This would mean that O. 92 rule 1(1) on the language of documents being in the national language would equally apply to matrimonial proceedings. [17] The exception to this requirement would be the proviso in O. r.1(4) where the matrimonial proceedings can commence or be conducted partly in English provided there is a certificate of urgency and copies of the documents in the national language shall be filed within two weeks or such extended period as the court may allow. In the instant appeal, it is not disputed the Husband did not fall within the exception. [18] In fact, the position of the Husband was that there is no requirement to file encl. 20, or for that matter, any of its application, in Bahasa Malaysia. Heavy reliance was placed on the Registrar’s Circular which provides as follows: [19] Reference was also made to a Bar Council Circular No 153/2019 dated 6-8-2019 (BC Circular) which is as follows: [20] In essence, the submission was that the Registrar’s Circular meant that cause papers for matrimonial proceedings could be filed in English as the Bahasa Malaysia translation of the Divorce and Matrimonial Proceedings Rules 1980 had yet to be gazetted. The fact of there being no such Bahasa Malaysia translation, is also undisputed. [21] The above submission was without merit as the Registrar’s Circular is at best administrative in nature. For such a proposition, we take guidance from the Supreme Court in Ooi Bee Tat v Tan Ah Chim & Sons Sdn Bhd and another appeal [1995] 3 MLJ 465 that: “… Practice directions are intended to be no more than a direction for administrative purpose …” [22] The Federal Court in Megat Najmuddin bin Dato Seri Megat Khas v Bank Bumiputra (M) Bhd speaking through Steve Shim CJSS [2002] 1 MLJ 385 had this to say at pages 403 and 404: “From the contents therein, it can be seen that the said practice direction deals specifically with documents falling under r 18(4)(d) of the RCA. The parts underscored are significant for our purpose. The first part provides that as soon as the appellant receives the sealed order from the High Court, it can be filed as a supplementary record of appeal without any application. The second part provides an alternative requirement, ie that the appellant is allowed to tender a copy of the judgment, decree or order appealed from on the day of the hearing of the appeal in open court … It is true that the Chief Justice has been empowered under r 110 of the RFC to issue practice directions. So has the President of the Court of Appeal under r 77 of the RCA. Nevertheless, it cannot have been in the contemplation of Parliament that they can issue practice directions in direct conflict with procedural rules of court which have been statutorily laid down. In my view, to the extent that such practice directions are in conflict, in the sense of superceding or deviating substantially from statutory rules of court, they are of no legal effect whatsoever. Of course, once practice directions have been properly and legally issued, they must be complied with. I believe that to be trite (see Yeo Yoo Teik v Jemaah Pengadilan Sewa, Pulau Pinang & Anor [1996] 2 MLJ 54; Raja Guppal a/l Ramasamy v Sagaran a/l Pakian [1999] 2 MLJ 677).” [23] The Registrar’s Circular cannot therefore depart from the language requirement as clearly stated in O. 92 r.1(1) RC 2012. To echo the words of Steve Shim CJSS in Megat Najmuddin, “to the extent that such directions are in conflict, in the sense of superseding or deviating substantially from statutory rules of court, they are of no legal effect whatsoever”. [24] Reliance was also placed on a Federal Court case of Lau Keen Fai v Lim Ban Kay @ Lim Chiam Boon & Anor [2012] 2 MLJ 8 for the proposition that the Registrar’s Circular being a specific and special provision for divorce and matrimonial proceedings would exclude the general provision of a general law as set out in O. 92 r.1(1) RC 2012. At page 15, this was said: “[13] It is also to be noted the provision of s 96(a) of the CJA is a provision regulating civil appeals in general to the Federal Court. The LPA is an Act relating to the legal profession in Malaysia, specifically to regulate the legal profession. The maxim generalia specialibus non derogant is applicable here which states, inter alia, that where a special provision is made in a statute as in s 103E of the LPA that special provision excludes the operation of a general provision in the general law (see the case of Director of Customs, Federal Territory v Ler Cheng Chye (Liquidator of Castwell Sdn Bhd, in liquidation) [1995] 2 MLJ 600).” Note: LPA refers to the Legal Profession Act 1976. [25] Lau Keen Fai can be easily distinguished where in that case there were two specific Acts of Parliament. In our instant appeal, we have on the one hand O. 92 r.1(1) RC 2012 which is statutorily enacted as against the Registrar’s Circular which is administrative in nature. Although the Registrar’s Circular may be specific, it cannot be elevated to a rule which overrides O. 92 r.1(1). [26] The significance of the use of the national language in court proceedings was underscored in Dato Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim referring to Zainun bte Hj Dahlan. Refer to pages 58 and 59 where this Court in dealing with a memorandum of appeal filed in English categorically rejected it, without further ado, where the law required it to be the national language. It was stated resoundingly that “What is mandatory, must be adhered to”. We refer to page 58 as follows: “[50] We categorically say that the mandatory provisions of art 152 of the Federal Constitution read together with s 8 of the National Language Acts 1963/67 (Act 32) and s 3 of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 (Act 388) must be adhered to. It requires the appellant to file the memorandum of appeal in the national language. No other language will be entertained. And the failure of the appellant to do so amounts to a blatant breach which would compel us to conclude that no memorandum of appeal has been filed at all. The purported memorandum of appeal in the English language must accordingly be rejected outright without further ado. What is mandatory, must be strictly adhered to. Otherwise dire consequences would follow.” [27] Likewise, in our instant appeal, as we find that the Registrar’s Circular is administrative in nature, it cannot possibly prevail over O. r.1(1) RC 2012 which requires court documents to be in the national language. Further the proviso in O. 92 r.1(4) could not assist the Husband. Under the circumstances and despite the Court being informed that the filing of cause papers in English is common in the High Court of Penang and Kuala Lumpur, we find that the HC was not plainly wrong in striking out encl. 20. [28] We note that, and it is not disputed that the ex parte injunction order dated 24-1-2022 was not served on the Husband within 7 days and also not within the 21 days validity period. An inter parte hearing date was also not fixed within 14 days. For all intent and purpose, the ex parte order had already expired by the time encl. 20 was filed on 24-3-2022 to set it aside. Conclusion [29] For the above reasons, the appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs. (SEE MEE CHUN) Judge Court of Appeal Malaysia Dated: 19-9-2023 Counsel for the Appellant: Honey Tan Aly Ean (Tay Kit Hoo with her) Messrs. Seira & Sharizad Kuala Lumpur Counsel for the Respondent: Dato Harpal Singh Grewal (Shailender Bhar and Chai Jia Yi with him) Messrs. Raihan & Shai Kuala Lumpur Cases referred to: Dato Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v Tun Dr Mahathir bin Mohamad [2010] 2 MLJ 41 Zainun bte Hj Dahlan lwn Rakyat Merchant Bankers Bhd & Satu lagi [1998] 1 MLJ 532 Ooi Bee Tat v Tan Ah Chim & Sons Sdn Bhd and another appeal [1995] 3 MLJ 465 Megat Najmuddin bin Dato Seri Megat Khas v Bank Bumiputra (M) Bhd [2002] 1 MLJ 385 Lau Keen Fai v Lim Ban Kay @ Lim Chiam Boon & Anor [2012] 2 MLJ 8 Legislation referred to: Rules of Court 2012, O. 92 r.1(1) and (4)