Ramayee A/P Suppiah v Devika A/P Ponnayah (MC-A73-1-11/2025)

This is a claim for general and special damages arising from a dog bite incident allegedly caused by the Defendant’s negligence. The Plaintiff (PW1) alleged that she was bitten by a dog on 19.6.2025 at approximately 4.50 pm at the house occupied by the Defendant

This court has heard the full trial, during which the following witnesses testified:- Plaintiff’s case: a) PW1: Ramayee a/p Suppiah, the Plaintiff; b) PW2: Rajendran a/l Murugaya, the Paintiff’s neighbour and relative; c) PW3: Suppiah a/l Periakarrupen, who claimed to be the adopted child (anak angkat) of the Plaintiff but was, in fact, the Plaintiff’s nephew; d) PW4: Supu a/p Kaniappan, the Paintiff’s neighbour; e) PW5: Muhammad Hafeez bin Maarif, the senior environmental health officer at Alor Gajah Municipal Council; f) PW6: Hamizah binti Montil, the assistant environmental health officer at Alor Gajah Municipal Council; This court found that the Plaintiff’s counsel had inadvertently made a clerical mistake in their written submissions at Encl. 48 as Supu a/p Kaniappanas was incorrectly identified as PW3 when she was in fact PW4. Likewise, Suppiah a/l Periakarrupen was incorrectly identified as PW4 when he was in fact PW3, having testified earlier than Ms. Supu during the course of trial; Defendant’s case: a) DW1: The Defendant herself; and b) DW2: Givakumar a/l Shanmugam, the Defendant’s husband.

After the trial, this court carefully considered the totality of the evidence and the submissions of the parties. Having done so, this court found that the Plaintiff has failed to establish her claim on a balance of probabilities. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s claim is dismissed with costs. The reasons for this decision are set out hereunder.

In the Plaintiff’s written submissions (Encl. 48), it was contended that on 19.6.2025 at approximately 4.50 pm, the Plaintiff was within the compound of the Defendant’s house when she was suddenly attacked by the Defendant’s dog which was allegedly left unsupervised and unrestrained, while the gate to the Defendant’s house was open.

However, this version differs materially from the Plaintiff’s pleaded case. In the Statement of Claim (Encl. 2), the Plaintiff pleaded that on or about 19.6.2025 at approximately 4.50 pm, she was in front of the Defendant’s residential house, a place which she frequently visited to purchase vegetables from the Defendant’s mother, when she was suddenly attacked by a dog belonging to the Defendant. The Plaintiff further pleaded that the dog was outside the Defendant’s house, roaming freely, unrestrained and unsupervised.

This court observed that no application was ever made by the Plaintiff to amend the Statement of Claim. As such, the Plaintiff remained bound by her pleadings and this court is of the view that the Plaintiff’s counsel ought to have advanced the Plaintiff’s case in a manner consistent with the pleaded facts.

The Plaintiff argued that the attack occurred without any provocation and was caused by the Defendant’s negligence as the owner of the dog, in allegedly allowing the dog to roam freely outside the house without proper supervision or control.

What is apparent to this court is that the Plaintiff’s written submissions contain internal inconsistencies. On the one hand, the Plaintiff’s counsel submitted that the Plaintiff was within the compound of the Defendant’s house when she was suddenly attacked by the Defendant's dog. On the other hand, the Plaintiff’s counsel proceeded to argue that the Defendant was negligent in allowing the dog to roam freely outside the house (under F, paragraphs 1 and 2 at Encl. 48). These two propositions are obviously mutually inconsistent with each other and cannot comfortably stand together.

As a result of the incident, the Plaintiff alleged that she sustained serious injuries, including a fractured pelvis, an injury to her right wrist and a fracture of the left femoral neck. The Plaintiff further alleged that she is no longer able to walk or carry on with her daily life in the same manner as she did prior to the incident. The Plaintiff also claimed various heads of special damages, including medical expenses, travelling expenses, loss of income, future medical expenses, as well as general and exemplary damages.

The Defendant’s counsel argued that the Plaintiff’s failure to prove ownership of the dog on the part of the Defendant is fatal to the Plaintiff’s entire claim. It was submitted that the foundation of the Plaintiff's action is that the Defendant, as the owner of the dog, was negligent and thereby caused the injuries allegedly suffered by the Plaintiff. The Defendant contended that the present action was not independently initiated by the Plaintiff but was instead instigated, encouraged or influenced by Mr. Suppiah a/l Periakarrupan (PW3), who claimed to be the Plaintiff's adopted child.

The Defendant further contended that PW3 had previously resided with his family at a house belonging to the Defendant for several years. According to the Defendant, when PW3 was requested to vacate the rented house, he caused damage to the Defendant’s property and also issued death threats against the Defendant. Police reports were subsequently lodged in relation to those incidents.

The Defendant also asserted that since those incidents, PW3 had repeatedly harassed the Defendant and her family members and had actively sought confrontations with them. The Defendant alleged that the present claim was originally made in bad faith being driven by personal hatred and for vengeance, and in a wrongful collateral motive as opposed to in a good faith based on an actual cause of action.

However, this court exercises caution and confines its consideration to the cause of action arising from the alleged dog bite incident which focused on the relevant facts and legal issues pertaining to the elements of the Plaintiff’s claim, and not on the previous acrimonious relationship or historical disputes between PW3 and the Defendant.

The Defendant further submitted that the Plaintiff had failed to adduce any direct evidence establishing that the Defendant was the owner of the dog in question. It was highlighted that the enforcement action undertaken by the Environmental Health Department in the form of a compound issued for the keeping of a dog without a valid licence which was directed against the Defendant’s husband, Mr. Giva Kumar a/l Shanmugam (DW2) and not against the Defendant herself. Accordingly, the Defendant prayed that the Plaintiff’s claim be dismissed with costs.

After hearing the trial and considering the submissions of both parties, this court reformulated the issues for determination and found that the following triable issues arise in the present case:- a) whether the Defendant had custody and control of the dog (“First Issue”); b) whether the dog had a vicious propensity to bite humans (“Second Issue”); and c) whether the Defendant was negligent and thereby caused the Plaintiff’s injuries (“Third Issue”).

(I) LIABILITY First and Second Issues 16. The first issue concerned whether the Defendant had custody and control of the dog which remained unnamed throughout the trial, while the second issue concerned whether the said dog had a vicious propensity to bite humans. The first and second issues were inextricably linked and therefore considered together.

It is well established that the law generally categorises animals as two classes, namely animals ferae naturae which are known as wild animals with dangerous propensities and animals mansuetae naturae which are known as domesticated presumed to be harmless (Ms Ravina Gautam, ‘Exploring Legal Remedies: Urgency for a Holistic Framework to Protect and Compensate Victims of Dog Bites in India’ (2024) 1(4) LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research 190-199). Dogs are usually included in the latter class as they are animals which are usually thought to be gentle companions to humans.

In determining whether the Defendant was either the owner of the dog or, alternatively, its keeper or harbourer as a member of the owner’s family, this court would have to consider whether the Defendant exercised custody or control over the animal throughout the period in question. The dog concerned could be viewed in the photograph at page 5 of Bundle B, which showed a large brown dog kept in a cage in the Defendant’s house. Trite Principle in Animal Tort Law 19. Having established the identity of an owner or a keeper or a harborer as above-mentioned, one can proceed to establish liability either on the basis of the doctrine of strict liability or on the basis of negligence (Jonathan R. Shulan, ‘Animal Law - When Dogs Bite: A Fair, Effective, and Comprehensive Solution to the Contemporary Problem of Dog Attacks’ (2010) 32 UALR L Rev 259; Bradley v Hendrick 251 Ark. 733, 474 S.W.2d 677 (1972); Russell v Rivera 780 N.Y.S.2d 699, 700 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept. 2004). In the present case, the Plaintiff did not explicitly depend on the doctrine of strict liability in her pleadings and written submissions. It was clear, on the consideration of the overall tenor of the Plaintiff’s case, that her claim was based on the cause of action of negligence, and centred on her alleged failure on the part of the Defendant to exercise reasonable care.

As this court sees it, the law relating to animals is a broad area of law but one that is rarely litigated in Malaysia. Accordingly, for completeness, this court considers it appropriate to address the proper legal principles governing civil liability arising from injuries caused by animals and the legal relationship between the owner, keeper, or harbourer of an animal and a person injured by that animal. This court will then apply those principles to the facts of the present case.

Although this court appreciates that the Plaintiff did not plead strict liability as a cause of action, it should be noted that a plaintiff may, in an appropriate case, plead allegations or causes of action in the alternative pursuant to Order 18 rule 10 of the Rules of Court 2012, provided that the alternative claims are founded on the same factual matrix and are not inconsistent with the pleadings.

(I) Strict Liability 22. Under the doctrine of strict liability, a tortfeasor can be liable irrespective of the fact that reasonable precautions were taken. In contrast, an alternative cause of action accrued based on negligence which normally arises in circumstances where there has been a failure to exercise reasonable care. However, even if I were to consider strict liability as an alternate basis of liability, this court would be disinclined to impose strict liability on the facts of the present case.

This is because, when considering strict liability in the present case, this court found that the evidence indicated that the Plaintiff had entered the Defendant’s house without invitation and she was trespassing onto the Defendant’s land. In such peculiar circumstances, the owner or keeper or harbouer of a dog is normally not liable to a trespasser whose presence at or within the vicinity of the animal which could not reasonably have been expected (Johnson v Brown 450 S.W.2d 495 (Ky.1970)).

This court agreed with the Defendant’s counsel who successfully highlighted that the Plaintiff’s (PW1) own testimony regarding the location of the incident was inconsistent. At one time, she said that the alleged dog bite incident took place in front of the Defendant’s house. At another time, she stated that the dog was within the compound of the Defendant’s house at the time of the incident.

The evidence of PW2 and PW4 was found did little to resolve such inconsistency. PW2, who was initially presented as a neighbour in his WS(SP2), agreed during cross-examination that he was in fact related to the Plaintiff as the Plaintiff’s relative. PW2 testified that, on the day of the incident, the gate to the Defendant’s house was open, the Defendant’s mother came out of the house and the dog also came out before allegedly biting the Plaintiff. PW2 further stated that he assisted in chasing the dog away. Similarly, PW4 who was initially presented as a neighbour in her WS(SP4) and also related to the Plaintiff, testified that she instructed her son to chase the dog away and that her son struck the dog with a stick.

This court gave little weight to the evidence of PW2 and PW4, who claimed themselves as the purported eyewitnesses to the alleged dog bite incident, had initially failed to reveal their relationship with the Plaintiff. Far more crucially, however, the evidence made it clear that they were very familiar with the area and aware that a dog was being housed at the Defendant’s house. Such a material gap in the Plaintiff’s case remained unaddressed and no satisfactory explanation was given as to why the Plaintiff was at the Defendant’s house at the material time since the Defendant was not present at the front part of her house compound at that time. The Defendant had been at the back of her house with a friend.

On this premise, none of the Plaintiff’s witnesses clearly and corroboratively testified that the incident occurred outside the Defendant’s house. The Plaintiff’s own testimony, the testimony of PW4 and even the Defendant’s testimony did not mention the presence or involvement of the Defendant’s mother at any stage of the incident, from beginning to end. It was only PW2 who stated that the Defendant’s mother came out of the house during the incident. Instead, the evidence consistently referred to the area in front of the house compound. Additionally, the learned counsel for the Plaintiff submitted that the incident was within the compound of the Defendant’s house.

On the totality of the evidence, this court found that the Plaintiff entered or was present within the Defendant’s house compound without any invitation from any occupants of the said house. In the circumstances, the Plaintiff’s presence may properly be regarded as that of a trespasser.

In terms of the strict liability in respect of animals, the scienter common law doctrine used refers to knowledge by the owner, keeper or harbourer of the dangerous propensity of the animal will be held strictly liable for the injuries caused by the said animal (Trager v Thor 445 Mich. 95, 516 N.W.2d 69). Put simply, scienter refers to “knowledge” that the animal possesses uncommon dangerous tendencies (Abdul Basir Mohamad, ‘Liability for Non-Dangerous Animals: The Scienter Action in English and Islamic Law of Tort’ (2005) 44(1) Islamic Studies 77; Belton v Spencer 2021 ONSC 2029).

Under the common law, to hold the owner of an ordinary domestic animal which are presumed to be tame, such as the dog, strictly liable for injuries caused by that animal, a claimant must prove the scienter requirement namely that the owner knew or ought reasonably to have known of the particular animal’s vicious propensity, and led to scienter being referred to as the “one-bite rule”. While many modern jurisdictions have enacted statutory regimes that impose liability on dog owners regardless of such knowledge,1 Malaysia has yet to enact specific legislation governing dog bite liability. Accordingly, at this stage, this court 1 Rebecca F Wisch and Diamond Conley, ‘Table of Dog Bite Strict Liability Statutes’ (Animal Legal & Historical Center, Michigan State University College of Law, 2025) <https://www.animallaw.info/topic/table-dog-bite-strict-liability-statutes>accessed 26.6.2026. considers it appropriate to refer to the common law principles of scienter and strict liability in the present case.

Put simply, for ordinary domestic animal such as the dog in the present case, an owner is not automatically strictly liable for a first attack and strict liability arises only where the claimant can prove that the owner knew or ought reasonably to have known that the animal had previously exhibited vicious propensity.

Common Law Negligence 32. In relation to the Plaintiff’s claim in negligence arising from the dog bite incident in the present case, this court is of the considered view that the concept of scienter remains relevant. In animal cases as above-mentioned, scienter is the knowledge of the owner, keeper, or harbourer that an animal is dangerous or that the animal has a vicious propensity. Such knowledge is significant as it makes the possibility of an injury foreseeable and may give rise to a duty to take reasonable steps to prevent harm. Under trite law, for victim to recover a dog injury, he or she must prove that the owner acted negligently and that the negligence of the owner caused the injury in question.

Therefore, this court could have to observe that scienter action is used under the negligence claim in substantially the same manner as under strict liability, namely whether the Defendant knew or should have known of the dog’s dangerous propensity, if any. Where such knowledge has been established, liability may develop in the absence of evidence of negligence in the ordinary sense.2

In this context, this court alludes to the classic case of McQuaker v Goddard [1940] 1 KB 687. The plaintiff in that case was attending to the defendant’s zoological garden and while feeding the animal, an Arabian camel bit the plaintiff and severely injured his hand. The court decided that it was not the defendant’s fault as there was no evidence that the camel had previously bitten anyone or shown other dangerous propensity. As such, liability under the scienter principle could not be established.

Similarly, in the present case, the Plaintiff who bears the burden of proof, did not adduce any expert evidence to establish that the dog in question possessed a natural tendency to bite humans or had any uncommon dangerous propensity. Throughout the trial, the Plaintiff repeatedly characterised the dog as an “anjing liar” (stray dog). However , the evidence in this case do not signify such a description especially when PW4 indicated that the dog had been a regular presence in the Defendant’s house since the commencement of the construction of the house some 15 to 20 years ago. 2 David Goldberg, ‘Dog Bites & The Doctrine of Scienter’ (Taylor & Blair Blog, 28 May 2024) <https://taylorandblair.com/blog/2024/05/28/dog-bites-the-doctrine-of-scienter/> accessed 26.6.2026.

In fact, the own evidence of the Plaintiff’s case does corroborate with the contrary. The evidence given by the witnesses of the Plaintiff, when considered together with the evidence of the DW1 and the DW2 established that neither the Defendant, the mother of the Defendant, nor the husband of the Defendant had any linking that the dog had in the past shown any vicious or dangerous propensity. This is particularly so given that the dog had been present at the Defendant’s house for approximately 15 to 20 years, as acknowledged by PW4.

In other words, there was no evidence that the dog had ever bitten or attacked or threatened anyone in the past when the incident in the present case as the Plaintiff claimed is taken into consideration. In the considered view of this court, the evidence consistently showed that the dog lived on the Defendant’s house for several years and there was no prior occurrence of biting by the dog. It is an intriguing fact as this is a piece of evidence that the conduct of the dog prior to the incident in question was no such conduct as to place any owner, keeper or harbourer of that animal on notice that the animal is a threat to others. Therefore, it is that the Plaintiff has failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the dog had such unusual vicious propensity and there is a knowledge of such propensity on the part of the Defendant or any other occupier of the house.

This court has also considered the apprehensions of the Plaintiff as concerned with risks of dog bites with the possibility of rabies infection. It is undeniable that such risks are very serious. However, the question before this court is not whether dog bites can be dangerous in the general sense. The issue in the present case is whether the particular dog had exhibited any propensity that is dangerous which was known by the Defendant. On the evidence given before this court, that peculiar fact has not been proved by the Plaintiff.

Furthermore, according to the testimony of DW2, the dog had passed away by August 2025. There is no evidence that can be available before this court to determine the temperament, behavioural condition, the propensity of aggression of the dog which can be appraised by this court at this juncture. This court is, therefore, limited to the available evidence demonstrated during the course of the trial.

Having considered to the totality of the evidence, this court found that the Plaintiff has failed to prove that the dog was a propensity to commit the types of harm being complained of, or that the Defendant had knowledge of any propensity of such a type. On the contrary, the evidence connotes that the dog is a companion animal that was peacefully living on the Defendant’s house of several years without any untoward event.

Going further, this court considers it proper to raise the issue of the breed, size or appearance of the dog. It is conceivable that the dog in question was held to be dangerous as being a dog of a particular breed, size or colour, but an assertion such as to prove this cannot be made on personal opinion or the singular experience of one individual. In the present case, the Plaintiff only referred to the dog as being a large brown dog, and did not identify or base her position upon any specific breed. While such an argument may usually be anticipated to be argued by a litigant in a present case of such description, non-adoption of such an argument does not thereafter limit this court’s consideration to the relevant facts and circumstances. Nevertheless, the simple fact that the dog was a large dog, in and of itself, is not enough to show itself of vicious or dangerous disposition.

Whether a dog or a particular breed of dogs is prone to bite depends on different factors. For instance, on the medical condition and behavioural condition of the dog, on the experience in its early upbringing, socialisation, training, experiences during the past, the conduct of the individual who is interacting with the dog are the factors which will be taken into account. A statement as to why a certain breed of dogs are specially prone to bite can be correct only by appropriate comparison of the number of bites among the breeds and the total number of dogs of that particular breed. There was no such evidence in the present case where the possibility of the dog barking and raising its legs toward passer-by was adduced (Hilary M. Schwartzberg, ‘Tort Law in Action and Dog Bite Liability: How the American Legal System Blocks Plaintiffs from Compensation’ (2008) 40 Conn L Rev 845).

In the light of above considerations, this court found that the Plaintiff has failed to prove the essential element the knowledge actual or constructive on the part of the Defendant. The Plaintiff’s claim therefore fails on a balance of probabilities.

Irrespective of the aspect in which the Plaintiff’s claim is put in the scienter or one based on negligence, where the Plaintiff pleaded negligence only in the present case, one common feature is that the Plaintiff was failed to prove that she was at a place where she had a right to be from a lawful perspective.

Returning to the facts of the present case, this court observed that the dog in question was not registered with the relevant local authority. PW5 and PW6 were called to testify regarding a complaint lodged through the online system by PW3 concerning an incident involving a dog bite. However, the complaint referred to PW3’s “mother” was attacked, whereas the Plaintiff was in fact PW3’s relative. During his testimony, PW3 insisted that he was the Plaintiff’s adopted son (anak angkat). However, the Plaintiff herself denied that PW3 was her adopted son and testified that PW3 was in fact the son of her younger brother’s child. This inconsistency raises concerns regarding the accuracy of the evidence presented before this court.

It is also apposite to underscore that the witness statements of the Plaintiff’s witnesses contained several inaccuracies as mentioned earlier. Particularly, PW2 and PW4 was initially as a mere neighbour to the Plaintiff as stipulated in their written statements tendered before this court [WS(SP2) and WS(SP4)], it became apparent during the trial when revealing that they were the relative to the Plaintiff. This court considers it necessary to warn the Plaintiff’s counsels and witnesses that swearing evidence is a serious matter and should not be taken lightly, whereby the Plaintiff’s counsels as officers of the court have a duty to ensure that evidence put before this court is correct and to help ensure proper administration of justice.

At this juncture, this court further noted that the dog in question was not registered with relevant local authority. As such, PW5 and PW6 was called to give evidence concerning to a complaint lodged via online system by PW3 against the dog about the alleged dog bite incident.

Following the complaint, the Environmental Health Officers from the Alor Gajah Municipal Council conducted a site visit to the premises on 4.7.2025. It was found that a dog was being kept on the DW2’s house without a licence issued by the Alor Gajah Municipal Council (MPAG). Consequently, a compound notice was issued, as reflected at page 2 of Bundle B, with the accompanying photographs appearing at pages 4 to 5 of the same bundle.

Importantly, the compound was issued not to the Defendant but to her husband, DW2. DW2 attended the court and candidly admitted that he was responsible for the custody and control of the dog in question, including providing its food, shelter and confinement. It is undisputed that the compound was subsequently paid by DW2.

In the considered view of this court. the local authority was not required to establish a complex chain of ownership. The purpose of the By-Laws on License for Dogs and Dog Breeding Houses (Alor Gajah Municipal Council) 2013 [“Undang-Undang Kecil Pelesenan Anjing dan Rumah Pembiakan Anjing (Majlis Perbandaran Alor Gajah) 2013”] is regulatory control and public safety rather than the determination of civil ownership disputes. For that reason, the compound was issued to the person found to be keeping and controlling the dog, namely DW2.

Interestingly, the Plaintiff relied on the case of Abadi Motor Sdn Bhd v Ewwa bt Mohd Yusoff & Ors [2019] 9 MLJ 18 (para 85, of the written submission), where the High Court held that acceptance of an offer of compound amounted to an admission of guilt in relation to the offence compounded. Applying that principle to the present facts, it was DW2 and not the Defendant, who accepted and paid the compound. Furthermore, DW2 expressly admitted that he provided the dog’s shelter, food, cage and day-to-day care. If the Plaintiff sought to rely on the principle in Abadi Motor, it is difficult to understand why proceedings were not commenced against DW2 instead. The very facts relied upon by the Plaintiff’s counsel point more directly towards DW2 as the person exercising custody and control over the dog.

This court therefore found very strange that the Plaintiff aimed to rely to DW2’s paying the compound to fortify the Plaintiff’s claim against the Defendant (DW1), where the similar evidence stated that DW2, rather than that Defendant, was the owner responsible for the dog in question.

This court now look further to consider the extent to which a family member of the dog owner might be held liable for injuries caused by the dog. For completeness of discussion, this court nevertheless proceeds to extend its consideration whether the Defendant falls within another legally recognised category, being a keeper or harbourer of the dog, although the Plaintiff’s case was pleaded solely on the basis that the Defendant was the alleged owner of the dog.

From the above, this court found that the Plaintiff had failed to adduce sufficient evidence to establish the Defendant had custody or control of the dog or was actively caring for the dog or was engaged in its care being an owner. In comparison to the Defendant’s husband (DW2), the DW2 was kept emphasizing that he was the owner of the dog and he was responsible to feed and provide for it. There was no denial from DW2 on his end that not only he is the husband of the Defendant and the dog was kept at the household residence occupied by both of them.

In substance, having found that the Plaintiff failed to establish that the Defendant was the owner of the dog which was the basis upon which the claim was pleaded by the Plaintiff, this court proceeds to consider, for completeness, whether the Defendant could fall within the alternative category of a keeper or harbourer of the dog notwithstanding that neither category was pleaded by the Plaintiff in the present case.

What is crucial is that, while the Defendant is the wife of DW2 with the dog was kept at the household residence and this fact alone did not automatically give assurance that the Defendant exercised the requisite degree of custody, control or care for her to be liable as a keeper or harbourer of the dog.

Be that as it may, it can be argued that as a person exercising control over the premise and permitting the dog to remain at the same house and similary the Defendant could arguably be regarded as a harbourer being someone in control of the said house and allowing the dog to take shelter on the property. Nevertheless, such a case would have required clear pleadings and supporting evidence, where the Plaintiff did not plead that the Defendant is either a keeper or harbourer of the dog.

As a result, the Plaintiff relied heavily on the compound issued by the local authority to establish that the Defendant was the owner of the dog, despite the compound being issued in the name of DW2. In fact, the Plaintiff’s contention was inconsistent with the evidence with which she made her claim.

The essential distinction between a keeper and a harbourer of the dog is well defined in law. The court held in the case of Verrett v Silver 244 N.W.2d 147 (1976) that harbouring or keeping a dog is more than a one-time suggestion or the occasional assistance of a stray dog or the casual presence of the dog on one’s premises. Harbouring a dog means for a dog to be provided with a shelter. On the other hand, to keep a dog implies no mere offering of temporary accommodation but it requires at least a modicum of management or control or care of the kind ordinarily exercised by the dog’s owner.

The case of Bailey v DeSanti 414 A.2d 1187 (Conn. Super. 1980), however, established that the owners of the premise could, in a legal sense, be considered as the keepers of a dog owned by their son-in-law. They were not owners of the dog themselves, but had a degree of control over the yard in which the dog had been kept and provided an effective refuge for it. The conditions were seen by the court as sufficient to establish an appropriate relationship with the dog.

In the considered view of this court, while a person may be regarded as a keeper of a dog at a given time, ownership generally remains with the owner who retains permanent dominion over the dog unless it is lawfully transferred, sold or dies. In the present case, it appears that the Defendant and DW2 did allow the dog to reside on their house and provided shelter for the said dog. Such circumstances could bolster a claim that the Defendant acted like a keeper of the dog, bearing in mind that the issue of keepership was not pleaded by the Plaintiff.

More importantly, the Plaintiff’s pleaded case was also materially inconsistent with the evidence presented at the trial. The statement of claim alleged that the alleged dog bite incident took place in front of the Defendant’s house. However, it appeared that Plaintiff’s own testimony indicated that the occurrence occurred within the area of the compound of the Defendant’s house where the dog was housed. That inconsistency was rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the Defendant.

This sort of contradiction is not a mere technicality since the place of the incident is part of the factual substratum of the Plaintiff’s claim and goes to very foundation of the determination of the liability issue involving element of duty of care and foreseeability of risk. These discrepancies as to the location of the incident either occurred in front of the Defendant’s house or within the compound of the Defendant’s house without any definite version, in turn, prejudiced the Plaintiff’s case.

As held in the case of SG Pari Land Sdn Bhd v Widad Business Group Sdn Bhd [2022] MLJU 3672 (High Court), the parties are bound by their pleadings and this court is confined to make the determination of the contention within the four corners of their pleadings. In other words, the parties cannot adduce facts or issues that the parties did not plead. Here, there was a departure from the pleadings concerning material facts to the Plaintiff’s claim and this defect goes to the merits of the case which cannot simply be treated as a mere technical irregularity, for when it can be remedied in the interest of preventing a miscarriage of justice. Consequently, this court found that the Plaintiff had failed to prove her case against the Defendant as the dog’s owner upon which the claim was pleaded. Orbiter dicta 65. By way of obiter dicta, this court wishes this judgment to be a reminder regarding the necessity to review and modernise the Malaysian legislative framework concerning civil liability arising from attacks by animals.

The Malaysian Animals Act 1953 (Revised 2006) (Act 647) was enacted principally to provide for the prevention of the introduction and spread of animal diseases, the control of the movement and slaughter of animals, the prevention of cruelty to animals and matters relating to animal welfare, conservation and improvement in Peninsular Malaysia. Further, as it so happens, while the title of the Malaysian legislation mirrors the Animals Act 1971 (UK), they are significantly different in substance. Specifically, unlike the United Kingdom, the Malaysian legislation does not deal specifically with civil liability arising from attacks by animals. Instead of legislative reform, civil liability arising from attacks by animals still largely revolved by common law principles.

As seen in Kamalanathan a/l Ramanathan v Jeevan a/l Velautham & Anor [2022] MLJU 1390 (Magistrates’ Court), the United Kingdom passed the Animals Act 1971 for the purpose of clarifying and streamlining the law concerning civil liability for damage caused by animals and a similar form of legislative reform may be appropriate and desirable to Malaysia. Until such reforms are effected, the common law principles of strict liability and negligence are applicable when claims arise from attacks by animals, for instance the dog attack that happened in the present case. Third Issue 67. The third issue now for this court’s deliberation is whether the Defendant was negligent and thereby caused the Plaintiff’s injuries, which can only be considered after this Court has determined the two preceding issues.

The Plaintiff’s principal argument was that the dog did not possess a valid licence issued by the local authority as at the date of the incident. The Plaintiff submitted that the failure to obtain a licence for such a prolonged period demonstrated the Defendant’s careless attitude towards the basic responsibilities of keeping a dog in a residential area.

However, this court found that the Plaintiff’s reliance on the compound notice issued in the name of DW2 was misplaced. The compound was issued against DW2, yet the Plaintiff sought to use it against the Defendant (DW1). The Plaintiff further argued that the compound was issued while DW2 was present at the house and the Defendant was not at home. At the same time, learned counsel for the Plaintiff relied on DW2’s acceptance of the compound as an admission that he was the owner of the dog. If DW2 was not the owner, he could have declined the compound and waited for the Defendant to return home or provided the Defendant’s particulars to the enforcement officer. None of these circumstances support the Plaintiff’s pleaded case. Accordingly, this court found the Plaintiff’s version to be improbable.

This court also accepted the submission of the Defendant’s learned counsel that the Plaintiff herself was inconsistent as to whether the alleged incident occurred outside the Defendant’s house or within the compound of the house. More significantly, PW4 testified that the location of the alleged bite was marked with “a red dot” on the first photograph at page 4 of Bundle B. PW4 confirmed during cross-examination that the marked location was within the compound of the Defendant’s house.

This court reiterates that the Plaintiff’s claim is founded on the common law of negligence. Regardless of the wording of any legislation, the law generally does not extend the same level of protection to a trespasser. The Plaintiff failed to prove that she had been invited onto the Defendant’s property. The evidence also showed that the Plaintiff and her relatives, who claimed themselves as the neighbours of the Defendant, were aware that a dog was kept at the Defendant’s house for a long time.

Bearing in mind that the Plaintiff did not specifically plead that the Defendant was the keeper or harbourer of the dog as an alternative cause in her pleading, where this court found it was a material omission as this court has to decide the facts raised confined to the four corners of the pleadings. For completeness, the evidence established that the dog was kept and sheltered at the house occupied by the Defendant and DW2, which was more than a mere shelter and prepared to provide food if DW2 was not in the house, which inclined to be a keeper. Further, even if the Defendant were to be regarded as a keeper of the dog, notwithstanding that such a case was not specifically pleaded by the Plaintiff and may be viewed as a mere technicality, this court may nevertheless proceed to consider the real issue, namely whether the Defendant owed the Plaintiff a duty of care in relation to the keeping of the dog.

A key concern raised by the Defendant was that the dog had not bitten the Plaintiff. Learned counsel for the Defendant submitted that the medical evidence did not clearly establish that a dog bite caused the Plaintiff’s injuries and the Plaintiff also failed to produce photographs of the alleged bite, the wound, or any other objective evidence of the alleged dog attack.

In addition, there was a material inconsistency in the evidence of the Plaintiff’s witnesses regarding the description of the dog. PW1 described the dog as black and white, whereas PW2 described it as brown. This court agrees with the Defendant that if PW2 had indeed witnessed the incident and assisted in chasing the dog away, it would be difficult to explain such a significant discrepancy regarding the dog’s colour.

The Plaintiff’s (PW1) credibility was further affected during cross-examination. PW1 admitted that she was unaware that this claim had been filed in court and only became aware of it two days before the trial. She also failed to explain why she was inside the Defendant’s house compound, at the location as marked by PW4. The marked location was clearly within the private compound of the Defendant’s house and not on a public road. PW1 also confirmed that the Defendant was inside the house at the material time. Indeed, these circumstances raise serious doubts as to the reliability of Plaintiff’s own version of events.

The evidence further showed that, after being informed by the Defendant’s friend, one Pn Norhayati, that screams had been heard on the day of the incident, the Defendant came out to investigate and found the Plaintiff in discomfort and unable to get up. The Defendant immediately assisted the Plaintiff and transported her to Hospital Alor Gajah in her own vehicle for medical treatment. According to the Defendant, during the journey to the hospital, the Plaintiff never mentioned being bitten by a dog. Additionally, the Defendant stated that the Plaintiff had mentioned previously to her about her family problems and financial difficulties.

This court also appreciates that the evidence regarding the Defendant’s mother was inconsistent. Neither PW1, PW4 nor the Defendant mentioned the involvement of the Defendant’s mother during the incident. Only PW2 testified that the Defendant’s mother came out of the house, following which the dog allegedly came out and bit the Plaintiff. In the absence of corroborative evidence, this court is unable to place significant weight on PW2’s testimony. This is especially so when PW4’s marked location places the alleged incident well within the Defendant’s house compound.

Notwithstanding the family issues allegedly faced by the Plaintiff, as claimed by the Defendant, this court confines itself to the available actual evidence, if any. From an objective perspective, a dog bite would ordinarily be expected to leave identifiable bite marks, puncture wounds, torn flesh or similar injuries consistent with the closure of a dog’s teeth upon a person’s body.

In the present case, the Plaintiff relied on the Orthopaedic Department report from Hospital Melaka dated 27.8.2025 (pages 22–23 of Bundle B), which was prepared long after the alleged incident. There was no medical report from Hospital Alor Gajah on the date of the incident (19.6.2025). This court, therefore, agrees with the Defendant that the Plaintiff failed to produce evidence of any identifiable dog bite injury which could reasonably have been expected to be recorded by medical personnel on the day of the incident.

More importantly, the Plaintiff did not call the treating doctor from Hospital Alor Gajah to explain whether the injuries observed were consistent with a dog bite. The medical records merely recorded a laceration wound to the right wrist and pain in the left hip. The X-ray showed no fracture of the right wrist, while the diagnosis recorded a laceration wound to the right wrist and a fracture of the neck of the left femur. These findings are more consistent with the Defendant’s version that the Plaintiff fell within the Defendant’s premise rather than being bitten by a dog. This court is therefore inclined to accept the Defendant’s explanation and found that the Plaintiff failed to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that she was bitten by the Defendant’s dog or that her injuries were caused by such a bite.

Finally, the letter from the Social Welfare Department (JKM) Alor Gajah dated 1.7.2025 at page 21 of Bundle B does not assist the Plaintiff’s case. The document merely confirms that the Plaintiff was receiving financial assistance under the Senior Citizens Assistance Scheme amounting to RM600 per month from August 2025 to July 2026. It has no probative value in establishing that the alleged dog bite incident occurred as claimed in the present case.

Even if this court were to proceed on the assumption that the alleged dog bite incident did occur, the Plaintiff has nevertheless failed to establish negligence against the Defendant on balance of probabilities:- a) Firstly, the evidence suggests that the Plaintiff was within the Defendant’s house compound without any proven invitation or lawful basis as the location marked by PW4 placed the alleged incident within the private compound of the Defendant's premise rather than on a public road; and b) Secondly, remote possibility of causing an injury is not sufficient to prove negligence.There should be a reasonable probability that the injury will occur such that the reasonable person in the position of the Defendant would have anticipated the risk and have taken precautions against the risk (Whippey v Jones [2009] EWCA Civ 452). Under a common law negligence claim, the injured party must prove that the owner or the keeper knew, or ought reasonably to have known, that the animal had vicious tendencies in order to impose a duty on the owner or the keeper (Lucas v Kriska, 168 III. App. 3d 317, 319-320 (1988)). Following this, the issue at hand is whether a reasonable person in the Defendant’s position would have foreseen the risk of injury and taken reasonable precautions to prevent it.

In the present case, there was no evidence that the dog had previously displayed any vicious propensity towards any person. The Plaintiff failed to plead or prove that the Defendant knew, or ought reasonably to have known, of any vicious propensity on the part of the dog. On the contrary, the evidence showed that the dog had been kept within the Defendant’s house and was generally under the care and supervision of the Defendant and DW2.

The Plaintiff attempted to justify her presence at the Defendant’s house by alleging that she frequently purchased vegetables from the Defendant's mother. However, no witness, including the Plaintiff’s own witnesses, gave evidence that the Defendant’s mother sold vegetables from the premise which was a fact had not been established by the Plaintiff. More importantly, no evidence was adduced to show that the Plaintiff attended the Defendant’s house on the day of the incident for that purpose. This explanation therefore, found no support in the evidence before this court.

As discussed under the issue of scienter, as mentioned earlier, liability arising from injuries caused by domestic animals generally requires proof that the animal possessed a vicious propensity and that the owner or keeper knew, or ought reasonably to have known, of that propensity. The Plaintiff here has failed to establish either element. In fact, the Plaintiff was unable to provide a coherent account of the alleged attack, including the manner in which the dog allegedly bit her.

That said, where a dog has exhibited no prior vicious tendencies, the owner or keeper cannot ordinarily be expected to foresee an attack. In such circumstances, the mere keeping of the dog within the owner’s and/or keeper’s premise does not amount to negligence. The photograph at page 5 of the Bundle B had showed that the dog was ordinarily kept within the cage in the Defendant’s house compound. The same photograph was taken during the unexpected site visit conducted by the the Environmental Health Officers on 4.7.2025.

Hence, even if the Defendant was a keeper of the dog, there was no evidence from the Plaintiff to show that the Defendant breached any duty of care to her. There was no evidence to show that the Defendant’s behaviour in keeping, supervising or controlling the dog fell short of the standard expected from a reasonable person to keep such a tame and domestic animal.

In my judgment, the photograph at page 5 of Bundle B as above-mentioned, reveals that the dog was normally confined to a cage within the compound of the Defendant’s residence. Such evidence established that the dog was confined, supervised, controlled and cared for by the Defendant and DW2 in accordance with normal practice regarding the management of a domestic animal. There was also no evidence adduced by the Plaintiff that the dog had previously bitten or harmed any person, nor was any evidence of any known vicious propensity. In the case of Russell v Rivera 780 N.Y.S.2d 699, 700 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept. 2004) as referred by this court, it was held that where a dog had no previous vicious tendencies, the owner could not reasonably have foreseen the injury complained of and therefore the negligence claim was dismissed.

In the considered view of this court, the scienter action which is commonly known as the “one-bite rule”, as referred to earlier, establishes that liability does not generally arise in cases involving injuries caused by domestic animals unless the owner or keeper knew, or ought reasonably to have known, of the particular animal’s vicious propensity. Importantly, a claimant need not prove that the animal had previously bitten a person (an actual bite). It is sufficient to prove that the animal had previously exhibited a propensity to cause injury and that such propensity was known, or ought reasonably to have been known, to the owner or keeper (Domm v Hollenbeck, 259 III. 382, 102 N.E. 782 (1913)). The logic behind this is that an owner cannot reasonably be expected to safeguard himself or herself against a risk, of which he or she is unaware given the presumption the domestic animals are inherently harmless to humans, which become an essential element to be assessed by this court in a negligence claim arising out of the animal attack.

Moreover, the presence of the dog was generally well known to those residing in the vicinity, including the Plaintiff. Despite such, the Plaintiff voluntarily entered the compound of the Defendant’s house at that material time without any proven invitation or lawful grounds. The Plaintiff’s own evidence placed her within the Defendant’s private compound, and she had knowledge of the existence of the risk arising from the dog being kept at the Defendant’s house. In the circumstances, it appeared that the Plaintiff failed to take reasonable care for her own safety and that such failure contributed to the injuries she sustained when she fell within the Defendant’s house compound, as suggested by the learned counsel for the Defendant.

At common law, an occupier owes only a limited duty to trespassers. As stated in Pearson v Coleman Brothers [1948] 2 KB 359, where the facts establish that the claimant was a trespasser, the defendant’s obligations must be assessed on that footing where the law does not impose any greater obligation than that owed to trespassers entering the land. As no breach of the duty of care owed by the Defendant to the Plaintiff has been established in the present case, the Defendant cannot be held liable in negligence. Consequently, there is neither room nor necessity for the doctrine of contributory negligence to apply even it was the Plaintiff’s fault which voluntarily agreed to undertake the risk at her own expense by illegally entering the Defendant’s private area and contributed to her injuries.

Consequently, it is this court’s considered view that, even if the alleged dog bite incident actually took place, the Plaintiff has not established the required scienter on the part of the Defendant. Further, at common law, a domestic dog is generally presumed to be tame and harmless in the absence of evidence of any vicious propensity. In the present case, the Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the Defendant knew, or ought reasonably to have known, that the dog possessed any such propensity. On the contrary, the evidence showed that the Plaintiff and her witnesses had been aware of the dog’s presence at the Defendant’s house for several years without any evidence of a similar incident occurring.

Where there is no evidence of any known dangerous propensity, the Plaintiff failed in the proving the element of foreseeability. It is not sufficient for this court to be satisfied that a reasonable person in the position of the Defendant should have foreseen a real risk of injury to the Plaintiff as the dog has no tendency to act in a dangerous way. In this context, the Plaintiff has failed to prove that the Defendant ought reasonably should have undertaken extra precautions over what was previously done.

At this point, this court found that the Plaintiff has failed to establish negligence as pleaded because there was no foreseeable risk of injury, which would otherwise have demanded further precautions on the part of the Defendant. Accordingly, on a balance of probabilities, this court found that the Plaintiff has failed to establish that the Defendant breached any duty of care owed to her. Other issues

Adverse inference 95. The Plaintiff further argued that the Defendant had earlier confirmed that a material witness namely Puan Norhayati, who was a friend of the Defendant, was present on the day of the incident. According to the evidence, Puan Norhayati heard someone screaming and called the Defendant (DW1) to the front of the house compound area. Following that, DW1 just saw the Plaintiff at the location inside the front of the house compound.

The Plaintiff was allegedly present there without invitation and was not supposed to be in that area which was situated in front of the house, but still within the gated compound of the Defendant’s house. This is evident from the photographs taken by the Environmental Health Officer during the site visit on pages 4–5 of Bundle B. The photographs clearly show that the front portion of the house is connected to a long driveway extending from the gate into the Defendant's house compound.

The Plaintiff submitted that Puan Norhayati was a material witness and that the Defendant’s failure to call her to testify regarding the incident entitled the court to draw an adverse inference against the Defendant under section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950. The learned counsel for the Plaintiff further argued that the absence of Pn Norhayati’s evidence created doubts and suspicion regarding the Defendant’s version of events.

Having assessed the evidence, this court found that Puan Norhayati merely heard a scream and was not a person who witnessed the incident, and therefore, she was not in the best position to explain how the incident occurred. Her role was therefore minimal. Accordingly, this is not a fit and proper case for this court to draw an adverse inference against the Defendant under section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950.

This case is distinguishable from Masyitah bt Md Hassan v Sakinah bt Sulong [2021] 7 MLJ 144 (High Court) relied upon by learned counsel for the Plaintiff. Unlike the witness in that case, Puan Norhayati did not witness the incident and hence was in no better position than the Defendant herself to explain how it occurred. In fact, Pn Norhayati never went to the front compound and did not personally observe the Plaintiff there.

In any event, it is trite law that the legal and evidential burden of proving the Plaintiff’s case rests on the Plaintiff pursuant to sections 101 and 102 of the Evidence Act 1950. For the reasons as stated above, the Plaintiff has failed to discharge these burdens. As such, the burden never shifted to the Defendant to prove her defence. In these circumstances, the issue of whether the Defendant should have called Puan Norhayati or any other witness does not arise and immaterial to the case determination.

(ii) Allegation of intimidation of the Defendant’s counsel

On 22.4.2026, being the fourth and final day of the trial commenced before this court, learned counsel for the Defendant i.e. Mr Mathan, informed the court that he had lodged a police report no. AG/2910/26, a copy of which was produced in open court. This court directed the Defendant’s counsel to file the relevant police report through the e-filing system for record purpose, however, no such filing had been made as at the date of this judgment. On the date the judgment was pronounced later i.e. on 26.6.2026, this court inquired about the status of the filing of the relevant police report against the Defendant’s counsel and the Defendant’s counsel undertook to complete the e-filing by today.

According to the police report and as submitted by the Defendant’s counsel, Mr. Mathan, on 21.4.2026, while leaving the Defendant’s house after meeting his client (the Defendant), Mr. Mathan was allegedly stopped by PW3, Mr. Suppiah, near a junction. Mr. Mathan alleged that PW3 threatened him in Tamil by stating that action would be taken against him if he won the case and that PW3 knew where he lived. Mr. Mathan brought the matter to the attention of this court for record purpose as he said that he feared for the safety of himself and his family, and had therefore lodged the said police report. Mr. Mathan prayed that the matter be recorded by this court.

Learned counsel for the Plaintiff i.e. Mr. Sumesh subsequently informed this court that, after confirming the matter with PW3, he was informed that the case had been withdrawn by the Defendant’s counsel. Mr. Sumesh further submitted that the Defendant’s counsel had misled the court by failing to disclose the fact that the police report had already been withrawn. Mr. Sumesh further informed the court that he had advised PW3 not to approach or communicate with the Defendant’s counsel while the case was still pending.

Thereafter, Mr. Mathan admitted that he had withdrawn the police report upon the investigating officer’s advice. However, he stated that the police had informed him that an investigation paper could still be opened should any related untoward incident occur on him in the future.

This court expressed its concern that the Defendant’s counsel had not provided the full facts to the court at the outset, particularly the fact that the police report had already been withdrawn. In my view, the Defendant’s counsel ought to have disclosed the full material fact when bringing the matter to the court’s attention. Nevertheless, this court made it clear that it had been informed of allegations concerning the intimidation of the Defendant’s counsel by PW3. This court will not tolerate any form of interference, intimidation or threat directed at any officer of the court. Any attempt to obstruct or improperly influence a lawyer in the discharge of his professional duties may amount to contempt of court.

This court therefore issued a warning and requested the assistance of learned counsel for the Plaintiff, as an officer of the court, to advise PW3 accordingly. The incident was also recorded in the Notes of Proceedings. However, this court recognised that there is a clear procedural distinction between contempt committed in the face of the court and contempt committed outside the court under Order 52 of the Rules of Court 2012. The alleged conduct in the present case occurred outside the courtroom and may also be the subject of police investigation. As such, any contempt proceedings would require compliance with the “show cause” procedure to ensure that the alleged contemnor is afforded the right to be heard pursuant to Order 52 rule 2B of the Rules of Court 2012.

Accordingly, this court reminded both parties' counsel that threatening or intimidating a lawyer while he is acting for his client in an ongoing trial may give rise to a real risk of interference with the due administration of justice and may constitute contempt of court. Interference with the administration of justice is a serious matter and cannot be taken lightly, as recognised in the cases of Dato’ Sri Andrew Kam Tai Yeow v Tan Sri Dato' Kam Woon Wah & Ors [2021] 7 MLJ 874 (High Court) and Attorney General v Lokman Noor bin Adam [2022] 7 MLJ 532 (High Court).

As regards the issue of contempt of court, this court reiterates that any person who threatens or intimidates opposing counsel in the course of court proceedings may obstruct the administration of justice. However, in the present case, this court makes no finding against PW3 as no show cause proceedings have been initiated and PW3 has not been given an opportunity to be heard.

If necessary, this court informed the Defendant’s counsel that an application for leave to commence contempt proceedings against the proposed contemnor may be filed in accordance with the applicable procedure. In any event, the relief sought by the Defendant’s counsel was limited to having the matter recorded and for PW3 to be advised not to repeat such conduct. This court notes that learned counsel for the Plaintiff was cooperative throughout and informed the Court that he had already spoken to PW3 and given the necessary advice to prevent any recurrence.

(iii) Demeanour of the Defendant (DW1)

The Plaintiff further submitted that the Notes of Proceedings recorded that the trial had to be stood down to allow DW1 to compose herself. Flowing from this, the Plaintiff argued that DW1’s overall demeanour showed that she was defensive, reluctant to admit the material facts and attempted to distance herself from responsibility when subjected to cross-examination.

This court carefully considers the Plaintiff’s argument and respectfully disagrees with that submission. Having observed the proceedings firsthand and being able to review the audio recording if necessary, this court found that, on several occasions during cross-examination, guidance had to be given to the learned counsel for the Plaintiff in order to ensure that the questioning remained fair and in accordance with established principles and the court remained neutral throughout the course.

As held by the Court of Appeal in the case of Samsuri bin Tumin v Pendakwa Raya [2011] 6 MLJ 358, a suggestion put in cross-examination merely reflects the case or position of the party conducting the cross-examination and the witness is entitled to agree or disagree with the suggestion. In the present case, there were occasions when the Plaintiff’s counsel appeared to state factual propositions from the Plaintiff’s perspective without first seeking DW1’s agreement or disagreement. In addition, this court observed that some questions were put in a relatively loud tone and the court therefore requested that counsel speak further away from the microphone to moderate the volume of questioning.

Learned counsel for the Plaintiff, Ms Jasmeen Kaur, responded positively to the court’s request. Following this, the atmosphere of the proceedings became calmer and the stress experienced by DW1 appeared to lessen. This can be verified from the court recording. In the circumstances, this court does not regard the brief adjournment or DW1’s reactions as a result of the stress during questioning by the Plaintiff’s counsel in such way, as evidence of unreliability or adverse demeanour. On the contrary, DW1’s evidence remained substantially consistent throughout the trial.

Having regard to the Defendant’s (DW1) background as a nurse at Hospital Alor Gajah, she appeared to understand the questions put to her and gave her answers confidently and coherently. This court therefore found DW1 to be a reliable witness. As trial judge, it is always the duty of this court to ensure proceedings are conducted in a fair, respectful and manner that allows all parties and witnesses to give evidence without unnecessary stress, pressure or intimidation.

F. CONCLUSION Therefore, pursuant to the above reasons, this court found that the Plaintiff has failed to establish that the Defendant owed her a duty of care. The Plaintiff appeared to be a trespasser within the Defendant’s private premise. In the circumstances, the Defendant, as the keeper of the dog, could not reasonably have foreseen any injury being caused to the Plaintiff. Further, this court is not persuaded that a dog bite had in fact occurred as no bite mark pattern was produced by the Plaintiff and no medical officer was called to corroborate the alleged bite mark evidence. The Defendant also had no knowledge of any vicious propensity of the dog and the Plaintiff failed expressed any belief that the dog was vicious throughout the trial.

Consequently, any damage allegedly suffered by the Plaintiff is too remote to attract liability and the Plaintiff has failed to prove that she suffered any compensable loss or damage as a result of the alleged dog bite incident, especially when the Plaintiff’s presence within the Defendant’s compound was entirely beyond the Defendant's control, as she entered the premise uninvited (Ranjit Singh a/l Jarnail Singh v Malayan Banking Bhd [2012] 1 MLJ 543, High Court).

Most significantly, this court is unable to accept the Plaintiff’s contention that the Defendant or DW2 was negligent for failing to close the gate, particularly when the Plaintiff’s own witnesses confirmed that the incident occurred inside the Defendant’s compound and not outside it.

Taking the totality of the evidence into account, this court found that the Plaintiff has failed to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the Defendant was negligent. The Plaintiff has failed to prove a breach of duty, foreseeability of harm or any factual basis upon which liability may be imposed on the Defendant. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s claim in negligence is hereby dismissed with costs of RM7,000.00 payable by the Plaintiff to the Defendant.

QUANTUM OF DAMAGES (BASED ON 100% LIABILITY) Plaintiff’s claim (if there is an appeal)

Although the Plaintiff’s claim is dismissed with costs, for the sake of completeness, this court has assessed the quantum of damages that would have been awarded had the Plaintiff established that she suffered compensable loss and damage as a result of the alleged dog bite incident. In this regard, learned counsel for the Plaintiff made relevant submissions on quantum at paragraph 141 of the written submissions. However, learned counsel for the Defendant did not make any submissions on the issue of quantum in any part of the Defendant’s written submissions.

General Damages This court has assessed the quantum of general damages as follows:- No. General Damages Plaintiff’s submission Defendants’ submission Court’s Award 1. Closed neck of femur fracture RM50,000 n/a RM40,000.00 with considering hip replacement done on 22.7.2025. (Refer to Cheah Kia Ming v Ratha Krishnan a/I Nadasan & Anor [2017] 1 PIR [49]; Chai Hon Yoong v Zenwan (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors [2012] MLJU 223 including hip replacement operation; Eswaran A/L Nagalingam v Hew Heng

Laceration wound over right wrist RM10,000 n/a RM6,000.00 (Refer to Revised Compendium of Personal Injury Awards 2018; Wan Khizan Binti Wan Ahmad & Anor v Haizan Bin Hasmi & 4 Ors [2023] MLJU 366; Parthiba Kumar A/L Subramaniam V Amiruddin Bin Biden [2025] 1 PIR 17)

Pain & suffering to undergo future operation RM5,000 n/a Dismissed As reflected from medical report at page 23 Bundle B under treatment section, wound debridement and surturing right wirst,as well as left total hip replacement surgery, were carried out in June and July 2025. This court could not find any specialist report or medical evidence adduced by the Plaintiff showing that any further operation had been recommended. No recommendation from any doctor or specialist has been produced by the Plaintiff here to establish the need for future surgery (Chong Kok Meng & Anor v Muhammad Zahirzahar bin Zainudin [2019] MLJU 1340). TOTAL GENERAL DAMAGES RM46,000.00 Special Damages The Plaintiff claims special damages as follows. No. Special Damages Plaintiff’s submission Defendants’ submission Court’s Award 1. Medical Report Fees Charged by Melaka Hospital (Page 14, Bundle B) Receipt of RM40 Granted – RM40.00 2. Damage to Clothing and personal belongings (no receipt) Dismissed (No evidence that the Plaintiff’s clothing or personal belongings were damaged during the incident.)

Cost of Nutritious Food and Daily Allowance (no receipt) Dismissed (The Plaintiff has failed to adduce any evidence to show that the purchase of nutritious food was medically required as a consequence of the injuries sustained in the incident. Likewise, there is no evidence establishing the basis for the claim for a daily allowance.)

Travel and Transportation (no receipt) Dismissed Expenses Incurred by the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff’s Family (The Plaintiff failed to particularise the transportation expenses claimed, including who incurred the expenses, the purpose of the travel, the destinations travelled to, and the identity of the family members concerned. Further, the evidence shows that the Plaintiff was transported to Hospital Alor Gajah by the Defendant immediately after the incident. No admission records, medical appointments, receipts, or other supporting documents were produced to establish that any subsequent transportation expenses were reasonably and necessarily incurred by the Plaintiff or her family as a result of the incident. Accordingly, this claim has not been proven.) TOTAL SPECIAL DAMAGES

If, this case is appealed and the High Court is not with this trial court’s findings on the issue of liability, the following is the court’s award regarding the quantum of damages of the Plaintiff’s claim:- a) General damages of RM46,000.00; b) Special damages of RM40.00; c) Interest at the rate of 5% per annum upon general damages from the date of the service of the writ until date of judgment; d) Interest at the rate of 2.5% per annum upon special damages from date of accident until the date of delivery of judgment; e) Interest at the rate of 5% per annum upon the total judgment sum from the date of this judgment until full and final settlement; and f) Cost is according to scale costs as provided under Order 59 rule 23(1) of the Rules of Court 2012. Dated this 26 June 2026 SGD ------------------------------ TEOH SHU YEE MAGISTRATE MAGISTRATES’ COURT AT ALOR GAJAH FOR THE PLAINTIFF : En. Sumesh & Pn. Jasmeen Kaur TETUAN SUMESH & PARTNERS, MELAKA FOR THE DEFENDANT : En. Mathan TETUAN MATHAN ANANDARAM & CO.,