Rosli Bin Abd Rahman v Pendakwa Raya (TA-42JSKS(A)-5-06/2025)

This is an appeal against the conviction and sentence imposed by the learned Sessions Court Judge ("SCJ") at the Sessions Court Kuala Terengganu. The Appellant, Rosli bin Abd Rahman, was found guilty of thirteen (13) charges across five (5) separate cases which were tried together. The Appellant was sentenced to various terms of imprisonment ranging from one (1) to fifteen (15) years, with all sentences ordered to run concurrently, and a one-year police supervision order under Section 27 of the Sexual Offences Against Children Act 2017 (Act 792). Being dissatisfied, the Appellant appealed against both conviction and sentence.

At the material time, the Appellant was the Principal of a religious high school in Kuala Terengganu. The Complainant (SP1) was a female student aged between 16 years 8 months and 17 years 8 months during the period of the alleged offences from November 2020 to October 2021. The prosecution's case was that the Appellant sexually groomed SP1, commencing with non-physical sexual communication, escalating to physical sexual assault, and culminating in multiple acts of rape by taking advantage of his position of authority as her Principal.

The charges were framed under three main statutory provisions: Section 11(1)(a) and Section 14(a), (c) and (d) of Act 792, and Section 376(2)(f) of the Penal Code (Act 574).

Before addressing the substantive issues, this Court considers it necessary to restate the well-established principles governing appellate intervention in findings of fact made by a trial court. It is a cardinal principle of appellate review that an appellate court will be slow to disturb findings of fact made by a trial judge. This deference is rooted in the distinct and significant advantage enjoyed by the trial judge, who has had the opportunity to observe the demeanour, conduct, and bearing of witnesses as they testify in open court. Such intangibles - a hesitant answer, a fleeting expression, a tone of voice - are often critical in assessing credibility but are entirely lost on a court reading only the cold transcript of proceedings.

This principle has been consistently articulated in our jurisprudence. In Public Prosecutor v Wan Razali Kassim [1970] 2 MLJ 79 (FC), the Federal Court held that an appellate court ought not to interfere with findings of fact by a trial judge unless they are plainly wrong or based on a misappreciation of the evidence. That case remains the cornerstone of appellate review. The same principle was reaffirmed in Herchun Singh & Ors v Public Prosecutor [1969] 2 MLJ 209 (FC), where the court emphasized that the trial judge's view on the credibility of witnesses must be given proper weight and consideration.

However, as the Court of Appeal in Mohd Yusri bin Mangsor & Anor v Public Prosecutor & Another Appeal [2014] 4 MLJ 875 (CA) clarified, this deference is not absolute and is not a licence for the trial court to err without consequence. An appellate court may and will intervene where, inter alia:

the judgment is based on a wrong premise of fact or law;

there has been insufficient or inadequate judicial appreciation or evaluation of the evidence;

the trial judge has overlooked or ignored the inherent probabilities or improbabilities of the case;

the trial judge has so fundamentally misdirected himself or herself that no reasonable court, properly directing itself, would have arrived at the same conclusion; or

the finding of fact is perverse or plainly against the weight of the evidence.

This Court is therefore duty-bound to carefully scrutinize the learned SCJ's findings against these established exceptions. The mere fact that this Court might have formed a different view on the evidence is not sufficient to justify interference. There must be a demonstrated error of principle, a clear misdirection, or a finding that is palpably unsupported by the evidence. With these principles in mind, this Court proceeds to examine the appeal.

This appeal raises three primary issues for this Court's determination:

Whether the learned SCJ erred in finding that a prima facie case had been established against the Appellant at the close of the prosecution's case;

Whether the learned SCJ erred in convicting the Appellant at the conclusion of the trial; and

Whether the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive. ANALYSIS OF THE OFFENCES AND THEIR ELEMENTS

Before addressing the specific issues, it is necessary to set out the legal elements of each offence with which the Appellant was charged, as the prosecution was required to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 11(1)(a) of the Sexual Offences Against Children Act 2017 provides that any person who communicates sexually with a child commits an offence. The elements of this offence are:

The accused communicated with a child;

The communication was sexual in nature; and

The communication was made by any means, including verbally, in writing, or electronically.

Section 11(2) further clarifies that a person is deemed to communicate sexually if the communication or any part of it relates to sexual activity, or any reasonable person would view any part of the communication as sexual.

In the present case, the prosecution alleged that the Appellant communicated sexually with SP1 via telephone calls on 8 November 2020 and on another occasion in November 2020. The content of the communication included questions such as whether SP1 liked being hugged by the Appellant, whether she was "wet" (basah), whether she was "stimulated" (stim), and whether she was "aroused". The Appellant also instructed SP1 to call him "abang" and referred to her as "sayang", which in the context of a teacher-student relationship was inappropriate and bore sexual connotations. Section 14(a), (c) and (d) of Act 792 - Physical Sexual Assault on a Child

Section 14 of Act 792 criminalises various forms of physical sexual assault against a child. The relevant subsections provide:

Section 14(a): Any person who touches any part of the body of a child for sexual purposes commits an offence.

Section 14(c): Any person who causes a child to touch any part of the child's own body for sexual purposes commits an offence.

Section 14(d): Any person who touches or makes physical contact with any part of the body of a child for sexual purposes commits an offence.

The common elements across all subsections of Section 14 are:

The victim is a child (under 18 years of age);

The accused touched the child, caused the child to touch herself, or made physical contact with the child; and

The touching or contact was for a sexual purpose.

In the present case, the Appellant was charged under Section 14(a) for multiple incidents where he kissed the complainant's breasts, hugged her, rubbed his genitals against her, and committed other acts of physical sexual assault. He was charged under Section 14(c) for an incident in February 2021 where, through a video call, he gestured to SP1 to rub her own breasts. He was charged under Section 14(d) for an incident on 25 November 2020 where he inserted his finger into SP1's vagina. Section 376(2)(f) of the Penal Code - Rape by Using a Position of Authority

Section 376(2)(f) of the Penal Code provides that a person commits rape if he has sexual intercourse with a woman with her consent, where such consent was obtained by using a position of authority over her or by reason of a professional or other relationship of trust.

The elements of this offence are:

The accused had sexual intercourse with the victim;

There was penetration of the penis into the vagina (any degree, however slight);

The victim consented to the sexual intercourse; and

The victim's consent was obtained by the accused using his position of authority over the victim or by reason of a relationship of trust.

This Court emphasizes that consent obtained through the misuse of a position of authority is not true consent in the eyes of the law. The section recognises that a subordinate or dependent person, particularly a minor student, may feel psychologically unable to refuse the advances of a person in authority, even if no explicit threat is uttered. The element of "using a position of authority" need not involve active coercion or overt intimidation; it is sufficient that the accused exploited the inherent power imbalance in the relationship. In a school setting, the principal holds ultimate authority over students. A student who is groomed may comply not out of genuine willingness but out of deference, fear of repercussions, confusion, or misplaced affection - none of which constitutes true consent.

In the present case, the Appellant was charged under Section 376(2)(f) for five (5) separate incidents of rape occurring between January 2021 and October 2021. The Appellant was the Principal of the school attended by SP1, and SP1 was a minor under his direct care, supervision, and disciplinary authority.

Learned counsel for the Appellant raised a multitude of grounds challenging both conviction and sentence. In essence, counsel contended that the learned SCJ had erred in law and fact, resulting in a miscarriage of justice. The Appellant's submissions can be summarized as follows:

Prima Facie and Evidentiary Issues

Counsel submitted that the learned SCJ erred in finding that a prima facie case had been established at the close of the prosecution's case. It was argued that the prosecution had failed to prove the essential elements of the charges, particularly under Section 376(2)(f) of the Penal Code, where the element of "consent obtained by using a position of authority" was not made out. Counsel contended that the relationship between the Appellant and SP1 was consensual and that SP1 had willingly participated in the relationship.

On the issue of credibility, the Appellant argued that SP1 was not a reliable witness. Counsel pointed to alleged material contradictions between SP1's oral testimony and the first police report (Exhibit P9), as well as inconsistencies between SP1's evidence and that of the Investigating Officer (SP12). It was submitted that SP1 had initially described the relationship as "suka sama suka" (consensual) in her police report, only to change her narrative during the trial. Counsel argued that such a fundamental shift in the complainant's story should have led the learned SCJ to reject her evidence entirely.

Counsel further relied on the testimony of SP12 during crossexamination, where SP12 allegedly agreed that (i) the homestay incident was consensual, (ii) SP1 was never afraid of the Appellant, (iii) it was reasonable to conclude they were lovers, and (iv) no rape occurred on 18 December 2020. The Appellant submitted that the learned SCJ's failure to address these "fatal admissions" constituted judicial silence and a serious misdirection.

Defects in the Charges

As a preliminary issue, counsel argued that the charges under Section 11(a) of Act 792 (without the subsection 1(a)) were defective because the referenced section did not exist in the statute. It was contended that this defect was not curable under Section 422 of the Criminal Procedure Code and that the proceedings in respect of those charges were therefore void ab initio.

Counsel also submitted that several charges failed to specify the precise date of the alleged offence, stating only the month or year (e.g., "bulan November 2020", "bulan Februari 2021", "bulan April 2021"). It was argued that this lack of specificity prejudiced the Appellant's right to mount a proper defence, including the defence of alibi under Section 402A of the Criminal Procedure Code.

The Defence Case

The Appellant contended that the learned SCJ had wrongly dismissed the entire defence as a bare denial and an afterthought without conducting a proper judicial analysis. Counsel highlighted that the Appellant had given detailed testimony under oath (SD1), explaining that SP1 had initiated and pursued the relationship, that SP1 had invited him to meet her in the school toilet, and that he had rejected her advances on several occasions.

Counsel placed significant emphasis on the testimony of SD2, a teacher with a PhD who had served at the same school for over fifteen years. SD2 testified that SP1 had expressed admiration for the Appellant, that in her opinion it was SP1 who had initiated the relationship, and that SP1 had asked her whether the Principal was handsome. The Appellant argued that this independent evidence, coming from a highly qualified and neutral witness, ought to have raised a reasonable doubt on the prosecution's case.

It was further submitted that the learned SCJ had made speculative inferences about the Appellant's state of mind, using phrases such as "OKT merasakan line clear", "OKT cuba test line", and "OKT cuba cover line", without any evidentiary basis. Counsel argued that such inferences amounted to the trial Judge acting as an expert psychologist without being qualified to do so.

Medical Evidence and the Element of Penetration

On the rape charges, counsel argued that the medical evidence did not support the prosecution's case. The doctor (SP7) had confirmed only "old tears" on the hymen, with no fresh injuries, inflammation, or bleeding. Counsel submitted that this was consistent with consensual sexual activity over a period of time, not forced or non-consensual rape.

Counsel also highlighted what was described as a "recent invention" in SP1's testimony. During cross-examination, SP1 initially stated that the Appellant's finger "did not enter" her vagina. However, during re-examination, SP1 changed her testimony, stating that the finger "did enter" but that she had forgotten to mention it earlier. Counsel argued that this material change was an embellishment that should have destroyed SP1's credibility.

Failure to Call Material Witnesses

The Appellant submitted that the prosecution had failed to call several material witnesses, including Zanariah (the school clerk), Jilan (the security guard), Ustaz Marzuki (the Senior Assistant for Student Affairs), and SP1's friends who were present at KTCC Mall. Counsel argued that the learned SCJ ought to have drawn an adverse inference under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 that, if called, these witnesses would have given evidence unfavourable to the prosecution.

Inconsistent Behaviour of the Victim

Counsel pointed to what was described as behaviour inconsistent with a genuine rape victim: SP1 bought the Appellant a birthday gift, called him "abang" and "sayang", saved his name as "habib" (beloved) in her phone, withdrew her police report to focus on her SPM examination, and appeared to smile and act voluntarily during a video call (Exhibit P13A). It was argued that this behaviour raised a strong inference of a consensual romantic relationship, not rape.

Finally, counsel submitted that SP1 had a motive to fabricate the allegations. It was suggested that the Appellant had rejected SP1's marriage proposal and that SP1 was distressed by the Appellant's decision to take early pension, as this would end their relationship. Counsel argued that the false report was an act of revenge by a spurned lover.

Sentence

On sentence, counsel submitted that the effective term of fifteen (15) years imprisonment was manifestly excessive given the Appellant's age (60 years), his 33 years of unblemished service as an educator, his lack of prior criminal record, and his family responsibilities, including caring for a wife with terminal cancer and supporting eight children. Counsel prayed that the appeal be allowed, the conviction quashed, and the Appellant acquitted and discharged, or in the alternative, that the sentence be substantially reduced.

The learned Deputy Public Prosecutor, Puan Noradila binti Ab. Latif, appeared for the Respondent and submitted that the appeal was without merit and ought to be dismissed in its entirety. The Respondent's submissions are summarized as follows:

Prima Facie Case and Credibility of SP1

The Respondent argued that the prosecution had adduced credible and consistent evidence from 12 witnesses, sufficient to establish a prima facie case. The evidence of SP1 was particularly compelling. She gave a detailed, chronological account of 13 separate incidents over nearly one year, including the dates, locations, and specific acts committed by the Appellant. Her evidence was supported by the testimonies of her friends (SP8 and SP10), her parents (SP4 and SP5), and medical officers (SP6 and SP7).

On the issue of credibility, the Respondent contended that the learned SCJ had the unique advantage of observing SP1's demeanour and found her to be a truthful and reliable witness. Relying on Public Prosecutor v Wan Razali Kassim (supra) and Mohd Yusri bin Mangsor & Anor v Public Prosecutor (supra), the Respondent submitted that the appellate court should be slow to disturb such findings of fact.

Regarding the alleged contradictions, the Respondent argued that they were minor, immaterial, and did not go to the core elements of the offences. It was submitted that the first police report (Exhibit P9) was not an encyclopedia of the entire case, and it was well established that an FIR need not contain every detail. The victim's initial reluctance to disclose the full extent of the abuse, out of fear and shame, was entirely understandable, especially for a minor.

The Investigating Officer's Testimony

The Respondent clarified that the alleged "admissions" by SP12 were responses to leading questions put by defence counsel during cross-examination. Such answers, given without elaboration, carried limited probative weight. The learned SCJ had correctly treated SP1 as the primary witness and SP12's evidence as merely corroborative. The trial Judge did not ignore SP12's testimony; he considered it and found it not to detract from the overall credibility of SP1.

The Respondent conceded that there was a typographical omission in the reference to Section 11(a) instead of Section 11(1)(a), but argued that this was a minor, curable defect under Section 422 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It was submitted that the Appellant was not misled or prejudiced, as he understood the nature of the charge and conducted his defence accordingly. On the issue of dates, the Respondent relied on Dato' Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v. Public Prosecutor [2004] 3 MLJ 405 (FC), where the Federal Court held that in sexual offences, the date is not a vital ingredient of the charge. What matters is proof of the sexual act and the identity of the offender.

The Defence was a Bare Denial

The Respondent submitted that the defence raised was nothing more than a bare denial and an afterthought. The Appellant had ample opportunity to cross-examine SP1 and SP12 on the facts now raised in his defence, but he failed to do so. The failure to challenge material facts during the prosecution's case justified the learned SCJ's finding that the defence was a recent fabrication.

As for SD2's opinion, the Respondent argued that her testimony was based on hearsay and personal speculation, not on direct observation of any sexual act. The Respondent argues that the learned SCJ was entitled to reject it in favour of SP1's direct, sworn testimony.

Medical Evidence and Penetration

The Respondent argued that the medical evidence was not inconsistent with the prosecution's case. The presence of "old tears" confirmed that penetrative sexual activity had occurred. The absence of fresh injuries was not conclusive proof that no rape occurred, particularly given the passage of time between the incidents and the medical examination. On the element of penetration, the Respondent submitted that the law requires only any degree of penetration, however slight. SP1's consistent evidence that the Appellant's penis entered her vagina was sufficient.

No Adverse Inference Warranted

The Respondent submitted that the prosecution was not obliged to call every possible witness. The witnesses named by the Appellant were not eyewitnesses to the sexual acts and could only have given corroborative evidence on peripheral matters. Since SP1's evidence was already found to be unusually convincing, the absence of those witnesses was not material, and no adverse inference was warranted under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950.

Behaviour of the Victim

The Respondent forcefully rejected the Appellant's argument that SP1's behaviour was inconsistent with that of a rape victim. The Respondent argued that there is no single "standard" behaviour for a victim of sexual abuse. Victims often react in complex and counter-intuitive ways, particularly when they have been groomed by a person in authority. The Appellant's argument that a victim must appear fearful and distressed at all times was described as a "myth of the perfect victim". The Respondent argues that the learned SCJ had correctly understood the dynamics of sexual grooming and was entitled to accept SP1's explanation that she felt confused, manipulated, and unable to resist the Appellant's authority.

Sentence

The Respondent submitted that the sentence of fifteen (15) years imprisonment (running concurrently) was neither manifestly excessive nor wrong in principle. It is argued that the learned SCJ had correctly weighed the mitigating factors against the serious aggravating factors, including the abuse of a position of trust, the grooming of a minor, the repeated nature of the offences, and the public interest in deterring such conduct by educators. The sentence was well within the statutory maximum, and this Court should not interfere.

The Respondent therefore prayed that the appeal against both conviction and sentence be dismissed and that the decision of the Sessions Court be affirmed. COURT'S FINDINGS ISSUE 1: Whether the learned SCJ erred in finding that a prima facie case had been established against the Appellant at the close of the prosecution's case

This Court finds no merit in the Appellant's challenge to the prima facie finding. The learned SCJ conducted a maximum evaluation of the prosecution's evidence as required under Section 182A of the Criminal Procedure Code. The prosecution called 12 witnesses, including the victim herself (SP1), her parents (SP4 and SP5), her friends (SP8 and SP10), medical officers (SP6 and SP7), and the Investigating Officer (SP12).

The evidence of SP1 was particularly critical. She testified in detail, providing a chronological account of thirteen (13) separate incidents over nearly one year. Her evidence was consistent on the material elements of each charge: the Appellant's identity, the locations, the nature of the acts, and the sequence of escalation from sexual communication to physical assault to rape. Her evidence was supported by contemporaneous complaints to her friends (SP8 and SP10) and by the medical evidence of a doctor (SP7) who confirmed old tears in the hymen consistent with penetrative sexual activity.

The Appellant argued that there were material contradictions between SP1's oral testimony and the first police report (Exhibit P9), and between SP1 and SP12 on certain details. However, as established in Chean Siong Guat v Public Prosecutor [1969] 2 MLJ 63 (HC) and Pie Bin Chin v PP [1985] 1 MLJ 234 (HC), discrepancies do not automatically render a witness incredible. The trial court must distinguish between material and minor discrepancies. Here, the alleged contradictions related to peripheral details such as the exact time of an incident or the precise wording used in a telephone call. None of these went to the core elements of the offences: the identity of the offender, the sexual nature of the acts, or the occurrence of penetration.

Furthermore, Section 18 of Act 792 expressly provides that a court may convict a person based on the uncorroborated evidence of a child witness. The trial Judge, having observed SP1's demeanour over multiple days of testimony and having had the advantage of assessing her credibility first-hand, found her to be a credible and reliable witness. This Court, applying the principles in Public Prosecutor v Wan Razali Kassim (supra) and Mohd Yusri bin Mangsor & Anor v Public Prosecutor (supra), must give due deference to that finding as it is based on the trial Judge's unique advantage - an advantage this appellate court does not share.

For all these reasons, the finding of a prima facie case was correct and is affirmed. This issue is resolved against the Appellant. ISSUE 2: Whether the learned SCJ erred in convicting the Appellant at the conclusion of the trial

The Appellant raised several sub-issues under this ground, each of which is addressed below.

Alleged admissions by the Investigating Officer (SP12)

The Appellant argued that SP12 admitted under cross-examination that the homestay incident was "suka sama suka" (consensual), that SP1 was never afraid of the Appellant, and that it was reasonable to conclude they were lovers. The Appellant submitted that the trial Judge's failure to address these admissions constituted a fatal error.

This Court finds this argument unpersuasive. First, the alleged "admissions" were responses to leading questions put by defence counsel during cross-examination. A response to a leading question, without elaboration or confirmation in chief, carries limited probative weight. Second, the learned SCJ did not ignore SP12's evidence. He duly considered the discrepancies between SP1 and SP12 on specific points and found them to be immaterial. The learned SCJ correctly held that the primary evidence was that of SP1 as the victim, and that SP12's evidence was merely corroborative in nature. The fact that the learned SCJ did not reproduce every exchange from the Notes of Evidence does not constitute judicial silence or misdirection. No reversible error is shown.

Contradiction between the police report and oral testimony

The Appellant argued that the first police report (Exhibit P9), which mentioned only one incident of "sexual intercourse" at a homestay, contradicted SP1's oral testimony of thirteen separate incidents.

This Court rejects this submission. A first information report (FIR) is not intended to be an exhaustive catalogue of every detail of the prosecution case. It is merely a memorandum to set the investigation in motion. It is a well-established principle that an FIR is not expected to contain every particular of the offence. Moreover, SP1 was a minor at the time she made the report, and she gave a credible explanation before the trial court that fear and shame prevented her from disclosing the full extent of the abuse immediately. The learned SCJ was entitled to accept that explanation as reasonable. This ground fails.

The defence as a "bare denial" and "afterthought"

The Appellant submitted that the learned SCJ wrongly shifted the burden of proof by labelling the defence as an "afterthought" because certain facts were not challenged during the prosecution's case.

This Court finds no error. The learned SCJ repeatedly and correctly stated the principle that the burden of proof lies on the prosecution throughout - from the opening of the case to the very end. The learned SCJ's reference to "afterthought" was a finding of fact and credibility, not a legal direction shifting the burden. The learned SCJ observed that the Appellant never raised critical aspects of his defence during cross-examination of SP1 or SP12 for example, that SP1 invited him to the toilet, that he had an alibi for 18 December 2020, or that SP1 had seduced him. It is settled law that failure to cross-examine a witness on a material fact can lead to an inference that the fact was not in dispute or that the defence on that point is an afterthought. The learned SCJ applied this principle correctly without reversing the legal burden.

Rejection of defence witnesses

The Appellant argued that the learned SCJ dismissed the defence as a "bare denial" without analysing the detailed testimony of SD1 (the Appellant himself), SD2 (a teacher with a PhD), and SD3 (a former Senior Assistant).

Having examined the Grounds of Judgment, this Court finds that the learned SCJ did analyse the defence evidence. The learned SCJ considered the Appellant's claim that SP1 invited him to the toilet and found it illogical for a principal to meet a student in a toilet for fear of her "merajuk" (sulking). The learned SCJ considered the alibi for 18 December 2020 and found it to be an afterthought because no alibi notice was filed pursuant to Section 402A of the Criminal Procedure Code and because SD2 herself admitted under cross-examination that the Appellant did attend school on some Fridays. As for SD2's opinion that SP1 initiated the relationship, the learned SCJ was entitled to prefer the direct, eyewitness evidence of SP1 over the opinion of a teacher who was not present during any of the alleged incidents. This Court finds no error in that assessment.

Speculative inferences

The Appellant complained that the learned SCJ made speculative inferences about his state of mind, such as "OKT merasakan line clear", "OKT cuba test line", and "OKT cuba cover line".

This Court holds that such comments are not speculative inferences in the legal sense. They are the trial Judge's common sense assessment of the sequence of events as narrated by SP1. It is the role and duty of a trial judge to draw reasonable inferences from proven facts. When a person in authority engages in sexual banter with a student and the student does not reject it, it is a reasonable inference that the person feels encouraged. When the same person then escalates to requesting a naked video call, it is a reasonable inference that he is testing the boundary. When the same person takes steps to ensure no one sees the student leaving a location, it is a reasonable inference that he is avoiding detection. These inferences were grounded in the evidence and were not speculative. This ground fails.

Element of penetration and medical evidence

The Appellant argued that the learned SCJ erred in law on the element of penetration for rape, and that the medical evidence of "old tears" did not support the prosecution case.

The law is clear and well-settled: for the offence of rape under Section 375 of the Penal Code, penetration means any degree of penetration, no matter how slight. The law does not require full or complete penetration. The learned SCJ correctly stated this principle. He also correctly distinguished between the offence of inserting a finger (Section 14(d) of Act 792) and the offence of rape (Section 376 of the Penal Code). SP1 consistently described incidents where the Appellant's penis entered her vagina. Her initial confusion during cross-examination about the exact details a common response among young victims of sexual abuse who are asked to recall painful and traumatic events with clinical precision is not fatal to the prosecution's case. As for the medical evidence, the doctor confirmed old tears in the hymen. This is not inconsistent with the victim's version. The absence of fresh or recent tears is not proof that rape did not occur, particularly given that the incidents occurred over a period of many months and that the medical examination took place after a significant lapse of time. This ground fails.

Failure to call material witnesses and adverse inference

The Appellant argued that the learned SCJ ought to have drawn an adverse inference under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 because the prosecution failed to call several material witnesses, including Zanariah (school clerk), Jilan (security guard), Ustaz Marzuki (Senior Assistant), and SP1's friends at KTCC Mall.

This Court disagrees. The prosecution is not obliged to call every possible witness who might have some knowledge of the case. The prosecution need only call witnesses sufficient to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The proposed witnesses could at best have corroborated whether the Appellant and SP1 were present at certain locations, a fact that was not seriously disputed. None of them were eyewitnesses to the sexual acts themselves. Moreover, the learned SCJ found that SP1's evidence was sufficient, consistent, and unusually convincing, and therefore the additional witnesses were not material. In these circumstances, no adverse inference is warranted. This ground fails.

The victim's behaviour and alleged fabrication

The Appellant submitted that SP1's behaviour - buying the Appellant a birthday gift, calling him "abang" and "sayang", saving his name as "habib" (beloved) in her phone, withdrawing the police report, and appearing to smile during a video call - was inconsistent with that of a genuine rape victim.

This Court emphatically rejects this submission. There is no single, prescribed, or standardised behaviour for a victim of sexual abuse. Victims respond to trauma in diverse, complex, and sometimes counter-intuitive ways. The phenomenon of "sexual grooming" which the learned SCJ expressly found to have occurred in this case - explains precisely why a young person may develop feelings of affection, loyalty, gratitude, or even romantic attachment towards an abuser in a position of authority. Such behaviour does not indicate genuine consent; it indicates the psychological effect of grooming, manipulation, and the exploitation of a power imbalance. The learned SCJ was acutely aware of this dynamic. The alleged motive of a rejected marriage proposal and the Appellant's pension application was speculative and was not established on the evidence. This ground fails.

For all the above reasons, and applying the principles of appellate restraint set out in Public Prosecutor v Wan Razali Kassim (supra) and Mohd Yusri bin Mangsor & Anor v Public Prosecutor (supra), this Court finds that the conviction of the Appellant by the learned SCJ was safe, sound, and fully supported by the evidence. This issue is resolved against the Appellant. ISSUE 3: Whether the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive.

The final issue is whether the sentence of fifteen (15) years' imprisonment (running concurrently) is manifestly excessive or wrong in principle.

The sentence imposed by the Sessions Court

The learned SCJ imposed individual sentences as follows:

Case No. TA-61JSK-1-01/2023: 1 year (Section 11(1)(a) first charge), 1 year (Section 11(1)(a) - second charge), 5 years (Section 14(a) - third charge).

Case No. TA-61JSK-2-01/2023: 5 years each for three charges under Section 14(a).

Case No. TA-61JSK-3-01/2023: 15 years (Section 376(2)(f) one charge).

Case No. TA-61JSK-4-01/2023: 15 years each for three charges under Section 376(2)(f).

Case No. TA-61JSK-5-01/2023: 5 years (Section 14(c)), 5 years (Section 14(d)), and 15 years (Section 376(2)(f)).

All sentences were ordered to run concurrently, resulting in an effective total imprisonment term of fifteen (15) years, commencing from the date of conviction on 24 June 2025. In addition, the learned SCJ ordered the Appellant to undergo police supervision for one (1) year at the Gong Badak Police Station under Section 27 of Act 792. No whipping was imposed on the account of the Appellant's age based on Section 289(c) of the Criminal Procedure Code.

Mitigating factors considered

The learned SCJ properly considered the mitigating factors advanced on behalf of the Appellant:

The Appellant was 60 years of age at the time of sentencing;

He had served 33 years as an educator;

He had no prior criminal record;

He was a first offender;

He had family responsibilities, including caring for a wife suffering from stage four lung cancer and supporting eight children, some of whom were still in school or university.

Aggravating factors

The trial Judge also correctly identified and weighed the aggravating factors, which this Court finds to be overwhelming:

The Appellant was in a position of great trust and authority as a school principal;

The victim was a minor child under his direct care, supervision, and disciplinary authority;

The Appellant systematically sexually groomed the victim over a period of nearly one year;

The offences escalated progressively: from sexual communication, to physical sexual assault, to multiple acts of rape;

The Appellant used his position of authority to obtain the victim's compliance, including by threatening that he would lose his job if she disclosed the relationship;

The offences were repeated on at least thirteen (13) separate occasions;

The victim, a young student, suffered lifelong psychological trauma as a result of the Appellant's abuse of power;

The public interest demanded a substantial deterrent sentence to send a clear and unequivocal message that such conduct by persons in authority - especially educators will not be tolerated by the courts.

Legal principles on sentencing

It is well established that an appellate court will not interfere with a sentence imposed by a trial court unless the sentence is manifestly excessive or inadequate, or wrong in principle (Adam Atan v PP [2009] 1 CLJ 33 (CA); Public Prosecutor v Sulaiman Ahmad [1993] 1 MLJ 74 (HC); Public Prosecutor v Loo Choon Fatt [1976] 2 MLJ 257 (HC)). The trial judge has a broad discretion, and the appellate court must respect that discretion unless it is clearly exercised improperly or based on a wrong appreciation of the facts or law.

The maximum penalty for an offence under Section 376(2)(f) of the Penal Code is thirty (30) years imprisonment and whipping. The maximum penalty for an offence under Section 14 of Act 792 is twenty (20) years imprisonment and whipping. The sentence of fifteen (15) years is well within these statutory limits and represents a mid-range sentence. Moreover, by ordering all sentences to run concurrently, the learned SCJ showed significant leniency. Had the sentences been ordered to run consecutively - which the court is entitled to do for multiple distinct offences - the Appellant would have faced a total term far exceeding fifteen years.

This Court also notes the learned SCJ's correct emphasis on the public interest. In Public Prosecutor v Loo Choon Fatt (supra), Hashim Yeop A. Sani J (as he then was) stated that the correct approach is to strike a balance between the interest of the public and the interests of the accused. However, as noted in PP v Badron Zamanuddin [2005] 5 CLJ 493 (HC), the fact that an accused is a first offender is not an automatic entitlement to a lenient sentence. When the offences involve the exploitation of vulnerable children by persons in positions of trust, the public interest must prevail. The sentence imposed serves as an adequate deterrent and reflects the court's abhorrence of the exploitation of children by those entrusted with their care and education.

Conclusion on sentence

Having considered the totality of the circumstances, the mitigating factors, the serious aggravating factors, and the established legal principles on sentencing, this Court finds that the sentence of fifteen (15) years' imprisonment (running concurrently) is not manifestly excessive and is not wrong in principle. The sentence is proportionate to the gravity of the offences and is affirmed. This issue is resolved against the Appellant.

For all the reasons set out above, this Court answers the three issues as follows:

Issue 1: No. The learned SCJ did not err in finding that a prima facie case had been established. The prosecution's evidence, when evaluated at its maximum, satisfied the threshold.

Issue 2: No. The learned SCJ did not err in convicting the Appellant. The defence failed to cast a reasonable doubt on the prosecution's case, and the trial Judge's findings of fact are entitled to deference under the principles in Public Prosecutor v Wan Razali Kassim (supra) and Mohd Yusri bin Mangsor & Anor v Public Prosecutor (supra).

Issue 3: No. The sentence imposed was not manifestly excessive and is affirmed. The trial Judge properly balanced the mitigating and aggravating factors and acted within his lawful discretion.

Accordingly, the appeal against conviction and sentence is dismissed in its entirety. The conviction of the Appellant on all thirteen (13) charges is affirmed. The sentences imposed by the Sessions Court on 24 June 2025 are upheld.

Upon pronouncement of this judgment on 8 June 2026, counsel for the Appellant applied for a stay of execution pending appeal to the Court of Appeal. Counsel informed the Court that a Notice of Appeal would be filed by 3:00 p.m. on 9 June 2026. Counsel also applied to maintain the existing bail of RM40,000 with one surety and the monthly reporting condition. It was submitted that the Appellant had cooperated throughout the proceedings and posed no flight risk.

The Deputy Public Prosecutor objected, submitting that the Appellant should commence his sentence as the appeal had been dismissed. Alternatively, the Prosecution applied for bail to be increased if a stay was granted.

Having considered both parties' submissions, this Court orders as follows:

The execution of the imprisonment sentence is stayed pending the disposal of the appeal to the Court of Appeal, on condition that the Notice of Appeal is filed by 3:00 p.m. on 9 June 2026.

The existing bail of RM40,000 with one surety is maintained.

The existing bail conditions, including monthly reporting to the nearest police station, shall remain in force. Dated: 23 June 2026 Yusrin Faidz Bin Yusoff Judge High Court of Malaya Kuala Terengganu Counsel for the Appellant: Mohd Asaari Bin Salleh (together with Othman Bin Bakar) Tetuan Sallehudin Harun & Partners, No 18C, Tingkat 1, Jalan Kg Dalam, 20100 Kuala Terengganu, Terengganu Darul Iman. Counsel for the Respondent TPR Noradila binti Ab Latif Timbalan Pendakwaraya Negeri Terengganu, Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Terengganu, Tingkat 14, Wisma Darul Iman, 20200 Kuala Terengganu, Terengganu Darul Iman. CASE REFERENCE:

Public Prosecutor v Wan Razali Kassim [1970] 2 MLJ 79 (FC).

Herchun Singh & Ors v Public Prosecutor [1969] 2 MLJ 209 (FC).

Mohd Yusri bin Mangsor & Anor v Public Prosecutor & Another Appeal [2014] 4 MLJ 875 (CA).

Dato' Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v. Public Prosecutor [2004] 3 MLJ 405 (FC).

Chean Siong Guat v Public Prosecutor [1969] 2 MLJ 63 (HC).

Pie Bin Chin v PP [1985] 1 MLJ 234 (HC).

Adam Atan v PP [2009] 1 CLJ 33 (CA).

Public Prosecutor v Sulaiman Ahmad [1993] 1 MLJ 74 (HC).

Public Prosecutor v Loo Choon Fatt [1976] 2 MLJ 257 (HC).

PP v Badron Zamanuddin [2005] 5 CLJ 493 (HC).

Sections 11(1)(a), 14(a), (c) and (d), 18, & 27 of the Sexual Offences Against Children Act 2017.

Sections 375 & 376(2)(f) of the Penal Code.

Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950.

Sections 182A,289(c),402A & 422 of the Criminal Procedure Code.