Rumah Berhala Sri Muniswaran, Tampoi, Johor Bahru, Johor v M Rajendran A/L M Suppurayan (JA-24NCvC-545-04/2025)

M RAJENDRAN A/L M SUPPURAYAN [NRIC NO. : 521118-01-5253]

ARAVALLI A/P SUPPURAYAN [NRIC NO. : 620810-01-5608] …PROPOSED INTERVENERS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Enclosure 7 - application for leave to intervene) 30/06/2026 13:33:23 JA-24NCvC-545-04/2025 Kand. 25

This is a case about a temple which was built on a dedicated State land and held by trustees. The society that ran the temple was later struck off and the temple was administered by the Director General of Insolvency (“DGI”). The Court granted the DGI an order to transfer that property to a newly registered society and to discharge himself. In this application (Enclosure 7), two children of one of the original trustees now apply to intervene to enable them to apply to undo the Order on the footing that it has taken away land belonging to their late father’s estate rather than to the society. The DGI objects on the grounds that he is no longer the right party and that the order they complain of never touched the land at all. The question I have to decide is a narrow one – “have the proposed interveners shown enough of an interest in what this case is actually about to be allowed in”.

The society known as Rumah Berhala Sri Muniswaran, Tampoi, Johor Bahru, Johor was registered on 8 April 1970 under registration No. : PPM-001-01-04081970. Its registration was cancelled by the Registrar of Societies on 29 May 2019 under s. 13(1)(c)(iv) of the Societies Act 1966 [Act 832]. On cancellation, by operation of s. 17(1)(a) of Act 832, the property of the society vested in the Applicant, the Ketua Pengarah Insolvensi (the “DGI”).

On 14 July 2021 a new society, Jawatankuasa Pengurusan Aathi Sivan Muniswarar Thirukovil Johor Bahru, Johor [PPM-017-01- 14072021] (“the new society”), was registered.

The new society applied to the DGI for a vesting order under s. 17B of Act 832. The DGI filed this Originating Summons (ex parte) on 29 April 2025. It was gazetted on 27 May 2025 and advertised in Utusan Malaysia (on 19 May 2025) and The Star (on 27 May 2025). On 10 July 2025 the High Court granted the order sought (Enclosure 6) (“the Vesting Order”).

The proposed interveners are children of the late M. Suppurayan s/o Mandar, who died on 27 March 1986. The land which is the subject of their complaint is Lot 2144, Mukim Tebrau, District of Johor Bahru. By a declaration under s. 62 of the National Land Code, gazetted in the Warta Kerajaan Negeri Johor (dated 6 December 1971 and published on 3 February 1972) [PTG. 640/61; PHTJB. 10/1/58], the land was reserved for a public purpose. It is a site for the Sri Muniswaran Temple, to be maintained by five named persons, the late M. Suppurayan s/o Mandar among them, as “Trustees and their successors in office”.

The proposed interveners obtained a grant of administration of his estate dated 21 May 2024. They incorporated a company limited by guarantee, Sri Maha Siva Muniswaran Devasthanam Berhad, on 15 December 2024.

Between 2024 and 2025 the proposed interveners, through their solicitors, wrote to the DGI asserting their status as administrators and trustees and asking that the temple property be handed to them. The DGI did not accede.

The proposed interveners claimed that they learned of the Vesting Order only when the movable property was handed to the new society on or about 16 October 2025. They filed an application for judicial review on 17 December 2025, which they withdrew on 5 February 2026 on technical grounds, and then filed the present application.

The proposed interveners apply under Order 15 rule 6(2)(b)(i) and (ii) and/or Order 92 rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012 (“ROC2012”). In substance they seek –

leave to intervene in this action;

leave to file, within fourteen days, an application to set aside the Vesting Order dated 10 July 2025;

a stay of the whole of the proceedings and of execution of the Vesting Order pending the disposal of the intervention; and

costs in the cause.

The DGI opposes the application and takes a preliminary objection as follows –

that by the Vesting Order he has been discharged from administering the affairs of the dissolved society and is no longer the proper party;

that the Vesting Order remains valid and has never been set aside, varied, stayed or appealed;

that the application is in substance a collateral challenge to a subsisting order and an abuse of process; and

that the proposed interveners have no locus standi to intervene.

The proposed interveners answered that –

the Vesting Order is confined to the movable property of the dissolved society and does not extend to the gazetted land and the temple buildings, which belong to their late father’s estate;

that they were neither named nor served although the DGI knew of their claim, so that the order was made in breach of the audi alteram partem rule and is a nullity as against them; and

that they have a proprietary and legal interest entitling them to intervene.

Based on the preliminary objections, three questions arise –

What does the Vesting Order dated 10 July 2025 actually vest - does it extend to the gazetted land and the temple buildings, or is it confined to the movable property of the dissolved society?

On the true scope of that Order, have the proposed interveners shown a legal or proprietary interest in the subject matter of this action sufficient to be granted leave to intervene under O. 15 r. 6(2)(b) of the Rules of Court 2012?

Is the application in any event to be dismissed because the Applicant has been discharged and is no longer the proper party, and the application is a collateral challenge to a subsisting order? ANALYSIS Issue (a) What does the Vesting Order actually vest?

The Vesting Order, at its paragraphs (a) to (h), dissolves the affairs of the old society, vests in the new society the debts and liabilities of the old society, vests the society’s goods then held in the DGI’s custody (itemised as bundles of temple accessories, a jar containing RM145.00, jars of coins, a set of nine keys, and metal pails), vests the society’s cash-flow records, books and related documents. It credits the balance of money held, after deduction of costs, to the new society. It fixes the costs of vesting on the new society. And finally, it discharges the DGI from administering the affairs of the dissolved society.

The Order does not mention, vest, or otherwise deal with Lot 2144, the gazetted land, or the temple buildings. There is no reference to any immovable property anywhere in it. Every limb is tied to property described as belonging to the dissolved society, or as held in the DGI’s custody, i.e. the movable estate that vested in him under s. 17(1)(a) Societies Act 1966 [Act 832] on cancellation. That is consistent with the statutory scheme, for section 17B of Act 832 operates upon “the assets, debts and liabilities of the old society”, and land reserved by gazette in the names of named trustees for a public purpose is not, without more, the property of the society.

This reading is confirmed by two further matters on the record. First, the Applicant’s own supporting affidavit for the Originating Summons identified the property to be dealt with as a bank account, the balance of moneys held, the society’s goods and its records, all of them movable and named no land or building. Second, the land is reserve land under section 62 of the National Land Code, held by named trustees for a public purpose. Such land is not the property of the society. It was therefore incapable of vesting in the DGI under section 17(1)(a) of Act 832 on cancellation and incapable of passing under section 17B of Act 832. The Order neither did, nor could, reach it.

I therefore find that the Vesting Order is confined to the movable property, records and moneys of the dissolved society. It neither vests nor purports to vest the gazetted land or the temple buildings. This finding governs all that follows. Issue (b) - Have the proposed interveners shown a sufficient interest to intervene?

The power to add a party on intervention is found in Order 15 rule 6(2)(b) ROC 2012. The classic statement of the principle is the Privy Council decision in Pegang Mining Co Ltd v Choong Sam & Ors [1969] 2 MLJ 52. The question identified in that case is whether the person seeking to come in is one whose presence is necessary to ensure that all matters in dispute may be effectually and completely adjudicated upon, or who has a legal interest in the subject matter of the litigation. The interest must be in the subject matter of the very action sought to be entered.

In my view, at its highest The proposed interveners’ case is : As administrators of the estate of one of the gazetted trustees of the temple, they hold, or are entitled to, the proprietary and legal interest in that land and in the buildings upon it. The Vesting Order, affects that interest, or is being used by the DGI as the foundation for taking possession of the land. They were neither named nor served in the ex parte proceedings, although the DGI knew of their claim. So, they claimed, the order was made in breach of the audi alteram partem rule and is a nullity as against them, which they are entitled to intervene to set aside. They further submitted, that the DGI came to court ex parte knowing of their asserted claim, having received their solicitors’ letters of 17 February and 20 March 2025 before the Originating Summons was filed. Yet the DGI did not disclose that claim and instead told the court that the order would not prejudice any party. This, they submitted, was a failure of the duty of full and frank disclosure owed by an ex parte applicant. They relied on the Federal Court decision in Dr Lourdes Dava Raj a/l Curuz Durai Raj v Dr Milton Lum Siew Wah & Anor [2020] 5 MLJ 185 for the proposition that an order made in breach of natural justice is a nullity that an affected person may intervene to set aside even after the proceedings have ended. The Federal Court in Dr Lourdes Dava Raj held that the principle in Hong Leong Bank Bhd (formerly known as Hong Leong Finance Bhd) v Staghorn Sdn Bhd and other appeals [2008] 2 MLJ 622, that a party cannot intervene under O. 15 r. 6 ROC 2012 once the proceedings have concluded, does not apply to an order that is a nullity.

The interveners also relied on Pegang Mining for the right of a person with a proprietary or legal interest to intervene, and for the disclosure duty, on NKM Properties Sdn Bhd v Rakyat First Merchant Bankers Bhd [1992] 2 MLJ 349.

I have set their case out fully, because it would be a serious matter to shut out a person with a real interest. But the case cannot be sustained, for the reason that runs through Issue (a), i.e. that the interest they assert is in the land, and the order they seek to enter and to undo does not touch the land. From that, four things follow.

First, leave to intervene under Order 15 rule 6(2)(b) ROC 2012 requires an interest in the subject matter of this action. The subject matter of this action is the vesting of the dissolved society’s movable property in the new society. The proposed interveners assert no interest in those movable properties. Their asserted interest lies elsewhere, i.e. in the land. In my judgment, an interest in something the action does not concern is not an interest in the subject matter of the action, and does not satisfy the test in Pegang Mining.

Second, their presence is not necessary to enable the Court to adjudicate the questions in this cause. Those questions, whether the conditions in section 17B of Act 832 were met and whether the society’s movable property should pass to the new society, can be, and were, completely determined without them.

Third, the natural-justice argument and the reliance on Dr Lourdes do not assist them on these facts. The audi alteram partem rule entitles a person to be heard before an order determines his rights. However, an order is not a nullity as against a stranger whose rights it does not determine. The Vesting Order determines nothing about the proposed interveners’ land. Dr Lourdes was a different case. There, the affected party was the very person whose conduct was in issue, deliberately excluded from the proceedings that found him guilty, so that the order directly decided his rights. Here the proposed interveners’ rights in the land are left exactly where the order found them. Indeed, Dr Lourdes itself marks the line that defeats them. The Federal Court there distinguished a person directly affected, whose rights the order determines, from one only indirectly or collaterally affected. It drew that distinction at [32]–[34], from R v Rent Officer Service, ex p Muldoon [1996] 1 WLR 1103 at 1105. Therefore, Dr Lourdes is distinguishable and not engaged.

Fourth, if the true complaint is that the new society, or others, are wrongly occupying or asserting control over the gazetted land, that is a distinct claim, either in trespass, or for a declaration of the trust and recovery of possession. This claim is to be brought by a properly constituted action against the proper defendants. It is not a reason to be let into a movables-vesting case in order to set aside an order that never reached the land. For the same reason, their complaints that the new society is run by the "same actors" who procured the cancellation of the old society and that it registered its address on the gazetted land without authority, even if made out, go to the merits of the land and the conduct of the new society. They are matters for that action, not grounds to intervene here. I would add that the very nature of the proposed interveners’ asserted interest is in contest. The land is reserve land held by five named trustees for a public purpose and whether administrators of one deceased trustee’s estate thereby become owners of the land, or successors to a trustee’s office, is neither self-evident nor a matter to be resolved summarily on an intervention. That contest is itself a reason the matter belongs in a properly constituted action.

Fifth, the very authority the proposed interveners invoke is, on its own terms, against them. Staghorn holds that a person not already a party cannot use Order 15 rule 6 ROC 2012 to intervene and undo an order that has been made and perfected. Once the proceeding has concluded the court is functus officio, and the course open to anyone, party or not, who wishes to challenge such an order is a fresh action. It holds further that an intervener must have an interest in the very subject matter and, where the object is to set aside an order affecting land, an interest in the land itself; absent that, he is not qualified to intervene. In my judgment, Dr Lourdes is the narrow exception to the first proposition, confined to an order that is a nullity against the person whose own rights it determined. The proposed interveners fall outside that exception and squarely within the rule, which reinforces what I have already held, their proper course, if they have one, is the properly constituted action to which this dismissal is without prejudice.

I should address separately the complaint of non-disclosure, which is the proposed interveners’ strongest point. It is right that the DGI’s supporting affidavit, affirmed before the Originating Summons was filed, did not mention the proposed interveners or their asserted claim, although their solicitors had by then written to him, and that it told the court the application would not prejudice any party.

Two things, however, stand in the way of that complaint carrying this application. First, the duty of full and frank disclosure on an ex parte application is a duty to disclose facts material to the order sought. The order sought and made was the vesting of the dissolved society’s movable property. The proposed interveners’ claim is to the land, which that order does not reach. Whether a claim to property lying outside the order is material to the making of the order is, at the least, open to serious doubt and it is not necessary for me to decide it on this application. Second, even if an arguable complaint of non- disclosure could be made out, its place is in a properly constituted application to set the order aside, brought against the party now interested in the vested property and not in an application to intervene against a discharged Applicant in proceedings whose subject matter does not engage the proposed interveners’ land.

For those reasons I find that the proposed interveners have not shown a legal or proprietary interest in the subject matter of this action and are not necessary parties to it. They do not cross the threshold for leave to intervene. Issue (c) - Should the application in any event be dismissed on the preliminary objection?

It is trite that an order of a court of competent jurisdiction is valid and binding until it is set aside, varied or discharged. It must be obeyed, and it cannot be impugned collaterally in other proceedings. By section 17B(7) of Act 832, once the Court approves the vesting and the decision is gazetted, the DGI is fully discharged from all his responsibilities and liabilities in the matter.

The proposed interveners claimed that the DGI cannot rely upon his own discharge to defeat them, because they were never made parties and so had no opportunity to resist the order; and that the rule against collateral attack gives way where the order is a nullity, as in Dr Lourdes.

However, that answer fails, for two connected reasons. First, as I have held under Issue (b), the order is not a nullity as against the proposed interveners, because it does not affect their land. So the exception in Dr Lourdes to the rule against collateral attack does not arise.

Second, the DGI’s objection that he is no longer the proper party is well founded on the face of the order. Paragraph (h) discharges him, and section 17B(7) of Act 832 completes that discharge. The property in question passed to the new society, which is the party now interested in it. And the DGI has maintained that position from the outset, having recorded at the case management of 19 March 2026 that he was not the proper respondent to the application. Yet the new society, although told by the DGI to appear and to answer, has filed nothing and has not been joined. The only respondent before me is a discharged former administrator. In my judgement, an application to set aside cannot sensibly proceed against him alone.

I add this. The course open to a person aggrieved by the Vesting Order, if within the class the statute protects, was to come forward on the advertisement and be heard under section 17B(2) of Act 832, or else to apply directly to set aside, to vary, or to appeal the order. I do not rest my decision on the time limit in regulation 8 of the Societies (Application for Vesting Order) Regulations 1993, because it is at least arguable that the proposed interveners, claiming as trustees of land rather than as members or creditors of either society, fall outside the class to which section 17B(2) of Act 832 and that regulation are addressed. I rest it on the surer ground that the order does not touch their land and that this application is not the appropriate vehicle for the grievance they truly have.

Drawing the issues together –

the Vesting Order is confined to the dissolved society’s movable property and does not reach the gazetted land or the temple buildings;

the proposed interveners assert no interest in that movable property and so have shown no interest in the subject matter of this action; and

their natural-justice and nullity arguments do not arise, because the order determines nothing about their land, I find that the Applicant, being discharged, is not in any event the proper party to a setting-aside they cannot on this footing mount.

I therefore allowed the DGI’s preliminary objection and dismissed Enclosure 7 with costs fixed at RM8,000.00 subject to allocatur.

To ensure that the proposed interveners are not shut out from whatever rights they may have in the land, I made the dismissal without prejudice to their right to commence a properly constituted action to assert and protect any proprietary or trust interest in Lot 2144 and the buildings upon it. Dated : 10 June 2026 -signed- (NORADURA BINTI HAMZAH) Judicial Commissioner High Court Civil 2 Johor Bahru Counsel for the Applicant : : Kodesviary a/p Ramanaidu Assistant Director of Insolvency Counsel for the Proposed Interveners : : Krishnan a/l Narayanan Nair Messrs. N.Krishnan Nair & Co.