S.P. Veloo & Co. v Affin Bank Berhad ... Respondent (W-02(A)1792-09/2016)

1 THE COURT OF APPEAL OF MALAYSIA (APPELLATE JURISDICTION) CIVIL APPEAL NO. W-02(A)1792-09/2016 BETWEEN S.P. VELOO & CO. ... APPELLANT [SUED AS A LAW FIRM] AND AFFIN BANK BERHAD ... RESPONDENT [COMPANY NO.: 25046-T] [Dalam Perkara Mengenai Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Kuala Lumpur] Saman Pemula No. WA-17D-14-04/2016 Dalam Perkara Seksyen 130,132 dan 126 Akta Profesyen Undang-Undang 1976; Dan Dalam Perkara mengenai fee guaman dan taksiran antara Affin Bank Berhad dengan Tetuan S.P. Veloo & Co.; Dan Dalam Perkara Aturan 59, Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dan/atau Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980. 2 ANTARA AFFIN BANK BERHAD … PLAINTIF [NO. SYARIKAT: 25046-T] DAN S.P. VELOO & CO. … DEFENDAN [DISAMAN SEBAGAI SEBUAH FIRMA GUAMAN] Coram: David Wong Dak Wah, JCA Hamid Sultan bin Abu Backer, JCA Umi Kalthum binti Abdul Majid, JCA Hamid Sultan Bin Abu Backer, JCA (Delivering Judgment of The Court) GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT [1] The appellant’s/solicitor’s appeal is against the decision of the learned High Court judge who had allowed the respondent’s/client’s application to get the Bill taxed relating to contentious business notwithstanding the limitation of one year to do so has set in pursuant to the Legal Profession Act 1976 (LPA 1976). The respondent’s prayers before the High Court read as follows: “(i) to deliver the Plaintiff the detailed solicitors' bills of costs within 14 days after the order is made; 3

(ii) the said detailed solicitors' bills of costs then fixed for taxation at this Honorable Court; and

(iii) to deliver all cause papers, documents, correspondences, files and all other matters relating to the works done by the Defendant to the Plaintiff within 14 days after the order is made.” [2] The central allegation of the respondent before the High Court was that the solicitor’s bill was not an itemised bill as per the requirement of Order 59 of the Rules of High Court 1980 (RHC). [Now Rules of Court 2012 (RC 2012)]. In addition, it was also the contention that the sum claimed by the solicitor for work done was not reasonable. The learned judge’s reasons as summarised by the respondent read as follows: “(a) the Appellant had only delivered gross sum bills to the Respondent. Although the Invoices set out "all the works done", they "did not itemise the costs of each items to show the legal fees were arrived."

(4) The fee of RM600,000 was arguably grossly excessive and did not commensurate with the legal work done. This, prima facie, was a special circumstance that warranted the High Court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction by granting an order for taxation. There was never any averment made by the defendant in their affidavit to challenge the plaintiffs' contention in the affidavit in support that the sum of RM631,141.20 was astronomical. The defendant in opposing the application did not explain or clarify the exorbitant fee of RM600,000 (see paras 34–35).” [5] The solicitor’s bill in the instant case for contentious business can be summarised as follows: No. Nature of Instruction

1. Fees Amended invoice no. 1 Removal of caveat Government tax of 6% Disbursement Total RM 115,000.00 RM 6,900.00 RM 2,566.00

2. RM 124,466.00 Amended invoice no. 2 Defending the setting aside of order application Government tax of 6% Disbursement Total RM 145,000.00 RM 8,700.00 RM 3,628.00

3. RM 157,328.00 Invoice no. 3 Defending the stay application Government tax of 6% Disbursement Total RM 55,000.00 RM 3,300.00 RM 1,212.40

4. RM 59,512.40 Invoice no. 4 Defending the appeal Government tax of 6% Disbursement Total RM 150,000.00 RM 9,000.00 RM 1,073.80 RM 160,073.80 Total sum: RM501,380.20 6 [6] Looking at the fees structure above for ordinary day to day business of the court, we reserve our comment on the issue of ‘unreasonable fee’. In the instant case, there was no expert evidence of members of the profession on this issue. [See Ngan Siong Hing v RHB Bank [2014] 2 MLJ 449; Pang Yeow Chow v Advanced Specialist Treatment Engineering Sdn Bhd [2014] 8 CLJ 188]. This was also a case where there was no prior agreement of fees and any reasonable client would expect the fees to be reasonable as the legal profession is duty bound to abide by ethics. Professional ethics in respect of lawyers is the set of moral principles which lays down certain duties for the observance of its members which they owe to the society, to the court, to the profession, to the public, to his client, etc. befitting professional standards of conduct. In Re GH Conaghan [1961] MLJ 81 it was stated that the legal profession occupies by law a privileged position. The continued existence of that position can only be justified if every individual member of the profession conforms to certain standards. Sending a purportedly an unreasonable bill to a client for a contentious business, that too without prior agreement, where in the ordinary course of business could have been done would attract professional misconduct and would also be a grave breach of ethical standards of the legal profession. If the bill is found to be reasonable then there can be no reason for the client to complain. Brief Facts [7] The brief facts and law related to the case has been set out by the learned judge. This judgment must be read together with the judgment of the learned judge to appreciate our grounds in the right perspective. 7 We do not wish to repeat what was said in the judgment save to summarise the facts in our own words as follows:

(ii) the said detailed solicitors' bills of costs then fixed for taxation at this Honorable Court; and

(iii) to deliver all cause papers, documents, correspondences, file and all others matters relating to the works done by the Defendant.” [8] The grounds of the Originating Summons inter alia are stated as follows: “(a) pihak-pihak tidak dapat mencapai sebarang persetujuan atas yuran yang kena dibayar oleh Plaintif kepada Defendan di mana yuran-yuran yang dikenakan adalah tidak munasabah. 8

2. The Learned Judge had erred in law and/or fact in arriving at her decision, in that she failed to take into account and/or appreciate section 121 of the LPA, when she held that a solicitor's bill of cost must be presented in the form of a bill of cost ready for taxation as prescribed by section 132 of the LPA.

3. The Learned Judge had erred in law and/or fact in arriving at her decision, in that she failed to appreciate and/or take into account that there is no legal requirement for the Appellant, as an advocate and 9 solicitor, to present a bill cost ready for taxation when rendering the Appellant's Invoices at the first instance.

4. The Learned Judge had erred in law and/or fact in arriving at her decision, in that she failed to take into account that it is the duty of the Respondent to, within the period prescribed under the LPA, to request for a bill of cost ready for taxation, if the Respondent required a bill of cost in that form.

5. The Learned Judge had erred in law and/or fact in arriving at her decision, in that she failed to appreciate and/or take into account that in the absence of a request by the Respondent for a bill of cost ready for taxation within the period prescribed in the LPA, the Respondent is not entitled to the delivery of a bill of costs ready for taxation.

6. The Learned Judge had erred in law and/or fact in arriving at her decision, in that she failed to take into account the fact that Respondent had never asked the Appellant to present a bill of cost ready for taxation within the period of 1 year from the date of delivery of the Appellant's Invoices.

7. The Learned Judge had erred in law and/or fact in arriving at her decision, in that she failed to appreciate the difference between:-

(ii) detailed bill; and

(iii) a bill of cost ready for taxation.

8. The Learned Judge had erred in law and/or fact in arriving at her decision, in that she failed to take into account that that all the Appellant's Invoices contained precise and sufficient details of all the work carried out by the Appellant pursuant to the Respondent's instructions, so as to enable the Respondent to assess and/or understand and/or appreciate the extent and the nature of the work 10 carried out by the Appellant and as to how the fee stipulated in the Appellant's Invoices were arrived at.

9. The Learned Judge had erred in law and/or fact in arriving at her decision, in that she failed to take into account that all material times the Respondent had in their possession all the relevant documents and/or information to enable them to assess and/or understand and/or appreciate the extent and the nature of the work carried out by the Appellant and as to how the fee stipulated in the Appellant's Invoices were arrived at.

10. The Learned Judge had erred in law and/or fact in arriving at her decision, in that she failed to appreciate and/or take into account that the Appellant's Invoices are in fact detailed bill of cost and not a gross sum bill.

11. The Learned Judge had erred in law and/or fact in arriving at her decision, in that she failed to take into account that the Respondent's application for an order for taxation (hereinafter referred to as "the said application") is statute barred by virtue of section 128(2) of the LPA.

12. The Learned Judge had erred in law and/or fact in arriving at her decision, in that she failed to take into account that a period of more than one (1) year had lapsed from the date of the delivery of the Appellant's Invoices to the date of the said application.

13. The Learned Judge had erred in law and/or fact in arriving at her decision, in that she failed to take into account that section 128(2) of the LPA creates an absolute bar to making of an order for taxation after the lapse of a period of more than one (1) year from the date of delivery of the Appellant's Invoices. 11

14. The Learned Judge had erred in law and/or fact in arriving at her decision, in that she failed to take into account that the Court, by virtue of section 128(2) of the LPA was not vested with any inherent jurisdiction to extend time to allow said application beyond the period of one (1) year from the date of delivery of the Appellant's Invoices.

15. The Learned Judge had erred in law and/or fact in arriving at her decision, in that she failed to take into account that section 128(2) is a negative enactment which effectively excludes the Court's inherent jurisdiction to extend time beyond the period of one (1) year from the date of delivery of the Appellant's Invoices so as to allow the said application.

16. The Learned Judge had erred in law and/or fact in arriving at her decision, in that she failed to appreciate and/or take into account the principles of statutory interpretation and/or rules of construction of statute.

17. The Learned Judge had erred in law and/or fact in arriving at her decision, in that she failed to take into account that the Respondent in the said application did not pray for an extension of time to make the said application.

18. The Learned Judge had erred in law and/or fact in arriving at her decision, in that she failed to take into account that the affidavit in support of the said application did not fulfil the necessary requirements prescribed by section 126(1) of the LPA so as to enable the Court to exercise its discretion to extend time beyond the period of 6 months from the date of delivery of the Appellant's Invoices, let alone extend time beyond the period of one (1) year to allow the said application.

19. The Learned Judge had erred in law and/or fact in arriving at her decision, in that she failed to appreciate and/or take into account that section 130 of the LPA has no application in the present instance. 12

20. The Learned Judge had erred in law and/or fact in arriving at her decision, in that she failed to appreciate and/or take into account the fact that the Respondent had never asked the Appellant to present a bill of cost ready for taxation within the period prescribed in the LPA, and as such the Respondent is not entitled to rely on section 130 of the LPA.

21. The Learned Judge had erred in law and/or fact in arriving at her decision, in that she failed to appreciate and/or take into account that section 132 of the LPA has no application in the present instance.

22. The Learned Judge had erred in law and/or fact in arriving at her decision, in that she failed to appreciate and/or take into account the unrebutted affidavit evidence of the Appellant that there had been assurance from the Respondent that the Appellant's 1st and 2nd Invoices will be paid and as such the Respondent is estopped from disputing the said Invoices.

23. The Learned Judge had erred in law and/or fact in arriving at her decision, in that she failed to appreciate and/or take into account that the 3rd and 4th Invoices of the Appellant were in fact agreed fees and as such the Respondent is estopped from disputing the said Invoices.

24. The Learned Judge had erred in law and/or fact in arriving at her decision, in that she failed to appreciate and/or take into account that the 3rd and 4th Invoices of the Appellant were in fact agreed fees and as such an order for taxation with regards to the said Invoices ought not have been made.

25. The Learned Judge had erred in law and/or fact in arriving at her decision, where she held that in that she failed to appreciate and/or take into account that the agreement as to fees with regards to the 3rd and 4th Invoices as reached between the Appellant and the Respondent 13 is valid despite the absence of a written agreement in the form as prescribed by section 116 of the LPA.

26. The Learned Judge had erred in law and/or fact in arriving at her decision, in that she failed to appreciate and/or take into account section 124 of the LPA where after a lapse of 6 months from date of presentation of the Appellant's Invoices to the Respondent, the said Invoices are presumed to be bona fide until the contrary is shown by the Respondent, and the fact that the Respondent had not shown anything to the contrary within the prescribed period under the LPA.

27. The Learned Judge had erred in law and/or fact in arriving at her decision, in that she failed to appreciate and/or take into account that the case of TAN TEIK SIN v NORA HAYATI & ASSOCIATES [2015] 1 CLJ 89 (hereinafter referred to as "Tan Tiek Sin's case") was wrongly decided.

28. The Learned Judge had erred in law and/or fact in arriving at her decision, in that she failed to distinguish the facts of Tan Tiek Sin's case from the facts of the said application, and she failed to appreciate and/or take into account that in such circumstances Tan Tiek Sin's case has no application in the present instance.

29. The Learned Judge had erred in law and/or fact in arriving at her decision, in that she failed to appreciate and/or take into account the actual facts and the legal principles enunciated in Tan Tiek Sin's case.” Jurisprudence Relating to Bill of Costs, Taxation and LPA 1976 for Contentious Matter [10] If there is no agreement for fees the LPA 1976 envisages at least three types of bill for purpose of costs between the solicitor and client. They are as follows: 14

2012. Courts in their decisions have often created confusion by asserting a detailed bill must be in the form of bill of taxation as set out in RHC 1980 and that too when dealing with section 121 of LPA where RHC 1980 or RC 2012 does not come into operation at all. Section 121 is independent of section 132 of LPA 1976. RHC 1980 or RC 2012 only comes into operation when it relates section 132 of LPA. [12] There is also a difference in phrase in the use of bill of costs in section 121 and section 128. Section 121(1) refers to solicitor’s bill of costs. Section 128 refers to an order for taxation of costs. The distinction is not one of an apple and an orange but one of a marble and pumpkin. This distinction is further emphasised by section 126(1) which states ‘an order for taxation of bill of costs’. The bill referred to here is the bill presented by the solicitor under section 121 and not the bill of costs related to taxation mentioned in RHC 1980 or RC 2012. Even section 130 refers to delivery of solicitor’s bill of costs and that bill can be a subject matter of taxation of bill of costs. If the court orders taxation of solicitor’s bill of costs, the taxation of the bill must follow the procedure set out for taxation of bill of costs under RHC 1980 and now under RC

2012. [Emphasis added]. 15 [13] The taxation of bill of costs of a solicitor’s bill was provided for in detail in RHC 1980. However, in RC 2012 the details required of a ‘taxation of bill of costs of solicitors’ have been dropped leaving only Form 117 which relates to Order 59 rule 7 and not really Order 59 rule 17 of RC 2012. We will not dwell on the RC 2012 for the purpose of this appeal, save to say that the phrase “itemised bills of costs” is no more found in RC 2012 and the words bill of costs also do not appear except in Form 117 which reads as follows: No. 117 BILL OF COSTS (O.59, r. 7) No. Particulars Amount (RM)

1. Getting Up (A)

(1) Taking instructions from client for the hearing

(2) Considering the facts and law

(3) Attending and corresponding with client

(4) Interviewing and corresponding with witnesses and potential witnesses and taking proofs of their evidence

(5) Perusing pleadings, affidavits and other relevant documents

(6) General care and conduct of the proceedings Total of Items

2. Out of Pocket Expenses (B) Filing Fees Attestation Transport Accommodation for Counsel and witnesses Witnesses allowances Expert fees and disbursements “Transcribing Court proceedings” Translation services Printing and/or Binding Photocopy 16 Miscellaneous (Particularize) TOTAL COSTS CLAIMED (RM TOTAL COSTS ALLOWED BY COURT (RM) “ALLOCATUR” DETERMINED BY THE REGISTRAR [14] It must also be noted that the previous Order 59 of RHC 1980 also mentioned that solicitor’s bill of costs and subsequent taxation procedure is referred to as taxation of bill of costs and also reference such as solicitor’s bill. [See for example RHC Order 59 rule 26(2); 28(1), etc.]. [15] Section 121 of LPA 1976 relates to “Where remuneration of advocate and solicitor not subject of agreement” reads as follows: “(1) Where the remuneration of an advocate and solicitor in respect of contentious business done by him is not the subject of an agreement made pursuant to section 116, the solicitor's bill of costs may at the option of the advocate and solicitor either contain detailed items or be for a gross sum: Provided that -

(2) Subsection (1) shall not apply to fees paid to an advocate and solicitor who is briefed as a senior counsel.” [16] Section 121 clearly talks about a solicitor’s bill of costs. It has nothing to do with “taxation of bill of costs”. Solicitor’s bill is a bill for services rendered by the solicitor. The bill can set out detailed items or for gross sum. This bill and the manner it is prepared is at the option of the solicitor. There is no provision in law for the court to dictate how the solicitor’s bill should be. Cases which have not made out the distinction must be corrected by due process of law. In addition, section 121(1) proviso (c) itself makes it clear if the matter is referred to taxation the solicitor must issue a bill as required by the taxing officer. Section 121(1) proviso (a) gives the client the right to demand from the solicitor a bill containing detailed item if the solicitor has served a gross bill. This request is only for the client to be informed of, of the breakdown of the gross bill and not a bill for taxation. A bill for purpose of taxation can only come after the court has ordered the matter to be referred to taxation. Section 121(1) proviso (b) also makes it clear even if a gross bill is submitted an order can be obtained for it to be taxed. 18 [17] Section 126 of LPA 1976 which relates to an order for taxation of costs to be made within 6 months of delivery of bill of costs reads as follows: “(1) An order for the taxation of a bill of costs delivered by any advocate and solicitor may be obtained by a petition as a matter of course by the party chargeable therewith, or by any person liable to pay the cost either to the party chargeable or to the advocate and solicitor, at any time within six months from the delivery of the bill, or, by the advocate and solicitor after the expiration of one calendar month, and within a year from, the delivery.

(2) The order shall contain such directions and conditions as the court thinks proper, and any party aggrieved by any order of Court may apply by summons in chambers that the same may be amended or varied or set aside.

(3) In any case where an advocate and solicitor and his client consent to taxation of a solicitor's bill the Registrar may proceed to tax the bill notwithstanding that there is no order therefor.” [18] Section 126 must be read with section 121. Section 126 simply sets out the step to be taken if the client is not satisfied with the solicitor’s bill of costs, be it gross or itemised bill. The time period of one month, six months and a year stated in the section is important. [19] Section 128 of LPA 1976 which relates to order for taxation of advocate and solicitor's bill on notice given reads as follows: “(1) After the expiration of six months from the delivery of a bill of costs, or after payment of the bill of costs, no order shall be made for taxation of a solicitor's bill of costs, except upon notice to the advocates and solicitors and under special circumstances to be proved to the satisfaction of the Court. 19

(2) No such order for taxation shall in any event be made after the expiry of one year from the delivery of the bill of costs.” [20] Section 128 must be read together with sections 121 and 126 for purpose of clarity. The law gives a right to a client to get the solicitor’s bill of costs taxed. The application must be made within six months and that can be done as of right. However, the application can also be made after the 6th month and within a year upon special circumstances been proved to the satisfaction of the court. The threshold test here is very high. [21] What is important to note is that if section 128 timeline is not adhered to by the client, he will not have the privilege to get the solicitor’s bill of costs to be taxed through the court process. What will be left to address his grievance will only be related to a common law right to dispute the claim. It is very unlikely for the courts to entertain a complaint on the solicitor’s bill of costs when the statutory mechanism was not adhered. Only in very rare and exceptional circumstances will the court want to reopen the issue of bill of costs. In Templer Park Golf & Resort Bhd & Anor v Tetuan George Varughese [2010] 8 CLJ 754, the Court went on to say: “When the dispute is to solicitor's bill, different jurisprudence applies as solicitors are a protected species, subject to the scrutiny by solicitors disciplinary board and/or the court in relation to bills for work done as provided for in LPA 1976. Dispute as to solicitor's bills must be challenged according to law and the mere assertion that the bills are bona fide disputed and the plaintiffs being ready and willing to deposit the sum claimed cannot be a ground to grant a "fortuna injunction".” 20 The facts of the Templer Park’s case as summarised in CLJ read as follows: “This was the plaintiff's application to restrain the defendant (solicitor) from presenting a winding up petition relating to non-payment of solicitors bill. The defendant had issued a total of 20 separate s. 218 notices to the plaintiffs relating to non-payment of their itemized solicitor's bill issued in essence pursuant to Solicitor's Remuneration Order 1980. The plaintiffs submitted, inter alia, that (i) the quantum was excessive; (ii) the defendant had failed to comply with ss. 126 and 128 of Legal Profession Act 1976; (iii) the plaintiffs were willing to deposit the monies claimed pending the invoices being taxed and the company was solvent. The defendant argued (i) it was an undisputed fact that the defendant had acted for the plaintiffs, for both contentious and non-contentious works and bills have been issued; (ii) at all material time the plaintiffs have not questioned, challenged or disputed the bills and (iii) the bills were all itemized bills giving full details of the nature of professional services rendered by the defendant.” The court in dismissing the clients’ application had held inter alia as follows: “(1) The contents of the solicitor's bill were presumed by law to be bona fide and the necessity to prove the contents of the bill and to tax the bill on the facts of this case did not arise due to several provisions of the LPA 1976. Under s. 124(2) once the bill had been delivered in compliance with sub-s. (1) it shall not be necessary in the first instance for the advocate and solicitor to prove the contents of the bill and it shall be presumed until the contrary was shown to be a bill bona fide complying with this Act. Further, the bills issued pursuant to Solicitors Remuneration Order was never resisted from the first instance and now one year had lapsed (Vije & Co v. Co-operative Central Bank Ltd ). [Emphasis added]. 21

(2) The plaintiffs' argument that they were commercially solvent could not on its own be a ground for preventing a petitioner (defendant) from presenting a petition on an undisputed debt (Savant-Asia Sdn Bhd v. Sunway PMI-Pile Construction Sdn Bhd ). An irreparable harm that may be caused to the debtor company could not be seen as a cure for not honouring the commitment to the creditors.

(3) The defendant's claim stood in law to be bona fide and the plaintiffs' claim that the sum claimed was bona fide disputed was not supported with contemporary objections against the bills and the line of arguments raised by the plaintiffs militated against the relevant provisions of LPA 1976. And in consequence, the plaintiffs' application must be dismissed with direction as they had stated that they were in a position to settle the bills.” [22] As we have stated earlier that a solicitor’s bill of costs has special protection by statute and section 124 gives the protection. It does not require the solicitor to prove the contents and it shall be presumed until the contrary is shown a bill bona fide complying with this Act. The emphasis is ‘bona fide’. If the bill is established to be not bona fide then the court’s role to intervene is not ousted. There appears to be no cases directly on point related to the factual matrix of this case so far on the meaning of ‘bona fide’. A grossly unconscionable or unreasonable bill may attract the jurisprudence of bona fide. In cases where it can be shown that the solicitor had done contentious work without fees agreement and the charges are excessive or exorbitant sum for the work a case can be made out provided there is evidence given by senior litigation solicitors on that issue, etc. and there can also be a subsequent complaint for misconduct before the Disciplinary Board. That is to say, though the LPA 1976 gives protection to solicitors in respect of bills unlike other profession, misconduct on issues of excessive or exorbitant bill can be a subject matter of complaint sufficient to protect the client. 22 Thus, the LPA 1976 on the issue of bills protect the lawyers and has also a mechanism to protect the clients. This may not be the case in other professions. [23] Section 124 of LPA 1976 which entitles ‘No advocate and solicitor to sue for costs until delivery of bill of cost’ reads as follows: “(1) Except as authorized by this Act, no advocate and solicitor shall without the leave of the court commence or maintain any action for the recovery of any costs due for any business done by him until the expiration of one month after he has delivered to the party to be charged therewith, or sent by post to. or left with him at, his office or place of business, dwelling house or last known place of abode, a bill of costs, which bill shall be signed either by the advocate and solicitor, or in the case of a partnership, by any of the partners, either with his own name or with the name or style of the partnership, or by another advocate and solicitor employed by the first-named advocate and solicitor or the partnership, or be enclosed in or accompanied by a letter, signed in the like manner, referring to the bill.

(2) Where a bill is proved to have been delivered in compliance with subsection (1) it shall not be necessary in the first instance for the advocate and solicitor to prove the contents of the bill and it shall be presumed until the contrary is shown to be a bill bona fide complying with this Act.” [24] Section 130 of the LPA 1976 also relates to a right to get the solicitor’s bill to be taxed and in that process also for delivery of any deeds, documents or other papers subject to lien, etc. The difference between sections 126 and 130 is inter alia that under section 126 the presumption is that a solicitor’s bill of costs has been delivered. Section 130 deals in a case where a solicitor’s bill of costs is not delivered and the clients want to pay the bill upon taxation and also collect the documents. The said section 130 of LPA 1976 states as follows: 23 “Order for delivery of solicitor's bill of costs by way of petition

130.(1) An order for the delivery of a solicitor's bill of costs, and for delivery up of any deeds, documents or other papers in the possession of the advocate and solicitor may, subject to any lien which such advocate and solicitor may have, and for the taxation of the bill when delivered, be obtained on a petition of course.

(2) Upon the petition being filed, the Registrar shall mark the order thereon forthwith, and draw up the order if necessary.

(3) Subject to this section, the Court shall have the like jurisdiction as the High Court in England to make an order under subsection (1).” [25] Section 132 of LPA 1976 makes the clear distinction to say when the bill of costs for taxation is made it must follow the Rules of Court. That is to say, a solicitor’s bill of costs need not follow the RC 2012 but a bill of costs for taxation must follow the RC 2012. [26] We are grateful to the learned counsel for a number of courts decision in this area of law. We have looked into it and take the view that the LPA 1976 has provided a clear guideline on the issue of solicitor’s bill of costs and the steps to be taken within the time frame to be taxed through the court’s process and also wide powers of the court set out in CJA 1964 Schedule relating to Additional Powers of Courts as well as case laws on inherent jurisdiction to extend time which makes our legal framework different from England and for that reason English case laws must be read with caution. A client can be deprived to get the solicitors bill taxed if the procedures in the LPA 1976 are not followed. However, the LPA 1976 per se does not prohibit the court from 24 reopening the issue of fees if prima facie it can be shown that the bill is not bona fide, etc. The distinction is this, the right to be taxed which means that the client must pay the taxed bill and the amount cannot be challenged. If the bill was never taxed, there may be a small window to challenge it seeking extension of time to set it to be taxed or otherwise. It all depends on the facts and circumstances and the seriousness of the complaint. [27] We do not think it is necessary to go through the cases, save to set out some of the cases cited before us. [See Re A Solicitor [1961] 2 ALL ER 321; Storer & Co v Johnson and Weatherall [1890] 15 App Cas 203; Phuah Choon Hwang & Anor v Hassan & Kong Yeam [1987] 1 MLJ 156; Harry Lee Wee v Haw Par Brothers International Ltd [1980] MLJ 228; Harrison and Others v Tew [1990] ALL ER 865 (CA); Harrison and Others v Tew [1990] ALL ER 321; Chia Ah Sim v Ronny Chong & Co [1993] 2 SLR 564; Vije & Co v Co-Operative Central Bank Ltd [1991] 3 MLJ 432; Tan Tek Sin & Anor v Tetuan Nora Hayati & Associates (Sued as a Firm) [2015] 2 MLJ 1]. [28] We have read the appeal record and able submissions of the parties. After giving much consideration to the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent/client, we take the view that the appeal must be allowed. Our reasons inter alia are as follows: