Resorts World at Sentosa Pte Ltd v Lee Fook Kheun (WA-24-92-11/2018)

There were two applications before this Court; encl. 35 in Originating Summons No. WA-24-92-11/2018 (‘O.S. 92’) and encl. 32 in O.S. No. WA-24-93-11/2018 (‘O.S. 93’) where the Judgment Debtor (‘JD’) essentially sought to set aside the registration of the judgments obtained in Singapore under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 1958 [Act 99] (‘REJA 1958’).

After having considered the affidavit evidence and oral and written submissions by the learned counsels who represented the JD and Judgment Creditor (‘JC’), I had, on 9.4.2026, dismissed both applications.

Dissatisfied, the JD has appealed against my decision.

These are my full grounds of judgment.

The JC is a licensed casino operator governed by the Casino Control Act 2006 in the Republic of Singapore.

The JD is a Malaysian citizen and a retiree.

The JC commenced a civil suit against the JD in the High Court of the Republic of Singapore in 2016 to claim the sum owing by the JD to the JC.

The claim was based on the Credit Facility Agreements and the credit markers dated 20.8.2010 and 22.8.2010, respectively, whereby S$10 million worth of gambling chips were given to the JD during the JD’s visit to the JC’s casino.

After a full trial, the Singapore High Court entered judgment for the JC on 31.7.2018 for the sum of S$5,930,595.00 being the remaining sum of credit facility issued and interest pursuant to Clause (J) of the terms and conditions of the Credit Facility Agreements (‘Singapore Judgment 1’).

On 13.8.2018, the JC obtained a judgment for costs in connection with the recovery action taken against the JD on an indemnity basis for the sum of S$180,000.00 and disbursement in the sum of S$55,143.77 (‘Singapore Judgment 2’; Singapore Judgment 1 and Singapore Judgment 2 shall hereinafter be referred to as the ‘Singapore Judgments’).

11.

RM17,686,220.40 (equivalent to S$5,930,595.00 at the said exchange rate);

interest in the sum of RM5,849,648.76 (equivalent to S$1,961,521.28 at the said exchange rate) as at 31.7.2018; and

further interest on the sum of RM17,686,220.40 (equivalent to S$5,930,595.00 at the said exchange rate) from 1.8.2018 to the date of full repayment.

Singapore Judgment 2 was registered as a judgment of the High Court in Malaya by an Order for Registration dated 13.8.2018.

On 3.6.2019, the JD filed an application to set aside the registration of the Singapore Judgments on the ground that the registration and enforcement of the same was contrary to public policy (“1st Setting Aside Application”).

The 1st Setting Aside Application was dismissed by the High Court on 2.10.2019.

The JD’s appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed on 8.3.2021.

The JD then applied for leave to appeal to the Federal Court, proposing the following questions of law:

Proposed Question (a): “In light of Section 5(1)(a)(v) of the Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgment Act 1958, shall our local Courts recognise the statutory defence of public policy and/or common law defence of public policy enshrined under Section 26(1), (2) & (4) of the Civi l Law Act 1956 against gambling debts and, hence, shall set aside the registration of foreign judgments based upon debts in relation to or in connection with the gambling transact ions entered between the parties?”

Proposed Question (b): “In view of the Singapore Court of Appeal’s decision in the case of Poh Soon Kiat v Desert Palace Inc (trading as Caesars Palace) [2010] 1 SLR 1129, whether our local Courts shall set aside the registration of foreign judgments wherein the underlying cause of action is a breach of agreement to pay gambling debts since it is contrary to public policy and is unenforceable.”

Proposed Question (c): “In view of the Singapore Court of Appeal’s decision in the case of Poh Soon Kiat v Desert Palace Inc (trading as Caesars Palace) [2010] 1 SLR 1129, whether our local Courts shall set aside the registration of foreign judgments based on gambling debts as the registration thereof would enable the judgment creditor to enforce an action for debts in relation to or in connection with the gambling transactions entered between the parties which are statutorily barred by virtue of section 26 (1),

& (4) of the Civil Law Act 1956?”

Proposed Question (d): “Whether the position of our local Courts in allowing the enforcement of foreign judgments based on debts in relation to or in connection with gambling transactions is in accordance with the true interpretation of Section 26(1) and (2) Civil Law Act 1956 in view of the House of Lords’ case of Lipkin Gorman (a Firm) and Karpnale Ltd., [1991] 2 A.C. 548 which has laid down the law on true interpretation of Section 18 of the Gaming Act 1845 [in pari materia with Section 26(1) and (2) Civil Law Act 1956]?”. On 19.8.2021, the Federal Court dismissed the JD’s motion for leave to appeal.

On 22.12.2021, the JC commenced bankruptcy proceedings against the JD.

The JD then filed an application to set aside the Bankruptcy Notice. This application was dismissed by the Senior Assistant Registrar (‘SAR’) on 17.6.2022.

The JD’s appeal to the Judge-in-Chambers was dismissed on 14.9.2023 while the subsequent appeal to the Court of Appeal was also dismissed on 17.10.2024. The JD’s motion for leave to appeal to the Federal Court was dismissed on 10.4.2025.

As at the date of the JC’s Written Submissions (19.9.2025), the following appeals were pending before the bankruptcy court:

the JD’s appeal to the Judge-in-Chambers against the dismissal by the SAR on 13.2.2025 of the JD’s application to set aside the creditor’s petition dated 17.11.2022. The appeal was fixed for case management (‘CM’) on 3.11.2025; and

the JD’s appeal to the Judge-in-Chambers against the dismissal by the SAR on 22.8.2025 of his application to stay the bankruptcy proceedings pending the disposal of the instant application. The appeal was fixed for CM on 3.11.2025.

The present applications were filed by the JD on 27.3.2025 (‘2nd Setting Aside Application’). The reliefs sought in encl. 35 of O.S. 92 are as follows:

a declaration that the decision of the Court in dismissing the JD’s application to set aside registration of the Singapore Judgment 1 vide the Order dated 2.10.2019 is null, void and/ or is to be set aside;

a declaration that registration of the Singapore Judgment 1 which was allowed by the Court vide the Order dated 28.11.2018, is null, void and/ or is to be set aside; and

an extension of time for the JD to file an application to set aside the order for the registration of the Singapore Judgment, if necessary.

The reliefs sought in encl. 32 of O.S. 93 are the same except that the registration was in relation to Singapore Judgment 2 which was allowed by the Court vide the Order dated 5.12.2018.

The relevant statutory provisions for purposes of the discussion on the issues arising in these applications are set out below for ease of reference: s 5(1)(a)(v) of the REJA 1958: “Cases in which registered judgments must, or may, be set aside

5.

On an application in that behalf duly made by any party against whom a registered judgment may be enforced, the registration of the judgment –

shall be set aside if the registering court is satisfied – …

that the enforcement of the judgment would be contrary to public policy in Malaysia; or …”. s 24 and sub-s 31(1) of the Contracts Act 1950 (‘CA 1950’): “What considerations and objects are lawful, and what not

The consideration or object of an agreement is lawful, unless –

it is forbidden by a law;

it is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat any law;

it is fraudulent;

it involves or implies injury to the person or property of another; or

the court regards it as immoral, or opposed to public policy. In each of the above cases, the consideration or object of an agreement is said to be unlawful. Every agreement of which the object or consideration is unlawful is void.”. s 26 of the Civil Law Act 1956 (‘CLA 1956’): “Agreement by way of gaming or wagering to be null and void

(1) All contracts or agreements, whether by parol or in writing, by way of gaming or wagering shall be null and void.

No action shall be brought or maintained in any Court for recovering any sum of money or valuable thing alleged to be won upon any wager or which has been deposited in the hands of any person to abide the event on which any wager has been made.

Subsections (1) and (2) shall not be deemed to apply to any subscription or contribution, or agreement to subscribe or contribute, for or toward any plate, prize, or sum of money to be awarded to the winner of any lawful game, sport, pastime or exercise.

Any promise, express or implied, to pay any person any sum of money paid by him under or in respect of any contract or agreement rendered null and void by subsections (1) and (2), or to pay any sum of money by way of commission, fee, reward or otherwise in respect of any such contract or of any services in relation thereto or in connection therewith, shall be null and void, and no action shall be brought or maintained to recover any such sum of money.”. The JD’s Submission

The JD submitted that this Court has jurisdiction to set aside the registration of the Singapore Judgments at any time upon finding that enforcement of the same is prohibited under the jurisdiction of the High Court in Malaya. To do otherwise will tantamount to ignoring the laws applicable in this country as affirmed by the Federal Court in Dato’ Ting Ching Lee v Ting Siu Hua [2025] 2

It was contended that, following the ratio in Dato’ Ting’s case, s 24 and sub-s 31(1) of the CA 1950 and s 26 of the CLA 1956 expressly, and by necessary implication, prohibit the enforcement of the registered Singapore Judgments whereby enforcement would be against the public policy in Malaysia.

According to the JC, the apex court in Dato’ Ting’s case has reinstated, approved and applied the public policy consideration against the enforcement of gambling debt in Malaysia as expounded by the High Court in The Ritz Hotel, Casino Ltd & Anor v Dato Seri Osu Haji Sukam [2005] 6 MLJ 760. Hence, it was argued that all the earlier decisions by the High Courts which held that gambling debt is not against the public policy in Malaysia were made per incuriam and have been overruled by Dato’ Ting’s case.

Further, it was submitted that s 5(1)(a)(v) of the REJA 1958 mandatorily requires the Registering Court to set aside the registered judgment if its enforcement is contrary to public policy in Malaysia.

The JC contended that the 2nd Setting Aside Application should be dismissed on the following grounds:

the registration and enforcement of the Singapore Judgments is not against the public policy of Malaysia;

the 2nd Setting Aside Application is barred by the principle of res judicata and is an abuse of the court process;

the JD is estopped from setting aside a final and regularly obtained order; and

the JD has long exceeded the prescribed period to set aside the registration of the Singapore Judgments.

The JC asserted that the principle of res judicata clearly applies here, given that this is the second time the JD is seeking to set aside the same registration of the Singapore Judgments. The JD is barred from re-litigating issues that have already been dealt with by the courts.

Since 2019, the JD has persistently filed numerous repetitive and vexatious applications, both to challenge the registration of the Singapore Judgments and to oppose the bankruptcy proceedings. These ongoing efforts represent the JD’s calculated and desperate attempt to evade his payment obligations and to deny the JC the fruits of its successful litigation. Analysis and Findings of the Court -

In the recent High Court case of Marina Bay Sands v Khoo Soo Hean [2025] MLJU 2912, it was held that Dato’ Ting’s case can be distinguished in the context of enforcement of foreign judgments as follows: “[59] Secondly, the JD’s heavy reliance on the recent Federal Court case of Dato’ Ting Ching Lee (supra) is misconceived as the same is easily distinguishable from the present facts as seen below: a. The Federal Court case of Dato’ Ting Ching Lee (supra) does not involve the enforcement of a foreign Judgment under REJA 1958. Instead, it concerned a domestic action arising from a foreign gaming contract; b. The casino in the Federal Court case of Dato’ Ting Ching Lee (supra) was located in Cambodia, and it is unclear whether it was licensed. In contrast, the JC herein is a duly licensed casino operator under the Singapore’s Casino Control Act 2006. In this regard, the Malaysian Court have held that Section 26 of the Civil Law Act 1956 and Section 31 of the Contracts Act 1950 do not apply to contracts involving a licensed casino operator; c. In any event, the Federal Court in the case of Dato’ Ting Ching Lee (supra) recognised that gambling activities are permissible upon the issuance of a license by the authorities, where it was enunciated as follows: “[39] In answering the novel question above, first and foremost, we need to understand the purpose of the legislature to enact the above-mentioned provisions visa-vis sections 24 and 31 of the Contracts Act 1950 and section 26 of the Civil Law Act 1956. There is no other but to curb gambling or wagering activities. These activities are only allowable upon the issuance of a license by the authorities. ...”.”.

Furthermore, and as mentioned under the Background Facts, the JD had applied to set aside the Bankruptcy Notice on the ground that the enforcement of the Singapore Judgments is against public policy in Malaysia and this ultimately led to the dismissal of the JD’s motion for leave to appeal to the Federal Court on 10.4.2025.

In that motion, and as in the present applications, the JD relied heavily on Dato’ Ting’s case. In the broad grounds of decision, the Federal Court had distinguished Dato’ Ting’s Case and held that the case does not pertain to a registration of a foreign judgment under the REJA 1958: “KEPUTUSAN: Mahkamah: Thank you for the careful and comprehensive submissions. We are not convinced that the threshold to section 96 has been met because: (a) Being a bankruptcy proceeding, the court ought not to go behind the judgment. The fact that the judgment remains on record would give rise to an anomalous result which is that while the judgment is registered under REJA it cannot be enforced via bankruptcy proceedings. Dato’ Ting’s case does not deal with such a situation at all; (b) Neither did Dato’ Ting’s case touch on Resorts World at Sentosa Pte Ltd v Lim Soo Kok which was upheld by the Court of Appeal and where leave was refused by the Federal Court. That remains good law, as it deals with foreign licensed gambling debts which are sought to be recovered in M’sia. There is no reason to have that matter ventilated again. For those reasons the motion is denied and we award costs of RM30,000.00 to the Respondent subject to allocatur.”.

The Federal Court had accepted the JC’s arguments that Dato’ Ting’s case can be distinguished on its facts from the present case and expressly held that Dato’ Ting’s case does not deal with a situation under the REJA 1958. Therefore, as submitted by the learned counsel for the JC, the position of foreign licensed gambling debts which are sought to be recovered in Malaysia remains good law.

Dato’ Ting’s case offers no guidance to the current case and does not bear any legal or factual similarity to the facts in the instant applications. That case is clearly distinguishable as –

the underlying suit in the instant applications was commenced in Singapore, not Malaysia;

there is a distinction between the original cause of action in Singapore, which arose from a contractual claim governed by Singapore law, and the present enforcement proceedings in Malaysia, which relate solely to the registration of a foreign judgment under the REJA 1958. The issue before this Court is not the underlying contract but the enforcement of valid and binding judgments;

the JD did not appeal against the Singapore Judgments, which were entered after a full trial and hence, they remain valid and enforceable;

the present applications concern registration of foreign judgments under the REJA 1958 and not s 24 and sub-s 31(1) of the CA 1950 and s 26 of the CLA 1956. The said provisions in the CA 1950 and CLA 1956 do not apply because the agreements were governed by Singapore law and there was no civil action by the JC in Malaysia to sue on the gaming debt. The JC exercised the statutory right of reciprocity under the REJA 1958. Once registered, the Singapore Judgments are enforceable as if they were Malaysian judgments. In contrast, Dato’ Ting’s case is not on the REJA 1958. The reasoning in that case cannot be extended to a REJA 1958 context when the Federal Court did not address, consider or apply that statute in any manner whatsoever; and

no reference was made in Dato’ Ting’s case to the case of Resorts World at Sentosa Pte Ltd v Lim Soo Kok [2016] MLJU 700, which deals with foreign licensed gambling debts sought to be recovered in Malaysia. Thus, the legal principle in Lim Soo Kok’s case that “when a gaming transaction is lawful in the foreign country from where the judgment originates, the registration of the foreign judgment is not against the public policy of Malaysia” remains good law.

In the upshot, the foregoing reasons puts paid to the JD’s submission centred on Dato’ Ting’s case. - Public policy under the REJA 1958 and the Principle of

Sub-s 4(2) of the REJA 1958 on the “Application for and effect of registration of judgment” reads as follows: “4.

A person, being a judgment creditor under a judgment to which this Part applies, may apply to the High Court at any time within six years after the date of the judgment, or, where there have been proceedings by way of appeal against the judgment, after the date of the last judgment given in those proceedings, to have the judgment registered in the High Court, and on any such application the court shall, subject to proof of the prescribed matters and to the other provisions of this Act, order the judgment to be registered: Provided that a judgment shall not be registered if at the date of the application –

it has been wholly satisfied; or

it could not be enforced by execution in the country of the original court.

Subject to the provisions of this Act with respect to the setting aside of registration –

a registered judgment shall, for the purposes of execution, be of the same force and effect;

proceedings may be taken on a registered judgment;

the sum for which a judgment is registered shall carry interest; and

the registering court shall have the same control over the execution of a registered judgment; as if the judgment had been a judgment originally given in the registering court and entered on the date of registration: Provided that execution shall not issue on the judgment so long as, under this Part and the rules of court made for the purposes thereof, it is competent for any party to make an application to have the registration of the judgment set aside, or, where such an application is made, until after the application has been finally determined.”.

Under the REJA 1958, the registration courts in Malaysia do not examine or enquire into the merits of the underlying claim when enforcing a foreign judgment. The determination of such merits lies exclusively within the jurisdiction of the foreign court. Once a foreign judgment is registered, it is enforceable as if it is a judgment originally given in the registration court.

The learned counsel for the JC cited the case authorities of The Aspinall Curzon Ltd v Khoo Teng Hock [1991] 2 MLJ 484, Jupiters Ltd (trading as Conrad International Treasury Casino) v Gan Kok Beng & Anor [2007] 7 MLJ 228 and Lim Soo Kok’s case for the proposition that the Malaysian courts have been consistent in holding that in a registration and enforcement of a foreign judgment under the REJA 1958, the enforcement cannot be regarded as against public policy if the judgment is validly and lawfully obtained in the originating country. In the same vein, in a situation where the gaming transaction is lawful in the foreign country from where the judgment originates, the courts have held that the registration of the foreign judgment is not against the public policy of Malaysia.

The learned counsel for the JC further drew the attention of this Court to the recent Court of Appeal case of Motor Insurers’ Bureau of Singapore v P&O Insurance [2025] 6 AMR 385 where it was held that the issue of public policy under s 5(1)(a)(v) of the REJA 1958 is premised on international comity or reciprocity and should be narrower than the scope of operation of public policy under Malaysian domestic law. The Court said, among others, at pp 410 - 411 that: “[39] We are of the following view regarding the application of public policy under s 5(1)(a)(v) of the

our Court of Appeal has decided in Mann Holdings, at paragraph [72], as follows: … The concept of public policy is a narrow and restrictive doctrine; … (Emphasis added.) Premised on Mann Holdings, the court should take a restrictive approach in the application of public policy pursuant to s 5(1)(a)(v) of the REJA (“restrictive approach”). This restrictive approach is understandable because if otherwise, the international comity/reciprocity (two bases of REJA) as embodied in s 3(2) of the REJA, will be undermined, if not rendered nugatory. It is to be borne in mind that by reason of the international comity/reciprocity (two bases of REJA), the courts of reciprocating countries are similarly obliged to enforce judgments of Malaysian courts in the reciprocating countries. Save in three exceptional circumstances, the Court of Appeal is bound by its own previous decisions – please refer to the Federal Court’s judgment delivered by Peh Swee Chin FCJ in Dalip Bhagwan Singh v Public Prosecutor [1997] 4AMR4029 at 4044 to 4045; [1998] 1 MLJ 1 at 12 to 13. Until the Federal Court overrules the restrictive approach as decided by the Court of Appeal in Mann Holdings, from the viewpoint of the doctrine of stare decisis, both the Court of Appeal and High Court are bound by Mann Holdings; … We adopt the judgment in Liao Eng Kiat that the scope of application of public policy to set aside a registered judgment under s 5(1)(a)(v) of the REJA {“public policy [s 5(1)(a)(v) of the REJA]”} should be narrower than the scope of operation of public policy under Malaysian domestic law, e.g., s 24(e) of the CA and s 37(1)(b)(ii) of the AA. This is because unlike the application of public policy in our municipal law, the narrow scope of public policy [s 5(1)(a)(v) of the REJA] is premised on the international comity/reciprocity (two bases of REJA) as provided in s 3(2) of the REJA – please refer to the above paragraph [37]. Consequently, cases on the application of public policy under s 24(e) of the CA, s 37(1)(b)(ii) of the AA and any other written law of Malaysia, should not apply in the context of public policy [s 5(1)(a)(v) of the REJA]. …”.

The JC also relied on the following excerpt from the judgment in Malayan Banking Berhad v Ng Man Heng [2005] 1 MLJ 470 at p 492: “[64] In application for registration of foreign judgment the court must be slow to refuse registration on tenuous grounds as it will lead to our judgments not being accorded reciprocity by the courts of reciprocating countries. This is the rationale behind s 5(1) of REJA, which limits and specifies the grounds on which registration can be challenged. If we begin to widen the scope set out by Parliament in s 5(1) of REJA, which is the very same scope in the legislation of reciprocating countries such as Singapore, then we can expect refusal to register our judgments in foreign courts on tenuous grounds. Even the public policy limb (must be interpreted restrictively because it is ‘a very unruly horse, and once you get astride it you never know where it will carry you. It may lead you from the sound law’ [per Burrough J in Richardson v Mellish [1824J 2 Bing 229, quoted with approval by Eusoff Chin J (as his Lordship then was) in The Aspinall Curzon Ltd v Khoo Teng Hock [1991] 2 MLJ 484. In the interest of comity of nations, the registration of a foreign judgment should not be refused on grounds not provided in s 5(1) of REJA.”.

The High Court in Marina Bay Sands (supra) undertook a detailed examination on whether the enforcement of a Singapore judgment based on a gaming debt is contrary to Malaysian public policy. The Court in refusing to set aside the registration of the Singapore judgment held that the said registration is not contrary to Malaysian public policy: “Issue No.3: Whether the enforcement of the said Singapore Judgment is contrary to the Malaysian public policy? [65] On the issue of public policy, the JD again places heavy reliance on the recent Federal Court decision of Dato’ Ting Ching Lee (supra) where it was enunciated as follows: … [66] The Federal Court in the abovementioned case has also found that any gaming/wagering contract is unenforceable due to public policy and Sections 24 and 31 of the Contract Act 1950. [67] However, it is trite that the public policy limb must be interpreted restrictively and applied only in rare and exceptional cases. [See the Court of Appeal case of Malayan Banking Berhad v Ng Man Heng [2005] 1 MLJ 470]. In addition, a higher standard of public policy is to be applied, given that the general rule is to allow for the enforcement of a foreign Judgment. [See the cases of Aspinall Curzon Ltd v Khoo Teng Hock [1991] 1 LNS 6 and Jan De Nul (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor v Vincent Tan Chee Yioun & Anor [2019] 1 CLJ 1] [68] Reference is also made to the case of Liao Eng Kiat v Burswood Nominees Ltd [2004] 4 SLR(R) 690 where it was held as follows: “...there is a higher standard of public policy in operation when a forum court is faced with a foreign judgment, as opposed to a domestic issue being litigated for the first time in the forum court. Foreign courts appear very reluctant to invoke the expedient judgment, even if their domestic public policy would have precluded enforcement of the underlying claim.” [69] Further, as highlighted earlier, the Court has to bear in mind that the JC here is not suing on the said Credit Agreement in Malaysia but merely enforcing it pursuant to Section 4 of REJA 1958. The validity of the said Credit Agreement and the Singapore Judgment is a matter squarely within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Singapore High Court and not this Court. [See the case of Resorts World at Sentosa Pte Ltd v Lim Soo Kok [2017] 1 CLJ 363] [70] Reference is again also made to the case of Mann Holdings (supra) where the Court of Appeal held as follows: “[74] ... The mechanisms of registration of a foreign judgment is part of the administration of justice of this country... The Singapore judgment is final and conclusive and does not suffer any of the inflictions complained of. It certainly is not a judgment which can be properly ascribed as being contrary to public policy. We do not see, though we must hasten to add that it is not the function of the registering country which Malaysia is, in the facts of this appeal, to examine the merits of the Singapore suit; or even to criticise the Singapore judgment.” [71] Based on the abovementioned case, I am of the considered view that the said Singapore Judgment is conclusive and is not a Judgment which can properly be ascribed as being contrary to Malaysian public policy. This Court will not examine the merits of the Singapore Suit or even criticise the said Singapore Judgment obtained against the JD herein. The Court is hereby bound by the Court of Appeal’s decision of Mann Holdings (supra) and ought to maintain the registration of the said Singapore Judgment. [72] In any event, even if the underlying claim relates to a gaming debt, I find that the amount due and owing to the JC arises from gaming activities lawfully conducted by the JC in Singapore by a licensed casino, governed by the Singapore’s Casino Control Act 2006. [73] As such, Section 26 of the Civil Law Act 1956 and Section 31 of the Contracts Act 1950 could/should not be applied to such contracts entered into by a company licensed under the Common Gaming Houses Act 1953. [See the case of Aspinall Curzon Ltd v Khoo Teng Hock [1991] 1 LNS 6]. [74] Therefore, I am of the considered view that the JD has failed to meet the higher threshold required to set aside the registration of the said Singapore Judgment on the grounds of contravention of the public policy.”.

Another relevant passage which was brought to my attention by the JC was from Stronghold Global Holdings Ltd (In Liquidation) v Lim Chang Huat [2025] MLJU 525 as follows: “[32] Therefore, the fact that Singapore is a reciprocal country under the First Schedule of REJA accords greater merits for this Honourable Court to refuse the setting aside of the registration of the Singapore Judgments. [33] A higher standard of public policy thus is to be applied to examine the JD’s public policy arguments, given that the general rule is to allow for the enforcement of foreign judgment.”

This high standard of public policy approach in respect of enforcement of foreign judgments is also adopted in Singapore where the Court of Appeal in Liao Eng Kiat v Burswood Nominees Ltd [2004] 4 SLR(R) 690 at p 700 said: “… there is a higher standard of public policy in operation when a forum court is faced with a foreign judgment, as opposed to a domestic issue being litigated for the first time in the forum court. Foreign courts appear very reluctant to invoke the expedient judgment, even if their domestic public policy would have precluded enforcement of the underlying claim.”.

Based on the cases as abovementioned, the law on this matter can be summarised as follows:

the public policy ground under s 5(1)(a)(v) of the REJA 1958 is to be applied restrictively and only in rare exceptional cases. In the context of registration of foreign judgment, a higher standard of public policy is to be applied given that the general rule is to allow the enforcement of foreign judgment;

the overarching and prevailing principle in the context of the REJA 1958 is that of international comity and reciprocity. Public policy is construed restrictively to preserve this principle. Domestic public policy concepts do not control the recognition of a registered foreign judgment; and

the public policy ground is not an invitation to relitigate the merits of the foreign judgment or apply local legal standards to a valid foreign decision.

Applying the law to the instant applications, I am of the considered view that to allow the JD to rely on allegations of public policy contraventions would run contrary to the case authorities and undermine the very purpose of the REJA 1958. Public policy under s 5(1)(a)(v) of the REJA 1958 must be applied narrowly and this is not a case that meets the high threshold required to invoke the public policy exception. - Whether the decisions in the 1st Setting Aside Application were made per incuriam

The JC cited the Federal Court case of Goh Leong Yong v Asp Khairul Fairoz bin Rodzuan & Ors [2021] MLJU 1326 on the meaning of “per incuriam”: “[21] Thus, a decision that is rendered per incuriam is a decision that fails to apply a relevant statutory provision or ignores a binding precedent. Going by the definition of “per incuriam” given in Morelle Ltd and Huddersfield Police Authority, it is perplexing how it can be said that Maria Chin and Rovin Joty were decided per incuriam. In the first place, this court in the two cases was not strictly bound by the doctrine of stare decisis such that it must abide by the decisions in Semenyih Jaya, Indira Gandhi and Alma Nudo. Secondly, counsel has not shown which “inconsistent statutory provision” this court in Maria Chin and Rovin Joty had forgotten or was ignorant of.”.

The JD argued, with reference to the case of Arulpragasan a/l Sandaraju v Public Prosecutor [1997] 1 MLJ 1, that the earlier decisions in the 1st Setting Aside Application were made per incuriam. However, I am unable to accept the JD’s contention.

The JD cannot simply label the earlier decisions as per incuriam just because they were not decided in his favour. The JD has failed to show how the earlier decisions in the 1st Setting Aside Application ignores a binding precedent or failed to consider any statutory provisions as required to fall within the definition of per incuriam.

On the contrary, all levels of the superior courts had considered the relevant statutory provisions involving public policy and the REJA 1958 and came to the same conclusion that the registration of the Singapore Judgments is not against public policy. - Prayer for extension of time to file the application to set aside the registration of the Singapore Judgments

O. 67, r. 5 of the Rules of Court 2012 (‘RC 2012’) reads as follows: “Order for registration (O. 67, r. 5)

…

Every such order shall state the period within which an application may be made to set aside the registration and shall contain a notification that execution on the judgment will not issue until after the expiration of that period. …”.

The relevant portion of the Registration Order states that: “… DAN AKHIRNYA DIPERINTAHKAN bahawa Lee Fook Kheun adalah bebas memohon untuk mengetepikan pendaftaran tersebut dalam tempoh empat belas (14) hari selepas penyampaian Notis ke atas beliau mengenai pendaftaran itu menurut Aturan 67 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 …”.

The Registration Order clearly stipulates the prescribed period of 14 days from the date of service of the Notice of Registration to apply to set aside the registration of the Singapore Judgments (‘Prescribed Period’).

The JD does not deny that the 14 days period has lapsed, thereby prayer (3) for an extension of time was included in encls. 32 and 35.

It is indisputable that the JD has long exceeded the Prescribed Period. Almost seven years have passed since the Registration Order was obtained and the JD is now attempting to set aside the registration for the second time.

Although the Court has discretion to extend time, this discretion must be exercised judiciously. The burden is on the JD to provide a credible and satisfactory explanation for the delay. The Court of Appeal in Abdul Latif bin Mohamed Ibrahim v International Factors Leasing Pte Ltd [2001] 2 MLJ 369 at pp 374 - 376 held, among others, that: “… It is a cardinal principle of law that when a litigant seeks the intervention of the court in a matter that affects his rights, he must do so timeously. The maxim vigilantibus, non dormientibus, jura subveniunt , though having its origins in the Court of Chancery, is of universal application. Even in cases where a right is exercisable ex debito justitiae, a court may refuse relief to an indolent litigant. In all cases in which delay in approaching the court is in issue, the burden is upon the litigant who has delayed to render a satisfactory explanation for it…And in a matter which involves the exercise of discretion, it is for the judge in whom the law primarily vests the discretion. The burden therefore falls on the appellant to render a satisfactory explanation or to lay sufficient material for the court to consider the delay in making the application for an extension of time. … … We must caution the litigants of the importance and need to comply with the Rules of Court and we quote what Lord Guest said in Ratnam v Cumarasamy & Anor [1965] 31 MLJ 228 at p 229: The Rules of Court must prima facie be obeyed, and in order to justify a court in extending the time during which some step in procedure requires to be taken there must be some material upon which the court can exercise its discretion. If the law were otherwise, a party in breach would have an unqualified right to an extension of time which would defeat the purpose of the rules which is to provide a time table for the conduct of litigation.” … We do not see the need for the learned judge to consider the merits of the application once he ruled that the application for the extension of time was rightly refused by the SAR. Hence, we do not propose to consider the merits of the application in view of our decision on the extension of time. We agree with the learned judge in RHB-Cathay Securities Pte Ltd v Lim Bee Keong [1999] 5 MLJ 641 that once the prayer for an extension of time was dismissed, the other application for setting aside the foreign judgment did not arise.”.

Returning to the present applications, and following from the previous discussion on the issues arising and my findings on the same, there is simply no basis for me to allow the JD’s prayer for an extension of time. - The JD’s reliance on Stone World Sdn Bhd v Engareh (M) Sdn

For the sake of completeness, I will briefly address the JD’s submission with respect to the Federal Court decision in Stone World’s case (supra).

The JD cited the following passage from the said decision to support the submission that, where a previous order was made in breach of a statute, this Court has jurisdiction to grant the declarations as sought by the JD in a collateral proceeding without the need of filing a fresh suit: “[78] It is important to emphasise that this appeal does not engage the inherent jurisdiction of the court to set aside a judgment on the grounds of illegality, or because it is null and void for the contravention of a statute, or by reason of a breach of the rules of natural justice, as expounded by the landmark cases of Badiaddin and Serac Asia Sdn Bhd v Sepakat Insurance Brokers Sdn Bhd [2013] 5 MLJ 1; [2013] 6 CLJ 673 (‘Serac’). [79] The mere assertion of an alleged lack of jurisdiction without more cannot, and does not generally, form the basis for the ‘impeachment’ of a consequential order that is binding between the parties, as is the case here. The plea of a lack of jurisdiction should be premised on substantial grounds, evidential or legal, which would justify the court exercising this rare and exceptional jurisdiction. Case law has supported the exercise of such inherent jurisdiction in the extraordinary occurrences of:

illegality;

fraud;

contravention of statute; and

breach of the rules of natural justice.”.

The JD asserted that the Federal Court had affirmed that there is an exceptional and inherent jurisdiction of the Court to set aside a judgment in its entirety in extraordinary occurrences of illegality or in contravention of statute.

The short and befitting answer to the JD’s submissions is that Stone World’s case is irrelevant to the present applications as there is no illegality or contravention of statute.

Based on the abovesaid considerations, the 2nd Setting Aside Application was bound to fail. The JD has exhausted all avenues of appeal in relation to the 1st Setting Aside Application and the matter is res judicata.

The JD is estopped from setting aside a final and regularly obtained order. The JD’s persistence in challenging the Singapore Judgments is an abuse of the court process.

The applications in encl. 35 of O.S. 92 and encl. 32 of O.S. 93 are plainly without merit and are accordingly dismissed with costs of RM10,000.00 for each application, subject to allocatur. DATED: 15.6.2026 (ALIZA SULAIMAN) JUDGE HIGH COURT IN MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR (BKK1) Solicitors for the Judgment Debtor: Muhammad Farhan Bin Sapian Sauri (Leong Cheok Keng and Jason Tiew Boon Kean with him) Messrs. Leong & Tan Solicitors for the Judgment Creditor: Aufa Binti Radzi (Natasha Neena Yau with her)