depend on the fact pattern of each case. However, when the principle is applied to a criminal case, what it means is that an accused has a constitutionally guaranteed right to receive a fair trial by an impartial tribunal and to have a just decision on the afacts. If there is an infraction of any of these rights, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. Whether there has been a fail trial by an impartial tribulan or a just decision depends on the facts of each case. While upon the subject under discussion we would refer with approval to the judgment of Edgar Joseph Jr J (as he then was) in Public Prosecutor v Choo Chuan Wang [1992] 2 CLJ 1242, where he held that: Article 5(1) of our Constitution does imply in favour of an accused person the right to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by an impartial court established by law. It follows that if an accused person can establish a breach of this right then, in the words of Sandhawalia CJ in Madheshwardhari Singh v The State (ibid) (Madheshwardhari Singh and Anor v State of Bihar AIR (Pat) 1986 324), he would be entitled to an unconditional release and the charges leveled against him would fall to the ground. [19] We must consider the impact of what we have said thus far on the facts of the instant case. In our judgment, the constitutionally guaranteed right in an accused to a fair trial includes his right to make a submission of no case at the close of the prosecution’s case. It is a right that he or she may waive. But he or she cannot be deprived of it. That unfortunately is what happened here. The accused accordingly did not have a fair trial and art 5(1) was violated. Following Public 39 Prosecutor v Choo Chuan Wang he is entitled to have his conviction set on this ground.”. [37] Pandangan yang sama telah disuarakan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan Jenayah di Singapura dalam kes Roseli bin Amat & ors v. PP [1989] 2 MLJ 65 dimana Thean J manyatakannya di m/s 69 – 70, seperti berikut: “In view of the remarks or observations which we have examined, it is doubtful whether the learned judge had fairly evaluated the evidence of the complainant and the appellants. They point very strongly to the unhappy fact that the learned judge did not keep an open mind throughout the trial and examine and weigh carefully the evidence of the complainant and that of the appellants. These unsatisfactory features of the trial were further compounded by the following passage of his judgment: At the end of her [complainant’s] cross-examination I was convinced that Orranuch Nilprang was a witness of truth and that she had submitted to the four of you under duress as she was afraid that you would either hurt or kill her. On this, the learned judge, with respect, was clearly in error. We wish to repeat what Lord Diplock said in Haw Tua Tau v PP (at p 51): …Whoever has the function of deciding facts on the trial of a criminal offence should keep an open mind about the veracity and accuracy of recollection of any individual witness, whether called for the prosecution or the defence, until after all the evidence to be tendered in the case on behalf of either side has been heard and it is possible to assess to what extent (if any) that witness’s evidence has been 40 confirmed, explained or contradicted by the evidence of other witnesses. It is true that the learned judge said that at the end of the case he scrutinized again the evidence adduced by the prosecution and that of the appellants. However, he ought not to have come to any definite conclusion, which he appeared to have done, on the credibility of the complaint – and that was purely on her own evidence – and on other matters which we have discussed until he had heard all the evidence adduced by the prosecution and evidence adduced by the defence. Only then would he be in a position to assess or evaluate fairly the evidence before him and make findings of facts and finally arrive at a conclusion. We now turn to the final question whether the convictions in the circumstances can stand. This is far from being a case of a couple of isolated imprudent remarks made injudiciously by a trial judge in unguarded moments in the course of a long trial – such incidents we can well appreciate and understand. The instant case unfortunately is much more than that. The passages of the transcript which we have reviewed and in which are found definite views and findings of the learned judge on material issues – some of them at an early stage of the trial – are far too compelling: they indicate starkly that the learned judge had pre-determined these material issues adversely against the appellants long before they had fully presented their case. With great reluctance, we have reached the unavoidable conclusion that the convictions should not be allowed to stand. Accordingly, we allow the appeal and quash the convictions and the sentences. We have considered whether we should now order a new trial. In our judgment, having regard to the long laps of time since the alleged offence and the fact that the appellants have by now served a term of imprisonment of over three years it would be unfair to subject them again to a long trial 41 on the same charges. We therefore do not propose to make such an order.”. Kegagalan membuat pertimbangan secukupnya terhadap pembelaan Perayu [38] Seksyen 182A(1) KAJ memperuntukkan bahawa Hakim bicara hendaklah menimbang dan meneliti keseluruhan keterangan, termasuklah keterangan pihak pembelaan. Dengan kata lain, pembelaan Perayu tidak boleh diketepikan begitu sahaja sebagai satu rekaan terbaru dan satu pemikiran terkemudian sebagaimana yang diputuskan oleh Hakim bicara dalam kes di hadapan kami. Kami bersetuju dengan hujahan peguam bela terpelajar bahawa Hakim bicara telah gagal untuk membuat pertimbangan dengan secukupnya terhadap pembelaan Perayu. Sekiranya pembelaan Perayu ditimbangkan dengan secukupnya, Hakim bicara akan membuat dapatan yang berbeza iaitu bahawa pihak pembelaan telah berjaya mematahkan anggapan pengedaran di bawah seksyen 37(da) Akta atas imbangan kebarangkalian dan seterusnya bahawa pembelaan Perayu telah berjaya membangkitkan keraguan yang munasabah terhadap kes pihak pendakwaan. 42 [39] Hakim bicara telah gagal membuat pertimbangan terhadap fakta-fakta matan dalam pembelaan Perayu yang tidak disangkal oleh pihak pendakwaan. Antaranya: