that the common course of business has been 165 followed in particular cases; b) The SCJ (“Session Court Judge”) also relied on the Federal Court case of Pekan Nenas Industries Sdn Bhd v Chang Ching Chuen & Ors [1998] 1 CLJ 793, where it was 170 established that a contract can be considered valid even in the absence of a formally executed agreement, especially if other elements of a contract (offer, acceptance, consideration) are present and actions of part performance indicate the existence of a contract. His Lordship Edgar Joseph Jr FCJ said: 175 “On the contrary, the Intervener/Purchaser was entitled to rely on the contemporary documents, to wit, the sale and purchase agreement and the[1998] 1 MLJ 465 at 520 memoranda of transfers of the disputed properties to invoke the presumption contained in illustration (f) 180 of s 114 of the Evidence Act 1950 for the purpose of establishing the true price paid for the disputed properties. So far as material, illustration (f) provides that: 'The court may presume that the common course of business has been followed in particular cases'. 185 Woodroffe and Amir Ali on the Law of Evidence (15th Ed, 1991) in commenting on the scope and applicability of illustration (f) of s 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, which is in pari materia with ours, say this (at p 849): Several presumptions are made from the regular course 190 of business in public offices …. … Similar presumptions are drawn from the usual course of men's private offices and business …. Similarly, the learned authors say this (at p 863): Actually under this section, there is a presumption not 195 only that official acts have regularly been performed, but also that ordinary business acts have normally been carried out. By way of illustration, the case of Suruchi Bala & Ors v Suruchi Bala Deb & Ors AIR 1976 Gau 92 may be 200 referred to. In that case, the court said this (at pp 93, 94): A court always presumes the apparent to be the real unless the contrary is proved. The burden is upon him who alleges that the apparent is not the real to prove 205 that the apparent is not the real. In the instant case, Ext A is a registered deed purporting to be a Hiba-bil-Ewaz for a consideration of Rupees 1,000. The court, therefore, that the suit land was transferred by a registered Hiba-bil-Ewaz for Rs1,000 by Washil Ali on 210 27 September 1945 to Masukuddin, who sold it to defendant No 1 on 26 September 1952. The plaintiff has failed to rebut that presumption. On this basis, the Intervener/Purchaser would be entitled to contend that the affirmative testimony of its 215 solicitor Mr Choo, Dato Tan and the Mother as to the purchase price of the disputed properties being RM4.8m, was reinforced by the presumption under illustration (f) of s 114 of the Evidence Act 1950 arising from the statements as to the purchase price in the Sale 220 and Purchase Agreement and the relevant memoranda of transfers, the price quoted in these contemporary documents being prima facie evidence of the true price. Thus, the burden of proving that the true price was RM6m not RM4.8m would then be on the Father and his 225 faction and this burden they might have succeeded in discharging by calling the solicitor for the vendor and, perhaps, the brokers. But neither the Father nor his faction adduced such evidence.” 230 c) The court found that the Appellant was likely aware of the contractual terms. This conclusion was based on the Appellant's acceptance of the Ph.D. program and related positions, which were stipulated in documents such as P11A (the employment offer letter) and P14 (the approval letter for 235 the extension of the study period), indicating an obligation to repay as compensation under certain conditions. d) The plaintiff’s continuous payment of salary and other emoluments was interpreted not as a waiver of rights but as 240 part of the contractual obligations. It was determined that even without a signed agreement, a contractual relationship existed based on the actions and awareness of both parties. e) The SCJ found that the plaintiff's action was within the limitation period. The statute of limitations, as per Section 6(1) 245 of the Limitation Act, did not bar the plaintiff’s claim, as the action was initiated before the expiration of six years from the date the cause of action accrued. f) The learned SCJ holds, there exist an assumption under s 114(f) of the Evidence Act that an agreement like P10 had 250 been delivered to the Appellant by SP5 in the course of her usual duties. Alternatively, the SCJ hold that if the assumption was incorrect, she referred to the employment offer letter (P11A), especially paragraph 3 (appended above), which mentioned repayment of damages based on the amount 255 stated in an agreement signed between the Appellant and the Respondent. [20]. In summary, the SCJ found the Appellant liable for damages based on assumptions about the delivery of agreement documents, references 260 in employment and extension letters, and the Appellant's perceived obligation to inquire about and sign an agreement regarding the funding for her Ph.D studies. Decision of this Court [21]. There are three (3) main issues which is an anchor point in the 265 Appellant’s appeal against the SCJ’s decision and they are: a) Issue on the payments made to the Appellant based on the Agreements; b) Quantum of compensation; and c) Issues on waiver and estoppel 270 [22]. I have carefully considered both sides' arguments. I favour the Respondent on all three (3) issues after reviewing the evidence and the authorities, which I shall expound on the reason hereafter. But before that, I must state here that this court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction 275 ought not to disturb the judgment of the trial judge unless it is evidently erroneous. This deference is due to the trial judge's unique position in directly observing witnesses, allowing them to assess subtleties in demeanour and expressions that are not translatable into written records. This is eloquently put by His Lordship Gopal Sri Ram in Eng Thye 280 Plantations Bhd v. Lim Heng Hock [2001] 4 MLJ 26: “The main ground for the High Court's intervention was that the trial judge had failed to properly evaluate the evidence. The defendant has criticised the High Court's judgment. In essence there is only one complaint. It is 285 suggested that the High Court was wrong to have interfered with the findings of fact made by the sessions court. Counsel for the defendant relies on the pronouncements made in several leading cases on the point. I find it unnecessary to go through all of them 290 here. Suffice that I refer to the rather well-known passage in the speech of Lord Dunfermline in Clarke v Edinburgh Tramways (1919) SC (HL) 35 at p 36 which encapsulates the principle in remarkably succinct language. I have quoted it often enough. Here it is once 295 again: When a judge hears and sees witnesses and makes a conclusion or inference with regard to what on balance is the weight of their evidence, that judgment is entitled to great respect, and that quite irrespective of whether 300 the judge makes any observations with regard to credibility or not. I can of course quite understand a Court of Appeal that says that it will not interfere in a case in which the judge has announced as part of his judgment that he believes one set of witnesses, having 305 seen them and heard them, and does not believe another. But that is not the ordinary case of a cause in a court of justice. In courts of justice in the ordinary case, things are much more evenly divided; witnesses without any conscious bias towards a conclusion may 310 have in their demeanour, in their manner, in their hesitation, in the nuance of their expressions, in even the turns of the eyelid, left an impression upon the man who saw and heard them which can never be reproduced in the printed page. What in such 315 circumstances, thus psychologically put, is the duty of an appellate court? In my opinion, the duty of an appellate court in those circumstances is for each judge of it to put to himself, as I now do in this case, the question: am I — who sit here without those 320 advantages, sometimes broad and sometimes subtle, which are the privilege of the judge who heard and tried the case — in a position, not having those privileges, to come to a clear conclusion that the judge who had them was plainly wrong? If I cannot be satisfied in my own 325 mind that the judge with those privileges was plainly wrong, then it appears to me to be my duty to defer to his judgment. But like all principles of law there are qualifications to this one as well. It would be an abdication of an 330 appellate court's proper responsibility if it did not intervene and set right decisions of trial courts that are plainly wrong or unjust. I do not think that an exhaustive list of cases in which an appellate court may intervene can be set out. What is to be discerned is the principles 335 upon which an appellate court acts. These are to be found in the joint judgment of my learned brother Shankar JCA and myself in Sivalingam a/l Periasamy v Periasamy & Anor [1995] 3 MLJ 395. That was also a case of a failure on the part of the trial judge to 340 undertake a judicial appreciation of the evidence. This is what we there said (at p 398): It is trite law that this court will not readily interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the court of first instance to which the law entrusts the primary task of evaluation 345 of the evidence. But we are under a duty to intervene in a case where, as here, the trial court has so fundamentally misdirected itself, that one may safely say that no reasonable court which had properly directed itself and asked the correct questions would 350 have arrived at the same conclusion.” [23]. Having thoroughly reviewed the reasoning of the learned SCJ, I find that the evaluation of the evidence was handled appropriately. The decisions on the issues, based on the evidence presented, show no errors 355 on his part that would necessitate intervention or reconsideration by this court on appeal. Issue on the payments made to the Appellant based on the Agreements [24]. The crux of the dispute centres around payments made to the 360 Appellant by the Respondent, totalling RM 198, 212.17, between October 2009 and September 2013. These transactions of payments to the Appellants were executed within the purview of a scholarship or study leave agreement (Exhibit P11(A)) and the Letter of Offer of Employment (Exhibit P5), substantiating this claim. 365 [25]. I affirm that Exhibit P11(a), particularly Paragraph 3.1, which explicitly states, “Bayaran balik gantirugi adalah berdasarkan jumlah yang dinyatakan dalam perjanjian yang ditandatangani di antara tuan/puan dan pihak Universiti." must be given due weight, as the learned SCJ did. This 370 statement in Exhibit P11(a) substantially reinforces the Respondent's claim. [26]. Further buttressing the Respondent’s stance are the Guidelines for IPTA Training Awards (SLAI) which is in Exhibit P29 and the stipulations of Government Circular No. 1 of 2011, as shown in Exhibit P44. These 375 documents not only emphasize the imperative nature of scholars executing an agreement but also clarify the stipulated terms and conditions intrinsic to such accords. [27]. In respect of both the Guidelines and Government Circular No. 1 of 380 2011, these documents set a clear precedent of obligations and agreements related to study leave awards. [28]. The intricate nuances of Section 114(f) of the Evidence, give the courts discretion in the application of the provision. The judge applied the 385 presumption under this section, which allows for the assumption of regularity in the conduct of business and official duties. Given SP5's role and the standard procedures in the Study Leave Unit, the judge presumed that the agreement was handed over to the appellant as part of these regular duties. 390 [29]. Even though the Appellant denied signing or receiving the agreement, the judge inferred from the standard practices and routines of the Study Leave Unit that the Appellant, at the very least, was likely aware of the existence of such an agreement. 395 [30]. In this regard, the case of Internatonal Islamic University Malaysia V Omar Bin Jamaluddin And Ors [2010] MLJU 1648 holds relevance. In that case, a judgment was rendered and upheld against the Defendant under Order 14, even when no signed agreement existed, 400 mirroring the circumstances in the present case. However, in contrast, the present matter was decided following a full trial involving the examination of seven (7) witnesses, including the Appellant, and the submission of other documentary evidence. Consequently, the learned SCJ had valid reasons to be convinced and justified in entering judgment in favor of the 405 Respondent. [31]. In summary, the judge inferred from the common practices of the Study Leave Unit and SP5's role that the Appellant was aware of and likely received the agreement, despite the lack of direct evidence of signing or receipt by the appellant. 410 [32]. The three (3) witnesses (SP1, SP2, and SP3) presented by the Respondent provided testimonies during the trial. Their testimonies corroborated the existence of the agreement and the amount claimed. Further, Respondent’s witness SP5 provides corroboration regarding the 415 process of completing the Study Leave Agreement. [33]. The Respondent has demonstrated the existence of a valid agreement between the parties for the payment of compensation. The existence is supported by a range of compelling evidence, including 420 employment offers, guidelines, and circulars. As highlighted in the case of Chai Kah Sim v. Ishak Saad [1986] 2 MLJ 132 (SC), the court is entitled to rely on circumstantial evidence to make a proper inference when determining the likelihood of events having occurred. In this case, the evidence of the agreement is strong and corroborated by multiple sources. 425 This is what Syed Agil Barakbah SCJ said in the case: “Taking the above into consideration, we do not think that the trial Judge has embarked upon a course of speculation when he concluded that the lorry probably cut across the corner in taking the right-hand bend and the collision occurred when it was diagonally 430 across the centre of the road. Although it was an inference from the facts, it was based on circumstantial evidence both oral and documentary which, in our considered judgment, are sufficient and conclusive as to entitle the learned Judge to make a proper inference. It was in the circumstances the only reasonable and irresistible 435 inference. He heard and saw the witnesses and was in a better position to determine their credibility and reliability” [34]. As exemplified in Mahadevi Nadchatiram v. Thiruchelvasegaram Manickavasegar [2003] 4 MLJ 345 (FC), it is firmly established that the 440 trial judge holds the prime position for assessing witness credibility and reliability. Hence, the trial judge's decision to uphold the Respondent's claim is affirmed, as emphasized by His Lordship Abdul Malek: [21] “The Court of Appeal agreed with the finding of the learned trial judge when it said:- 445 The learned Judge, in our view, is the best person to evaluate the evidence of both parties before him and we are in no position to disagree or quarrel with his evaluation. (Fusing Construction Sdn Bhd v. Eon Finance Berhad & 2 Ors (and Another Appeal)Supra…” 450 [35]. It is evident that the Appellant’s defence was weak and contradictory. Despite claiming the impossibility of completing a Ph.D at UPM within the stipulated five-year time frame, the Appellant successfully completed a Ph.D at another university within the same time frame. This inconsistency in their position, coupled with the lack of evidence, further 455 strengthens the Respondent’s case. Quantum of Damages: [36]. The amount of damages claimed in this case corresponds to the exact total sum of the Appellant's salary, allowances, and associated emoluments paid by the Respondent throughout the Ph.D. program, 460 which totals RM198, 212.17. [37]. The Respondent's claim of RM198,212.17 is corroborated by various evidence presented during the trial. These evidence include: a) The Letter of Offer of Employment (Exhibit P11(a)) specifically 465 paragraph 3.1 which states “Bayaran balik gantirugi adalah berdasarkan jumlah yang dinyatakan dalam perjanjian yang ditandatangani di antara tuan/puan dan pihak Universiti." b) Procedures for Full-time and Part-time Study Leave (Exhibit P27) - this exhibit outlines the procedures for granting study 470 leave and supports the existence of the agreement for study leave. c) The Guidelines for IPTA Training Awards (SLAI) (Exhibit P29), specify the requirement for scholars to sign an agreement and corroborate the existence of the agreement between the 475 Respondent and the Appellant. d) The Government Circular No. 1 of 2011 (Exhibit P44), at paragraph 24 of this circular states, “Setiap calon yang ditaja melalui kedua-dua skim biasiswa SLAB dan SLAI mempunyai dua (2) ikatan perjanjian..." This circular reinforces the 480 existence of the agreement. [38]. Section 5 of the Contracts (Amendment) Act 1976 provides a legal basis for the Respondent's claim. It states that if a scholarship agreement has been broken by the scholar, the scholar and the surety 485 shall be liable to pay the named sum in the agreement. This statutory provision reinforces the Respondent's right to claim the specified amount. 5Remedy in the event of breach Where a scholarship agreement has been broken by the scholar 490