Saleh Bin Izul v Tribunal Tuntutan Pengguna (BA-25-7-01/2026)

1.

MR BONGSU MOTORSPORT (No Pendaftaran: 202103167220) ... RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Lampiran 1) Introduction

Vide Enclosure 1, the Applicant prayed for leave to file for Judicial Review for an order of certiorari to quash the First Respondent’s decision dated 20.8.2025 (Impugned Decision) allowing only part of his claim in the sum of RM1,210.00. S/N grwE3ULa7kCn/K81XgJurg

After careful consideration of the cause papers and the Honourable Attorney General Malaysia (AG)’s objections and parties’ submissions, this Court allowed the AG’s objection and dismissed Enclosure 1. The following is the reasons for the decision. Background facts

The Applicant appointed the 2nd Respondent to undertake repairs to his car. Parties agreed that the costs of the full restoration was RM8,500.00 which included an overhaul of the engine and repainting the car including the engine. The work was to be completed in 2 weeks and came with a 3-month warranty for the engine.

The Applicant handed over the car and paid RM4,000.00 on 28.5.2024. He only got the car back 5 ½ months later at additional costs and poor workmanship. When the car stalled once again, the 2nd Respondent refused to honour the warranty. The Applicant had to spend a further RM4,269.27 to have car repaired.

The Applicant instituted a claim at the First Respondent for RM12,269.27. It was only allowed to the tune of RM1,210.00. S/N grwE3ULa7kCn/K81XgJurg

The Applicant complains that despite providing receipts, documents and messages to substantiate his claim, the First Respondent only allowed it partially. AG’s objections

The AG objected to Enclosure 1 which was filed on 14.1.2026, on the grounds that it was filed out of time and the Applicant did not seek an extension or abridgment of time.

They reminded that Court that this went to the issue of jurisdiction.

The Applicant argued that he had yet to receive the grounds for the decision and that this Court had the jurisdiction to extend time. Findings and analysis

O.53 Rules of Court 2012 (ROC) sets out a specific procedure for applying for reliefs under the First Schedule Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (Act 91).

In particular, O.53 r.3(6) ROC reads – S/N grwE3ULa7kCn/K81XgJurg “An application for judicial review shall be made promptly and in any event within three months from the date when the grounds of application first arose or when the decision is first communicated to the applicant”

In Wong Kin Hoong & Anor (Suing For Themselves And On Behalf All Of The Occupants Of Kampung Bukit Koman, Raub, Pahang) v. Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Alam Sekitar & Anor [2013] 4 MLJ 161 Raus Sharif PCA (as His Lordship then was) held at 171 – “The time frame in applying for judicial review prescribed by the Rules was fundamental. It goes to jurisdiction and once the trial judge had rejected the explanation for the delay for extension of time to apply for judicial review, the court no longer has the jurisdiction to hear the application for leave for judicial review. Whether the application has merits or not, is irrelevant.”

In the most recent pronouncement of the Court of Appeal in Tan Boon Teet v. Jawatankuasa Perancangan Negeri Pahang & 2 lagi [2026] MLJU 933, Ong Chee Kwan JCA held at para [48] onwards – “O. 53 provides that an application for judicial review must be made “promptly and in any event within three months” from the date when “the grounds of application first arose or when the decision is first communicated”. There are 2 distinct requirements: the application must be made promptly, and the S/N grwE3ULa7kCn/K81XgJurg utmost limit requires the application to be made within 3 months from either the date when the grounds of application first arose or when the decision was first communicated. … … Under O 53, an applicant must act “promptly”, and the failure to act promptly is independently fatal, even if the application is technically filed within time. The rationale is stated in Hardy v Pembrokeshire County Council [2006] EWCA Civ 240, para [10] as follows: It is important that those parties, and indeed the public generally, should be able to proceed on the basis that the decision is valid and can be relied on, and that they can plan their lives and make personal and business decisions accordingly. We also draw support from the case of Finn-Kelcey v. Milton Keynes Council [2008] EWCA Civ 10676 (HL) and Re Musgrave Retail Partners (Nl) Limited; Re Department of the Environment (Planning Services) [2012] NIQB 109. … …We are of the view that the word “promptly” in O. 53 is not inserted purely for ornamental value. In fact, this Court has in Abdul Rahman bin Abdullah Munir & Ors v. Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur & Anor [2008] 6 MLJ 704 adopted the jurisprudence set out by the House of Lords in Griffiths & Anor v. Secretary of State for the Environment & Anor [1983] 2 WLR 172 (HL) as to why prompt action is needed, especially in planning cases: … … We find that the facts of this case, as enumerated, support our conclusion that the JR Application has not been filed promptly. S/N grwE3ULa7kCn/K81XgJurg This means that the Court did not have the necessary jurisdiction to hear the matter right from the beginning [See: Kijal Resort Sdn Bhd v. Pentadbir Tanah Kemaman & Anor [2016] 1 MLJ 544].”

These cases enunciated by the Federal Court and the Court of Appeal are clear and bind this Court; this Court has no jurisdiction to hear any application that is filed outside this time frame without regard of the merits of the application.

This Court must decline the Applicant’s invitation to exercise its discretion to extend time for him. This Court does not have such a discretion in the absence of an application setting out good for the delay.

The Applicant is clearly out of time and this reason alone, this Court has no jurisdiction to hear his application. Decision

The Court finds that the Applicants have failed to meet the threshold requirements for leave to file for Judicial Review. S/N grwE3ULa7kCn/K81XgJurg S/N grwE3ULa7kCn/K81XgJurg