Sam Mohamed v Yap Lai Huea (WA-B53KJ-32-06/2024)

Plaintif membuat tuntutan terhadap Defendan melalui Writ Saman bertarikh 18.12.2025. Perbicaraan telah diadakan pada tarikh 10.6.2025, 15.7.2025, 8.9.2025 dan 5.3.2026 . Saksi-saksi yang telah memberi keterangan di Mahkamah adalah seperti berikut:

Plaintif telah mencadangkan serta bersetuju bahawa tiada keperluan bagi pihak Defendan untuk memberikan keterangan di perbicaraan. Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah ini telah mengarahkan Defendan untuk menutup kes tanpa memanggil Defendan sebagai saksi.

Setelah mendengar keterangan saksi dan membaca hujahan bertulis kedua pihak, Mahkamah mendapati bahawa pihak Plaintif telah gagal membuktikan tuntutannya terhadap Defendan berdasarkan imbangan kebarangkalian. Kemalangan yang melibatkan kecederaan Plaintif adalah berpunca daripada kecuaian Plaintif sepenuhnya.

Rakaman dashcam motokar Defendan telah merakamkan bahawa kemalangan ini sepenuhnya berpunca daripada kecuaian Plaintiff yang telah menunggang motosikal luar daripada laluan sah Plaintiff dan kemudiannya memotong Defendan di kepala simpang kanan. Siasatan daripada Pegawai Penyiasat mengesahkan bahawa Defendan tidak cuai dalam pemanduan beliau. Sehubungan itu, tuntutan yang difailkan oleh Plaintiff terhadap Defendan adalah tidak berasas dan ditolak oleh Mahkamah ini dengan kos RM8,000.00 dibayar oleh Plaintiff kepada Defendan..

Plaintif menyatakan bahawa pada 18.8.2023 Defendan telah secara tiba-tiba membelok ke kanan tanpa isyarat menyebabkan Plaintif melanggarnya . Plaintif telah memplidkan bahawa Kemalangan tersebut diakibatkan daripada kecuaian Defendan dalam pengawalan, penguasaan dan pembawaan motokarnya. C. BEBAN PEMBUKTIAN ADALAH ATAS PLAINTIF

Plaintif memikul beban pembuktian untuk membuktikan kecuaian Defendan. Ini adalah selaras dengan peruntukkan Seksyen 101 hingga 103 Akta Keterangan 1950: "101. Burden of Proof

Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability, dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist.

When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person.

On whom burden of proof lies The burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side.

Burden of proof as to particular fact The burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person." [7] Mahkamah Persekutuan menyatakan sebagaimana berikut dalam kes Wing Thin Yit v Mohamed Ali [1971] 2 MLJ 175 ; "In a negligence action the onus of proof rests wholly on the plaintiff, whether or not the defendant gives evidence. The plaintiff cannot succeed without proof of the defendant's negligence. "Evidence is the foundation of proof, with which it must not be confounded. Proof is that which leads to a conclusion as to the truth or falsity of alleged facts which are the subject of inquiry. Evidence, if accepted and believed, may result in proof, but it is not necessarily proof of itself" [8] Mahkamah bersetuju bahawa Plaintif telah gagal untuk membebaskan beban pembuktian untuk membuktikan bahawa kecuaian Defendan telah mengakibatkan Kemalangan tersebut. Pada setiap masa yang material, Kemalangan tersebut adalah diakibatkan sepenuhnya oleh kecuaian Plaintif yang keluar dari laluan sah beliau dan memotong Defendan di bahu simpang. D. DAPATAN MAHKAMAH ISU LIABILITI I. KEWAJIPAN BERJAGA-JAGA [9] Seorang pemandu kenderaan mempunyai kewajipan berhati-hati terhadap pengguna jalan raya yang lain semasa menggunakan jalan raya. Ini dihuraikan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Sukatno v Lee Seng Kee & Anor [2009] 4 CLJ 171:7 [48] Put differently, the tort of negligence involves a duty of care, a breach of that duty and damage caused to the claimant by that breach. A motorist may drive his car as carelessly as he pleases and he will not be liable in tort unless he damages another. However, it is indisputable that all motorists "owe" a duty of care to other road users. The same duty of care would also apply to the defendant here when he drove that motor van WR 5906 along Jalan Kamaruddin Isa in the direction of Jalan Ghazali Jawi as depicted in the sketch plan at p. 31 of "AAR". The defendant "owe" that duty of care to the plaintiff so as not to collide into the plaintiff who was then walking on the right side of the same road facing the hospital. Lord MacMillan observed in M'Alister (Or Donoghue) (Pauper) v. Stevenson [1932] AC 562, HL, 619 that: The grounds of action may be as various and manifold as human errancy; and the conception of legal responsibility may develop in adaptation to altering social conditions and standards. The criterion of judgment must adjust and adapt itself to the changing circumstances of life. The categories of negligence are never closed. [49] Even though the facts in M'Alister (Or Donoghue) (Pauper) v. Stevenson (supra) concerned the manufacturer-consumer relationship and, factually speaking, are poles apart from the facts of the present appeal, yet the principles of law laid down in that case are of universal application. That case is regarded as a landmark in the tort of negligence." [10] Defendan juga mempunyai kewajipan berjaga-jaga terhadap pengguna jalan raya yang lain. Pada setiap masa yang material, Plaintif juga mempunyai kewajipan berjaga-jaga terhadap pengguna jalan raya yang lain termasuk Defendan. [11] Namun Mahkamah mendapati defendan telah mengambil langkah yang munasabah semasa memandu motorkarnya. Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa Kemalangan tersebut berlaku disebabkan oleh kecuaian Plaintif dan bukan dari kecuaian Defendan. II. PELANGGARAN KEWAJIPAN BERJAGA-JAGA [12] Berdasarkan keterangan Pegawai Penyiasat (IO) kes, teah mengesahkan bahawa Kemalangan tersebut berlaku semasa Plaintif masuk ke laluan bertentangan dan memotong motokar Defendan di kepala simpang kanan. S : Berdasarkan siasatan Sarjan, apakah punca kemalangan dalam kes ini, Sarjan? SD1 Punca kemalangan dalam kes ini apabila motosikal memotong di kepala simpang kanan, Tuan Yang Arif. [13] Mahkamah mendapati tindakan Plaintif yang cuba untuk memotong di kepala simpang kanan adalah suatu perlanggaran undang-undang dan Plaintif telah gagal untuk mematuhi Peraturan-Peraturan Lalu-Lintas 1959. Seksyen 68 Akta Pengangkutan Jalan 1987 menyatakan seperti berikut: “(1) Menteri hendaklah menyediakan suatu kod (dalam Akta ini disebut sebagai "kod lebuh raya") yang mengandungi apa-apa arahan sebagaimana yang didapatinya patut bagi panduan orang yang menggunakan jalan-jalan dan boleh dari semasa ke semasa menyemak kod itu dengan membatalkan, mengubahkan, meminda atau menambahkan kepada peruntukannya sebagaimana yang difikirkannya patut.

Kod lebuh raya dan apa-apa pengubahan yang dicadangkan hendak dibuat dalam peruntukan kod itu atas apa-apa penyemakannya hendaklah, sebaik sahaja disediakan oleh Menteri, disiarkan dalam Warta.

Kegagalan di pihak mana-mana orang bagi mematuhi mana-mana peruntukan kod lebuh raya tidak dengan sendirinya menyebabkan orang itu berliabiliti ke atas apa-apa jenis prosiding jenayah, tetapi dalam apa-apa prosiding, sama ada sivil atau jenayah, sesuatu kegagalan sedemikian boleh dijadikan asas oleh mana-mana pihak dalam prosiding itu sebagai membuktikan atau menafikan apa-apa liabiliti yang menjadi soal dalam prosiding itu." [14] Plaintif sepatutnya mematuhi Peraturan-Peraturan Lalu-Lintas 1959, terutamanya Peraturan 5 dan 6: "5. Passing to the right The driver of a motor vehicle shall pass on the right hand side when overtaking traffic proceeding in the same direction: Provided that he may pass on the left hand side of a vehicle- (a) the driver of which having indicated an intention to turn right has drawn to the centre of the road; or (b) which is stationary in or proceeding in a traffic lane at or near a traffic junction provided for the purpose of segregating traffic.

Overtaking and obstruction of overtaking (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of the last preceding rule no driver shall pass or overtake another vehicle in such circumstances as to cause danger or inconvenience to other road users, or in the vicinity of a bend, corner, hill or other obstruction which impedes his view. (2) The driver of vehicle which is being overtaken by another vehicle shall not by increasing speed, or in any other way, willfully prevent such vehicle from passing him." [15] Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa Plaintif telah masuk ke laluan bertentangan dan memotong Defendan di sebelah kanan, khususnya di kepala simpang kanan secara merbahaya di mana terdapatnya kereta yang akan pusing ke kanan untuk masuk persimpangan tersebut.Menurut Pegawai Penyiasat, Defendan tidak cuai semasa membelok ke kanan. DS :Saya cadangkan sebenarnya pemandu kereta telah membelokkan secara cuai dan tanpa mengikut peraturan berdasarkan apa yang kita tayang pada dashcam tersebut? Setuju atau tidak? SD1 :Tidak setuju, Tuan Yang Arif. [16] Mahkamah mendapati Defendan telah berada di laluan sah Defendan dan membelok ke simpang di kawasan yang dibenarkan untuk membelok. Berdasarkan Rajah Kasar, garisan tengah di hadapan simpang adalah garisan putih putus-putus di mana Defendan dibenarkan untuk membelok sekiranya tiada kenderaan dari arah bertentangan. Peruntukan bahawa undang-undang memperuntukkan Plaintiff untuk memotong Defendan dari belah kiri dan bukan kanan seperti yang dilakukan oleh Plaintiff. Kegagalan Plaintiff bagi mematuhi undang-undang jalan raya telah mengakibatkan Kemalangan tersebut. [17] Pegawai Penyiasat kes juga turut mengesahkan dalam keterangannya denganbahawa Plaintif telah cuai dalam kemalangan dan dibuktikan dengan keputusan siasatan bertarikh 4.10.2024, di mana Plaintif telah disaman RM300 dibawah Peraturan 5(a) oleh pihak polis untuk kemalangan tersebut. [18] Kes Bong Chee Min v Jacknoris Golinjun [2020] 1 LNS 12011 telah menjelaskan isu keputusan siasatan oleh polis, dengan menyatakan bahawa dapatan liabiliti oleh pihak polis membantu dalam penentuan isu liabiliti: [27] Counsel for the Defendant contended that the summons and fine were not conclusive of liability. I am mindful of the cases of Annamalay Retnam v. Mah Chong Peng & Anor [2010] 6 CLJ 487, Rozita Ahmad & Yang Lain Iwn. Mohd Yusof Saidin & Satu Lagi [2015] 1 LNS 1289, and Mohd Salleh Samad v. Zainuddin Dongking [2002] 1 CLJ 139, to that effect. However, although not conclusive of liability, it is nevertheless a very telling fact." [19] Plaintif juga turut mengaku yang dia telah memasuki lorong bertentangan dan memotong Defendan dari kanan semasa Pemeriksaan Balas seperti berikut: S: Agree with me, based on the video, before you collided with the Defendant, you actually had encroached to the left lane? SP2: Yes, that's true because I was trying to overtake. S: So, you agree with me you're trying to overtake the Defendant? SP2: Yes. [20] Mahkamah mendapati Plaintif di dalam keterangannya bukan sahaja mengakui bahawa beliau telah memotong kenderaan Defendan dari kanan malah , Plaintif juga gagal membuktikan dakwaannya bahawa Defendan tidak memberikan isyarat membelok. Seksyen 101 hingga 103 Akta Keterangan 1950. Plaintiff juga telah memberikan keterangan yang bercanggah berhubungan dengan kelajuan Defendan: S: So, you had encroached to the right lane... SP2: Ya, to take over, I want to overtake the car because I don't see any vehicle on the front. S: You don't see any vehicle in the front? SP2: No, no vehicle in the front other than this car. The opposite direction no cars, no vehicles are coming. S: But you already see that Defendant is turning into a junction, right? SP2: No, no, no. There is no indication that taking a right because I'm driving from last 22 years. This is the first time I'm meeting with an accident. If I see there's an indication, that it is taking a right, I could have stop. I can avoid to overtake. S: Do you have any proof to show to the court today that Defendant did not give indication? SP2: Because I'm not carrying a camera on my bike so how I can proof? S: Based on the dashcam you were actually travelling behind the Defendant's car, correct? SP2: Ya, that's true. S: So, agree with me that you actually have a probability to keep a proper distance... SP2: I did the safe distance but the sudden slow down and taking a right that I cannot. Because the car is coming. If you see the distance, if you see the distance... [21] Berdasarkan keterangan Plaintif, Defendan telah memperlahankan kenderaan beliau sebelum memasuki simpang di sebelah kanan. Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah bersetuju dengan hujahan Defendan yang menegaskan bahawa Defendan telah bertindak berjaga-jaga sebelum membelok ke simpang dengan memperlahankan kenderaan beliau. Mahkamah mendapati Plaintif yang telah gagal untuk peka dengan kenderaan di hadapan dan gagal menjaga jarak sekaligus melanggar Defendan dan menyebabkan kemalangan tersebut. Rakaman dashcam yang difailkan di Mahkamah dengan jelasnya menunjukkan bahawa Plaintif tidak memperlahankan motosikalnya dan secara tiba-tiba memasuki laluan sebelah kiri untuk memotong Defendan di sebelah kanan [22] Rakaman dashcam menunjukkan dengan jelas bahawa Plaintif dari jauh telah memasuki lorong bertentangan dan bukannya lorong sah beliau. Undang-undang jelas memperuntukkan bahawa mana-mana pihak yang masuk ke lorong bertentangan dan menyebabkan kemalangan adalah pihak yang cuai. Mahkamah dirujuk kepada kes Hong Teng Yong v Khaw Kim Seng & Anor [2010] 9 MLJ 448 di mana Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan seperti berikut: [2] The sessions judge clearly came to her finding on liability based on the facts, evidence and circumstances surrounding the case that on 12 March 1998 at about 9.30am when the two respondents were travelling along Jalan Ghazali Jawi from the direction of the Sports Complex roundabout (see sketch plan P1), the driver of car ADH 2102 who was travelling from the opposite direction suddenly encroached on to their right of way thus forcing the second respondent to evasively swerve to his left. This action caused him to collide with the first respondent. She found the testimony of the two respondents to be the same pertaining to how the accident happened. Their version was corroborated by witness SD2 who was driving behind car ADH 2102 when she witnessed how this car 'drifted' over to the opposite lane that resulted in the collision between the two respondents." [23] Di samping tindakan Plaintif yang memotong Defendan secara memberhaya dari sebelah kanan, Plaintiff juga telah gagal untuk menjaga jarak yang selamat dengan kereta Defendan memandangkan posisi Plaintif dari asalnya adalah dari belakang Defendan. Kes De Cotta v Tan Hock Lee [1972] 2 MLJ 173 telah menyatakan kewajipan berjaga-jaga apabila seseorang mengikuti kenderaan daripada belakang: "Observations on the duty of the driver of a motor vehicle which is following another motor vehicle have been made in many reported cases. In Brown & Lynn v Western SMT Co Ltd [1945] SC 31, Lord Justice-Clerk (Cooper) said, at page 35:- "... The distance which should separate two vehicles travelling one behind the other must depend upon many variable factors - their speed, the nature of the locality, the other traffic present or to be expected, the opportunity available to the following driver of commanding a view ahead of the leading vehicle, the distance within which the following vehicle can be pulled up, and many other things. The following driver is, in my view, bound, so far as reasonably possible, to take up such a position, and to drive in such a fashion, as will enable him to deal successfully with all traffic exigencies reasonably to be anticipated: but whether he has fulfilled this duty must in every case be a question of fact, just as it is a question of fact whether, on any emergency disclosing itself, the following driver acted with the alertness, skill and judgment reasonably to be expected in the circumstances...” And a little earlier, on the same page, the Lord Justice-Clerk had this to say:— "... The conduct of the leading driver will, of course, have an important bearing upon liability for an accident in every case in which the conduct of both drivers is put in issue, either by a plea of contributory negligence or by double allegations of fault. But the duty of the following driver is a continuous duty which persists independently of any actual emergency or of the leading driver's reaction to such emergency, and the question whether the following driver has failed in his duty cannot depend upon whether the leading driver had fulfilled his." [24] Mahkamah bersetuju dengan hujahan Defendan bahawa Plaintif seharusnya berada di belakang Defendan semasa Defendan membelok ke kanan, dan jika Plaintif ingin memotong Defendan, dia seharusnya memotong dari arah kiri mengikut Peraturan 5 Peraturan-Peraturan Lalu-Lintas 1959. Defendan berada di laluan beliau yang sah dan tidak menghalang laluan Plaintif. Sebaliknya, Plaintif yang memandu secara berbahaya dan memotong motorkar Defendan dengan keadaan yang boleh menyebabkan bahaya atau kesulitan kepada Defendan. Defendan tidak sama sekali melanggar kewajipan berjaga-jaga beliau terhadap Plaintif. Sebaliknya, Plaintif yang telah gagal dan cuai dalam pemanduan beliau sehingga mengakibatkan Kemalangan tersebut. PLAINTIF GAGAL UNTUK MENGEKALKAN JARAK JAUH YANG SELAMAT DARIPADA MOTOKAR DEFENDAN [25] Kes De Cotta (supra) memperjelaskan undang-undang berkenaan kecuaian sertaan apabila seorang pemandu mengikuti kenderaan di hadapannya dan juga turut memutuskan seperti berikut: "Three possible inferences can be drawn from these facts on the assumption that 30 feet was a safe distance. First, that the respondent was driving without due care and attention and hence was late in taking preventive measures to avoid the collision. Secondly, that he was travelling at a speed in excess of 30 m.p.h. And thirdly, that he was travelling less than 30 feet behind the van. In our opinion, the real reason for the respondent being unable to avoid colliding with the van when it suddenly pulled up, was that he was travelling too close behind the van. The distance of 30 feet which separated the two vehicles was not a safe distance in the circumstances of this case. A reasonable prudent man riding a motor scooter at 30 m.p.h. would have kept much further away from the van because it is impossible for a scooter travelling at that speed to pull up in 30 feet. Quite apart from the fact that the respondent did not in his own interest take reasonable care of himself and contributed by this want of care to his own injury, the respondent in the circumstances of this case owed a duty to the appellant to move with due care and on his own evidence he was clearly in breach of that duty." [26] Oleh yang demikian, berdasarkan kes di atas, Mahkamah mendapati berdasarkan keterangan Plaintif sendiri, adalah jelas bahawa Plaintif telah meletakkan dirinya dalam keadaan berbahaya dan secara material menyumbang kepada kecederaannya dengan gagal mengekalkan jarak selamat serta memotong Defendan dari sebelahkanan. PLAINTIF GAGAL MENGAMBIL LANGKAH BERJAGA-JAGA YANG MUNASABAH UNTUK MENGELAKKAN DARIPADA MELANGGAR DEFENDAN [27] Plaintif mempunyai tanggungjawab untuk mengambil langkah-langkah yang munasabah untuk mengelakkan perlanggaran dengan Defendan. Plaintif juga mempunyai kewajipan terhadap dirinya sendiri untuk mengambil langkah-langkah yang munasabah untuk mengelak daripada melanggar Defendan yang berada di hadapannya. [28] Mahkamah dirujuk kepada kes Khairul Nizad bin Daud & Anor v Juprin Paul [2018] 9 MLJ 32, di mana Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan: [31] On the finding of contributory negligence of 20% on the part of the respondent, the rationale by the sessions court judge was that the respondent could or should have done something which would have mitigated the severity of the collision and hence the injuries suffered. [32] I am in agreement that there is always a duty on road users to remain vigilant at all times as public roads are always a venue for danger, whichever time of the day or location, where one can never be entitled to take it easy and be off-guard because it is a quiet stretch of roads or a time of the day where traffic volume is low. [33] There is sometimes also a stubborn attitude of some drivers to consider that when they have right of way, the road is 'theirs' where any little interruption or interference with their 'right of way' would be subject to annoyance, irritation and a tendency to 'hold their ground' and not give way as it is their 'legal' right of way. They will have sufficient presence of mind and time to sound their horn, gesture or otherwise indicate to the person offending against their right of way, but not to slow down or yield — which in the matter of a second or two, would have been sufficient to cause the incident to come to pass. [34] In this regard, I have reason to refer to the decision in the case of Goh Beng Seng v Dol bin Dolah [1970] 2 MLJ 95b which had espoused the following: There can be no territorial or geometrical division of the road. The centre line remains a guide and a reminder only. One's duty is to ensure safety for oneself and for others. The attitude of mind that because the driver coming from the opposite direction is encroaching a few inches of my side of the road, I can treat him as a trespasser and proceed on my half of the road as if it was my exclusive domain and that I am totally immune from liability if I drive within the exact limits of that 'realm' even though I know that an accident may thereby happen on my side of the road, is the attitude of an irresponsible and an irrational being. I owe a duty to others on the road just as others owe a duty to me." PLAINTIF MENUNGGANG MOTORSIKALNYA DENGAN KELAJUAN YANG TINGGI [29] Berdasarkan keterangan Defendan, Mahkamah mendapati Plaintif menunggang motorsikalnya dengan kelajuan yang tinggi semasa percubaannya untuk memotong motorkar Defendan. Ini adalah dibuktikan dengan kegagalan Plaintif untuk memberhentikan motorsikalnya semasa Defendan membelok ke kanan. [30] Mahkamah dirujuk kepada Kes Azrulasyraf Abd Hadi v Zharif Syafiq Zainul Rashid & Ors [2024] 2 SMC 257 di mana Mahkamah menyatakan seperti berikut: [15] Reasons for the liability finding are as follows: ... (iv) the plaintiff's contributory negligence: Despite the first defendant's negligence, the court cannot overlook the fact that the plaintiff also contributed to the accident. The evidence suggests that the military jeep was a large and long vehicle, making it difficult to miss on a straight road unless the plaintiff was riding at an excessive speed. If the plaintiff, who is a McDonald's rider, had ridden his motorcycle more cautiously and slowly, he could have certainly avoided colliding with the defendants' military jeep. It is an undisputed fact that, at the material time, the plaintiff was delivering McDonald's food. The road conditions were also wet and slightly dark, which should have prompted the plaintiff to reduce speed and exercise greater caution. As a motorcyclist, the plaintiff was expected to adapt to these conditions by slowing down and being aware of his surroundings, especially in front of him;” [31] Mahkamah juga mendapati bahawa Plaintif sedar akan kewujudan Defendan atas jalan raya melalui pengakuannya sendiri, sepatutnya berwaspada dan membawa motorsikalnya dengan perlahan dan berhati-hati. Kelajuan Plaintif dan kekurangan kewaspadaannya, meskipun mengetahui motorkar Defendan dipandu dihadapannya dan terdapatnya simpang di kawasan kemalangan, telah secara material menyumbang kepada Kemalangan. E. HUJAHAN BAGI KUANTUM [32] Berdasarkan kes Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Inas Faiqah Mohd Helmi (A child suing through her father and next friend; Mohd Helmi Abdul Aziz) v Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors [2016] 2 CLJ 885 menyatakan bahawa: [20] It is trite that damages serve as compensation, not a reward, less still a punishment (see Ong Ah Long v. Dr S Underwood [1983] 2 CLJ 198; [1983] CLJ (Rep) 300; [1983] 2 MLJ 324). In assessing damages, the court should not be motivated by sympathy and award fair compensation based on cogent evidence. The court should not descend into a domain of speculation. The evaluation of those evidence, which form the basis of any risk of future damage, must therefore still be undertaken. And the trial judge can only evaluate such evidence based on the recognised balance of probabilities standard. As was stated in Schrump: Thus, future contingencies which are less than probable are regarded as factors to be considered, provided they are shown to be substantial and not speculative. (emphasis added) The qualification as underscored in that sentence is in our considered view, necessary to be proven on a balance of probabilities." [33] Tujuan Mahkamah memberikan ganti rugi kepada Plaintif adalah untuk memberi pampasan untuk kerugian, kecederaan atau kehilangan yang Plaintif mendakwa dia alami. Plaintif juga mempunyai beban untuk membuktikan bahawa dia telah mengalami kerugian, kecederaan atau kehilangan. [34] Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Datuk Mohd Ali Hj Abdul Majid & Amor v Public Bank Bhd [2014] 6 CLJ 269: [31] The object of an award of damages is to give the claimant compensation for the damage, loss or injury he has suffered. The general principle governing the measure of damages has its origin in the words of Lord Blackburn in Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co [1880] 5 App Cas 25 where he said: ... that sum of money which will put the party who has been injured, or who has suffered, in the same position as he would have been in if he had not sustained the wrong for which he is now getting his compensation or reparation. [32] It is trite law that a claimant claiming damages must prove that he has suffered the damage. The claimant has the burden of proving both liability and quantum of damages, before he can recover the sum claimed. This follows from the general rule that the burden of proving a fact is upon him who alleges it and not upon him who denies it, so that where a particular allegation forms an essential part of a person's case, the proof of such allegation falls on him. (See s. 103 of the Evidence Act 1950). If he fails to prove both the liability and the quantum of damages, he loses the action. [33] Therefore, in a claim for damages, it is not sufficient for the plaintiff to merely state the amount of damages that he is claiming, he must prove the damage that he had in fact suffered to the satisfaction of the court. This principle is borne out in the case of Bonham-Carter v. Hyde Park Hotel [1948] 64 TLR 177 where Lord Goddard CJ observed: Plaintiffs must understand that if they bring actions for damages it is for them to prove their damage; it is not enough to write down the particulars, and, so to speak, throw them at the head of the court, saying: 'This is what I have lost, I ask you to give me these damages'. They have to prove it. This statement was cited with approval by Edgar Joseph JR FCJ in Tan Sri Khoo Teck Puat & Anor v. Plenitude Holdings Sdn Bhd [1995] 1 CLJ 15; [1994] 3 MLJ 777." GANTI RUGI AM (Atas dasar 100%) [35] Kedua pihak telah bersetuju dengan Laporan-Laporan Perubatan dan Laporan Pakar Ortopedik yang berikut

Laporan Perubatan dari Pantai Hospital Kuala Lumpur bertarikh 3.10.2023;

Laporan Perubatan dari KMI Taman Desa Medical Centre;

Laporan Pakar Plaintif dari Life Care Diagnostic Medical Centre Sdn Bhd bertarikh 12.3.2024 (dirujuk di sini sebagai "Laporan Pakar Plaintif"); dan

Laporan Pakar Defendan dari Universiti of Malaya Specialist Centre dated 12.8.2024 ("Laporan Pakar Defendan"). I. CLOSED LEFT DISTAL END RADIUS FRACTURE Mahkamah awardkan RM20,000.00 II. 7CM DISFIGURING SURGICAL SCAR LEFT WRIST Mahkamah awardkan RM5,000.00 III. MULTIPLE ABRASION Mahkaamh awardkan RM3,000.00 IV. MUSCLE WASTING Mahkamah awardkan RM1,500.00 V. OSTEOARTHRITIS Mahkamah awardkan RM5,000.00 GANTIRUGI KHAS Mahkamah awardkan kos rawatan Pantai Hospital Kuala Lumpur RM35,330.99 dan kos laporan perubatan RM92.00 [36] Walau bagaimanapun, Mahkamah berpendapat Defendan tidak mempunyai apa-apa liabiliti memandangkan Defendan tidak melanggar kewajipan berjaga-jaganya. Dalam apa jua keadaan, Plaintif telah menyumbang kepada kecederaan yang dialaminya F. KESIMPULAN [37] Sebagai kesimpulannya, Mahkamah mendapati bahawa Plaintif telah gagal untuk membuktikan tuntutannya di atas imbangan kebarangkalian terhadap Defendan. Berdasarkan keterangan Plaintif, rakaman dashcam dan keputusan siasatan, Plaintif telah cuba untuk memotong Defendan secara salah dan merbahaya apabila Defendan hendak membelok ke kanan. Plaintif juga telah menyumbang kepada kecederaan yang didakwanya dengan gagal untuk mengekalkan jarak jauh yang selamat dengan Defendan, gagal untuk mengambil langkah-langkah yang munasabah untuk mengelak daripada melanggar kereta Defendan, dan menunggang motorsikal Plaintif dengan laju. Bertarikh 28 Julai 2026 HJ.EFFANDI NAZILA BIN ABULLAH