RHB TRUSTEES BERHAD Pemegang Amanah Kepada Linggiu Valley Orang Asli (Jakuns) Trust v TETUAN ROSLEY ZECHARIAH (Di Saman sebagai Firma) (WA-17D-30-12/2020)

MESSRS. ROSLEY ZECHARIAH ADVOCATES & SOLICITORS (Sued as a Firm)

MESSRS. ISHARIDAH, HO, CHONG & MENON ADVOCATES & SOLICITORS (Sued as a Firm) ... DEFENDANTS

This was an application by the Plaintiff for, among others, an order that the invoices rendered by the Defendants in respect of legal services provided to be referred to the Taxing Officer to be taxed.

The Originating Summons (‘O.S.’, encl. 1) had been struck out by the High Court on 22.12.2021 pursuant to the applications made by the 1st Defendant (‘D1’) and the 2nd Defendant (‘D2’) in encls. 5 and 7, respectively.

On 4.7.2024, the Court of Appeal in a unanimous decision, among others, allowed the Plaintiff’s appeal against the said decision and ordered that the Order of the High Court be set aside and the matter be remitted back to this Court to determine the relevant questions of law (‘CA Decision’), which shall be elaborated in the ensuing part of this judgment.

After having considered the cause papers and the oral and written submissions of the parties, I had, on 30.1.2026, dismissed the Plaintiff’s application.

These are my full grounds for purposes of the Plaintiff’s appeal against my decision.

There was a long and chequered history to the relationship between the parties, especially the Plaintiff and D1.

The litigation surrounding matters related to the Linggiu Valley Orang Asli has been captured in several judgments, among others, Saling bin Lau Bee Chiang dan lain-lain lwn Kanawagi a/l Seperumaniam dan lain-lain [2012] 10 MLJ 683 (HC), Linggiu Valley Orang Asli (Jakuns) Trust lwn. Virgin Properties Sdn Bhd & Yang lain dan Kes lain [2017] CLJU 2195 (HC) and Tetuan Khana & Co (sued as a firm) v Saling bin Lau Bee Chiang & Ors and Other Appeals [2019] 3 MLJ 189 (CA).

The Linggiu Valley Orang Asli (Jakuns) Trust (‘Trust’) was created pursuant to the Order made by the Johor Bahru High Court (‘JBHC’) dated 5.6.2000 in O.S. No. 24-828-1994 where a sum of RM26.5 million was to be paid as compensation to 52 Orang Asli living at Kampung Sayong Pinang, Kampung Pasir Assam (Pasir Intan) and Kampung Semangar Dalam in the Sungai Linggui catchment area for deprivation of their customary land. The judgment sum consisting of the compensation sum and interest thereon amounted to RM38,544,111.92.

On 25.3.2009, the beneficiaries of the Trust commenced another action at the JBHC i.e. Suit No. MT1-22-228-2009 (‘JB Suit 228’) against the previous Trustees for, among others, breaches of the Trust and mismanagement and misappropriation of the Trust monies.

10.

The R&M appointed D1 as their solicitors. D1 appointed D2 as their counsel.

Subsequently, R&M commenced Civil Suit No. 22NCC-1512- 09/2011 at the Kuala Lumpur High Court (‘KL Suit 1512’) against various parties, including the Trustees, for, among others, mismanagement and misappropriation of the Trust funds.

The JB Suit 228 and KL Suit 1512 were heard together at the JBHC. A new suit number was assigned to the KL Suit 1512 i.e. JBHC Suit No. 23NCvC-106-07/2012 (‘JB Suit 106’).

On 22.12.2016, the JBHC gave judgment in favour of the Orang Asli in JB Suit 228 and JB Suit 106.

Dissatisfied with the decision of the JBHC, the defendants in JB Suit 228 and JB Suit 106 appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals on liability but varied the relief in part. Based on the Order made by the Court of Appeal on 17.1.2019, HSBC Trustee was appointed as the Trustee of the Trust replacing R&M and the appointment of HSBS Trustee was to be enforced within two months from the date of the Order. In the event HSBC Trustee declines the appointment, the Orang Asli were at liberty to apply to the JBHC for an alternative Trustee to be appointed. Further, the R&M shall, within three months from the date of the Order, hand over all matters to HSBC Trustee or to the alternative Trustee.

HSBC Trustee declined the appointment and the Plaintiff was approached as an alternative Trustee for the Trust. The Plaintiff accepted the appointment vide a letter dated 20.2.2019.

An application was filed in the JB Suit 228 for an Order that the Plaintiff be appointed as Trustee. This application was allowed on 10.3.2019.

As the solicitors and counsel for the Trust, the Defendants had conducted matters in the High Court, Court of Appeal and Federal Court where at the apex court, it was in relation to six Motions for Leave to Appeal (‘Six Motions’).

On 11.4.2019, the Plaintiff wrote to D1 referring to the Order dated 10.3.2019 wherein the Plaintiff’s appointment as Trustee was effective from 16.3.2019. The Plaintiff also stated the following: “We hereby appoint your Firm to undertake and to continue acting in the matters relating to the Linggiu Valley Orang Asli (Jakuns) Trust [“the Trust”] as mentioned above including attending to all recovery processes on the Judgment dated 22.12.2016 obtained in the 106 Suit (ie item 1 above] and confirmed by the 22.1.2019 Judgment in the 5 Appeals [ie items 2 to 6 above] arising from the 106 Suit and in opposing the 6 Motions for leave to the Federal Court [ ie items 8 to 13 above]. We also appoint your Firm to render advisory and other legal services as may be required from time to time on the abovementioned matters and with respect to the Trust. In that context, kindly let us have your fee quote on the respective services to be rendered as mentioned above.”.

D1 replied by e-mail on 5.12.2019 explaining the Six Motions and that – “The 6 Motions are fixed for hearing on 10/12/2019 at the Federal Court, Putrajaya and you can attend if you wish. The proceedings will commence at 9am. I, Cheryl and Prakash Menon will be attending for the Trust to oppose the 6 Motions. … Please note that in the event the Federal Court allows the postponement, we will be issuing charges by way of a refresher fee for the day for ourselves and for Mr Menon. In the event all the Motions proceed, please note that our charges will be approximately in the region of RM750,000/- excluding expenses and service tax. Please note that we are holding a sum of RM250,000/- as security for costs paid by the Applicants in Items 1-5, the sum of RM30,000/- paid by VPSB by way of the lien and the sum of RM278,000/- with a view to set off and if the Court grants us the costs and order for set off, these sums will defray the fees and expenses that is chargeable to the Trust. Furthermore we hope that the Liquidator will be able to retrieve the Judgment sums and the several other costs payable by VPSB for the benefit of the Trust. From our calculation and apart from the Judgment sum, VPSB owes the Trust costs as per the List attached.”.

The hearing at the Federal Court did not proceed on 10.12.2019. A meeting was held between the Plaintiff and D1 on 3.1.2020 to discuss the legal fees. This resulted in the Plaintiff’s letter dated 10.2.2020 and titled “TERMINATION OF SERVICE PROVIDED BY MESSRS ROSLEY ZECHARIAH (“the Firm)” as follows: “... We hereby terminate your services with immediate effect. The reason being as informed in the meeting was due to the exorbitant legal fee charged by your Firm. In view thereof, kindly transfer/handover all documents related to the Linggiu Valley Orang Asli (Jakuns) Trust (“the Trust”) together with any security for costs held in your client’s account to the new solicitor appointed, Messrs Kesavan. Kindly provide us with final invoice for outstanding legal fee for our consideration and further action.”.

D1 wrote a 13-paged reply on 13.2.2020 to record, among others, that – “… While we are in receipt of your letter terminating our services for “exorbitant legal fees charged”, we regret the said decision and are taken aback, as the matter of fees was always open to negotiation. Furthermore, it is not prudent to change legal representation at this final stage which will bring this matter to a final conclusion soon and for the following reasons as will be set out below. … Please note that the Trust must carefully consider whether to hand over the conduct of the above matters to new lawyers at this late stage who have no personal knowledge of this lengthy litigation [covering more than 11 years], despite the fact that such services may be rendered on a pro bono basis and despite the fact that some portion of the beneficiaries may be raising issue that such services should be rendered pro bono. Due to the urgency of the upcoming matters with particular reference to the FC Motions fixed on 26/2/2020, we would be obliged if an urgent meeting could be fixed for us to meet and to resolve all outstanding issues as the Trust must give careful consideration for the same. …”.

In the letter dated 13.2.2020, D1 had attached most of the Invoices, the Quotation and The Job Activity [Detail] which can be seen in ANNEXURE A to the O.S.

The Plaintiff wrote to D1 on 17.2.2020 to say – “…

We take note of the contents of your said letter therein and we re-iterate that the fees charged as stated in the invoices enclosed therein are exorbitant.

We also note that the claim for disbursements are without any supporting documents. Please forward the same to us.

As you are aware, that the services of the new solicitors appointed to take over conduct of the said matters and the Counsel to oppose the Motion for Leave at the Federal Court are rendered on a pro bono basis.

You will not doubt agree with us that it is our utmost and paramount duty to protect the interest of the Trust and in particular the Trust monies.

We agree with you that as Trustee we have a legal duty and obligation to bring all the litigation matters to a final conclusion but not at the expense of the Trust monies (compensation) being depleted.

We have sought legal advice and are now instructed to file an application in Court to tax your bills and also to file an application in Court to assess the monies withdrawn by the Receiver & Manager during his tenure where you were the solicitors for the Receiver & Manager at the material time.

We undertake to pay your bills after having the same taxed by the Court.

In the meantime, please release all the documents, cause papers and the security deposits currently held by you to Messrs. Kesavan within (24) hours from the date hereof.

In this regard we have instructed our newly appointed solicitors Messrs. Kesavan to contact you.

In the meantime, all our rights are hereby reserved.”.

D1 then sent a seven-paged response on 18.2.2020, stating among others, the following: “…

Prior to your letter dated 10/2/2020, • there had been an agreement on our fee quote dated 5/12/2019 for the 6 Federal Court Motions and we attended for the hearing of the same on 10/12/2019 without any protest from yourselves. • our 3 Invoice Nos. 01.001.20 dated 3/1/2020 and 02.001.20 and 02.002.20 both dated 4/2/2020 had been sent and there was no request for taxation. • your letter dated 10/2/2020 stated that our legal fees would be resolved and thereafter we subsequently prepared the Invoice Nos.

02.009.20,

02.010.20,

02.011.20,

02.012.20,

02.013.20,

02.014.20,

02.015.20,

02.016.20,

02.017.20 and 02.018.20, for work done and disbursements incurred and forwarded the same together with the Invoice from M/S Isharidah Ho Chong & Menon dated 13/2/2020 for your settlement. We state therefore that you cannot have ‘reiterated’ the fees charged as being ‘exorbitant’ in light of the above. …

Hand over of cause papers We are unable to hand over any cause papers within the time stipulated by you due to the following factors: i. With respect to the cause papers for the 6 Federal Court Motions these had been sent to yourselves for your perusal on condition and your agreement that they be sent back to us. They remain in your custody and under your responsibility to date and we are unable to itemise nor collate the documents for a proper hand over. Please return the same within 24 hours to us for our further action as per our prior verbal and written requests and reminders. Furthermore, despite your agreement on the said fees (for which we reserve our rights) you now require the Bill to be taxed and in this event we will need the entire set of documents sent back for this purpose. You will no doubt also appreciate the lien that we have on such documents until our fees are paid. ii. With respect to the following matters and the respective Invoices: • Enclosures 166 and 168 pending in the JB High Court • Court of Appeal Civil Appeal No: W- 02(IM) (NCC)-1656-09/2019 • Court of Appeal Civil Appeal No: W- 02(IM) (NCC)(A)-2212-11/2019 • KL High Court Originating Summons No: WA-24NCVC-1076-05/2019 • Shah Alam High Court BN No: BA- 29NCC-3184-05/2019 • Shah Alam High Court BN No: BA- 29NCC-3185-05/2019 • Kuala Lumpur High Court BN No: WA- 29NCC-1648-05/2019 as you have stated you wish our Bills to be taxed, we need to retain the said files for that purpose. You will no doubt appreciate the lien that we have on such documents until our fees are paid. However we can make copies of the entire files for hand over subject to your undertaking and agreement to pay all photostat charges incurred on the hand over, as the documents are voluminous. We await your confirmation of this and in the meantime we will endeavour to defer the said matters coming up for hearing. …

The Taxation As you have indicated in your letter dated 17/2/2020 that you will be ‘applying’ to tax the bills, please confirm your understanding of this to us as time periods are involved to undertake this. …”.

This was followed with D1’s letter to Messrs. Kesavan, the Plaintiff’s new solicitors, dated 19.2.2020 wherein D1 stated, among others, that: “… You are to please revert on an urgent basis on the matters as stated in our letter namely in Items 5, 6 and 7 before you proceed to notify the relevant Court's and before we revert with our agreement and attend to a proper and orderly hand over of all matters. For the record the entire set of the cause papers for the 6 Federal Court Motions remain in the custody of the Trust and were not returned to us. We require the entire set to be copied and sent to us to attend to the taxation as requested by the Trust.”.

By way of the letter dated 6.5.2020 to D1, Messrs. Kesavan had attached a cheque for the sum of RM18,700.99 being payment for four Invoices.

On 5.10.2020, D1 issued a “7 day legal notice” to Messrs. Kesavan for the Plaintiff to settle the following amounts, failing which D1 will proceed with further legal action to recover the same:

RM418,700.00 for the Invoices dated between 3.1.2020 to 12.2.2020 which were delivered to the Trust;

RM159,212.00 for the Invoice dated 13.2.2020 from D2 and delivered to the Trust; and

RM3,547.82 for the Invoices dated between 9.3.2020 to 13.3.2020 which were delivered to Messrs. Kesavan.

Messrs. Kesavan replied on 14.10.2020 that: “… Our client is surprised with your demand for our client to pay your bills/invoices as highlighted in paragraph A and B of your aforesaid letter within seven (7) days despite parties having consented to your bills/invoices to be taxed. You will also note that you have retained the relevant cause papers documents subject to lien. As such, kindly proceed to tax the bills before the High Court Registrar. In respect of the disbursement for the photocopy charges under paragraph C, we will issue a cheque in the amount of RM 3, 547.82 soonest. …”.

On 19.11.2020, D1 filed Civil Suit No. B52NCvC-434-11/2020 at the Kuala Lumpur Sessions Court against the Plaintiff for non-payment of 10 bills which were sent to the Plaintiff between 3.1.2020 and 17.2.2020 for work rendered by D1 (‘KLSC Suit 434’).

Shortly thereafter, i.e. on 3.12.2020, the Plaintiff filed the O.S. seeking, among others, for the following orders:

That all the bills delivered/ served to the Plaintiff and/ or its solicitors by the Defendants be referred to the Taxing Officer to be taxed (annexed as ANNEXURE A are the bills amounting to RM600,160.81);

That the Taxing Officer taxes the bills and certifies ascertain the amount that has to be paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendants pursuant to the Legal Profession Act 1976 [Act 166] (‘LPA 1976’);

That the Defendants give an account of all sums of money received by the Defendants from or on account of the Plaintiff and refund all sums (if any) in excess of the sums due to the Defendants subsequent to such taxation;

That no action be commenced or prosecuted by the Defendants to recover the amounts stated in their bills pending the disposal of the instant action;

That upon payment by the Plaintiff of what (if anything) may be due to the defendants after taxation, the Defendants do deliver up to the Plaintiff or as the Court may direct, all deeds, books, papers and writings and documents in the Defendants possession, custody or power belonging to the

That in the event this action is found to have been filed beyond the time frame permitted under the Legal Profession Act 1976 to seek taxation, then an extension of time be granted to file and commence the action and the action be deemed to have been filed within time.

On 17.12.2020, D1 filed the application to strike out the O.S. (encl. 5) while D2 filed a similar application on 4.1.2021 (encl. 7). The hearing for encls. 5 and 7 was held on 30.9.2021. On 22.12.2021, the High Court allowed both applications (see RHB Trustees Berhad v. Rosleyzechariah Peguambela & Peguamcara & Anor [2022] CLJU 2906). The Plaintiff filed an appeal on 3.1.2022.

Meanwhile KLSC Suit 434 proceeded to trial and, on 27.12.2021, judgment was entered in favour of D1. The Plaintiff appealed against the decision of the Sessions Court Judge. On 26.4.2022, the High Court allowed the Plaintiff’s appeal and the judgment of the Sessions Court was set aside and a retrial was ordered.

Despite D1’s applications for stay of the decision of the High Court, the second trial took place at the Sessions Cout in August

On 29.9.2022, the Sessions Court allowed D1’s claim primarily on the ground that the 6-month period to tax the bills had expired under s 126 of the LPA 1976.

The Plaintiff appealed to the High Court where the learned Judicial Commissioner dismissed the appeal on 19.6.2023 (see RHB Trustees Berhad (Pemegang Amanah Kepada Linggiu Valley Orang Asli (Jakuns) Trust) [2023] MLJU 1491). The Plaintiff then appealed to the Court of Appeal.

Hence, there were three appeals at the Court of Appeal, namely W-02(IM)-12-01/2022 and W-02(IM)-13-01/2022 (‘Appeals 12 and 13’), which were the Plaintiff’s appeal against the decision dated 22.12.2021, and W-04(NCVC)(W)-266-07/2023 (‘Appeal 266), which was in relation to the decision dated 19.6.2023.

As mentioned at the outset, on 4.7.2024, the Court of Appeal delivered the CA Decision. The relevant excerpt from the broad grounds of judgment by the Court is re-produced below: “Appeals 12 and 13 – on striking out [20] … We note that in the OS action, RHB sought, inter alia, a prayer for an extension of time to file the action. However, it is unclear which provision RHB had relied on to file the OS action to petition for a court order for the respondents’ bills to be taxed. In the intitulement, it mentioned, inter alia, ss. 121 and 126 of the LPA. Both the sections allow the party chargeable with the solicitor’s bill to petition for an order of the court for the bill to be taxed, and which section to apply depends on the circumstances of the case. Further, the sections impose a time frame when a party could rely on them. [21] In essence, the appellant’s counsel submitted that the respondents did not provide the appellant with a detailed bill of costs in order to trigger the operation of the time frame as stated in s. 126 of the LPA. The appellant’s counsel has submitted that “bill of costs” in s. 126(1) means a detailed items bill so to trigger the time frame of 6 months to petition for the bill to be taxed. The appellant’s counsel submitted that the bills in question are not detailed items bills. [22] The appellant’s counsel further submitted that corollary to this, the Sessions Court action commenced by the Tetuan Rosley was premature as the gross sum bills issued by the 1st respondent have no effect under the provision of s. 121(1)(a) of the LPA. [23] The appellant’s counsel submitted that in the alternative s. 121(1)(b) of the LPA ought to apply and that the OS action was therefore filed within time. The Sessions Court action was filed on 19.11.2020 and the OS action was filed on 3.12.2020 which was mere 14 days after the filing of the Sessions Court action. [24] Based on the appellant’s counsel’s submission, it was incumbent upon the High Court to examine whether the respondents’ bills of costs are detailed items bills or gross sum bills. This is important because in order to rely on s. 121(1)(b), the appellant must satisfy the court that the respondents’ bills of costs are gross sum bills. As such, this issue alone is sufficient to raise a question fit to be tried by the judge to be determined in the full hearing of Enclosure 1 in the OS action. [25] The above issue, unfortunately, was not brought to the attention of the learned HCJ. If the learned HCJ had considered the issue, he could have concluded not to strike out the OS action. [26] In relation to the respondents’ submission that the appeals have become academic because the bills in question have become final and absolute with the decisions of the Sessions Court and the High Court (in Appeal 266), we are of the considered view that this argument is misconceived because the Sessions Court and High Court decisions mainly depend on the question whether the bills in question could be taxed or otherwise under s. 121(1)(b) of the LPA. In the event Appeals 12 and 13 are allowed by this Court, then the question whether the bills could be taxed under s. 121(1)(b) would become a live issue. [27] The striking out applications in the OS action were allowed by the High Court before the Sessions Court gave its judgment. If the striking out applications were not successful, perhaps the Sessions Court judge would not have made its decision until after the final disposal of the OS action. [28] The respondents’ counsel submitted that the appellant’s submission on s. 121(1)(b) in the Court of Appeal was not raised in the OS action, and therefore, the appellant could not now raise it before this Court. This Court is of the considered view that the appellant should not be precluded from raising its submission on the application of s. 121(1)(b) before us for consideration because we find the issue raised is a valid question of law. Further, the learned HCJ (Justice Ahmad Kamal) did not consider the nature of the bills in question as to whether they are detailed items bills or gross sum bills. If the learned HCJ had considered this question, he would have considered the application of s.121(1)(b), and would have concluded that there was a question fit to be tried or to be decided by the court. [29] Specifically with regard to Appeal 13, counsel for Tetuan Isharidah relied on s. 121(2) which states that s.121(1) shall not apply to fees paid to an advocate and solicitor who is briefed as a senior counsel, therefore, its bill is not subject to be taxed. The learned HCJ (Justice Ahmad Kamal) relied on the High Court case Amat Loyut & Ors v Ng Eng Kiat & Ors [2014] 1 CLJ 901 which stated that “those who practice law are both advocates and solicitors”, and “it is misconception to say that lawyers in Malaysia are either advocates or solicitors but not both”. Further, the learned HCJ found that Tetuan Isharidah’s bill of costs was issued and addressed to the appellant, but sent through Tetuan Rosley to the appellant. Based on this reasoning, the learned HCJ found the argument by the counsel for Tetuan Isharidah that s.121(1) does not apply to its bill of costs was “unsustainable and misconceived.” [30] The lawyer concerned in Amat Loyut argued that he could not be personally liable for the costs because he was merely acting as a counsel in the case for the plaintiffs. The lawyer concerned attempted to distinguish the roles played by a solicitor and a counsel, and submitted that O.59 r. 6 of the ROC only applies to a solicitor, and not to a counsel. The learned HCJ (as he then was) cited and relied on the definition of “advocate and solicitor” in s. 3 of the LPA and concluded that there is no division in the legal profession between an advocate and solicitor in Malaysia, therefore, to assert that the word “solicitor” in O.59 r.6 does not apply to a counsel was a fallacy. It is in this context that the learned HCJ in Amat Loyut found that a counsel could not detach his legal responsibility from a solicitor. [31] In our present case, the issue is not about whether counsel from Tetuan Isharidah should be personally liable for costs under O. 59 r.6 of the ROC. The issue before the High Court in the OS action was whether s. 121(2) of the LPA applies to a counsel’s bill of costs, particularly a bill of costs of a “senior counsel”. [32] The LPA does not define the word “counsel” nor the words “senior counsel”. However, it is obvious that a counsel appearing before a court for a litigant is an advocate and solicitor of either the High Court of Malaya or the High Court of Sabah and Sarawak. The learned HCJ (Justice Ahmad Kamal) held that the fact that Tetuan Isharidah acted as counsel would not make a difference because a counsel is an advocate and solicitor, relying on the legal principle in Amat Loyut, and therefore, the learned HCJ concluded that the argument that s. 121(2) was applicable was “untenable and misconceived”. [33] We find the learned HCJ’s reasoning to be incoherent in that even if a counsel, or a senior counsel, is no different from an advocate and solicitor, then the learned HCJ should have considered the applicability of s. 121(1) and 121(2) of the LPA. This is because s. 121(2) states clearly that subsection (1) “shall not apply to fees paid to an advocate and solicitor who is briefed as a senior counsel”. When an advocate and solicitor is appointed as a senior counsel, then his bill of costs would not be subject to the application of s. 121(1). This legal proposition was not properly considered by the learned HCJ. Why s. 121(1) and (2) could not apply in the instant case was not clearly explained in the GOJ. [34] We find there are questions fit to be tried in Appeal 13, particularly the interpretation and applicability of s. 121(2) of the LPA. We accept the fact that a counsel is an advocate and solicitor. However, a distinction must be drawn on the appointment of an advocate and solicitor as a “senior counsel”. The question when an advocate and solicitor could be termed as “a senior counsel” is also a question fit to be tried and to be ventilated in the OS action. [35] It is trite law that so long as the statement of claim discloses some cause of action or raises some questions fit to be tried or decided by the judge, then a striking out application should not be allowed. We find that the learned HCJ should not have struck out the OS action without first determining the question whether the bills of cost in question are detailed items bills or gross sum bills. Further, it was also incumbent upon the learned HCJ to consider whether s. 121(1)(b) could be applicable if he makes a finding that the bills of cost in question are indeed gross sum bills. In addition, the learned HCJ did not determine whether the term “bill of costs” in s. 126 refers to only a detailed items bill. These questions are sufficient to be fit to be tried or decided by the judge in the OS action. Appeal 266 [36] With regard to Appeal 266, in view of our findings in Appeals 12 and 13, the decisions of the Sessions Court and High Court ought to be set aside because whether the respondents’ bills in question could be challenged under s. 121(1)(b) is still a live issue vis-à- vis whether the bills of cost in question are gross sum bills and liable to be taxed, and whether s.121(2) could exclude Tetuan Isharidah’s bill of costs to be liable to be taxed. Therefore, the respondents’ bills have yet to become final and absolute. Conclusion [37] For the reasons as stated above, and among others, this Court, in a unanimous decision, allows Appeals 12 and 13, and orders that the order of the High Court in the OS action dated 22.12.2021 be set aside, and the matter be remitted back to the High Court to determine the relevant questions of law. [38] Further, consequential to the decisions in Appeals 12 and 13, this Court allows Appeal 266 and orders that the order of the High Court dated 19.6.2023 be set aside, and that the Sessions Court suit No. WA-B52NCVC-434-11/2020 be revived and stayed pending final disposal of the OS action. …”.

The relevant provisions in the LPA 1976 for present purposes are quoted below for ease of reference. “Where remuneration of advocate and solicitor not subject of agreement

(1) Where the remuneration of an advocate and solicitor in respect of contentious business done by him is not the subject of an agreement made pursuant to section 116, the solicitor’s bill of costs may at the option of the advocate and solicitor either contain detailed items or be for a gross sum: Provided that –

at any time before service upon him of a writ or other originating process for the recovery of costs included in a gross sum bill and before the expiration of three months from the date of the delivery to him of the bill, the party chargeable therewith may require the advocate and solicitor to deliver to him in lieu of the cost a bill containing detailed items, and the gross sum bill shall thereupon be of no effect;

where an action is commenced on a gross sum bill, the Court shall, if so requested by the party chargeable therewith before the expiration of one month from the service on that party of the writ or other originating process, order that the bill shall be taxed;

if a gross sum bill is referred to taxation, whether under this section or otherwise, nothing in this section shall prejudice any rules of court with respect to taxation and the advocate and solicitor shall furnish the taxing officer with such details of any of the costs covered by the bill as the taxing officer may require.

Subsection (1) shall not apply to fees paid to an advocate and solicitor who is briefed as a senior counsel. … No advocate and solicitor to sue for costs until delivery of bill of cost

(1) Except as authorized by this Act, no advocate and solicitor shall without the leave of the court commence or maintain any action for the recovery of any costs due for any business done by him until the expiration of one month after he has delivered to the party to be charged therewith, or sent by post to, or left with him at, his office or place of business, dwelling house or last known place of abode, a bill of costs, which bill shall be signed either by the advocate and solicitor, or in the case of a partnership, by any of the partners, either with his own name or with the name or style of the partnership, or by another advocate and solicitor employed by the first-named advocate and solicitor or the partnership, or be enclosed in or accompanied by a letter, signed in the like manner, referring to the bill.

Where a bill is proved to have been delivered in compliance with subsection (1) it shall not be necessary in the first instance for the advocate and solicitor to prove the contents of the bill and it shall be presumed until the contrary is shown to be a bill bona fide complying with this Act. … An order for taxation of costs to be made within 6 months of delivery of bill of costs

(1) An order for the taxation of a bill of costs delivered by any advocate and solicitor may be obtained by a petition as a matter of course by the party chargeable therewith, or by any person liable to pay the cost either to the party chargeable or to the advocate and solicitor, at any time within six months from the delivery of the bill, or, by the advocate and solicitor after the expiration of one calendar month, and within a year from, the delivery.

The order shall contain such directions and conditions as the court thinks proper, and any party aggrieved by any order of Court may apply by summons in chambers that the same may be amended or varied or set aside.

In any case where an advocate and solicitor and his client consent to taxation of a solicitor’s bill the Registrar may proceed to tax the bill notwithstanding that there is no order therefor. … Order for taxation of advocate and solicitor’s bill on notice given

(1) After the expiration of six months from the delivery of a bill of costs, or after payment of the bill of costs, no order shall be made for taxation of a solicitor’s bill of costs, except upon notice to the advocates and solicitors and under special circumstances to be proved to the satisfaction of the Court.

No such order for taxation shall in any event be made after the expiry of one year from the delivery of the bill of costs. … Bill of costs to follow Rules of Court

Bills of costs for taxation as between advocate and solicitor and client shall be drawn in the manner provided by the Rules of the High Court, and the taxation shall be governed by the Rules.”.

The circumstances in which an advocate and solicitor’s bill of costs could be ordered to be taxed was outlined in the CA Decision as follows: “[10] Section 121(1) of the LPA states that when there is no agreement for the remuneration of a contentious business done by an advocate and solicitor, the advocate and solicitor may either issue a detailed items bill or a gross sum bill. The same section then sets down two situations and follows with a general statement of law. [11] The first situation: s.121(1)(a) deals with a situation where an advocate and solicitor has issued a gross sum bill. The party chargeable may then request the advocate and solicitor to deliver to him a bill containing detailed items, and upon issuance of a detailed items bill then the gross sum bill shall have no effect. The caveat is that (i) the request must be made within 3 months from the date of delivery of the gross sum bill, and (ii) before the service upon him of a writ or other originating process for the recovery of the costs in the gross sum bill. [12] The second situation: s. 121(1)(b) deals with a situation where an advocate and solicitor has issued a gross sum bill. In this second situation, the party chargeable may request from the court that the gross sum bill be taxed. “Court” is defined in s. 3 of the LPA as “the High Court or a Judge thereof when sitting in open Court, and “Judge” means a Judge of the High Court sitting in Chambers. However, this section only applies when (i) an action has been commenced on the gross sum bill, (ii) the party chargeable has been served with a writ or other originating process, and (iii) the request must be made before expiration of 1 month from the service of the writ or other originating process. [13] The general statement of law: s. 121(1)(c) provides that the Rules of Court in relation to taxation shall be applicable if the gross sum bill is referred to taxation either under this section (meaning under s. 121(1)(b)) or otherwise (it could mean under s. 126(1)). This brings us to the second provision of the LPA where an advocate and solicitor’s bill of costs could be ordered to be taxed. [14] Section 126(1) provides two situations where a bill of costs of an advocate and solicitor could be ordered to be taxed. [15] First, a party chargeable or a party liable to pay may petition the bill of costs to be taxed provided that (i) the bill of costs has been delivered by the advocate and solicitor, and (ii) the application for an order for the bill of costs to be taxed must be made within 6 months from the delivery of the bill. [16] The second situation is the advocate and solicitor may petition for the bill of costs to be taxed provided that

the application can only be made after 1 month from the delivery of the bill of costs, and (ii) it must be made within a year after the delivery of the bill of costs. [17] Another relevant section for the order for taxation of an advocate and solicitor’s bill of costs is s. 128 of the LPA. In a situation where the time limit of 6 months to petition to the court for an order of taxation has expired (refer to s. 126(1)) or that the bill of costs has been paid, the general rule is that no order for taxation shall be made. However, the exception is provided if (i) a notice is given to the advocate and solicitor, and (ii) special circumstances are proven to the satisfaction of the court. [18] It is to be noted that s. 128(2) of the LPA states “no such order for taxation shall in any event be made after the expiry of one year from the delivery of the bill of costs.” Therefore, the proviso in s. 128(1) is subject to sub-s (2). In other words, a bill of costs can no longer be ordered to be taxed after the expiry of 1 year from the delivery of the bill of costs.”.

D1 had also drawn my attention to the earlier decision by the Court of Appeal in SP Veloo & Co v Affin Bank Bhd [2017] MLJU 1042 where the following excerpts from the judgment are instructive: “[11] The Learned Judge had erred in law and/or fact in arriving at her decision, in that she failed to take into account that the Respondent’s application for an order for taxation (hereinafter referred to as “the said application”) is statute barred by virtue of section 128(2) of the LPA. [12] The Learned Judge had erred in law and/or fact in arriving at her decision, in that she failed to take into account that a period of more than one (1) year had lapsed from the date of the delivery of the Appellant’s Invoices to the date of the said application. [13] The Learned Judge had erred in law and/or fact in arriving at her decision, in that she failed to take into account that section 128(2) of the LPA creates an absolute bar to making of an order for taxation after the lapse of a period of more than one (1) year from the date of delivery of the Appellant’s Invoices. … [16] The Learned Judge had erred in law and/or fact in arriving at her decision, in that she failed to appreciate and/or take into account the principles of statutory interpretation and/or rules of construction of statute. … [18] The Learned Judge had erred in law and/or fact in arriving at her decision, in that she failed to take into account that the affidavit in support of the said application did not fulfil the necessary requirements prescribed by section 126(1) of the LPA so as to enable the Court to exercise its discretion to extend time beyond the period of 6 months from the date of delivery of the Appellant’s Invoices, let alone extend time beyond the period of one (1) year to allow the said application. … [20] The Learned Judge had erred in law and/or fact in arriving at her decision, in that she failed to appreciate and/or take into account the fact that the Respondent had never asked the Appellant to present a bill of cost ready for taxation within the period prescribed in the LPA, and as such the Respondent is not entitled to rely on section 130 of the LPA. [21] The Learned Judge had erred in law and/or fact in arriving at her decision, in that she failed to appreciate and/or take into account that section 132 of the LPA has no application in the present instance. [22] The Learned Judge had erred in law and/or fact in arriving at her decision, in that she failed to appreciate and/or take into account the unrebutted affidavit evidence of the Appellant that there had been assurance from the Respondent that the Appellant’s 1st and 2nd Invoices will be paid and as such the Respondent is estopped from disputing the said Invoices. … [28] The Learned Judge had erred in law and/or fact in arriving at her decision, in that she failed to distinguish the facts of Tan Tiek Sin’s case from the facts of the said application, and she failed to appreciate and/or take into account that in such circumstances Tan Tiek Sin’s case has no application in the present instance.”.

The following is the crux of the submissions by the Plaintiff, D1 and D2 as set out in their respective written submissions.

The Plaintiff contended that –

there was no agreement between the parties as to the legal fees;

the 10 Invoices annexed as ANNEXURE A to the O.S. were gross sum bills as the Invoices do not provide a detailed breakdown or itemisation of the charges in respect of each item of work done;

by immediately writing to D1 within days, terminating D1’s services on the ground that their fees were exorbitant, and requesting that D1’s bills be taxed and undertaking to pay the taxed bills, the Plaintiff had in effect sought a detailed bill of costs from D1 that could be taxed. Hence, s 121(1)(a) of the LPA 1976 was complied with;

the Defendants’ invoices were disputed but the Defendants never provided the Plaintiff with a detailed bill in order to trigger the operation of the time frames within ss 126 - 132 of the LPA 1976. The gross sum invoices issued by the Defendant have no effect under s 121(1)(a) of the LPA

In any event, this was an issue to be decided by the taxing master in the event the Plaintiff’s application was allowed;

if the court was of the view that the Plaintiff did not request for a detailed bill of cost under s 121(1)(a) of the LPA 1976, s 121(1)(b) would then apply as the O.S. was filed within one month from the time that D1 filed KLSC Suit 434. Thus, the Plaintiff was within time to seek taxation of the Defendants’ gross sum bills;

when an order to tax a gross sum bill is made under s 121(1)(b) of the LPA 1976, the taxing officer will tax the invoice by requesting details from the Defendants as the invoice is not a detailed bill of costs that can be presented for taxation and the relevant information as to what work the solicitors actually did can only be provided by them to the taxing officer; and

the term “Senior Counsel” is not defined anywhere in the LPA 1976. Unlike Singapore where the title of “Senior Counsel” is awarded by the Singapore Academy of Law to lawyers, or the United Kingdom where the Crown appoints King’s Counsel, Malaysia has no similar practise. The invoice issued to the Plaintiff was the invoice of D2, which is a law firm. A law firm is not an individual and therefore cannot be labelled as a “Senior Counsel” to fall within that category. Even if the invoice issued by D2 was for services rendered by Prakash Menon, the burden of proof was on D2 or Prakash Menon to establish that D2 or Prakash Menon falls within the category of “Senior Counsel”. Furthermore, as the fees between the solicitor and counsel would have been agreed, sub-s 121(2) of the LPA 1976 excludes the Senior Counsel’s fee from taxation. D1 was liable to D2 for that amount. In order to recover that sum payable to D2 from the Plaintiff, D1 would have to issue an invoice in respect of the Counsel’s fees and such an invoice was taxable.

D1 strenuously opposed the O.S. on the following grounds:

the Plaintiff’s case only concerns its reliance on s 121 of the LPA 1976;

the 10 Invoices which were sent to the Plaintiff were detailed bills and not gross sum bills;

there was no request by the Plaintiff for detailed items for the 10 Invoices under s 121(1)(a) of the LPA 1976 within the specified and statutory period of three months from the date of delivery of the bills. Hence, the bills remained as detailed bills;

a notice of intention to tax pursuant to ss 124 and 126 of the LPA 1976 is not a request for detailed items under s 121 as ss 124 and 26 have their own procedures and statutory time periods for orders for taxation to be sought, which time periods have lapsed. In any event, the Plaintiff was not relying on ss 124 and 126 of the LPA 1976; and

even if there was a request for detailed items and these were not given, s 121(1)(b) of the LPA 1976 applies and the Plaintiff must obtain a Court order for taxation within one month from the date of filing KLSC Suit 434. The Plaintiff did not comply with s 121(1)(a) or (b) because it did not, within three months, request for detailed items and it did not, within one month, obtain any Court order for taxation. Instead, the Plaintiff insisted on proceeding with the trial in KLSC Suit 434, thereby waiving its right to rely on s 121.

D2 took the position that the O.S. was flawed as, in view of the absence in the distinction between sub-s 121(1) and (2) of the LPA 1976, the court would have to resort to an interpretation of the provision. D2 relied on the decision by the apex court in Econpile (M) Sdn Bhd v ASM Development (KL) Sdn Bhd & Anor Appeal [2024] 5 CLJ 16 where it was held, among others, that: “[35] Section 17A of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 provides that in interpreting an Act, the construction promoting the purpose or object of the legislation shall be preferred: In the interpretation of a provision of an Act, a construction that would promote the purpose or object underlying the Act (whether that purpose or object is expressly stated in the Act or not) shall be preferred to a construction that would not promote that purpose or object.”.

The issues which arose for determination and the analysis and findings of the Court are as follows: 1st Issue: Whether the 10 Invoices annexed as Annexure A to the O.S. are gross sum bills

An initial matter which arose in the parties’ submissions was whether there was an agreement on the legal fees. The Plaintiff claimed that there was no agreement because, after the Plaintiff was appointed as Trustee, it specifically sought a fee quote from D1 vide the letter dated 11.4.2019. However, the fee quote was only given by D1 on 5.12.2019; a mere five days before the hearing of the Six Motions. This left the Plaintiff with no time to realistically find any replacement. When the hearing of the Six Motions did not proceed on 10.12.2019, the Plaintiff wrote to terminate D1’s engagement on the ground that the fees being charged were exorbitant.

Based on the affidavit evidence, I find that there was an agreement on the legal fees. Although the Plaintiff received the fee quote from D1 very close to the hearing of the Six Motions, it could have immediately raised an objection or indicated its disagreement with the fee quote at the material time. Instead, the Plaintiff’s representative was present at the Federal Court on 10.12.2019 and nothing was raised about the amount of fees charged by D1.

I have scrutinised the 10 Invoices and, in my view, the Invoices were not gross sum bills but rather detailed bills of costs because –

based on the case authorities submitted by the D1, namely, Tetuan Azim Tunku Farik & Wong v Tetuan Ong Partnership [2021] 10 CLJ 258 and HMJ Shaharom & KS Wee v Kumpulan Wang Amanah Pencen [2013] 3 CLJ 423 a solicitor’s bill can be a gross bill or detailed bill;

in this case, the Plaintiff did not demand for bills containing detailed items from D1 even though the 10 Invoices were delivered to the Plaintiff on 3.1.2020, 10.2.2020 and 17.2.2020. By merely stating in the letter dated 17.2.2020 that it intends to tax the Bills, the Plaintiff cannot be said to have made a request for detailed items under s 121(1)(a) of the LPA 1976; and

looking at the format of the Invoices where each description of work was particularised, I was inclined to conclude that the Invoices were detailed bill of costs akin to the bills in Tetuan Azim Tunku Farik (supra), where the Court of Appeal held that an explanation and details were given in the bill of costs. This can be contrasted with the bill as sent by the lawyers in HMJ Shaharom (supra), which was a gross sum bill as it contained a lump sum fee without any description of the work done. Similarly, in Dato’ Pahlawan Ramli bin Yusuff v Tetuan Vin Law & Co (suing as a firm) [2026] 7 MLJ 288, I found that the first bill which was served by the respondent on the appellant was a gross sum bill. Thereafter, the appellant requested for a break-down of the fees. I held that the said request was in fact for a detailed bill.

The 1st Issue was thus answered in the negative. 2nd Issue: Whether the Plaintiff is out of time to seek taxation under the LPA 1976

Based on the O.S. alone, it was unclear as to which provision of the LPA 1976 that the Plaintiff was seeking to tax the 10 Invoices as the intitulement refers to ss 121, 124 and 126 to 129 of the LPA 1976 while no provision is mentioned in the body of the O.S. Judging from the Plaintiff’s written submission, reliance was placed only on s 121, LPA 1976.

At both the trials at the Sessions Court, the Plaintiff’s representatives testified that the taxation sought was pursuant to ss 124 and 126 of the LPA 1976 as the 10 Invoices were detailed bills.

As it was my finding that the 10 Invoices were indeed detailed bills of costs, s 121(1)(b) of the LPA 1976 cannot apply.

Assuming that the Plaintiff’s case was pursuant to ss 124, 126 and 128 of the LPA 1976, all time periods under these provisions have expired.

Hence, the 2nd Issue was answered in the affirmative. 3rd Issue: Whether the Court retains the discretion in its inherent jurisdiction to order taxation regardless of the fact that it was time-barred

According to the Plaintiff, almost universally overlooked is the fact that the court, in exercising its inherent jurisdiction, always retains the discretion to order taxation regardless of whether time frames under the LPA 1976 have been exceeded. The Plaintiff drew support for this proposition from the case of Tan Tek Sin & Anor v. Tetuan Nora Hayati & Associates [2015] 1 CLJ 89 where Azahar Mohamed JCA elucidated as follows: “[27] The question then arises whether court has the power by virtue of its inherent jurisdiction to depart from the provisions of statute, where the circumstances so require. In this regard the case of Phuah Choon Hwang & Ors v. Hassan & Kong Yeam [1986] 1 CLJ 513; [1986] CLJ (Rep) 579 is instructive. There, the petitioners, who were residents in Singapore had retained the respondents as their solicitors in a case which involved the distribution of the estate of the deceased. Later, the respondents informed the petitioners’ solicitors in Singapore that in lieu of taxation they would like to deduct from the estate money a certain sum for their professional fees. The petitioners’ solicitors protested and asked the respondents to have their bills of costs taxed. Three months later the respondents forwarded to the petitioners’ solicitors two sets of bills of costs which were later handed to their present solicitors for further action. Subsequently, the present solicitors filed the petition for an order that the two sets of bills of costs be taxed on a solicitor and client basis. The petitioners’ solicitors also filed an application by way of summons-in-chambers for an order that the time limited by s. of the LPA for the filing of the petition be extended. After taking into consideration all the circumstances of that case, Mohamed Dzaiddin J (as His Lordship then was) held that the court’s inherent jurisdiction should be exercised by ordering taxation of both bills of costs because justice requires that such an order should be made, notwithstanding that the petitioner’s solicitors had allowed the twelve-month period to elapse without making the application. Mohamed Dzaiddin J referred to the House of Lords decision in Storer & Co. Ltd. v. Johnson and Weatherall [1890] 15 App Cas 203 to hold that “as for the inherent jurisdiction of the court, the authorities show that it is exercised independent of the statute”. In Storer & Co. Ltd. v. Johnson and Weatherall, Lord Halsbury said: … I believe that your Lordships are all of opinion that in a proceeding under the Solicitors Act we cannot do what is asked to be done by the appellants. But it was of course open to the Court to pronounce a judgment which should do justice between the parties when once the case was brought before them. This was not a case in which the summons absolutely bound the court as to the remedy which they should administer; and I think it is quite clear that the Solicitors Act did not deprive the Court of the jurisdiction which they always possessed to do justice in the premises when dealing with one of their officers, and that they might therefore order that the costs should be taxed, although not in terms of the Solicitors Act, and they might have selected one particular portion of the bill of costs to be taxed. The moment it was taken out of the region of the Solicitors Act and brought within the general jurisdiction of the Court, then the Court could exercise its own jurisdiction in the way it might think fit; and I am of opinion that the Court rightly exercised its jurisdiction so far as it was advised of what were the real facts. [28] In Perusahaan Petanda Bintang Sdn Bhd v. Asbir, Hira Singh & Co [1995] 3 CLJ 234, the High Court held that by virtue of their role as watchdog over the conduct of solicitors (being officers of the court), the courts were not precluded under the LPA from invoking its inherent jurisdiction, in appropriate cases even in petitions made outside the stipulated period, where the facts pleaded disclose a serious misconduct of gross overcharging or fraud on services rendered by an advocate and solicitor.”.

The Plaintiff argued that the following facts in this case support an order for taxation to be allowed even if the court was of the view that the time frames under the LPA 1976 have been exceeded:

after being appointed as Trustee, the Plaintiff specifically sought a fee quote from D1 vide the letter dated 11.4.2019 but the fee quote was given by D1 only on 5.12.2019, which was a mere five days before the hearing of the Six Motions, leaving the Plaintiff with no time to realistically find any solicitor;

when the Six Motions did not proceed for hearing, the Plaintiff wrote to terminate D1’s engagement on the ground that the fees being charged were exorbitant. Ultimately, the Defendants did not conduct the hearing in the Federal Court and given this, the sums invoiced for were noticeably excessive;

numerous letters were then exchanged between the parties on the issue of taxing the invoices;

no sum was shown next to each item in the particulars of work done and only provides for a total lump sum at the end, especially Invoice No.: 02.018.20 (A2013) dated 12.2.2020 for the sum of RM200,000.00. The 10 Invoices fall squarely within the description in Tan Tek Sin’s case (supra) (see paragraph 33 in the judgment) and this constitutes a special circumstance for the court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to permit taxation by extending the time to do so. The Plaintiff was not taking the position that the Defendants should not be paid for being prepared to proceed for the hearing of the Six Motions on 10.12.2019, however, the appropriate sum is something that can only be determined fairly by this court; and

fees are to be paid out of a Trust created for the benefit of Orang Asli who not only have lost their ancestral lands, but have since also lost substantial sums of the monies, through no fault of their own, that was awarded to them by the court.

I have given utmost consideration to the Plaintiff’s submission. However, the case authorities in recent years, for example Tetuan Azim Tunku Farik (supra), have held that the statutory time periods in the LPA 1976 in relation to taxation must be strictly adhered to.

Moreover, in the light of the background facts in this case, including the fact that the Plaintiff did not expeditiously seek to obtain an order for this O.S. and instead, participated and agreed for the first and second trial in KLSC Suit 434 to proceed, the Court was not inclined to exercise its discretion in the Plaintiff’s favour. 4th Issue: Whether in view of sub-s 121(2) of the LPA 1976, the issue of taxation applies to D2

D2 acknowledged that there is a specific provision in the LPA 1976 which governs the issue of taxation and exclusion when it comes to issue of fees payable to Senior Counsel. Unfortunately, there is no definition in the LPA 1976 as to who can be categorised as a Senior Counsel, unlike in Singapore and other jurisdictions.

D2 contended that an “advocate and solicitor” referred to in sub-s 121(1) of the LPA 1976 and an “advocate and solicitor” who is briefed as a Senior Counsel as referred to in sub-s 121(2) cannot be one and the same, otherwise sub-s 121(2) would be rendered superfluous and redundant, which surely was not the intention of the legislature. As a fused profession, there is no distinction between an advocate and solicitor or a counsel when it relates to professional conduct in court.

D2 implored that judicial notice can be taken that, when an advocate and solicitor is briefed as counsel, the fees payable are agreed, as in the instant case, as there was no objection to the fee quote. Hence, the exclusion of taxation under sub-s 121(2) of the LPA 1976 applies.

I was inclined to agree with D2’s line of argument.

Although it was established that D2’s continued appointment as Senior Counsel was with the consent and knowledge of the Plaintiff, the fact remains that D2 had no direct communications with the Plaintiff and all instructions pertaining to the matters and issues at hand were dealt with D1 as instructing solicitors. Therefore, there was no solicitor-client relationship between the Plaintiff and D2.

I accepted D2’s submission that sub-s 121(2) of the LPA 1976 and the words “senior counsel” therein should be given a purposive and harmonious interpretation to refer to a person who is briefed to attend to a case and not a person who has a solicitor-client relationship.

The answer to the 4th Issue was thus, in view of the provision of sub-s 121(2) of the LPA 1976, the issue of taxation does not apply to D2.

Based on the aforesaid considerations, the Plaintiff’s application against both Defendants was dismissed with costs of RM7,500.00 to each Defendant, subject to allocatur. DATED: 20.2.2026 (ALIZA SULAIMAN) JUDGE HIGH COURT IN MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR (BKK1) Solicitors for the Plaintiff: Anantha Krishnan Messrs. Anantha Krishnan Solicitors for the1st Defendant: Renu Zechariah (Cheryl Kwan Chui Yi with her) Messrs. Rosley Zechariah Solicitors for the 2nd Defendant: