Rishipal Singh Dhanoa A/L Charanjit Singh (Berniaga Atas Nama Dhanoa Enterprise) v Kawalan Pertiwi Sdn Bhd (BA-22NCvC-19-01/2024)

1.0

These Grounds of Judgment are prepared pursuant to the Plaintiff’s appeal against this Court’s decision dismissing the Plaintiff’s striking out application under Order 18 rule 19 ROC 2012 in Enclosure 58. 10/07/2026 09:04:08

The present Grounds therefore concern this Court’s reasons for refusing to strike out substantial portions of the Defendant’s Defence dated 6.10.2025.

The Plaintiff’s application in Enclosure 58 was filed pursuant to Order 18 rule 19(1)(a) and/or (c) and/or (d) of the Rules of Court 2012 seeking, among others, orders that paragraphs 3, 3.1 to 3.6, 4, 5, 5.1 to 5.11, 6, 7, 7.1 to 7.8, 8.6, 8.8(i), 7.13.1, 7.13.3,

7.13.4 and 7.14 of the Defendant’s Defence be struck out, deleted and/or expunged.

The Plaintiff’s central contention was that the Court of Appeal, in allowing the Defendant’s appeal against the dismissal of the Defendant’s setting aside application, had conclusively determined the issue of liability in favour of the Plaintiff. According to the Plaintiff, the Defendant was therefore estopped from disputing liability in the present proceedings and the impugned portions of the Defence consequently disclosed no reasonable defence and/or constituted an abuse of process.

The Defendant opposed the application and maintained that the Court of Appeal’s findings arose purely within the context of an interlocutory setting aside appeal and did not amount to a final adjudication on liability after full trial. The Defendant further contended that the impugned portions of the Defence raised substantial and triable factual issues requiring full evidential ventilation at trial.

Having heard parties and considered the pleadings, affidavits, written submissions and authorities relied upon, this Court dismissed Enclosure 58 with costs of RM3,000.00 to the Defendant.

The Plaintiff has since appealed against that decision.

The Plaintiff’s Claim 8. The Plaintiff commenced this action by Writ and Statement of Claim dated 18.1.2024 seeking recovery of RM1,530,984.66 allegedly due from the Defendant for manpower and security-related services rendered to customers said to be connected to the Defendant from the year 2021 until 2023.

According to the Plaintiff, the Defendant had requested the Plaintiff to introduce customers and to supply manpower through the Defendant to those customers. The Plaintiff’s pleaded case is that parties agreed, among others, that:

the Plaintiff would receive 95% of the invoiced service costs excluding SST;

the Defendant would retain 5%; and

payment would be made within seven days from the issuance of invoices to customers.

The Plaintiff further contends that despite repeated oral and written demands, including through solicitors’ correspondence, the Defendant failed and/or refused to make payment. The Plaintiff thereafter commenced the present action on 18.1.2024 by filing the Writ and Statement of Claim.

The Plaintiff’s position throughout these proceedings is that the Defendant’s liability had already been admitted through the Defendant’s email and letter dated 19.3.2024 enclosing a draft payment arrangement agreement. The Plaintiff further contends that liability was thereafter conclusively determined by the Court of Appeal on 11.9.2025 in Civil Appeal No. B-02(IM)(NCVC)- 2116-12/2024.

The Defendant’s Defence 12. The Defence pleads that the Defendant never entered into the alleged manpower supply arrangement with the Plaintiff and never conducted business dealings directly with the Plaintiff. The Defendant further pleads that it had no knowledge of the alleged contractual arrangement relied upon by the Plaintiff and that the Plaintiff therefore has no cause of action against the Defendant.

The Defendant’s pleaded case is that the relevant dealings were instead conducted with Stallion Empire Sdn Bhd. According to the Defendant:

Stallion Empire introduced customers requiring security services;

Stallion Empire supplied manpower;

Stallion Empire issued invoices to customers on behalf of the Defendant; and

the Defendant made payments to Stallion Empire based on invoices and statements submitted by Stallion Empire.

The Defendant further pleads that Stallion Empire did not possess the requisite KDN licence to operate security services independently and therefore utilised the Defendant’s licence for the purpose of dealing with customers. The Defendant also pleads that the Plaintiff has no corporate relationship whatsoever with Stallion Empire.

The Defence additionally disputes the Plaintiff’s Appendix A computations and alleges that certain invoices had already been paid to Stallion Empire, some invoices remained disputed or unverified, and certain amounts claimed by the Plaintiff were inconsistent with the Plaintiff’s own pleaded formula.

The Defendant therefore maintains that the Plaintiff’s claim is disputed both as to liability and quantum.

The Judgment in Default, the Court of Appeal Decision and the Present Application 17. On 4.3.2024, the Plaintiff entered Judgment in Default against the Defendant.

The Defendant subsequently applied to set aside the Judgment in Default vide Enclosure 11. That application was dismissed on 8.11.2024.

The Defendant then appealed to the Court of Appeal.

On 11.9.2025, the Court of Appeal allowed the Defendant’s appeal and set aside the Judgment in Default. The Plaintiff now places substantial reliance on the broad grounds of the Court of Appeal.

In particular, the Plaintiff relies on the following passage reproduced in the Plaintiff’s Reply Submissions: “In our view, the letter dated 19 March 2024 from the appellant to the lawyer of the Respondent, together with the covering email, as well as the draft agreement constitute an admission of the claim of the respondent.”

The Plaintiff further relies on the Court of Appeal’s observation that: “there is a triable issue as to the quantum”

According to the Plaintiff, those findings demonstrate that the Court of Appeal conclusively determined liability in favour of the Plaintiff while leaving only the issue of quantum outstanding.

The Plaintiff therefore contends that the Defendant is estopped from disputing liability through the impugned portions of the Defence. The Plaintiff further argues that the impugned pleadings are contrary to the Court of Appeal’s findings, undermine finality in litigation and constitute an abuse of process.

The Defendant disputes that proposition entirely.

The Defendant contends that the Court of Appeal’s findings arose solely within the context of an interlocutory setting aside appeal and did not amount to a final adjudication of disputed factual issues after full trial. The Defendant further submits that the Court of Appeal was not adjudicating the merits of the Plaintiff’s contractual claim after oral evidence and cross-examination, but merely considering whether the Judgment in Default ought to be set aside and whether the Defendant had raised triable issues warranting trial.

The Defendant also maintains that the impugned portions of the Defence raise substantial and triable issues concerning privity, Stallion Empire, payment structures, invoices and computations which ought properly to be determined after oral and documentary evidence at trial.

Against that backdrop, the central issue before this Court was whether the Court of Appeal’s decision dated 11.9.2025 conclusively determined liability so as to render the impugned portions of the Defence plainly and obviously unsustainable and liable to be struck out under Order 18 rule 19 ROC 2012.

2.0

The Law on Striking Out Under Order 18 Rule 19 ROC 2012 29. The present application was filed pursuant to Order 18 rule 19(1)(a) and/or (c) and/or (d) ROC 2012. The relevant provision empowers the Court to strike out pleadings where they disclose no reasonable cause of action or defence, are scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, may prejudice or delay the fair trial of the action, or otherwise amount to an abuse of process.

Order 18 rule 19(1) ROC 2012 provides: “The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any pleading or the endorsement, of any writ in the action, or anything in any pleading or in the endorsement, on the ground that—

it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence, as the case may be;

it is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious;

it may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action; or

it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court.”

Order 18 rule 19(2) further provides: “No evidence shall be admissible on an application under subparagraph (1)(a).”

The principles governing the exercise of this jurisdiction are well settled. The striking out jurisdiction is a summary and exceptional jurisdiction which must be exercised sparingly and only in plain and obvious cases.

In Lee Nyan Choi v Voon Noon [1979] 2 MLJ 28, Lee Hun Hoe CJ (Borneo) stated: “The power to dismiss an action summarily without permitting a party to proceed to trial is a drastic power and should be exercised with utmost caution. The power of summary procedure should only be resorted to in plain and obvious cases.”

The same principle was emphatically reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36 where Mohamed Dzaiddin SCJ observed: “It is only in plain and obvious cases that recourse should be had to the summary process under this rule … and this summary procedure can only be adopted when it can be clearly seen that a claim or answer is on the face of it obviously unsustainable.”

The Supreme Court further cautioned: “It cannot be exercised by a minute examination of the documents and facts of the case in order to see whether the party has a cause of action or a defence.”

Similarly, in Harapan Permai Sdn Bhd v Sabah Forest Industries Sdn Bhd [2011] 2 MLJ 192, the Court of Appeal reiterated that where disputed factual issues require viva voce evidence and mature consideration, striking out would generally be inappropriate. The Court observed: “We would now embark on a consideration of the authorities relied on by the parties herein. We wish to state categorically that the majority of the authorities cited for the defendant are not concerned with the summary procedure under O 18 r 19(1). The issue of illegality raised therein had been disposed of only after a full trial.”

The Court of Appeal further stressed that where factual disputes remain unresolved, such disputes ought properly to be ventilated at trial rather than summarily disposed of through affidavit evidence alone.

The Court must therefore exercise considerable restraint before striking out substantive portions of a defence.

The Plaintiff’s Position: Liability Already Concluded by the Court of Appeal 39. The Plaintiff’s case is fundamentally premised upon the proposition that the Court of Appeal had conclusively determined liability against the Defendant in Civil Appeal No. B- 02(IM)(NCVC)-2116-12/2024.

The Plaintiff relies heavily on the broad grounds of the Court of Appeal, in particular the following passage: “In our view, the letter dated 19 March 2024 from the appellant to the lawyer of the Respondent, together with the covering email, as well as the draft agreement constitute an admission of the claim of the respondent.”

The Plaintiff further relies on the Court of Appeal’s observation that: “there is a triable issue as to the quantum”

According to the Plaintiff, those findings demonstrate that liability had already been conclusively determined in favour of the Plaintiff and that only quantum remained outstanding for trial.

The Plaintiff therefore contends that the Defendant is estopped from denying liability through the impugned portions of the Defence. The Plaintiff submits that the Defendant cannot now approbate and reprobate by first admitting liability through the letter dated 19.3.2024 and thereafter disputing liability in the Defence.

The Plaintiff further submits that the impugned portions of the Defence directly contradict the Court of Appeal’s findings and undermine the principle of finality in litigation. According to the Plaintiff, the impugned pleadings therefore amount to an abuse of process under Order 18 rule 19 ROC 2012.

The Plaintiff additionally contends that the Court of Appeal’s findings give rise to issue estoppel and/or res judicata notwithstanding that the findings arose from interlocutory proceedings. The Plaintiff relies on authorities such as Firdaus Khan Bin Parit Khan & Anor v CIMB Bhd [2024] 4 MLJ 474 and Hartecon JV Sdn Bhd & Anor v Hartela Contractors Ltd [1996] 2 MLJ 57 for the proposition that findings made at earlier stages of litigation may nevertheless bind parties subsequently.

The Plaintiff further argues that the Defendant’s continued attempt to dispute liability constitutes a waste of judicial resources and undermines the finality of the Court of Appeal’s ruling.

The Plaintiff therefore prays that the impugned portions of the Defence be struck out and that the matter proceed solely on the issue of quantum.

The Defendant’s Position: Interlocutory Findings and the Existence of Triable Issues 48. The Defendant opposes the application on both procedural and substantive grounds.

Substantively, the Defendant contends that the Plaintiff has fundamentally misconceived the nature and scope of the Court of Appeal proceedings. According to the Defendant, the appeal before the Court of Appeal arose strictly from the Defendant’s interlocutory application to set aside the Judgment in Default and did not involve a substantive trial of the Plaintiff’s claim or a final adjudication on liability.

The Defendant further submits that in interlocutory proceedings:

findings are based solely on affidavit evidence;

witnesses are not subjected to cross-examination;

disputed factual matters are not comprehensively tested; and

interlocutory findings therefore lack the element of finality required for issue estoppel or res judicata.

In support of that proposition, the Defendant relies on JAKS Resources Bhd v Star Media Group Bhd and other appeals [2023] 6 MLJ 114 where the Court of Appeal held: “In an interlocutory application, finding of facts derived from often affidavits that are in conflict are not final and conclusive of the rights of the parties to be ventilated at the trial.”

The Defendant also relies on Ling Towi Sing @ Ling Chooi Sieng & Ors v Sino America Tours Corp Pte Ltd [2022] 3 MLJ 821 where the Court of Appeal stated: “The new High Court judge was not bound by what is a tentative finding on limitation by the previous judge for the purpose of a striking out application.”

The Defendant therefore contends that the Court of Appeal’s observations concerning the Defendant’s letter dated 19.3.2024 cannot automatically extinguish all remaining factual disputes concerning liability, privity, invoicing structures, payments and entitlement.

The Defendant further maintains that the impugned portions of the Defence raise substantial and triable issues which ought properly to proceed to trial. In particular, the Defendant pleads that:

there was no direct contractual relationship between

the relevant dealings were conducted through Stallion

Stallion Empire introduced customers and supplied manpower;

substantial payments had already been made to Stallion

certain invoices had already been settled;

some invoices remained disputed or unverified; and

the Plaintiff’s claim may expose the Defendant to double payment.

The Defendant therefore contends that the impugned pleadings are not frivolous, vexatious or unsustainable but instead go directly to the core factual disputes requiring adjudication at trial.

Procedurally, the Defendant additionally contends that the Plaintiff’s application is defective because it invokes Order 18 rule 19(1)(a), (c) and (d) cumulatively while simultaneously relying on affidavit evidence. The Defendant relies on Pegasus Engineers Sdn Bhd v Sambu (M) Sdn Bhd [1998] 4 MLJ 129.

The Plaintiff disputes the procedural objection and relies on See Thong & Anor v Saw Beng Chong [2012] 1 LNS 817 for the proposition that cumulative reliance on multiple limbs under Order 18 rule 19 does not automatically invalidate an application provided affidavit evidence is disregarded in relation to limb (a).

Against that backdrop, the central issue before this Court is whether the Court of Appeal’s interlocutory findings truly amounted to a final adjudication of liability such as to render the impugned portions of the Defence plainly and obviously unsustainable.

3.0

Whether the Court of Appeal Had Conclusively Determined Liability 59. Having considered the pleadings, affidavits, written submissions and authorities relied upon by parties, this Court was unable to accept the Plaintiff’s central contention that the Court of Appeal had conclusively and finally determined liability against the Defendant so as to render the impugned portions of the Defence plainly and obviously unsustainable.

The Plaintiff relies heavily on the broad grounds of the Court of Appeal delivered on 11.9.2025. In particular, the Plaintiff relies on the Court of Appeal’s observations concerning the Defendant’s letter dated 19.3.2024 and the accompanying draft agreement.

The relevant portions of the Court of Appeal’s findings, as reproduced by the Plaintiff in its submissions, state as follows: “In our view, the letter dated 19 March 2024 from the appellant to the lawyer of the Respondent, together with the covering email, as well as the draft agreement constitute an admission of the claim of the respondent.”

The Plaintiff further relies on the Court of Appeal’s observation that: “there is a triable issue as to the quantum”

Based on those passages, the Plaintiff argues that the Court of Appeal had conclusively determined liability in favour of the Plaintiff and that only quantum remained to be tried.

The Plaintiff further submits that: “it is plain that the Court of Appeal in no uncertain terms concluded that the letter dated 19-3-2024 of the Defendant and its enclosure constituted an unequivocal admission by the Defendant of the Plaintiff’s claim.” and: “Thus, for all intents and purpose, the liability of the Defendant to the Plaintiff in respect of his present claim against the Defendant has been ascertained by the Court of Appeal conclusively, and finally.”

With respect, this Court is unable to agree with the Plaintiff’s construction of the Court of Appeal’s decision.

The appeal before the Court of Appeal arose from the Defendant’s application to set aside the Judgment in Default entered against it on 4.3.2024. The Court of Appeal was therefore not conducting a full trial on the merits of the Plaintiff’s contractual claim. The appellate court did not hear oral evidence, did not receive cross-examination and did not undertake a complete forensic evaluation of disputed factual matters. Rather, the Court of Appeal was concerned with whether the Judgment in Default ought to remain and whether the Defendant had raised matters warranting the setting aside of that judgment.

This distinction is important. Findings made during interlocutory proceedings are ordinarily based upon affidavit evidence and are not usually intended to constitute final adjudications upon disputed factual issues after full trial.

In JAKS Resources Bhd v Star Media Group Bhd and other appeals [2023] 6 MLJ 114, the Court of Appeal observed: “In an interlocutory application, finding of facts derived from often affidavits that are in conflict are not final and conclusive of the rights of the parties to be ventilated at the trial.”

The Court of Appeal further referred with approval to Cheng Hang Guan & Ors v Perumahan Farlim (Penang) Sdn Bhd & Ors [1988] 3 MLJ 90 where it was held that: “The order … was merely a prima facie view and lacked the element of finality since it is always open to the High Court, at the final hearing, to review that question involved and to arrive at an opposite conclusion in the light of all evidence both oral and documentary should the circumstances so required.”

Likewise, in Ling Towi Sing & Ors v Sino America Tours Corp Pte Ltd [2022] 3 MLJ 821, the Court of Appeal reiterated: “The new High Court judge was not bound by what is a tentative finding on limitation by the previous judge for the purpose of a striking out application.”

Most significantly, despite the observations reproduced above, the Court of Appeal nevertheless ultimately set aside the Judgment in Default in its entirety. The Court of Appeal did not enter judgment on admission against the Defendant, did not direct that the matter to proceed solely for assessment of damages, and did not expressly confine the remaining proceedings to quantum alone.

In the judgment of this Court, the procedural consequence of setting aside the Judgment in Default is highly significant. Once the Judgment in Default was set aside, the parties reverted to the ordinary litigation process. The Defendant became entitled to file and maintain its Defence subject to the ordinary rules governing pleadings and trial. If the Court of Appeal had intended to conclusively determine liability while leaving only quantum to be assessed, the appellate order would reasonably have reflected such intention expressly. No such order was made.

The Plaintiff nevertheless contends that the Court of Appeal’s observations gave rise to issue estoppel and/or res judicata. This Court is unable to agree. The doctrines of issue estoppel and res judicata require finality and conclusiveness. The Court must be satisfied that the earlier decision finally determined the precise issue sought to be reopened.

In Pengiran Othman Shah bin Pengiran Mohd Yusoff & Anor v Karambunai Resorts Sdn Bhd [1996] 1 MLJ 309, the Court of Appeal cautioned that where disputed questions of fact remain unresolved and require oral evidence, interlocutory findings ought not be treated as finally determinative of those disputes.

In the present case, the Court of Appeal was not adjudicating liability after a full trial but was dealing with an interlocutory setting aside appeal. In those circumstances, this Court was not satisfied that the appellate observations concerning the Defendant’s letter dated 19.3.2024 could automatically extinguish all remaining disputes concerning privity, contractual structure, invoicing arrangements, payments and entitlement.

Whether the Impugned Portions of the Defence Raise Triable Issues 76. The Defendant’s pleaded case raises substantial and triable issues which, in the judgment of this Court, ought properly to proceed to trial.

The Defence pleads that there was no direct contractual relationship between the Plaintiff and Defendant, that the relevant dealings were conducted through Stallion Empire Sdn Bhd, that Stallion Empire introduced customers and supplied manpower, and that substantial payments had already been made to Stallion Empire. The Defence further disputes the Plaintiff’s computations and alleges that portions of the invoices relied upon by the Plaintiff had either already been settled, remained disputed or had not been paid by customers.

The Plaintiff, of course, disputes those assertions and maintains that Stallion Empire was merely utilised by the Defendant in its dealings with the Plaintiff and that payments to Stallion Empire do not extinguish the Defendant’s liability to the Plaintiff. However, the existence of those competing factual narratives itself demonstrates why the present matter is unsuitable for summary disposal under Order 18 rule 19 ROC 2012.

The Court cannot, at interlocutory stage, conclusively determine the true nature of the relationship between the Plaintiff, Defendant and Stallion Empire merely by undertaking a minute examination of affidavits and documents.

In Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36, the Supreme Court made clear that: “It cannot be exercised by a minute examination of the documents and facts of the case in order to see whether the party has a cause of action or a defence.”

Likewise, in Seruan Gemilang Makmur Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Pahang Darul Makmur & Anor [2016] 3 MLJ 1, the Federal Court reaffirmed that striking out should only be resorted to in plain and obvious cases where the pleading is “obviously unsustainable” on its face.

The Plaintiff’s submission would effectively require this Court to conclude, summarily and without trial, that:

Stallion Empire was legally irrelevant;

payments allegedly made to Stallion Empire are immaterial;

the Defendant’s pleaded disputes concerning invoices are unsustainable;

the Defendant’s denial of direct contractual relationship is hopeless; and

the Court of Appeal’s interlocutory observations conclusively extinguished all remaining disputes on liability.

With respect, this Court is unable to arrive at such conclusions at this interlocutory stage.

The present case plainly involves factual disputes requiring evidential scrutiny. The Defendant’s pleadings are neither fanciful nor incoherent. They are directed toward identifiable factual disputes concerning privity, invoicing structures, payment arrangements and computations. The Defence therefore cannot be characterised as plainly and obviously unsustainable merely because the Plaintiff disputes the Defendant’s factual position.

Whether the Defence is Frivolous, Vexatious or an Abuse of Process 85. This Court was also unable to conclude that the impugned portions of the Defence are scandalous, frivolous or vexatious within the meaning of Order 18 rule 19 ROC 2012.

In See Thong & Anor v Saw Beng Chong [2013] 3 MLJ 235, the Court of Appeal explained that “frivolous” and “vexatious” pleadings refer to pleadings which are obviously unsustainable or groundless and which possess no prospect of success. The impugned pleadings in the present case do not fall within that category.

The pleadings are neither irrelevant nor abusive. They are directed toward the Defendant’s substantive position on liability, payment structures and invoicing arrangements. The Defence cannot therefore be categorised as frivolous or vexatious merely because the Plaintiff contends that the Defendant’s case is weak.

The authorities consistently emphasise that even a weak defence ought not to be struck out summarily if it raises arguable or triable issues. In the present matter, the impugned pleadings plainly raise issues requiring full factual ventilation.

Similarly, this Court was unable to accept the Plaintiff’s contention that the impugned pleadings prejudice or delay the fair trial of the action. The dispute between parties is not one of procedural embarrassment but one of substantive disagreement on liability and entitlement. The Plaintiff itself has responded substantively to the Defendant’s allegations in the Reply to Defence and affidavits. The existence of serious factual disputes is therefore not a reason to strike out pleadings; rather, it is often the very reason why the matter ought to proceed to trial.

Nor was this Court persuaded that the Defence amounts to an abuse of process.

In Gabriel Peter & Partners v Wee Chong Jin [1998] 1 SLR 374, referred to in Kainan Sdn Bhd v Ocean Packaging Sdn Bhd & Anor [2021] 1 LNS 2326, abuse of process was described as involving misuse of the Court’s machinery for collateral or improper purposes.

In the present case, the Defendant is not seeking to reopen a final judgment after trial. The Judgment in Default had itself been set aside by the Court of Appeal. The Defendant thereafter filed a Defence in the ordinary course of litigation. In those circumstances, it cannot properly be said that the Defendant is abusing the process of Court merely because it seeks to contest liability at trial.

4.0

This Court also considered the Defendant’s preliminary objection concerning the cumulative invocation of Order 18 rule 19(1)(a), (c) and (d). The Defendant relied on Pegasus Engineers Sdn Bhd v Sambu (M) Sdn Bhd [1998] 4 MLJ 129 and Abeo International Pte Ltd v Tia and Noordin Solutions Pte Ltd [2020] MLJU 1020 in support of the proposition that the limbs under Order 18 rule 19 ought not be invoked cumulatively where affidavit evidence is relied upon. The Plaintiff, however, relied on the later Court of Appeal decision in See Thong & Anor v Saw Beng Chong for the proposition that cumulative reliance on multiple limbs does not automatically invalidate an application provided affidavit evidence is disregarded in relation to limb (a).

In the view of this Court, it is unnecessary to conclusively determine the preliminary objection in order to dispose of Enclosure 58. Even assuming in favour of the Plaintiff that the application is procedurally maintainable, the Plaintiff nevertheless fails on the substantive merits.

Accordingly, this Court finds that the Court of Appeal’s decision dated 11.9.2025 did not amount to a final adjudication of liability after full trial; that the Court of Appeal’s observations concerning the Defendant’s letter dated 19.3.2024 do not automatically give rise to issue estoppel or res judicata barring the Defendant from maintaining its Defence; that the impugned portions of the Defence raise genuine and triable issues concerning privity, Stallion Empire, invoices, payment structures and computations; and that the Defence cannot be said to be plainly and obviously unsustainable within the meaning of Order 18 rule 19 ROC

2012.

This Court therefore concludes that the present matter is plainly unsuitable for summary disposal. The issues raised by parties ought properly to be determined at full trial upon comprehensive consideration of oral and documentary evidence.

Accordingly, Enclosure 58 is dismissed.

Costs of RM3,000.00 are awarded to the Defendant.

The matter shall proceed for further case management. Dated 27 May 2026 -sgd-ANITA BINTI HARUN JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER HIGH COURT OF MALAYA SHAH ALAM SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN To the parties’ solicitors: For the Plaintiff : M.Rajenthirakumar a/l R.Malaiapan (Messrs Kumar & Associates) For the Defendant: Yap Bing Yew & Leong Yee Dawn (Messrs Bing Wen & Associates)