Rahmat Jutamas Sdn. Bhd. v Hoi Huat Industries Sdn. Bhd. (KB-22NCvC-6-03/2022)

HOI HUAT INDUSTRIES SDN. BHD.

WONG FEE CHEW

LIM TIO HUAT (NO. K/P: 571029-07-5065) … DEFENDANTS

This is First Defendant ("D1") application in Enclosure 80 for consequential orders arising from the Consent Judgment recorded before this Court on 17.10.2023.

The dispute before this Court concerns D1's failure to obtain the CCC within the period agreed under the Consent Judgment and 08/06/2026 16:03:45 KB-22NCvC-6-03/2022 Kand. 98 D1's contention that such failure was caused by the Plaintiff's refusal to restore the premises to its original condition.

After considering the affidavits and submissions filed by parties, the Court dismissed the application.

Plaintiff is the tenant and occupier of two industrial premises situated at No. 1, Jalan Bukit Makmur 1 and No. 9, Jalan Bukit Makmur 3, Kawasan Perusahaan Bukit Makmur, Sungai Petani, Kedah and D1 is the owner of the said premises.

The dispute between the parties arose from the Plaintiff's discovery that the premises did not have a Certificate of Completion and Compliance ("CCC"). The Plaintiff contended that it only became aware of the absence of the CCC sometime around May or June 2021.

The parties were also at odds over renovation works carried out at the premises. The dispute was subsequently resolved by way of a Consent Judgment entered on 17.10.2023.

Under the terms of the Consent Judgment, D1 undertook to procure the CCC for both premises at its own cost within six months, with a further extension of six months if necessary, giving D1 a total period of twelve months from 17.10.2023 to obtain the CCC.

D1 also undertook to carry out temporary roofing repairs within the stipulated timeframe and, upon obtaining the CCC, to complete the permanent roofing repairs.

In addition, D1 agreed to bear any summonses, compounds or penalties imposed by Majlis Bandaraya Sungai Petani arising from issues relating to the absence of the CCC.

The Plaintiff, on the other hand, agreed to provide reasonable cooperation in relation to D1's efforts to procure the CCC. The Plaintiff further agreed, without any admission of liability, to pay an ex-gratia sum of RM150,000.00 by instalments to the parties' solicitors as stakeholders. The sum was to be released to D1 upon fulfilment of the conditions stipulated in the Consent Judgment.

The Consent Judgment further provided that in the event D1 failed to obtain the CCC within the agreed twelve-month period, the Plaintiff would be entitled to continue occupying the premises without payment of rent until the CCC was obtained.

D1 engaged OKS Consulting Engineer to facilitate the CCC application. During the course of the application, issues relating to non-compliance with the approved building plans and approved fire safety plans were identified.

D1 took the position that such non-compliance arose from renovations and alterations carried out by the Plaintiff. D1 subsequently engaged Jamil Architect, whose findings similarly identified structural inconsistencies between the existing buildings and the approved plans.

D1 contended that Plaintiff had failed to provide reasonable cooperation by refusing to reinstate the premises to their original approved condition.

The Plaintiff disputed that contention and maintained that the obligation to provide reasonable cooperation did not extend to undertaking demolition, reconstruction or structural reinstatement works.

Following D1's failure to obtain the CCC within the stipulated period, the Plaintiff ceased paying rent from November 2024

Thereafter, extensive correspondence ensued between the parties' solicitors concerning responsibility for the failure to obtain the CCC, the release of the ex-gratia sum, and the parties' respective obligations under the Consent Judgment.

As a result, D1 filed the present application seeking various consequential orders arising from the implementation of the Consent Judgment.

It is trite that once a Court has finally determined a dispute and entered judgment, the Court becomes functus officio in respect of the matters adjudicated.

The principles governing the issue were comprehensively discussed by the Federal Court in Stone World Sdn. Bhd. v. Engareh (M) Sdn. Bhd. [2020] 9 CLJ 358. The Federal Court reiterated that, as a general rule, a court has no jurisdiction to revisit, vary or supplement a final judgment after it has been entered.

Notwithstanding, the Court retains a limited jurisdiction to make consequential orders in appropriate cases: i. To reflect the original intention of the Court; ii. To correct clerical errors or accidental slips under the "slip rule" (Order 20 Rule 11 of the Rules of Court 2012); or iii. To give practical effect to the original order through under the 'liberty to apply' rule.

It should also be noted that a consequential order cannot be used as a means of obtaining relief which was never granted in the first place. The jurisdiction exists to facilitate the working out of a judgment. It does not permit the court to alter the substance of the judgment or to impose obligations which do not already arise from it.

The doctrine of functus officio is closely connected with the principles of finality in litigation and res judicata. Once a matter has been adjudicated upon and judgment entered, parties are generally bound by the result. Subject to the recognised exceptions, the court cannot thereafter revisit the matter.

Before turning to the substantive issues raised in the present application, it is necessary to briefly deal with the preliminary objection raised by the Plaintiff

By a letter dated 04.02.2026, the Plaintiff raised a preliminary objection that D1's Affidavit in Reply was in breach of Order 41 Rule 5 of the Rules of Court 2012.

Pursuant to the said provision, an affidavit ought to be confined to facts within the deponent's own knowledge and should not contain legal inferences.

However, the objection was not further pursued in the Plaintiff's written submissions.

Further, the Plaintiff did not identify the specific paragraphs in the affidavit which were alleged to be in breach of the said provision.

In the absence of such particulars, the Court is unable to ascertain which part of the affidavit are being challenged. The Court cannot be left to speculate on this issue.

In the circumstances, this Court unable to determine the preliminary objection and shall proceed to consider the application on its merits. Issues Issue 1 - Whether the Court was functios officio Issue 2 - Whether the Plaintiff's obligation to provide "reasonable cooperation" extends to undertaking structural reinstatement works

Issues 1 and 2 are closely connected and it is convenient to deal with them together.

D1 contends that the Consent Judgment must be construed in a commercially sensible manner. According to D1, the failure to obtain the CCC was caused by renovations and alteration works carried out by Plaintiff.

Despite requests being made, Plaintiff refused to restore the premises to its original approved condition. This resulted in a deadlock between the parties and ultimately led to the failure to obtain the CCC within the time stipulated in the Consent Judgment.

As a result, Plaintiff ceased to pay rent from November 2024 onward. This situation would defeat the commercial purpose of the Consent Judgement and cause injustice to D1 as the owner.

Plaintiff submits that the present application falls outside the scope of a consequential order. The Consent Judgment expressly places the obligation of obtaining the CCC on D1, whilst the Plaintiff's obligation is confined to providing reasonable cooperation in relation to the CCC application.

D1 is now seeking to redefine the meaning of "reasonable cooperation" so as to require the Plaintiff to undertake structural reinstatement, demolition and reconstruction works, notwithstanding that no such obligation appears in the Consent Judgment.

The orders sought would have the effect of altering the rights and obligations agreed upon by the parties under the Consent Judgment. Therefor, the Court is functus officio and the present application does not fall within the limited category of consequential orders recognised by law.

It is trite that once a court has pronounced a final judgment and perfected its order, the court becomes functus officio in respect of the matters adjudicated upon.

Therefore, the important question is whether the reliefs sought by D1 merely facilitate the implementation of the Consent Judgment or whether they seek to impose obligations which were never agreed to by the parties.

Paragraph 4B of the consent judgement provides that the Plaintiff shall give "reasonable cooperation" in relation to D1's application to obtain the CCC.

D1's complaint is that the Plaintiff failed to provide such cooperation. According to D1, the failure to obtain the CCC was caused by renovations and alterations carried out by the Plaintiff. It is on that basis that D1 contends that the Plaintiff ought to restore the premises to its original approved condition.

Having considered the evidence before me, I am unable to accept that contention.

The documentary evidence does not support D1's assertion that the failure to obtain the CCC was solely attributable to renovations carried out by the Plaintiff.

The letter dated 09.09.2024 from OKS Consulting Engineer shows that the buildings did not conform to the approved building plans and approved Fire Safety System Plan. However, the letter does not state that all the non-compliance issues arose from renovations carried out by the Plaintiff.

Subsequently, in the letter dated 22.05.2025, Jamil Architect stated that additional structures had been erected after the issuance of the Certificate of Fitness in 1995 and that such structures did not conform to the approved plans. There is nothing in the letter to suggest that all such structures were erected by the Plaintiff.

More importantly, in the letter dated 06.11.2025, Jamil Architect explained that the issues affecting the CCC could be categorised into three separate parts. The letter further states that the CCC application could proceed through the appointment of the relevant consultants without necessarily requiring reinstatement, demolition or additional construction works.

In my view, if the consultants already stated a route towards obtaining the CCC without reinstatement works, it is difficult to accept D1's position that reinstatement works necessarily form part of the Plaintiff's obligation to provide reasonable cooperation.

There is no evidence that D1 had acted upon the recommendations contained in the said letter. The letter dated 06.11.2025 identified a possible avenue towards obtaining the CCC through the appointment of the relevant consultants. However, D1 did not explain why that course was not pursued.

The Court also notes that although D1 repeatedly alleged that the Plaintiff had carried out unauthorised renovations, no clear evidence was produced identifying the precise works complained of and how those works prevented the issuance of the CCC.

The Court also not referred to any joint inspection report or other contemporaneous evidence showing that the Plaintiff was solely responsible for the non-compliance issues identified by the consultants.

D1's demand that the Plaintiff restore the premises to its original condition was made without identifying the precise structures complained of or producing the original approved plans against which the alleged non-compliance could be assessed.

In those circumstances, I am unable to conclude that the Plaintiff bears sole responsibility for the failure to obtain the CCC.

More importantly, I am unable to accept that the obligation to provide "reasonable cooperation" can be construed as requiring the Plaintiff to undertake structural reinstatement works. No such provision appears in the Consent Judgment.

In other words, the relief sought by D1 would require the Court to impose obligations which do not presently form part of the parties' aggreed terms.

For that reason, the present application falls outside the limited category of consequential orders recognised by law. The court is bound by doctrine functus officio to not allow such application. Issue 3 - Whether D1 is entitled to the release of the RM150,000.00 ex gratia payment

D1 submits that it is entitled to the release of the RM150,000.00 ex-gratia payment pursuant to the terms of the Consent Judgment. D1 contends that both expressions refer substantially to the same scope of works and that the repairs undertaken by D1 were sufficient to satisfy the relevant requirements under the Consent Judgment.

On that basis, D1 argues that the Plaintiff's continued refusal to release the ex-gratia sum is unreasonable and inconsistent with the settlement reached between the parties.

Plaintiff submits that the ex-gratia payment is subject to the fulfilment of the conditions stipulated in the Consent Judgment, including the procurement of the CCC and the completion of the relevant roofing works.

According to the Plaintiff, those conditions have yet to be fulfilled. In particular, CCC has not been obtained. Therefore, D1's entitlement to the ex-gratia payment has not yet arisen.

The Court must give effect to the terms agreed upon by the parties and not rewrite the terms which they have chosen to make.

Reading of paragraphs 6A and 6B of the Consent Judgment shows that the RM150,000.00 ex-gratia payment was not intended to be an unconditional payment. The payment formed part of the overall arrangement reached between the parties in resolving their dispute.

It is clear from the terms of the Consent Judgment that the procurement of the CCC was an important part of that arrangement. In the circumstances, I am unable to accept D1's contention that the ex-gratia payment became payable regardless of whether the CCC was obtained.

Plaintiff's distinction between temporary roofing repairs and the final rectification works is not without basis. Temporary repairs are, by their nature, interim measures and cannot necessarily be equated with full compliance with the obligations contemplated by the Consent Judgment.

More importantly, it is not disputed that the CCC has yet to be obtained.

In my view, to permit the release of the ex-gratia payment notwithstanding the continued absence of the CCC would be inconsistent with the terms of the Consent Judgment.

As matters currently stand, the conditions giving rise to the release of the ex-gratia payment have not been fulfilled.

In the circumstances, I find that D1 has failed to establish its entitlement to the RM150,000.00 ex-gratia payment. Issue 4 - Whether the Plaintiff has been unjustly enriched by continuing to occupy the premises without paying rent

D1 contends Plaintiff has obtained an unfair benefit by continuing to occupy the premises without paying rent whilst D1 remains unable to obtain the CCC. According to D1, such a situation is prejudicial to D1 and amounts to unjust enrichment at its expense.

Plaintiff cannot rely on the absence of the CCC to avoid paying rent whilst at the same time refusing to take the necessary steps to facilitate the issuance of the CCC. In those circumstances, it is inequitable for the Plaintiff to continue occupying the premises rent-free.

Plaintiff submits that the suspension of rental payments is not a consequence imposed by law but a term expressly agreed upon by the parties in the Consent Judgment.

The parties agreed that if the CCC was not obtained within the stipulated period, the Plaintiff would be entitled to continue occupying the premises without paying rent until the CCC was obtained. Therefore, D1 cannot now complain of a consequence arising from a term which it had voluntarily agreed.

The doctrine of unjust enrichment has no application where the rights and obligations of parties are governed by contract. In Kee Hin Ventures Sdn. Bhd. & Ors. v. Great Partners Industries Ltd & Ors. (Cheng Ping Keat & Ors, third parties) [2021] MLJU 2379, Liza Chan JC referred to the decision in Ricardo G Tapel v. Polar Twin Advance (M) Sdn. Bhd. (Nicholas Lee Zse Young & Anor, third parties) [2013] 9 MLJ 69, where it was held that section 71 of the Contracts Act 1950 does not apply where the benefit complained of arises pursuant to a contractual relationship between the parties.

In the present facts, the relationship between the parties is governed by the Consent Judgment. The parties' respective rights and obligations must be determined by the terms of the Consent Judgment.

D1's submits that the Plaintiff continuing to occupy the premises without paying rent pending the issuance of the CCC amounts to unjust enrichment at its expense.

I am unable to agree with this contention. The suspension of rental payments did not arise from unilateral act of Plaintiff. It arises from a term agreed upon by the parties in the Consent Judgment. Having agreed to such term, D1 cannot now complain merely because the arrangement has turned out to be unfavourable to it.

In any event, I found that the evidence also shows that the Plaintiff has itself suffered difficulties arising from the absence of the CCC, including disruption to its business operations and action taken by the local authorities.

In those circumstances, this is not a case of unjust enrichment. The Plaintiff's continued occupation of the premises without payment of rent is simply a consequence of the Consent Judgment entered into by the parties.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff's continued occupation without payment of rent, pending the issuance of the CCC does not amount to unjust enrichment.

Accordingly, I find no merit in D1's contention in this issue.

Having considered the affidavits filed and the written submissions of parties, I find no merit in the present application.

Therefore, this D1 application (Enclosure 80) is dismissed with costs of RM10,000.00. Dated 02 June 2026 (DARMAFIKRI BIN ABU ADAM) Judicial Commisioner High Court of Malaya, Sungai Petani Kedah Darul Aman Plaintiff’s Solicitor: Dato’ Saw Lip Khai and Vivianne Khoo Wei Vern [Messrs Chooi, Saw & Lim] First Defendant’s Solicitor: Benjamin Tan Yee Bin and Ng Sze Wei [Messrs Lee Law Office]