Rosliza Binti Ibrahim v Kerajaan Negeri Selangor (01(f)-2-01/2020(B))

MAJLIS AGAMA ISLAM SELANGOR ... RESPONDENTS [In The Matter of Court of Appeal of Malaysia (Appellate Jurisdiction) Civil Appeal No. B-01(A)-264-08/2017 Between Rosliza binti Ibrahim And ... Appellant

Kerajaan Negeri Selangor

Majlis Agama Islam Selangor ... Respondents] [In the Matter of High Court of Malaya at Shah Alam, Selangor Originating Summons Application No. 24-1314-11/2015 Between Rosliza binti Ibrahim ... Plaintiff And Kerajaan Negeri Selangor ... Defendant And Majlis Agama Islam Selangor ... Intervener] Coram: Tengku Maimun binti Tuan Mat, CJ Rohana binti Yusuf, PCA Azahar bin Mohamed, CJM Nallini Pathmanathan, FCJ Abdul Rahman bin Sebli, FCJ Zabariah binti Mohd Yusof, FCJ Hasnah binti Mohammed Hashim, FCJ Mary Lim Thiam Suan, FCJ Rhodzariah binti Bujang, FCJ JUDGMENT OF AZAHAR MOHAMED, CJM [1] There are two questions of law posed to this Court in the present appeal. [2] The first question of law is: "Where the subject matter of a cause or matter requires a determination of "whether a person is or is not a Muslim under the law" rather than "whether a person is no longer a Muslim", whether the High Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine the said subject matter on a proper interpretation of Article 121 and Item 1 of the State List of the Federal Constitution?" [3] The second question of law is: "In light of Regulation 24(1) of the National Registration Regulations 1990 and where the truth of the contents of any written application for the registration of an identity card or the contents of an identity card is not proven by affidavit or at the trial, whether the said contents can be considered facts proved for a declaration of status under Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act 1950?" [4] I have had the benefit of reading the learned Chief Justice's judgment in draft. Having considered the reasons given by the learned Chief Justice, I agree that Question 1 is answered in the affirmative and Question 2 is answered in the negative. However, I respectfully consider that before granting the relevant remedies the Appellant sought, we should first request for the opinion of the Fatwa Committee of the State of Selangor pursuant to section 53 of the Administration of the Religion of Islam (State of Selangor) Enactment 2003 ("the 2003 Enactment") pertaining to the question on Hukum Syarak ("Islamic Law"), namely whether or not the Appellant was a Muslim at the time of birth. Before turning to the discussion on this matter, I would also like to express my own views and add the following reasons why Question 1 should be answered in the affirmative. [5] This important appeal once again raises the issue of conflict of jurisdiction between the Civil and Syariah Courts, which I shall refer to as the jurisdictional problems. The Courts have faced this issue frequently in recent years. On such occasions, the jurisdictional problems which bring obvious challenges and inherent difficulties, in turn, raise the delicate issues involving the application of Clause (1A) of Article 121 of the Federal Constitution ("FC") and the interpretation of the laws of the State passed by the State Legislature. The opportunity presented itself for this Court in the present appeal to reexamine and clarify this important issue. [6] In this case, the High Court found that the Appellant's mother and her putative father were married, and that the Appellant is a child of the marriage. The High Court also found that the validity of their marriage fell within the jurisdiction of the Syariah Court and consequently, the question of whether the Appellant was no longer a Muslim also fell within the Syariah Court's jurisdiction. [7] The Court of Appeal dismissed the Appellant's appeal and held that the Appellant is a Muslim and the effect of the declaration sought by the Appellant was to enable her to renounce Islam as her religion that in effect amounted to a declaration that the Appellant is no longer a Muslim. The Court of Appeal went on to hold that the jurisdiction is thus vested with the Syariah Court and not the Civil Court. The Court of Appeal held that pursuant to Clause (1A) of Article 121 of the FC, the Appellant's avenue for the declaration sought was within the jurisdiction of the Syariah Court and not the Civil Court. [8] It will be helpful to begin the discussion by making some general observations on our court system. The FC demarcates between two distinct legal system, namely the civil legal system, and the Syariah system. As a matter of broad general rule, the Civil Courts which are vested with the judicial power conferred under Article 121 of the FC, being courts of general jurisdiction, administer laws that are of general application, namely the FC, legislations passed by the Federal and State Legislatures, the common laws and rules of equity. [9] Whereas the Syariah Courts, that operate outside the civil system, administer the Syariah Family and Syariah Criminal Enactments passed by the respective State Legislatures. In other words, in our jurisdiction, the justice delivery system on Islamic matters is done through the Syariah Courts. The Syariah Courts came into existence only when the State Legislatures make law to establish them pursuant to the exercise of powers given under Item 1 of the State List of the FC. More importantly, Syariah Courts have jurisdiction only over persons professing the religion of Islam. When one of the parties is a non-Muslim, the Syariah Courts do not have the jurisdiction over the case even if the subject matter falls within their jurisdiction. [10] Prior to 1988, the Syariah Courts did not have exclusive jurisdiction over matters under their respective jurisdictions as the Civil Courts had power to review, and quite regularly reviewed, the decisions of the Syariah Courts by way of certiorari, which in the process had overturned the decisions of the Syariah Courts. There were instances where the Civil Courts entertained applications that sought to re-adjudicate matters that the Syariah Courts had determined (see Myriam v. Mohamed Ariff [1971] 1 MLJ 265, and Tengku Mariam binti Tengku Sri Wa Raja & Anor v. Commissioner for Religious Affairs, Trengganu & Ors [1969] 1 MLJ 110). There was also a case in which the Civil Court had applied laws of general application, which are in conflict with Islamic law (see Ainan bin Mahamud v. Syed Abu Bakar bin Habib Yusoff and Others [1939] 1 MLJ 209). Tan Sri Professor Ahmad Ibrahim in his article The Amendment to Article 121 of the Federal Constitution: Its effect on Administration of Islamic Law [1989] 2 MLJ xvii discussed a number of cases in Civil Courts which had not applied the Islamic law but had applied law which was in conflict with the Islamic law. [11] An important event took place in 1998. A new clause was added to the FC. The new Clause (1A) of Article 121 of the FC, with effect from 10 June 1988, provides that the Civil Courts shall have no jurisdiction with respect to matters within the jurisdiction of the Syariah Courts. The new Clause has taken away the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in respect of matters within the jurisdiction of the Syariah Courts. If a matter falls within the jurisdiction of the Syariah Court, the Civil Court has no jurisdiction over it (see Majlis Agama Islam Pulau Pinang v. Isa Abdul Rahman & 1 yang lain [1992] 3 CLJ 1675 "Majlis Agama Islam Pulau Pinang v. Isa Abdul Rahman", Mohd Habibullah bin Mahmood Faridah bt Dato Talib [1993] 1 CLJ 264 "Mohamad Habibullah Mahmood" and Soon Singh a/l Bikar Singh v. Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (PERKIM) Kedah & Anor [1999] 1 AMR 1211). [12] It is trite that only the FC is supreme; the Judiciary, the Executive and the Legislature are subject to the FC (see Letitia Bosman v Public Prosecutor & other appeals [2020] 8 CLJ 147). Pursuant to this important principle, the judicial power of the Civil Courts have been excluded by Clause (1A) of Article 121 of the FC resulting in the exclusion of jurisdiction of the Civil Courts over matters within the jurisdiction of the Syariah Courts. The amendment to the FC was made in order to avoid conflict between decisions of the Syariah Courts and the Civil Courts, to give the Syariah Courts exclusive jurisdiction over matters relating to Islamic law (see Viran a/l Nagapan v. Deepa a/p Subramaniam and other appeals [2016] 1 MLJ 585). But, that Clause does not take away the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to interpret any written laws of the States enacted for the administration of Muslim law (see Dalip Kaur v. District Police Officer, Bukit Mertajam & Anor [1992] 1 MLJ 1 "Dalip Kaur"). Clause (1A) of Article 121 of the FC does not constitute a blanket exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts whenever a matter relating to Islamic law arises (see Indira Gandhi a/p Mutho v. Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam Perak & Ors and other appeals [2018] 1 MLJ 545). [13] Coming back to the present appeal, as I have indicated earlier both the Courts below concurrently held that the Civil Court was not seized with the jurisdiction to adjudicate on the matter; it falls within the province of the Syariah Court. [14] In view of the approach taken by the Courts below, it is crucial to appreciate precisely what this case concerns. In 2015, the Appellant filed an Originating Summons at the Shah Alam High Court under section 41 of the Specific Relief Act 1950 seeking the following declaratory orders:

a declaration that the Appellant is an illegitimate person and that one Yap Ah Mooi a Buddhist was her natural mother;

(ii) a declaration that the word "parents" in paragraph (b) of the interpretation of "Muslim" in section 2 of the Administration of the Religion of Islam (State of Selangor) Enactment 2003 does not include the putative father of an illegitimate child; and

(iii) a declaration that the Appellant is not a person professing the religion of Islam, and that

all laws made by the Legislative Assembly of the State of Selangor under the Ninth Schedule, List II, Item 1 of the FC are of no effect on, and are not applicable to, the Appellant; and

all Syariah Courts within the State of Selangor do not have jurisdiction over the Appellant. [15] It can be seen that the Appellant's case rests on her never having been a Muslim. According to the Appellant, she has never been a Muslim in all her life. What's more, according to the Appellant she was born out of wedlock, raised by a Buddhist mother in the Buddhist faith at all times. She did not dispute that her putative father was at all material times a Muslim. In this regard, I agree with the findings of the learned Chief Justice that as the evidence stands the Appellant ought to have succeeded in her claim in the Courts below i.e. that her parents being unmarried at the time of her birth renders her an illegitimate child. I also agree with the learned Chief Justice's findings that the evidence suggests the Appellant was raised in the Buddhist faith and there is nothing in the evidence to prove that the Appellant was raised a Muslim. The Appellant also averred that Muslim Laws are being and will be imposed on her unlawfully. She further averred that there's no legal basis for imposing Islamic law and Islamic morality on her. [16] In my opinion, both the Courts below erred in failing to appreciate that the Appellant is not claiming that she is "no longer a Muslim". One crucial point needs to be made here. The present case is not a case of renunciation. It is not an "exit case". We are concern here with the question of whether the Appellant was a Muslim at birth, which is a question of law. The Courts below made an erroneous finding that the present case fell outside the Civil Courts' jurisdiction. [17] Clearly the decision of Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan dan lain-lain [2007] 4 MLJ 585 "Lina Joy", that was relied on by the Court of Appeal is distinguishable. Lina Joy and the present case could not be more different form each other. The issue in Lina Joy concerned the original de facto status of the Applicant, a Malay who was originally a Muslim, seeking to renounce her Islamic faith. Therefore, the Federal Court found that it was a matter within the Syariah Court's jurisdiction. In my opinion, where the subject matter requires a determination of whether a person is or is not a Muslim under the law, the Civil High Court has the jurisdiction to hear and decide whether the case is properly brought before the Civil Courts by evaluating the factual matrix and circumstances presented before it and also the declaration that is being sought for. [18] Which brings me to the case of Dalip Kaur, where the Supreme Court heard and disposed of Dalip Kaur's appeal on its merits and found that based on evidence, her son died a Muslim. The Court did not decline to hear the appeal for an ostensible lack of jurisdiction or purport that Dalip Kaur's remedy lies elsewhere. Dalip Kaur is the authority for the proposition that the Civil Courts have the exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a person is or is not a Muslim under the law; this is a question with respect to a person's legal status. [19] On the other hand, with regards to the question of "whether a person is no longer a Muslim", there is no dispute of the person affected having been a Muslim. Under the scheme of the FC, a Muslim in our country shall be governed by Islamic personal and family law (see Mohd Habibullah Mahmood; and Jabatan Pendaftaran Negara & 2 Ors. v. A Child & 2 Ors [2020] 4 CLJ 731 "Jabatan Pendaftaran Negara & 2 Ors. v. A Child & 2 Ors") . A Muslim also becomes subject to specific offences, namely offences against the precepts of Islam to which non-Muslim is not. Being a Muslim confers one a legal status and changes the entire regime of personal law applicable to them (see Ketua Pegawai Penguatkuasa Agama & Ors v. Maqsood Ahmad & 38 Lagi [2020] MLJU 1259). And having been a Muslim, the person might have existing legal obligations under Muslim Laws that require determination owing to his or her apostasy. Renunciation of Islam, therefore carries specific legal consequences. It is for this reason that where the subject matter of a cause or matter requires a determination of whether a person is no longer a Muslim, the Syariah Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine the said subject matter, and under Clause (1A) of Article 121 of the FC, the Civil Court has no jurisdiction in respect of the subject matter. [20] For all the above reasons, on the first question of law posed, I conclude that where the subject matter of a cause or matter requires a determination of "whether a person is or is not a Muslim under the law" rather than "whether a person is no longer a Muslim", the High Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine the said subject matter. In consequence, my answer to the question is in the affirmative. [21] What I have said so far explains why my answers to both the questions posed are in the Appellant's favour. But it does not end there. Still, I have to consider and determine whether the Appellant is entitled to the orders prayed for. First of all, in view of the factual findings made by the learned Chief Justice that I entirely concurred, there can be no issue that the Appellant is entitled to prayer (i), namely a declaration that she is an illegitimate person and that one Yap Ah Mooi a Buddhist was her natural mother. However, in my opinion, prayers (ii) and (iii) sought by the Appellant as reproduced in paragraph 14 of this judgment require further careful deliberation. [22] Here, I get to the key point. Underlying prayers (ii) and (iii) is a foundational issue that is of critical importance, namely, whether the Appellant was a Muslim at birth. The answer to this question will have a direct bearing on the prayers sought by the Appellant. On this, the learned Chief Justice made an important observation, "It is thus necessary to now examine the factual matrix of the case to determine whether the plaintiff is, on the evidence, a Muslim to begin with. If she is not, then in accordance with the principles established earlier, this Court can grant her the declaration she seeks. If she is a Muslim by original faith, then the matter will be for the exclusive jurisdiction of the Syariah Court and this Court would not have the jurisdiction to grant her the reliefs sought to the extent that they relate to renunciation" [23] This key question encompasses legal and religious consequence. This question, as I see it, requires the Civil Court to make a decision on a question on Islamic law. The Civil High Court is not prohibited by Clause (1A) of Article 121 of the FC to hear and determine this issue. In the case of Majlis Agama Islam Pulau Pinang v. Isa Abdul Rahman and The Others [1992] 2 MLJ 244, three out of four orders prayed for required decisions to be made in accordance with Islamic law, including waqf. Only one, injunction, need not be decided in accordance with Islamic law. The Supreme Court ruled that the High Court has jurisdiction to hear the case. The Civil Court is not prohibited by Clause (1A) of Article 121 of the Federal Constitution to hear and determine any question on Islamic law. [24] In determining this question, a key point to remember is that the Appellant is an illegitimate child born to a Buddhist mother and her putative father is a person who professes the religion of Islam. I am mindful that section 111 of the 2003 Enactment states that where a child is born to a woman who is married to a man more than six qamariah months from the date of the marriage or within four qamariah months after dissolution of the marriage either by the death of the man or by divorce, and the woman not having remarried, the nasab of the child is established in the man, but the man may, by way of li'an or imprecation, disavow or disclaim the child before the Court. It cannot be disputed that upon a plain reading of the provision a child born out of wedlock is illegitimate and therefore the nasab of the child could not be established in the father. [25] What then is the meaning of the word nasab? It appears the word has specific meaning in the Islamic law context. According to Kamus Dewan Edisi keempat the word "Nasab" is 'pertalian keluarga, keturunan (terutama daripada sebelah bapa). Contohnya, nasab bapa pertalian keluarga di sebelah bapa; nasab ibu pertalian keluarga di sebelah ibu; penasaban hal yang berkaitan dengan nasab: ini berkaitan dengan pewalian, pewarisan, dan pergaulan dalam keluarga". In the case of A Child & Ors v. Jabatan Pendaftaran Negara & Ors [2017] 4 MLJ 440, the Court of Appeal at page 452 referred, among others, to a fatwa issued by the Jawatankuasa Fatwa Majlis Kebangsaan （'the National Fatwa Committee'）in 2003 which provides as follows: "The 2003 Fatwa

(ii) Muzakarah Jawatankuasa Fatwa Majlis Kebangsaan bagi Hal Ehwal Ugama Islam Malaysia Kali ke 57 yang bersidang pada 10.6.2003 telah membincangkan mengenai Anak Tak Sah Taraf. Muzakarah telah memutuskan seperti berikut:

Anak yang dilahirkan di luar nikah sama ada akibat zina atau rogol dan dia bukan daripada persetubuhan syubhah atau bukan daripada anak perhambaan.

Anak dilahirkan kurang dari 6 bulan 2 lahzah (saat) mengikut Takwim Qamariah daripada tarikh tamkin (setubuh). b. Anak tak sah taraf tidak boleh dinasabkan kepada lelaki yang menyebabkan kelahirannya atau kepada sesiapa yang mengaku menjadi bapa kepada anak tersebut. Oleh itu, mereka tidak boleh pusaka mempusakai, tidak menjadi mahram dan tidak boleh menjadi wali.” (emphasis added) [26] It is significant to note that with regard to the term nasab, both the Kamus Dewan and the 2003 Fatwa made no reference of the religious status of the illegitimate child. We were not referred to any authority on this point. In my research, I did not find any authority or literature addressing this issue directly to the point. It would appear that in relation to the term 'nasab' it is more generally understood to relate merely to issues of custody, guardianship, legitimacy, succession, inheritance and rights to a putative's title or surname. [27] I do not think we can extract a principle of Islamic law from the provisions of section 111 of the 2003 Enactment with certainty that the religious status of the illegitimate child born out of wedlock follows the religion of the natural mother at the time of birth and not the religion of the putative father who incidentally is a Muslim. In a matter that has a far-reaching ramification, it is imperative that there must be a degree of certainty in our decision. Granted that section 111 of the 2003 Enactment applies to the Appellant's putative father (it remains undisputed that he's a Muslim) to strip him of nasab from the Appellant, still I do not think that it is appropriate for a Civil Court dealing with the religious status of the Appellant at the time of birth to merely decide on the terms of the provision without having an appreciation and understanding of the rules of Islamic jurisprudence. [28] The question pertaining to the religious status of the Appellant at the time of birth transgresses into the realm of Islamic law, which needs serious consideration, proper scrutiny and proper interpretation of such law. Unquestionably, when the legal question of religious status is concerned, it bears spiritual and theological undertones. In my opinion, the Civil Court on its own is not qualified to determine this issue. It bears emphasizing that Islamic law is derived from the primary sources i.e. the Holy Quran and the Hadith. In addition, there are other secondary sources of Islamic law, for example the consensus of the religious scholars (ijma) and the authoritative rulings (fatwa) (for a discussion on the sources of Islamic law see the judgment of Mohd Zawawi Salleh FCJ in JRI Resources Sdn Bhd v. Kuwait Finance House (Malaysia) Bhd; President Of Association Of Islamic Banking Institutions Malaysia & Anor (Interveners) [2019] 5 CLJ 569 at 626-627 and The Administration of Islamic Law in Malaysia by Professor Ahmad Mohamed Ibrahim, Institute of Islamic Understanding Malaysia at page 37). Moreover, due to difficult theological doctrinal differences, there are diverse interpretations of Islamic law (see the judgment of Rohana Yusuf PCA in the case of Jabatan Pendaftaran Negara & 2 Ors. v. A Child & 2 Ors). Hence, this specific question on Islamic law is outside the ordinary competency of a Civil Court. In my opinion, unless it is an established principle of Islamic law and there is certainty on the matter, judges in the Civil Court should not take upon themselves to decide on this matter without expert opinion, as we are not sufficiently equipped to decide on it. [29] In a matter so fundamental and important as to the religious status of a person, for this Apex Court to decisively and conclusively determine the issue which is without precedent, I am of the opinion that to remove any doubt it is advisable the Civil Court obtains the opinion of qualified and eminent Islamic scholars who are properly qualified in the field of Islamic jurisprudence to provide opinion in accordance with religious tenets and principles, to assist the Court in determining the issue. Above all else, this is to ensure that our decision is not contrary to Islamic law and it is in conformity with the Islamic law jurisprudence. The point I want to make is this: while we are competent to adjudicate the matter and to rule on this foundational issue, it must not be without the assistance of Islamic jurists after consideration of Islamic law. With this in perspective, in my opinion, the expert opinion given by a Fatwa Committee is relevant evidence to be considered in deciding with certainty the issue before us. In this regard, learned counsel for the Appellant Datuk Seri Gopal Sri Ram in his written submission has brought to our attention the 2003 Enactment that provided an exclusive provision for the Civil Court to avail itself to seek the opinion of the Syariah Committee if any question on Hukum Syarak or Islamic law calls for a decision. Section 53 of the 2003 Enactment reads: "Request for opinion of Fatwa Committee

If, in any Court other than a Syariah Court any question on Hukum Syarak calls for a decision, the Court may request for the opinion of the Fatwa Committee on the question, and the Mufti may certify the opinion of the Fatwa Committee to the requesting Court". [30] In addition, Datuk Seri Gopal Sri Ram carefully traced the legal as well the historical background of similar provision even before the Federation of Malaya Agreement 1948 that allowed the Civil Courts to refer questions relating to Islamic law or Malay custom to the State Council for determination [citing Muhammadan Law and Malay Custom (Determination) Enactment 1930 (Cap. 196, Federated Malay States, Muhammadan Law Determination Enactment No. 27/1919 (State of Johore) and Administration of Muslim Law Enactment 1952]. Presently, almost all State Legislatures have made such laws in their respective Administration of Islamic law or Religious Council Enactments (see for example Council of the Religion of Islam and Malay Custom, Kelantan Enactment 1994 (section 36(5)) Administration of the Religion of Islam (State of Malacca) Enactment 2002 (section 41), Administration of the Religion of Islam (Negeri Sembilan) Enactment 2003 (section 53), Administration of the Religion of Islam (Perak) Enactment 2004 (section 42), Sabah Fatwa Enactment 2004 (section 13), Majlis Islam Sarawak Ordinance 2001 (section 38) and Administration of Islamic Religious Affairs (Terengganu) Enactment 2001 (section 53). [31] The next point that Datuk Seri Gopal Sri Ram made is quite important. He made the point that by availing itself to such laws when deciding disputes where a Hukum Syarak or Islamic law question is raised, the Civil High Courts will promote certainty in the law, prevent additional litigation at the Syariah Courts and preserve access to justice for persons who are not Muslims. [32] Indeed, such recourse has been made in Dalip Kaur. In taking this recourse, the Supreme Court adhered firmly to the State law in Kedah i.e. section 37(4) of the Administration of Muslim Law Enactment (Kedah) 1962: that " [i]f in any Civil Court any question of Muslim law falls for decision...the question shall be referred to the Fetua Committee which shall...give its opinion thereon and certify such opinion to the requesting court". At the hearing of the appeal the Supreme Court remitted the case to the High Court for the learned Judicial Commissioner to refer certain questions of Islamic law that arose to the Fatwa Committee under section 37 of the Enactment. The expert opinion given by the Fatwa Committee was relevant evidence in deciding whether Dalip Kaur's son's purported conduct amounted to apostasy in Islam. The High Court and the Supreme Court accepted the opinion. [33] In the same vein, in the case of Majlis Agama Islam Pulau Pinang v. Isa Abdul Rahman, the Supreme Court held that when a Civil Court hears a claim for an order (and the order that is applied for did not fall within the jurisdiction of the Syariah Court to issue), the Civil Court should hear the claim and if, in the course of such hearing, a question regarding 'hukum syarak' should arise the parties involved may call in experts in the religion of Islam to give evidence at the hearing; or the Court can refer the questions to the Fatwa Committee concerned for certainty on the matter. [34] Nevertheless, the opinion does not bind the Civil Court. It is therefore for the Court to decide whether to accept the expert evidence or otherwise. The opinion should be considered and serves as guiding principles. The final decision of the matter remains with the Court. The opinion is relevant only in so far as it can assist the court in forming an opinion upon the issue in this case. [35] It is with all the above principles in mind that before granting prayers (ii) and (iii) sought by the Appellant, the opinion of the Fatwa Committee should first be obtained. In the interest of justice and in order not to prolong the proceedings any longer than it should, instead of remitting the matter to the High Court, I would request for the opinion of the Fatwa Committee of the State of Selangor pursuant to section 53 of the 2003 Enactment pertaining to the question whether or not the Appellant was a Muslim at the time of birth. [36] In conclusion, in view of all the above, the Appellant's appeal is allowed and the orders of the Courts below are hereby set aside. An order is granted in terms of prayer (i), namely a declaration that the Appellant is an illegitimate person and that one Yap Ah Mooi, a Buddhist is her natural mother. However, as I do not have the benefit of the opinion of the Fatwa Committee of the State of Selangor pursuant to section 53 of the 2003 Enactment, it is with deep regret that I am unable to make any orders in respect of prayers (ii) and (iii) sought by the Appellant. [37] My learner sister Justice Hasnah Mohammed Hashim has read this judgment in draft and has expressed her agreement with it. Dated this day 5 February 2021. (AZAHAR BIN MOHAMED) Chief Judge of Malaya For the Appellant/Plaintiff Datuk Seri Gopal Sri Ram (With him Aston Paiva, Yasmeen Soh Sha-Nisse) Messrs. Vazeer Akbar Majid & Co. 1$^{st}$ Respondent/Defendant Dato' Salim bin Soib State Legal Adviser (With him Nur Irmawati binti Daud, Assistant State Legal Adviser and Muhammad Haziq Hashim, State Legal Officer) Selangor State Legal Adviser's Office 2$^{nd}$ Respondent/Defendant Haji Abdul Rahim bin Sinwan (With him Dato' Haji Zainul Rijal Abu Bakar and Azman bin Marsaleh) Chambers of Zainul Rijal For the Amicus Curiae (Attorney General's Chambers) Suzana binti Atan Senior Federal Counsel (With her Shamsul bin Bolhassan, Senior Federal Counsel) Mansoor Saat Messrs. Mansoor Saat & Co. For Malaysian Consultative Council of Buddhism, Christianity, Sikhism and Taoism, MCCBCHST (Watching Brief)