S.P. Mulia Sdn. Bhd. v Ctl Bored Pile & Machinery Sdn. Bhd. (JA-24C-4-10/2025)

There are three applications before this Court, arising from 2 suits –

the Plaintiff's application to set aside the Adjudication Decision dated 17.09.2025 delivered by Adjudicator Tan Yee Sin (AIAC Ref : AIAC/D/ADJ-5992-2025) pursuant to section 15 of the

the Plaintiff's application for a stay of execution of the said Adjudication Decision pursuant to section 16(1)(a) CIPAA (Enclosure 5) in Suit : JA-24C-4-10/2025); and

the Defendant's application for enforcement of the Adjudication Decision pursuant to section 28 CIPAA ((Enclosure 1) in Suit : JA-24C-6-11/2025).

For ease of reference I’ll refer parties as they are in suit : JA-24C-4- 10/2025.

Parties agreed for the matter to be heard simultaneously. Both parties have filed their respective written submissions and bundles of authorities and orally submitted before this Court on two specific issues, namely –

the effect of the Defendant's commencement of arbitration on the

the lapse of time between the accrual of payment and the commencement of enforcement, being matters which the Plaintiff submitted were not ventilated in the written submissions and which were raised in rebuttal of the Defendant's reply submission. The Court, having considered the same, now delivers its decision.

The Defendant, CTL Bored Pile & Machinery Sdn Bhd, was appointed by the Plaintiff, S.P. Mulia Sdn Bhd, as sub-contractor for piling works for a project known as 'Laluan Alternatif Menghubungkan Jalan Parit Jalil (J126) dan Jalan Peserai (FT005), Batu Pahat, Johor' pursuant to a Letter of Award dated 27.03.2018.

The Defendant carried out the works but was not fully paid. On 25.03.2025, the Defendant served a Payment Claim under the CIPAA. The Plaintiff did not serve any payment response. The Defendant then issued a Notice of Adjudication on 25.04.2025. The matter was referred to adjudication before Adjudicator Tan Yee Sin (AIAC Ref : AIAC/D/ADJ-5992-2025).

On 17.09.2025, the Adjudicator delivered her decision ordering the Plaintiff to pay –

the adjudicated sum of RM83,153.77;

interest at 5% per annum from 2 September 2019 until full settlement; and

adjudication costs of RM34,961.60.

The Plaintiff filed the Setting Aside Application (Enclosure 1) on 10.10.2025 under section 15(b) and (d) CIPAA and the Stay Application (Enclosure 5) on 13.10.2025 under section 16(1)(a) CIPAA in Suit No. 4 and Defendant filed the application for Execution of the Adjudication Order dated 17 September 2025 in Suit No. 6.

I deal first with Enclosure 5. The Plaintiff seeks a stay of execution of the Adjudication Decision pending disposal of the Setting Aside Application.

Since both the Setting Aside Application and Stay Application were fixed for hearing together today, the Stay Application is, in my view, nugatory. The purpose of a stay under section 16(1)(a) CIPAA is to preserve the status quo pending the hearing of the setting aside application. Where both applications are heard and determined simultaneously, there is nothing to stay pending.

I should also briefly address the Plaintiff's preliminary objection that the Defendant did not file a separate Affidavit in Reply specific to the Stay Application and that the matters set out in Enclosure 6 must therefore be treated as admitted on the principle in Ng Hee Thoong & Anor. v. Public Bank Berhad [1995] 1 CLJ 609. In light of my finding that the Stay Application is nugatory by reason of the simultaneous disposal of the Setting Aside Application, it is unnecessary for me to determine this objection.

I would, however, observe in passing that the Plaintiff's reliance on Ng Hee Thoong goes only to factual averments and not to questions of law. The matters which would in any event be determinative of the Stay, namely the legal effect of section 16 CIPAA, the interim finality of the Adjudication Decision under section 13 CIPAA, and the absence of any "clear and unequivocal error" of the kind contemplated in View Esteem - are matters of law on which no factual admission could in any event be procured by the rule in Ng Hee Thoong.

I note that the Plaintiff had also raised, through its Afidavit Tambahan (Enclosure 6), the commencement of arbitration proceedings by the Defendant via Notis Timbang Tara dated 14.11.2025 as a basis for a stay under section 16(1)(b) CIPAA. However, the commencement of arbitration does not, without more, warrant a stay of the adjudication decision. The adjudication decision remains binding under section 13 CIPAA unless set aside, settled by written agreement, or finally decided by arbitration or court. The arbitration proceedings are in their infancy and no final decision has been rendered.

Enclosure 5 is accordingly dismissed.

At the outset, I note the Defendant's preliminary objection that the Setting Aside Application does not comply with Order 69A, Rules 7 2(1)(f) and 3(1)(b) of the Rules of Court 2012 (“ROC 2012”). Rule 3(1)(b) requires the applicant to identify which part or parts of the adjudication decision are challenged. Rule 2(1)(f) requires the originating summons to specify "the respondents on whom the originating summons is to be served, stating their role in the adjudication. "Having reviewed the Saman Pemula, I observe that it seeks to set aside the entire Adjudication Decision under section 15(b) and (d) without specifying the parts challenged and that it makes no mention whatsoever of the Defendant's role in the adjudication proceedings. These are mandatory provisions employing the word "shall" and are intended to ensure that all parties are clearly informed of their respective roles and the specific parts of the decision being challenged. The non-compliance is not a mere technical irregularity and renders the Setting Aside Application procedurally defective.

While this is a valid procedural concern supported by Game On Funpark (Southern) Sdn Bhd v Bond M&E Sdn Bhd and another summon [2025] MLJU 3002, I will, in the interest of justice, proceed to consider the substance of the Plaintiff's complaints as discernible from the supporting affidavit.

The law on setting aside under section 15 CIPAA is well-settled. It is not an appeal mechanism. The Court's role is limited to determining whether the adjudicator decided the question referred to her and whether the process was fair. The Court does not review the merits of the adjudicator's findings. [See : ACFM Engineering & Construction Sdn Bhd v. Esstar Vision Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal [2016] 1 LNS 1522; TSR Bina Sdn Bhd v. Syarikat Pembenaan Yeoh Tiong Lay Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal [2024] 5 CLJ 402].

The Court of Appeal in TSR Bina emphasised that the objective underlying CIPAA requires courts to respect and enforce the adjudicator's decision and that it should only be in rare circumstances that courts will interfere. The need to have the "right" answer has been subordinated to the need to have an answer quickly.

The Federal Court in Anas Construction Sdn Bhd v. JKP Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal [2024] 2 CLJ 665 further affirmed that the grounds for setting aside under Section 15 of the CIPAA are confined to the four statutory grounds therein. The Court's function in a Setting Aside Application is only to consider whether the adjudication decision could be set aside on those grounds. It is not an appeal, nor is it a judicial review. The Court cannot review the merits of the adjudication decision. Where the complaints raised are in substance challenges to the correctness of the Adjudicator's findings on fact or law, such complaints do not engage Section 15 and are not a proper basis for setting aside. The proper recourse for such complaints is arbitration or litigation under Section 13(c) of the CIPAA.

Against this backdrop, the following are my analysis and findings.

The Plaintiff raised seven preliminary objections before the Adjudicator, going to the Adjudicator's jurisdiction. These were directed at, in summary –

limitation;

estoppel;

cause of action;

due dates in the Payment Claim;

description of works;

departure from CIPAA Form 1, and

the validity of the Notice of Adjudication. For convenience, I have grouped these together with the related natural justice complaints into the six Complaints addressed below. I address each in turn.

The Plaintiff contends the Adjudicator had no jurisdiction as the Defendant's claim is time-barred. The Plaintiff points to the completion date of 4.8.2018, demobilisation on 18.4.2019 and delivery orders from 2018-2019 as being more than 6 years prior to the Notice of Adjudication.

I find this complaint to be, in substance, a challenge to the merits of the Adjudicator's finding on limitation. The time bar issue was raised by the Plaintiff in its Adjudication Response, addressed by the Defendant in its Adjudication Reply and decided by the Adjudicator at paragraphs 21-27 of the Adjudication Decision. The Plaintiff itself admits the issue was dealt with. Its complaint is that the Adjudicator erred ("telah terkhilaf"). An allegation of error in deciding a merits issue is not a ground for setting aside.

In any event, I agree with the Defendant that the cause of action, properly analysed, accrued on 2 September 2019, being 30 days after Payment Certificate No. 11 was issued on 2 August 2019, pursuant to Clause 12(b) of the LOA. The Notice of Adjudication was issued on 25 April 2025, well within the 6-year limitation period under section 6 of the Limitation Act 1953 [Act 254]. The Adjudicator was correct on this point.

The Plaintiff additionally relies on Section 32 of Act 254 and the equitable doctrine of laches, contending that the Defendant has slept on its rights and that the conscience of the Court ought to refuse relief on that ground. I am unable to accept this submission for two reasons.

First, in a setting aside application under section 15 CIPAA, the Court does not exercise the equitable jurisdiction described in Section 32 where the Court's enquiry is confined to the four statutory grounds in section 15. Whether the Defendant's conduct amounted to laches such that an arbitrator or trial court would, in equity, refuse a remedy is a question for any subsequent arbitration or litigation under section 13(c) of the CIPAA, not for this Court on a setting aside application.

Secondly, even if laches were a relevant consideration, the Defendant's claim is for a certified but unpaid sum which fell due 30 days after Payment Certificate No. 11 dated 2 August 2019, that is on 2 September 2019. The Notice of Adjudication was issued on 25 April 2025 well within the six-year limitation period. There is, on the face of the timeline, no acquiescence such as would engage the doctrine of laches.

The Plaintiff contends the Defendant is estopped from claiming by virtue of a letter dated 18.4.2019. Again, this issue was raised before the Adjudicator and decided at paragraphs 28-35 of the Adjudication Decision. This is a merits challenge.

In any event, the Adjudicator's finding is supportable. The letter of 18.4.2019 related to Payment Certificate No. 10. Crucially, the Plaintiff subsequently issued Payment Certificate No. 11 certifying higher values, and made partial payment towards it. This subsequent conduct contradicts any reliance on the letter as a full and final settlement.

The Plaintiff challenges the validity of the Payment Claim on four sub-grounds –

failure to identify cause of action;

two due dates;

no proper description of works; and

departure from CIPAA Form 1.

These are again merits challenges. The validity of the Payment Claim was raised in the Adjudication Response and decided by the Adjudicator at paragraphs 36-55 of the Adjudication Decision.

In any event, I am satisfied that the Payment Claim complied with section 5(2) CIPAA. The different due dates (2.9.2019 and 1.1.2020) correspond to different heads of claim - there is nothing in CIPAA prohibiting multiple due dates. Form 1 is a suggested template, not mandatory : see KLRCA, A Practical Guide to Statutory Adjudication in Malaysia. Moreover, the Adjudicator only awarded on one head of claim (the certified but unpaid sum under Certificate No. 11), rendering any defects in the other heads academic.

The Plaintiff contends the Notice of Adjudication was issued to the wrong party and included fresh evidence. This was ventilated before and decided by the Adjudicator at paragraphs 56-68 of the Adjudication Decision.

Having examined the cover letter and Notice of Adjudication, both clearly identify the Plaintiff by name and business address. Service was effected by registered post to the Plaintiff's business address in compliance with section 38(c) CIPAA, and delivery was confirmed by the AR Card. The Plaintiff participated fully in the adjudication. The complaint is one of form over substance. As for the inclusion of supporting documents, there is nothing in CIPAA prohibiting this. Complaint 5 : Adjudicator Exceeded Jurisdiction (RM83,153.77)

Plaintiff contends that the Adjudicator had acted in excess of her jurisdiction when she awarded the sum of RM83,153.77, which allegedly exceeded the amount claimed by Defendant. With due respect, I could not agree with the Plaintiff for the following reasons.

Firstly, Complaint 5 is in substance a challenge on the merits of the Adjudicator’s decision and not a challenge on the Adjudicator’s jurisdiction. What Plaintiff is in effect attempting to do is to revisit the merits of the dispute which have been dealt with by the Adjudicator through a "backdoor", which, in my considered view, ought not to be permitted, for a single reason that a Setting Aside Application under Section 15 of the CIPAA is not an appeal to the High Court against an adjudication decision, nor is it a judicial review of an adjudication decision. This is clearly explained in Alpha Galaxy Sdn Bhd v Euro Destar (M) Sdn Bhd and another case [2021] MLJU 767, that the court in a Setting Aside Application cannot review the merits of an adjudication decision and cannot set aside an adjudication decision merely on any one or more of the following grounds, which include an error of law, a plain error regarding a finding of fact, an erroneous finding of mixed fact and law, or errors in the reasons given in support of the adjudication decision. Such errors, if any, are remediable by arbitration or litigation pursuant to Section 13(c) of the CIPAA.

Secondly, and more importantly, a careful examination of the facts reveals that the Adjudicator did not at all act in excess of her jurisdiction. Defendant’s claim in relation to Payment Certificate No. 11, as stated in its Payment Claim, was for the sum of RM94,040.42. The sum awarded by the Adjudicator in relation to Payment Certificate No. 11 is only RM83,153.77, which is a sum lower than that sought by Defendant in its Payment Claim, and not higher. There is therefore no question of the Adjudicator having acted in excess of her jurisdiction.

I also observed that the sum of RM83,153.77 awarded by the Adjudicator was clarified by Defendant in its letter dated 18.08.2025 as the certified outstanding sum remaining unpaid under Payment Certificate No. 11, derived as follows – No.

Total value of work done as certified pursuant to Payment Certificate No. 11 3,279,557.74

Add : GST 10,792.07

(Less : Payment) (3,207,196.02)

Outstanding 83,153.77

Pursuant to section 27(1) CIPAA, the Adjudicator's jurisdiction is derived from the Payment Claim. The Federal Court in View Esteem Sdn Bhd v Bina Puri Holdings Bhd [2018] 2 MLJ 22 has clearly stated that if the Payment Claim relates to a particular progress claim, the jurisdiction of the adjudicator is limited to that progress claim and nothing else. This was further affirmed in Anas Construction Sdn Bhd v JKP Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal [2024] 2 CLJ 665, where the adjudication decision was set aside because the adjudicator had relied on a contractual clause not pleaded in either the Payment Claim or the Adjudication Claim. The present case is plainly distinguishable, i.e. the Adjudicator's award is premised entirely on Payment Certificate No. 11, which was the very basis of the Defendant's Payment Claim and there is no reliance on any unpleaded matter.

The Plaintiff's true complaint is, on closer examination, not that the awarded sum of RM83,153.77 exceeds the sum claimed in the Payment Claim (which it plainly does not), but that it exceeds the Defendant's pleaded position in the Adjudication Claim (RM72,361.72) and the Plaintiff's own stated figure in the Adjudication Response (RM76,153.77). Two answers may be given. First, as a matter of jurisdiction under section 27(1) CIPAA, the relevant question is whether the awarded sum is within the matters referred by the Payment Claim and Payment Response and not within the parties' subsequent adjudication submissions. The award in this case sits comfortably within the Payment Claim sum. Secondly, even if the parties' adjudication positions were the relevant ceiling, an adjudicator is not bound to choose between the extremes of the parties' figures. As the High Court held in PCP Construction Sdn Bhd v. Leap Modulation Sdn Bhd and Other Cases [2018] 1 LNS 1459, citing the Singapore Court of Appeal in Soh Beng Tee & Co. Pte Ltd v. Fairmount Development Pte Ltd [2007] 3 SLR 86, an adjudicator is entitled to embrace a middle path so long as it is supported by the evidence before her. The Adjudicator here did precisely that, basing the figure of RM83,153.77 on the certified value of works less the actual payments received, as set out in the Defendant's letter of 18.08.2025.

Furthermore, in my considered view, even if the Adjudicator had erred in allowing a sum which is higher than the sum sought by Defendant (which is vehemently denied), this at best falls within one of the errors set out in Alpha Galaxy Sdn Bhd which does not warrant the adjudication decision to be set aside. Such errors, if any, can be remedied by an arbitration or litigation as provided in Section 13(c) of the CIPAA.

In any and all event, as mentioned above, at all material time, Defendant’s letter dated 18.08.2025 which clarified the computation of the sum of RM83,153.77 was also copied to Plaintiff’s representative. Be that as it may, at all material time Plaintiff had elected to keep silent and did not at any time submit any request to address the matters raised in Defendant’s said letter. Having elected not to respond to the said letter, Plaintiff ought to be now estopped from raising this as a basis to challenge the jurisdiction of the Adjudicator.

In this regard, I refer to the decision in Pembinaan Melima (M) Sdn Bhd v ATM Development Sdn Bhd and another case [2021] MLJU 2416 where it was clearly explained that if a party has not requested to make any clarification on a point, there can be no breach of natural justice if the Adjudicator considered the point which the other party has not sought to reply. The Court further noted that in Cantillon Ltd v Urvasco Ltd [2008] EWHC 282 (TCC), it was held that if either party has argued a particular point and the other party does not come back on the point, there is no breach of natural justice in relation thereto.

The Plaintiff makes a related but distinct complaint that the Adjudicator, of her own volition through Order No. 5 dated 15.08.2025, raised the issue of the Plaintiff's Debit Note for RM7,000.00. The Plaintiff submits that this was a matter not pleaded by either party in the Adjudication Claim or Adjudication Response, and that the Adjudicator therefore embarked on a frolic of her own. The Plaintiff further submits that the Defendant's letter dated 18.08.2025 ("the 18.08.2025 Letter"), which disputed the Debit Note for the first time, was admitted into the record without affording the Plaintiff any opportunity to respond, in breach of natural justice.

I do not accept these submissions. The Debit Note for RM7,000.00 was put into issue by the Plaintiff itself in its own computation of payments made under Certificates Nos. 1 to 11. It was the Plaintiff that asserted, in its Adjudication Response, a payment figure of RM3,214,196.02, which figure included the disputed RM7,000.00 Debit Note credit. The reconciliation of payments made and certified value of work was therefore squarely within the matter referred to adjudication. Order No. 5 was an exercise of the Adjudicator's procedural powers under section 25 CIPAA to seek clarification on figures already in the pleadings, not the introduction of a new dispute.

As to the alleged denial of natural justice, the 18.08.2025 Letter was, on the undisputed evidence, copied to the Plaintiff's representative at the time it was sent to the Adjudicator. The Plaintiff elected not to make any application to respond to it, nor to seek an extension of time, nor to raise the matter at any stage prior to the issuance of the Adjudication Decision. In Pembinaan Melima (M) Sdn Bhd v ATM Development Sdn Bhd and another case [2021] MLJU 2416, the Court, citing Cantillon Ltd v Urvasco Ltd [2008] EWHC 282 (TCC) held that where a party has had the opportunity to address a point and elected not to do so, no breach of natural justice arises if the Adjudicator subsequently decides on that point. The Plaintiff, having elected not to respond when given the opportunity, cannot now be heard to complain that it was not heard.

Insofar as the Plaintiff relies on Carlson Construction Sdn Bhd v. AWP Properties Sdn Bhd & Other Cases [2023] MLRHU 2256 and Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co Ltd v. Oxley Rising Sdn Bhd & Another Case [2023] MLRHU 286, those cases are distinguishable. In Carlson Construction Sdn Bhd, the Adjudicator went behind a conceded averment in the pleadings to make a contrary finding on a point neither party had put in issue. In Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co Ltd, the Adjudicator relied on an expert report that had not been disclosed to the affected party at all. In the present case, the figure underlying the Debit Note was raised by the Plaintiff itself, the 18.08.2025 Letter was contemporaneously copied to the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff had a meaningful opportunity to respond, which it elected not to take. There is therefore no parallel.

In the circumstances, Plaintiff ought to be estopped from now raising Complaint 5.

For the reasons stated above, this Court is satisfied that the Adjudicator did not act in excess of her jurisdiction when she awarded the sum of RM83,153.77 to Defendant. Complaint 5 by Plaintiff is accordingly dismissed.

The Plaintiff's final complaint is that the Adjudicator breached natural justice by failing to consider the defences raised in the Adjudication Response. This complaint is general and lacking in specificity. No particular defence is identified as having been ignored.

A review of the Adjudication Decision shows that the Adjudicator addressed each of the issues raised therein, namely –

time bar (paragraphs 21–27);

estoppel (paragraphs 28–35);

payment claim validity (paragraphs 36–55);

notice of adjudication validity (paragraphs 56–68); and

quantum (paragraphs 69–86).

The Plaintiff's real grievance is that the Adjudicator did not decide in its favour. Dissatisfaction with the outcome is not a basis for setting aside. There is a clear distinction between an adjudicator not considering a defence and not accepting it. The latter does not constitute a breach of natural justice.

Learned counsel for the Plaintiff also raised the issue of why the Defendant had only sought to enforce the Adjudication Decision after a considerable lapse of time from when payment was allegedly due. In my judgment, this complaint has no legal basis. Neither the CIPAA nor the ROC 2012 prescribes any time limit within which a party must apply to enforce an adjudication decision under Section 28 of the CIPAA. Insofar as the complaint relates to the lapse of time between when payment became due under Payment Certificate No. 11 (2 September 2019) and when the Defendant commenced the adjudication process (Payment Claim dated 25 March 2025), this Court notes that the Payment Claim was filed within the 6-year limitation period under section 6 of Act 254. In any event, the limitation issue was ventilated before and decided by the Adjudicator. This Court, in a Setting Aside Application, ought not to revisit such merits.

I now turn to the Defendant's application to enforce the Adjudication Decision under section 28 CIPAA. The legal framework is well-settled. Where –

the Adjudication Decision has not been set aside under section 15 or stayed under section 16;

(ii) the subject matter of the decision has not been settled by written agreement; and

(iii) the dispute has not been finally decided by arbitration or the Court, the Court is bound to enforce the decision as if it were a judgment or order of the High Court.

This is the effect of section 13 read with section 28 CIPAA, as held in Geoforce East Sdn. Bhd. v Melati Evergreen Sdn. Bhd. and another summons [2020] MLJU 1063, in which the Court applied the Court of Appeal’s decision in Inai Kiara Sdn. Bhd. v Puteri Nusantara Sdn. Bhd. [2019] 2 MLJ 362.

In the present case, having dismissed the Setting Aside Application and the Stay Application, none of the three statutory bars to enforcement is engaged. The arbitration commenced by the Defendant by Notice of Arbitration dated 14.11.2025 is in its infancy; there is no "final decision" within the meaning of section 13(c) CIPAA. The Adjudication Decision therefore remains binding and enforceable.

The Plaintiff raises three specific objections to enforcement which I should briefly address.

Alleged risk of double recovery in light of the arbitration

The Plaintiff submits that the Defendant's commencement of arbitration covering the same adjudicated sum means that enforcement should be dismissed (not merely stayed) to avoid double recovery. I am unable to accept this submission. The interim-finality regime of CIPAA presupposes precisely that an unsuccessful party may pursue arbitration or litigation under section 13(c) CIPAA while the adjudication decision remains enforceable. The risk of "double recovery" is more apparent than real : any sum paid under enforcement of the Adjudication Decision would necessarily be brought into account in the subsequent arbitration. To accept the Plaintiff's submission would be to invert the policy of CIPAA and to reward dilatory tactics by the unsuccessful party.

(ii) The disputed Invoice IN 1399 dated 24.9.2025

The Plaintiff disputes the authenticity of the Defendant's Invoice IN 1399 dated 24.9.2025 (Enclosure 20 in Suit : JA-24C-4-10/2025) and points out that the signature said to acknowledge receipt is not that of any of the Plaintiff's staff. With respect, the issue is immaterial to enforcement. The Plaintiff's obligation to comply with the Adjudication Decision arises from section 12 CIPAA (the Adjudication Decision itself), not from the service of any subsequent invoice. There is no statutory or common-law requirement that a party seeking enforcement under section 28 CIPAA must first issue a formal notice of demand. The dispute over the Invoice - if it survives - may be a matter for any subsequent assessment but does not displace the right to enforcement.

(iii) Adjudication costs already paid

The Plaintiff's third objection is that, on 7.7.2025, it had paid RM10,000.00 as its share of the deposit for the adjudication costs in compliance with the Adjudicator's Order No. 3 dated 4.7.2025 and that the Defendant's prayer for the full RM34,961.00 in adjudication costs does not credit this. With respect, this is a matter for the parties to reconcile at the stage of execution. It does not displace the Court's duty under section 28 CIPAA to enforce the Adjudication Decision as an order of the High Court. The Plaintiff has liberty to apply if reconciliation cannot be achieved.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff fails in its objections and the Defendant's Enforcement Application is allowed.

In the premises, having considered all six complaints, I find that the Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the threshold for intervention under section 15 CIPAA. The complaints are, in substance, challenges to the merits of the Adjudicator's findings which are not permissible under a setting aside application. Even where the complaints touch upon procedure, I find no breach of natural justice or excess of jurisdiction warranting the setting aside of the Adjudication Decision.

The Adjudication Decision carries interim finality under section 13 CIPAA. The Plaintiff's remedy, if it disputes the merits, lies in arbitration or litigation under section 13(c) CIPAA - not in a setting aside application.

Accordingly, Enclosure 1 (Setting Aside Application) and Enclosure 5 (Stay Application) in Suit : JA-24C-4-10/2025 are dismissed with costs of RM15,000.00, subject to the allocator and Enclosure 1 (Enforcement Application) in Suit : JA-24C-6-11/2025 is allowed with cost of RM 10,000.00, subject to the allocatur. Dated : 2 Mac 2026 -signed-Dr Noradura binti Hamzah Judicial Commissioner High Court Civil 2 Johor Bahru Solicitor for the Plaintiff : : Tan Vincent Messrs. Tan Vincent & Co. Solicitor for the Defendant : : Naveen a/l Sri Kantha together with Leong Chee Weng Messrs. Lee & Poh Partnership