A non-paying party who fails to respond to a payment claim in the manner provided under this section is deemed to have disputed the entire payment claim.” [29] I hold that Samsung JV cannot from the circumstances before me claim that they we confused as to which provision or the cause of action was relied on. I am supported on my decision on this point in that Samsung JV had and were able by their Payment Response, which went to almost 133 pages in total, to extensively and comprehensively respond to the Payment Claim. Thus, in my view both the requirements in View Esteem Sdn Bhd v. Bina Puri Holdings Bhd [2019] 5 CLJ 479 FC and JKP Sdn Bhd V. Anas Construction Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal [2022] 10 CLJ 528 were complied with via a vis the ingredients and requirements in CIPAA on the “pleadings”. S/N HIiq9eut60q7AwePliU1pw [30] I therefore hold that there is thus on this issue of the pleadings not being sufficient, no excess of jurisdiction occurring. Were There New Claims In The GWM’s Expert’s Assessment [31] I have also considered the argument by Samsung JV that GWM’s expert’s assessment by Nicholas Ian Powell was repeated in the Adjudication Claim which Samsung JV submits once again that there is no identification of the cause of action and no details given as well as no reference to the provisions relied upon. [32] I have after reading the Adjudication Claim as well as GWM’s Expert Report found that the contention is misconceived and that no new claims were introduced by GWM’s said Expert. [33] The portion of GWM’s Expert Report which can be found at exhibit P 6 of enclosure 4 in OS 162 supports my decision on this where at page 12 of his Report under the heading “Background’ which related to only IPA 65, its issuance thereto and the differences in both sides assessment of the same as well as the details of the CIPAA Claim. To this end, I note that the said Expert’s report on the ‘abortive costs’, “redesign 3D Model, fabrication drawing and MR” were admitted by GWM as a genuine mistake and was in fact not considered by the Adjudicator. [34] I have also found that the reference to ‘idling costs’ in GWM’s Expert Report was in fact part of IPA 65 under the sub heading “Time Related Preliminaries” and the Payment Claim and the adjudicator S/N HIiq9eut60q7AwePliU1pw had in the AD found that these were not new claims but that different descriptions were given by GWM’s Expert in his Report. For added support to this issue, I have noted that Samsung JV’s expert did it his own Expert Report on quantum, noted that GWM’s Expert had ‘separated his assessment on time related preliminaries into two sections i.e standby/idling costs… and prolongation costs…”. Therefore, I do not find any merit in Samsung JV’s contention that these issues of inter alia loss and expense, time related preliminaries, prolongation costs were new claims outside the sphere of IPC 65. [35] I accordingly agree with counsel for GWM that the above GWM’s Expert Report is thus merely a review and a tidying up of the description which relates to IPA 65 and I do find that GWM’s expert did in his said Expert Report assess and gave his independent professional opinion on GSM’s claims. This issue does not warrant the AD to be set aside and does not in my decision amount to an excess of jurisdiction by the Adjudicator. There has been in my decision no issue of the claim being defective based on the contentions raised by GWM. Back Charges [36] As to the issue of wrongful back charges of RM8,046,404.58 which was contended by Samsung JV to be based on CIPAA 1 and were therefore improperly deducted from IPC 65. I have found that the Adjudicator did address and consider this issue, which I might add was raised in the Adjudication Claim, in the AD whereby the Adjudicator then determined that the same was to be allowed. S/N HIiq9eut60q7AwePliU1pw [37] In the AD at exhibit P3 of enclosure 3 of OS 162, the Adjudicator had in his findings on the same, after reviewing both parties positions, accepted that the back charge amounts in CIPAA 1 were contained in Schedule C of the Adjudication Response and found that Samsung JV was not entitled to deduct these amounts again as a set off in IPC 65 and therefore held that GWM as entitled to claim the said sum of RM8,046,404.58 which he held was improperly deducted in IPC 65. [38] Based on the Adjudicator’s line of reasoning as stated above, be it right or wrong, I therefore cannot agree that the Adjudicator was essentially enforcing CIPAA 1 and was going on a frolic of his own. It must be emphasized here that the Court in considering OS 162 to set aside the AD is not acting in an appellate capacity or to review the merits of the Adjudicators decision but is merely considering and deciding whether there has been a denial of natural justice or the adjudicator has acted in excess of his jurisdiction by his decision in the AD pursuant to section 15 (b) or (d) of CIPAA. [39] The said Adjudicator’s finding is a finding of fact which the Adjudicator is entitled or empowered to do so. Any error thereto in his findings, if any, is merely as to such finding which I hold is not a breach of natural justice. So long as the Adjudicator has asked himself the right question, the fact that the answer may be erroneous is not a ground to nullify the AD or be deemed a breach of natural justice, see cases such as BM City Realty & Construction Sdn Bhd v Merger Insight (M) Sdn Bhd [2016] MLJU 1567. [40] I am also guided in my decision herein by the Court of Appeal in ACFM Engineering & Construction Sdn Bhd v Esstar Vision Sdn Bhd S/N HIiq9eut60q7AwePliU1pw and another appeal [2016] MLJU 1776 where it was held amongst others that: “.. it cannot be the function of the Court to look into or review the merits of the case or to decide the facts of the case. The facts are for the adjudicator to assess and decide on. The Court’s function is simply to look at the manner in which the adjudicator conducted the hearing and whether he had committed an error of law during that process. Such error of law relates to whether he had accorded procedural fairness to the Appellant In the context of this case, the complaints of the Appellant were nothing but complaints of factual findings of the adjudicator which in our view cannot be entertained by us.” [41] I am well aware that Samsung JV have now raised that this amount of RM8,046,404.58 had been made to GWM as per its Affidavit in Reply at enclosure 59 of OS 162 and that GWM has submitted that this is a new allegation which should have been raised in the Adjudication proceedings in CIPAA 2 and that Samsung JV had failed to allege this or produce documents to support their said contention in CIPAA 2 and cannot now raise this new allegation to fault the Adjudicator. I have however found that GWM has not categorically denied that Samsung JV has paid this amount on 18.5.2023. [42] There are cases such as the decision of Lee Swee Seng J (as he then was) in BM City Realty & Construction Sdn Bhd (supra), the decision of Aliza Sulaiman J in MRCB Builders Sdn Bhd V Swim Resources Sdn Bhd And Another Case [2021] MLJU 1856 and the decision of Anand Ponnudurai J in Setia Fontaines Sdn Bhd V Pro S/N HIiq9eut60q7AwePliU1pw Tech Enterprise Sdn Bhd And Another Case [2022] MLJU 2865 where the Courts have found that the affected parts of an AD can be severed. [43] I find that the sum of RM8,046,404.58 had been made to GWM has been made to GWM by Samsung JV and that this fact has not been denied. In the circumstances I do hold that this part of the AD pertaining to the backcharges of RM8,046,404.58 can be severed from the AD based on the authorities above and that this Court has the power under section 28 of CIPAA to enforce only a part of the AD. [44] This Court therefore varies the AD or severs the AD so as to enforce only those part of the AD which does not include the said sum of RM8,046,404.58. Decision for OS 162 (Setting Aside of AD) & 163 (Stay of AD pending Arbitration) [45] To surmise, this Court does not find any ‘clear errors’ with regards the AD before this Court. All in based on my aforesaid reasons, I do not find that the AD was a nullity. [46] After considering all of the above issues and my findings thereto, I therefore do not find any circumstance to justify a stay of the AD pending Arbitration as per the application in enclosure 1 of OS 163. In this instance, Enclosure 2 is now academic and is also dismissed with costs. S/N HIiq9eut60q7AwePliU1pw [47] I therefore further hold that both Enclosure 1 OS 162 and Enclosure 5 OS 162 is to be dismissed. [48] Consequently, I dismiss both OS 163 and OS 162 with costs. Enforcement Application OS 165 [49] As I find no impediments with regards the AD and that the sum specified in the AD has yet to be paid by Samsung JV, I hereby subject to the amount of RM8,046,404.58 which Samsung JV had paid to GWM for the backcharges, make an order that: