Rishindran A/L Paramanathan v Manokaran A/L D Rathinasamy (BA-24F-92-04/2023)

High Court of Malaysia9 Nov 2023BA-24F-92-04/2023

The written judgment as the court issued it, with the coram, case number, and source links. Every paragraph has its own anchor.

Open official source PDF Report an issue

Content

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM 1 DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA 2 (BAHAGIAN KELUARGA) 3 SAMAN PEMULA NO : BA-24F-92-04/2023 4 5 Dalam Perkara Jagaan, Kawalan, 6 Penjagaan Dan Pemeliharaan 7 Kanak-Kanak Risharti Rishindran 8 (Sijil Kelahiran No. : 210223-10- 9 1702); 10 11 Dan 12 13 Dalam Perkara Aturan 76 Kaedah- 14 Kaedah Prosiding Perkahwinan 15 Dan Perceraian 1980; 16 17 Dan 18 19 Dalam Perkara Seksyen 88 Dan 89 20 Akta Membaharui Undang-Undang 21 Perkahwinan & Perceraian) 1976 22 (Akta 164); 23 24 Dan 25 26 Dalam Perkara Aturan 92 Kaedah 4 27 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 28 29 ANTARA 30 RISHINDRAN A/L PARAMANATHAN 1 (NO. K/P : 860228-35-5925) ...PEMOHON 2 3 DAN 4 5 MANOKARAN A/L D RATHINASAMY 6 (NO. K/P : 521002-07-5027) ...RESPONDEN 7 8 9 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT 10 11 12 Introduction 13 [1] This Originating Summons (OS – Enclosure 1) filed by the Applicant 14 against the Respondent seeks an order inter alia for the guardianship, 15 custody and control and care of the child Risharti Rishindran and that she 16 be delivered to the Applicant with immediate effect. 17 18 [2] A little over 3 months later on 2.7.2023 the Applicant filed a Notice 19 of Application (Encl 9) for an interim order praying for interim access to 20 the child. Parties entered into a consent order, thus leaving Encl 1 to be 21 ventilated before this Court. 22 23 [3] After perusing the cause papers filed, respective written 24 submissions, and hearing parties, I allowed the Applicant’s application in 25 Encl 1 for guardianship, custody care and control of the child. I further 26 ordered that the Respondents be given reasonable access including 27 overnight access to the child. 28 29 [4] Dissatisfied with that decision the Respondent had filed this appeal. 1 These are the reasons for my decision. 2 3 Background Facts 4 [5] The Applicant, Rishindran a/l Paramanathan was married to 5 Sharmini a/p Manokaran on 10.12.2017 and were blessed with a 6 daughter, Risharti Rishindran who was born on 23.2.2021. 7 8 [6] Sadly Sharmini died soon after on 11.3.2021. 9 10 [7] The Applicant took the loss of his wife keenly and hence the 11 Respondent and his wife (Sharmini’s parents) took over responsibility of 12 looking after the child with the consent of the Applicant. On that note the 13 Applicant had signed a letter of Assurance dated 9.4.2021 agreeing to 14 allow the Respondent and his wife ‘to look after and care for the child until 15 their deaths’. The child has been under the Respondent and his wife’s 16 care since then and the Applicant has visited and been granted access to 17 the child liberally. 18 19 [8] The Applicant married for a second time on 23.3.2023 and his 20 current wife supports this instant application. Her Affidavit in Support can 21 be found in Encl 13. 22 23 Contentions of Parties and Decision of this Court 24 [9] I do not intend to set out the respective submissions of the parties 25 separately but will where necessary, address them in the course of this 26 decision. 27 28 [10] I have duly perused and considered the arguments in canvassing 29 for their positions in wanting custody care and control of the Child. It is 30 reassuring that both parties are in agreement that they want only what is 1 in the best interest and welfare of the Child but they have not spared 2 detailing every grievances they have against each other via their 3 respective affidavits to advance their narration that the Child would be 4 better off in their care. 5 6 [11] No party has a prior right to each other. Although the wishes of either 7 party will be considered their wishes must not be inconsistent with the best 8 interest and welfare of the child. The Court will always act for the best 9 interest and welfare of the child at all times. 10 11 [12] The principle for this stand is statutorily embodied in a number of 12 Acts. 13 14 [13] Section 88 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce Act 1976 (LRA, 15 1976) provides the power to the Court to make an order for custody of a 16 child. 17 18 “Section 88: Power of the Court to make an order for custody 19

Subsection

(1) The Court may at any time by order place a child in the custody of 20 their father or his or her mother or, where there are exceptional 21 circumstances making it undesirable that the child be entrusted to either 22 parent, of any other relative of the child or of any association the objects 23 of which include child welfare or to any other suitable person.

Subsection

(2) In deciding whose custody a child should be placed, the paramount 25 consideration shall be the welfare of the child, and subject to this the 26 Court should shall have regard- 27

(a) To the wishes of the parents of the child; and 28

(b) To the wishes of the child, where he or she is of an age to express 29 an independent opinion.

Subsection

(3) There shall be a rebuttable presumption that it is for the good of a 31 child below the age of seven years to be with his or her mother, but in 32 deciding whether that presumption applies to the facts of any particular 1 case, the Court shall have regard to the undesirability of disturbing the 2 life of a child by changes of custody.

Subsection

(4) Where there are two or more children of a marriage, the Court shall 4 not be bound to place both or all in the custody of the same person but 5 shall consider the welfare of each independently." 6 7 [14] The above provision provides that the Court may at any time by 8 order place a child in the custody of his father or mother or where there 9 are exceptional circumstances making it undesirable that the child be 10 entrusted to either parent to any other relative of the child or to any other 11 suitable person. 12 13 [15] Section 6 of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1962 enacts as follows: 14 15 “6. Rights of surviving parent as to guardianship 16

Subsection

(1) On the death of a parent of an infant, the surviving parent, if any, 17 shall, subject to this Act, be guardian to the infant either alone or jointly 18 with any guardian appointed by the deceased parent.” 19 20 [16] Section 11 of the same Act says : 21 22 “11. Matters to be considered 23 The Court or a Judge, in exercising the powers conferred by this act, 24 shall have regard primarily to the welfare of the infant and shall, where 25 the infant has a parent or parents, consider the wishes of such parent or 26 both of them as the case may be.” 27 28 [17] The matters which have to be considered by the Court in exercising 29 its powers are cited in s. 11 of the Act and the Court is required primarily 30 to have regard to the welfare of the Child. The welfare of the child shall 31 transcend all the other considerations. In the case of Mahabir Prasad v 32 Mahabir Prasad [19810 CLJ Rep 65, a judgment of the Federal Court 1 where in their judgment the Federal Court held :- 2 3 “In short the learned judge has given the overriding consideration of the 4 welfare of the children uppermost in his mind. That, we think, is the 5 correct approach. We would state categorically that that must be the first 6 and paramount consideration and other considerations must be 7 subordinate. The mere desire of a parent to have his children must be 8 subordinate to the consideration of the welfare of the children, and can 9 be effective only if it coincides with their welfare. Consequently, it cannot 10 be right to speak of the pre-eminent position of the parents alone, or 11 their exclusive right to the custody of the children, when their future is 12 being considered by the Court.” 13 14 [18] The term “welfare” means that every circumstances must be taken 15 into consideration and the court must do what under the circumstances a 16 wise parent acting for the true interests of the child would or ought to do 17 (see Yong May Inn v Sia Kuan Seng [1971] 1 MLJ 280). 18 19 [19] Under the circumstances the Court shall not concern itself with the 20 feelings of the opposing parties but must do what it considers will be in 21 the best interest and welfare of the child. The well being, happiness and 22 interest of the child shall be the main and paramount consideration in 23 selecting who is to have guardianship, custody care and control of the 24 child who as yet cannot give expression as to her wishes. In any given 25 circumstances the welfare of the child must necessarily depend upon the 26 facts of each case. 27 28 [20] The present case deals with a tussle between the father and the 29 grandparents of the only child of the marriage. The child is a little girl and 30 is 3 years old now. She was about 2 years old at the time the OS was filed 1 and when the Court delivered its decision on Encl

2 3 [21] As alluded to earlier, both the Applicant and the Respondent have 4 sought to convince the Court that they are the rightful persons to have 5 guardianship custody and care of the child and that the welfare of the child 6 would best be taken care of in their hands. 7 8 [22] The Respondent in an effort to convince the Court of his suitability 9 to take sole custody, care and control of the child has levelled numerous 10 accusations against the Applicant, the most serious of which is that the 11 Applicant is a drug user and had been found out by the AADK to be a drug 12 addict. This was revealed when his then girlfriend had reported him to the 13 ADDK in December 2022. The Respondent alleges that the Applicant lost 14 his job as a result of this. It is pertinent to note that the motivation for Ms 15 Tracie Sonia Emmanuel (the then girlfriend) to lodge the report had 16 something to do with the ending of their relationship. 17 18 [23] I find the Respondent’s argument to hold no water as Ms Emmanuel 19 had retracted her allegation and had withdrawn the said report very soon 20 after. Ms Emmanuel had stated that she had resorted to reporting the 21 Applicant “out of frustration and anger” and that she regretted her actions. 22 The fact that she had withdrawn her report makes it compelling for this 23 Court to conclude that she had made false accusations and lied in regard 24 to the Applicant being a drug user and addict. As such those allegations 25 ought not to be taken against the Applicant as there was no longer any 26 allegation of that nature cast against the Applicant. 27 28 [24] The Respondent has also urged the Court to consider the evidence 29 that the AADK had confirmed on 14.3.2023 the results of the Applicant’s 30 urine and pathology tests were positive for Methamphetamine use. The 1 Applicant has on the other hand submitted various recent urine test 2 reports which confirm he is not a drug user. 3 4 [25] At the time of hearing this application, there is nothing before the 5 court to evidence that the Applicant is a confirmed drug user or addict. 6 The Respondent had not furnished any current pathology report to show 7 that the Applicant has been confirmed or convicted of being a drug user. 8 There is no evidence that he was under the influence when he visited the 9 child or when the child was with him during the access period. It has to be 10 borne in mind that the burden lay upon the Respondent to show with 11 compelling and convincing evidence that the Applicant is not a fit parent 12 to have custody of the child due to his drug usage and dependence. I find 13 that the arguments put forth by the Respondent does not meet the strong 14 evidence requirement to prove that the Applicant is at present still a drug 15 user. The allegations are in my view slanted to suit his resistance to the 16 Applicant’s application. In any event the Applicant had successful 17 answered those allegations with a more probable version of the facts. 18 19 [26] Whatever the argument may be the Applicant has shown to this 20 Court that he is ready to care for the child for the long haul, that he has 21 not abandoned the child and wanted to be given the opportunity to take 22 care of her for the future. He denied the Respondent’s allegation that he 23 is an irresponsible father. He has averred in his affidavits that he had inter 24 alia : 25 26 - visited everyday and spent time with the infant while it was 27 under the care of his former inlaws; 28 29 - bought essential supplies for the child and provided financial 1 support by handing over RM800 from the monthly death 2 benefit payment from SOCSO; 3 4 - invested in Public Mutual Fund for the benefit of the child. 5 6 [27] Further to this it was also the contention of the Respondent that the 7 Applicant’s self declared depressive state of mind at the time of the death 8 of his wife precluded him from caring for the Child. At the material time the 9 Applicant was emotionally not ready to care for his newborn baby. The 10 Applicant had not shied away nor avoided the impact his state of mind had 11 been at that time. The Applicant had frankly addressed the issue in his 12 affidavits. He has had time to compose himself and is reconciled to the 13 loss of his wife. The Applicant is now happily remarried to his present wife 14 and she has affirmed an affidavit (Encl 13) attesting to her readiness and 15 willingness to assist the Applicant in caring for and bringing up the child. 16 She has also averred in her affidavit that she will work from home and can 17 therefore focus on the child’s upbringing and welfare. Hence in the 18 absence of cogent evidence this Court cannot safely conclude that the 19 Applicant is unfit or emotionally unready to care for the Child. 20 21 [28] Next in the Respondent’s list is his claim that the Applicant had on 22 one occasion taken the child for access for five hours and had returned 23 the child in a hungry, disheveled stage. The Respondent further alleged 24 that the child came back with swollen eyes, a sore throat and a fresh red 25 bruise on her lips. The Respondent presented photographs of the child at 26 pgs 3, 4 and 5 of Exhibit MRI in Encl

On a separate occasion the 27 Respondent observed that upon taking custody of the child the Applicant 28 handed her over to his wife while he videotaped the antics of the child. 29 [29] The Respondent also claimed that the child cried and struggled and 1 was not happy in the company of the Applicant and his wife. The 2 Respondent argued that this was clear proof of the inability of the 3 Applicant to offer care and protect the child’s welfare even for a short 4 period. The Respondent claimed that the child was traumatized at every 5 access meeting between the child and the Applicant. 6 7 [30] As highlighted earlier the child had at that material time was a mere 8 toddler, barely having crossed the age of two. Children of such a young 9 age would naturally react in such a manner and would prefer the arms of 10 a person of familiarity. No one should be faulted for such a reaction. In 11 any event those events narrated by the Respondent occurred in the early 12 days of access. Having the Respondent and his wife hovering in the 13 vicinity could hardly have helped the child to want to go voluntarily to the 14 Applicant. Instead of emphasizing on the awkwardness of those moments, 15 the Respondent and his family could have easily eased the child into 16 accepting the presence of the Applicant and his wife. The Respondent 17 cannot expect the physical access visits to yield overnight results. 18 19 [31] In regard to what the Respondent perceived as the Applicant’s 20 coldness and lack of tender care and love during access visits, I would 21 venture the opinion that no parent can gain experience overnight in 22 handling children. They make mistakes and learn from their experiences 23 in how to parent a child. I have no doubt that with the passage of time the 24 Applicant will be more capable and adapt at handling the Childs’s wants 25 and needs better. 26 27 [32] Having directed my mind to the pertinent sections of the law and the 28 judgments quoted in the law journals, I was of the view that it would be in 29 the best interest of the Child that she be placed in the custody of her 30 father, the Applicant. The Applicant is the rightful person to have custody 1 care and control of the child as she is his biological daughter. The Child 2 should have the benefit of being brought up by her own father rather than 3 grandparents who to put it bluntly may not be around for long. 4 5 [33] There is no evidence to prove that the Applicant had effectively and 6 completely vanquished his right to the child. It is to be noted that at the 7 time he signed the Letter of Assurance consenting to the Respondent and 8 his wife to taking care of the child, he was still in the throes of grieve over 9 the loss of his wife. To my mind it is reasonable and only right for the 10 Applicant to entrust the baby to the Respondent and his wife as they were 11 his parents in law. Naturally they would be the ones whom he would turn 12 to care to keep the baby safe, secured and cared for. Be that as it may, it 13 was the situation then when both sides were mourning the passing of 14 Sharmini. 15 16 [34] In any event this was only a letter of assurance and can in no way 17 be construed to have attached to it any longstanding legal effect. I am of 18 the view that there are no legal impediments which would restrict the 19 Applicant from wanting to become a more involved parent to the Child. 20 The Respondent should welcome the Applicant’s readiness to be a proper 21 father and parent to his only child. 22 23 [35] The letter of assurance cannot be used to hold the Applicant down 24 to an assurance that was given under the circumstances then. Custody 25 relating to family matters is never final. The welfare of the child may 26 require changes to be made over time. The Court is empowered to adjust 27 custody agreements if there are valid reasons to it do so. Where the 28 welfare of the child dictates that there should be a change in custody then 29 the Court will be empowered to revisit the custody arrangements. In any 30 event, I note here that the letter of assurance is not a court approved 1 agreement. Hence, I find the Respondent’s reliance on the letter of 2 assurance to be misconceived as the said letter cannot be made to bind 3 the Applicant to his promise made under those circumstances many years 4 ago. 5 6 [36] The Applicant thinks the time is right for him to regain full custody 7 care and control of his Child. I am in agreement that this is the right time 8 for him to take over the responsibility and duty of caring for and bringing 9 up the child. The child’s rightful place is to be with the Applicant as she 10 has a bright future and fruitful life ahead of her. The Applicant as her 11 parent is the rightful person to be responsible for her future upbringing and 12 be in charge of all her care arrangements. It is in the best interest and 13 welfare of the child that she be allowed to grow up knowing and being 14 under the physical care of her father. The Applicant should not be 15 deprived of his natural rights and obligations as a father. Allowing the 16 Applicant only sporadic access rights would not be in the best interest of 17 the child or for her future upbringing. 18 19 [37] I have not discounted the loving care and affection that the 20 Respondent and his family have lavished upon the child since her birth. I 21 have given anxious thought and consideration as to whether the child 22 should be left in her familiar surroundings and not suffer the trauma of 23 changes in custody. I understood and empathized with the Respondent’s 24 concern that the child would be distressed and traumatized at parting with 25 the grandparents. I pondered on whether irreparable damage would be 26 done to her emotional development if she were to be thrust into the care 27 of ‘strangers’ even though the Applicant is her father. However what was 28 uppermost in my mind was whether in the long run it would be in the 29 greater interest, welfare and happiness of this child to be with the 1 Applicant or remain with the Respondent and his wife. 2 3 [38] I considered and drew strength from the sentiments expressed in 4 the case of Chuah Thye Peng & Anor v Kuan Huah Oong [1978] 2 MLJ 5 217 where the learned Judge too had to consider the following : 6 7 “But as the child’s future happiness and sense of security are important 8 factors and as advised by Lord MacDermott in the above-quoted 9 passage of his judgment I gave close and anxious attention to the 10 effects of a change of custody in this case and came to the 11 conclusion, on a balance of probabilities, that although there might 12 be some transient effect of taking the infant away from the 13 respondent, there would be no long-term detriment to his health 14 and welfare in the circumstances of this case. With these factors in 15 mind and after much anxious consideration I have in the end come 16 to the conclusion, though by no very great margin, that it would be 17 for the child’s benefit and welfare on the long-term view, that 18 custody care and control of the infant ought to be awarded to the 19 applicants. Accordingly, I awarded the custody, control and care of the 20 infant to the applicants, subject to liberal access by the respondent and 21 her husband at all reasonable times. I therefore ordered the respondent 22 to forthwith deliver the said Alexander Chuah-Li ming to the applicants..” 23 24 [39] I could not agree with the Respondent’s reference to the case of 25 Teh Eng Kim v Yew Peng Siong [1977] 1 LNS 138 to support his stand 26 that it was not in the best interest of the Child to remove her from her 27 current environment. In that case, the learned Judge was convinced that 28 irreparable damage can be done to a child’s emotional development if the 29 living environment is suddenly changed and the child is thrust into the care 30 of strangers even if there be some blood relationship with one or more of 31 the strangers. 32 [40] I respectfully find that the facts of that case are easily distinguishable 1 to the instant application. To be fair, the learned Judge there was 2 concerned with the welfare and well being of 3 children of the ages ranging 3 from 15, 10 and 5 unlike the child presently at the centre of this custody 4 battle who is of tender age. 5 6 [41] I was of the opinion that any trauma and unhappiness the Child 7 might feel in being taken away from the Respondent would be transient 8 and will fade very quickly and be forgotten. Children of tender years are 9 curious souls and they can usually be cajoled to bounce back to their 10 happy self especially with the novelty of fresh surroundings and new 11 friends. There can be no doubt that with the passage of time any 12 semblance of trauma will be a distant memory and eventually erased 13 completely. 14 15 [42] I am influenced by the fact that the Respondent and his wife are the 16 elderly grandparents of the child. I am concerned with the age of the 17 grandparents who are both now over 70 years old. They are advancing in 18 years and will inevitably have to relinquish personal caring and upbringing 19 of the child to others in their family. As hard as it would be they have to 20 accept the fact that they will not be around for her formative years. 21 22 [43] In contrast the Applicant and his wife are in the prime of their lives. 23 At their age they are young, energetic and can physically and actively 24 participate in bringing up the child. The Child will be bound to feel free and 25 more adventurous in the company of the Applicant rather than in the 26 company of her elderly grandparents. The Applicant can be actively 27 involved in the child’s future schooling, health, games, extra curricular 28 activities and religious upbringing. With the advances in technology and 29 in this modern world I would consider the Applicant to be best suited to 30 nurture the child and guide her to deal with life vicissitudes as she grows 1 up to become a young lady. 2 3 [44] I am firmly of the view that the time for the child to be reunited with 4 her biological parent should be now when she is just 2 years old instead 5 of later when she is older as suggested by the Respondent. At the same 6 time, I have given thought to the Respondent’s fear that a change in 7 custody may unsettle the mind of the child but it is only a circumstance to 8 be considered and ought not to be regarded as a complete and 9 irrevocable bar to any change. Hence the Respondent’s reliance on the 10 authority of Masam v Salina Saropa & Anor [1974] 1 MLRH 662 may be 11 distinguished in its facts and circumstances. 12 13 [45] The Respondent has asserted that the Applicant is only interested 14 in exercising his “right” as a father and has not explained how the Child’s 15 welfare would benefit if custody were transferred to him from the 16 Respondent. I found that contention untenable and without merits. A 17 father plays a pivotal role in fostering a nurturing environment for a child 18 throughout its life. In Elaine Lee Ming Li v Ng Yew Ming [2022] 1 LNS 19 2276 the profound effect and the role of a father was emphasized and 20 given credit to as follows : 21 22 “It was crucial to bear in mind the role that a father has in ensuring that 23 the child is raised in a nourishing environment.” 24 The learned Judge went on to note that : 25 “This was highlighted in the Singapore case of APE v APF [2015] 26 SGHC 17, where reference was made by Tan Siong Thye J to the article 27 Contact and Domestic Violence – The Experts’ Court Report [2000] 28 Fam Law 615 by Claire, Sturge and Danya Glaser, which provided an 29 analysis of the role of the father to his child (emphasis added): 30 The findings are that the position in law that parental involvement on 1 both sides is indeed in the best interests of the child. In a paper 2 commissioned by the Official Solicitor, Clare Sturge and Danya Glaser, 3 Contact and Domestic Violence – The Experts’ Court Report” [2000] 4 Fam Law 615 (“The Experts’ Court Report”) at pp 616-617, the authors 5 comment that: 6 Contact with fathers, as opposed to other family members or people with 7 whom the child has a significant relationship, brings the following, in 8 particular, to bear, although the general principles remain the same: 9 • the father’s unique role in the creation of the child; 10 • the sharing of 50% of his or her genetic material; 11 • the history of his or her conception and the parental relationship; 12 • the consequent importance of the father in the child’s sense of 13 identity and value; 14 • the role modelling a father can provide of the father’s and male 15 contribution to parenting and the rearing of children which will 16 have relevance to the child’s concepts of parental role models 17 and his or her own choices about choosing partners and the sort 18 of family life he or she aims to create. 19 In summary, the benefits include the meeting of his or her needs for: 20 • warmth, approval, feeling unique and special to a parent; 21 • extending experiences and developing (or maintaining 22 meaningful relationships; 23 • information and knowledge; 24 • reparation of distorted relationships or perceptions.” 25 26 [46] I do not share the Respondent’s misgivings about the Applicant 27 wife’s role as a stepmother to the Child. She may not be the Child’s natural 28 mother but she has admirably shown her willingness to assist the 29 Applicant to comfort, care for and bring up the Child together with him. 30 There is no convincing evidence to prove that she is a ‘wicked stepmother’ 31 and an unfit person to co-parent the Child. With respect the Respondent’s 32 fears of abuse or neglect is merely conjecture and speculative. I find no 33 reason to think it is detrimental or that the Child will be unhappy in her 1 care. What they have in common is that they are both females and this 2 will be to the advantage of the Child who will be growing up and will need 3 the counselling and advise of an adult female in navigating matters that 4 only females will encounter and experience. The Applicant’s wife will fit 5 that mould. 6 7 Conclusion 8 [47] With all these factors in mind and having given them my utmost 9 consideration, I have come to the conclusion that that it would be for the 10 child’s benefit and welfare in the long term that custody care and control 11 of the Child be awarded to her father, the Applicant. 12 13 [48] And if anyone were to be placed in Sharmini’s position I am certain 14 beyond a shadow of a doubt that she would have wanted both the 15 Applicant and the Respondent to put aside their differences for the sake 16 of the Child. 17 18 [49] Considering that the Applicant shall be granted sole custody care 19 and control of the Child, it is only fair and just that the grandparents are 20 given reasonable access to their grandchild. The Applicant must ensure 21 that the Child shall remain in contract with her grandparents in order to 22 nurture and sustain that familial bond. 23 24 [50] This Court is vested with the authority to impose terms and 25 conditions of a custody order. That said this Court orders that the 26 Respondent is given reasonable overnight access to the Child every third 27 weekend of the month from Saturday 10am to Sunday 6 pm. 28 29 [51] Application allowed. 30 [52] No order as to costs. 1 2 Dated 20 March 2024. 3 4 5 6 (JULIE LACK) 7 Judge 8 High Court of Malaya 9 Shah Alam, Selangor Darul Ehsan 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 Counsel 1 For the Applicant : 2 R. Mageswaran 3 (MESSRS. M. SUJATA & ASSOCIATES) 4 5 For the Respondant : 6 Sreedhara Naidu 7 (MESSRS. NAIDU CHAMBERS) 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

Something wrong on this page?

Wrong text, a broken link, out-of-date content, or a removal request — tell us and we'll check it against the official source.

Report an issue Request removal

Malaysian judgment

Case metadata

Court: High Court of Malaysia
Decision date: 9 Nov 2023
Case number: BA-24F-92-04/2023
Coram: YA Dato' Julie Lack
Practice area: [1] This Originating Summons (OS – Enclosure 1) filed by the Applicant against the Respondent seeks an order inter alia for the guardianship, custody and control and care of the child Risharti Rishindran and that she be delivered to the Applicant with immediate effect. [2] A little over 3 months later on 2.7.2023 the Applicant filed a Notice of Application (Encl 9) for an interim order praying for interim access to the child. Parties entered into a consent order, thus leaving Encl 1 to be ventilated before this Court
Version: Alasan Penghakiman 1
Published: 25 Mar 2024
Source ID: e132ce45-4735-4417-a792-e069e6ee1957

Catchwords

[1] This Originating Summons (OS – Enclosure 1) filed by the Applicant against the Respondent seeks an order inter alia for the guardianship, custody and control and care of the child Risharti Rishindran and that she be delivered to the Applicant with immediate effect. [2] A little over 3 months later on 2.7.2023 the Applicant filed a Notice of Application (Encl 9) for an interim order praying for interim access to the child. Parties entered into a consent order, thus leaving Encl 1 to be ventilated before this Court

Parties

RISHINDRAN A/L PARAMANATHAN - applicant - ejudgment_parties
MANOKARAN A/L D RATHINASAMY - respondent - ejudgment_parties

Primary source

Compare this reader text against the official judgment source.

Open source PDF

Catchwords

Rishindran A/L Paramanathan v Manokaran A/L D Rathinasamy (BA-24F-92-04/2023)

How this case connects

Cited by

Authorities cited

Something wrong on this page?

Rishindran A/L Paramanathan v Manokaran A/L D Rathinasamy (BA-24F-92-04/2023)

How this case connects

Cited by

Authorities cited

Something wrong on this page?