Sanjay Singh Chauhan (W/India) v Pendakwa Raya (P-05(M)-90-02/2017)

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA (BIDANG KUASA RAYUAN) RAYUAN JENAYAH NO: P-05(M)-90-02/2017 ANTARA SANJAY SINGH CHAUHAN (W/INDIA) … PERAYU DAN PENDAKWA RAYA … RESPONDEN (Dalam Perkara Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Pulau Pinang Perbicaraan Jenayah No: 45A-8-03/2014) Antara Pendakwa Raya Lawan Sanjay Singh Chauhan KORUM: MOHTARUDIN BAKI, HMR ABDUL KARIM BIN ABDUL JALIL, HMR RHODZARIAH BINTI BUJANG, HMR 2 PENGHAKIMAN [1] Perayu telah dituduh dan disabitkan kesalahan oleh Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi (Hakim bicara) di bawah satu pertuduhan mengedar dadah berbahaya menurut seksyen 39B(1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 (ADB) dan dihukum dengan hukuman mati mandatori menurut seksyen 39B(2) Akta yang sama. [2] Pertuduhan: Kes 45A-9-03/2014: “Bahawa kamu pada 29.9.2013, jam lebih kurang 11.00 malam di Balai Ketibaan Lapangan Terbang Antarabangsa Pulau Pinang, di dalam Daerah Barat Daya, di dalam Negeri Pulau Pinang, telah memiliki racun iaitu Pseudoephedrine dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 9(1) Akta Racun 1952 yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 32(2) Akta yang sama.” Kes 45A-8-03/2014: “Bahawa kamu pada 29.9.2013, jam lebih kurang 11.00 malam di Balai Ketibaan Lapangan Terbang Antarabangsa Pulau Pinang, di dalam Daerah Barat Daya, di dalam Negeri Pulau Pinang telah didapati mengedar dadah berbahaya iaitu Methamphetamine seberat 1,068.0 gram dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 39B(1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 39B(2) Akta yang sama.” [3] Kami telah mendengar dan menolak rayuan Perayu secara sebulat suara sebagai tidak bermerit. Pada asasnya kami bersetuju dengan dapatan fakta dan undang-undang Hakim bicara. Sabitan dan hukuman di bawah kedua-dua pertuduhan disahkan dan dikekalkan. 3 Nota: Perayu hanya merayu terhadap sabitan dan hukuman di bawah seksyen 39B(1)(a) ADB 1952 sahaja (rujuk Notis Rayuan di m.s. 2 RR Jld. 1). [4] Fakta Kes Prima Facie:

4.1 Pada 29.9.2013, SP2, seorang Pegawai Kastam, sedang bertugas di Balai Ketibaan Antarabangsa, Lapangan Terbang Antarabangsa Pulau Pinang. SP2 melihat seorang lelaki (Perayu) mengambil sebuah bagasi (P17) dan membawanya untuk beredar keluar. SP2 mengarahkan SP3, seorang Pegawai Kastam yang bertugas di mesin pengimbas, untuk mengimbas bagasi Perayu;

4.2 SP3 bertanya kepada Perayu sama ada bagasi P17 adalah kepunyaan Perayu. Perayu mengesahkan bahawa P17 adalah bagasi Perayu. Perayu diminta untuk meletakkan P17 untuk diimbas oleh mesin pengimbas. P17 telah diimbas dua kali. Kedua-dua imbasan menunjukkan imej yang mencurigakan;

4.3 SP3 telah mengeluarkan isi kandungan P17 dan merasakan P17 agak berat. SP2 dan SP3 melihat keadaan Perayu yang agak gelisah ketika itu;

4.4 Seterusnya Perayu dan bagasi P17 telah dirujuk kepada SP5 untuk pemeriksaan fizikal terhadap P17. SP5 telah menjumpai ruangan khas di bahagian dasar P17, berisi dua bungkusan berwarna 4 cokelat mengandungi bahan disyaki dadah berbahaya (P11C dan P11D);

4.5 SP4, Ahli Kimia Kerajaan telah menganalisa P11C dan P11D. SP4 mengesahkan bahan-bahan di dalam P11C adalah dadah berbahaya jenis Methamphetamine dengan berat bersih 1,068.0 gram. Methamphetamine adalah dadah berbahaya yang disenaraikan di bawah Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952. Manakala P11D pula disahkan sebagai Pseudoephedrine mengikut Jadual Pertama Akta Racun 1952. [5] Di akhir kes Pendakwaan, Hakim bicara memutuskan bahawa pihak Pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan kes prima facie. Ini jelas dinyatakan di perenggan 25, 26 dan 27 Penghakiman bertulis Hakim bicara (m.s. 15 RR Jld. 1): “[25] The proof of these primary facts established that the Accused was in custody and control of the said bag. The impugned drugs and said substance was found in the bag. In turn this enabled the presumption of possession and knowledge to arise against the Accused under section 37(d) of the DDA and I so find accordingly. It now fell upon the Accused to rebut the presumption on a balance of probabilities; [26] In respect of the substance Pseudoephedrine, I found that there were no proof of documents in the form of a licence or permit for the Accused to carry or be in possession of such poison. The said substance was also found concealed in the bag (P17) carried by the Accused. The Accused is also deemed to have been in possession of the Pseudoephedrine knowingly under section 9(2) of the said Poisons Act 1952 unless proved to the contrary. I therefore found that the Accused was in possession of Pseudoephedrine and the prosecution had 5 therefore proven a prima facie case in respect of the charge under section 9(1) Poisons Act 1952; [27] The boarding pass of the Accused (P25K and P25l) showed that the Accused had travelled from Delhi, India to Hong Kong and then on to Penang on board a Cathay Pacific flight. This is evidence of movement of the drugs carried by him in the bag (P17) from one place to another.” [6] Pembelaan:

6.1 Perayu adalah seorang pekerja syarikat pengangkutan, New Delhi, India. Perayu telah diarahkan oleh Penyelia Syarikat bernama “Sammy” untuk menjalani latihan di Pulau Pinang;

6.2 “Sammy” memberi tiket penerbangan, paspot serta sebuah beg pakaian (P17) kepada Perayu pada hari penerbangan. Sebelum itu “Sammy” mengarahkan Perayu untuk membawa pakaian Perayu di dalam beg plastik ke Pejabat dan memasukkannya ke dalam P17. “Sammy” juga memberi nombor telefon seorang bernama “Judy” yang akan menguruskan Perayu di Pulau Pinang. Nombor telefon “Judy” ada disimpan di dalam telefon bimbit Perayu;

6.3 Apabila tiba di Lapangan Terbang Antara Bangsa Pulau Pinang, Perayu telah ditahan dan ditangkap. Perayu tidak mempunyai pengetahuan tentang dadah berbahaya yang dijumpai dalam bagasi P17; 6

6.4 Selain Perayu, pembelaan juga memanggil SD2 iaitu seorang pelayan pejabat syarikat di mana Perayu bekerja di New Delhi, India. SD2 melihat “Sammy” memberikan P17 kepada Perayu. SD2 juga mendengar “Sammy” memberi arahan kepada Perayu untuk pergi ke Pulau Pinang untuk tujuan kerja. SD2 juga melihat “Sammy” memberikan tiket penerbangan, visa dan paspot kepada Perayu. SD2 juga mendengar “Sammy” mengarahkan Perayu untuk menghubungi “Judy” apabila tiba di Pulau Pinang. “Sammy” juga memberikan nombor telefon “Judy” kepada Perayu. [7] Isu rayuan di hadapan kami:

7.1 Hakim bicara gagal memberi pertimbangan yang sewajarnya keterangan yang memihak kepada pembelaan;

7.2 Hakim bicara gagal mematuhi kehendak undang-undang mengikut kes Mahkamah Persekutuan Mohamad Radhi Yaakob v PP [1991] 1 CLJ Rep. 311 (Radhi’s direction). [8] Isu pertama – Kegagalan Hakim bicara memberi pertimbangan yang sewajarnya terhadap keterangan yang memihak kepada pembelaan. Peguam Perayu yang bijaksana telah merujuk kepada nas undang-undang dalam kes Sridhar Arunasalam v PP [2009] 6 CLJ 595, di mana di m.s. 601: “[3] Further, the well-settled principles in criminal law that an accused must be accorded the benefit of any inference favorable to him from a given set of facts 7 must be strictly adhered to and the prosecution cannot shirk its responsibility to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt by invoking any adverse inferences from the said facts, to establish any ingredient of the offence.” [9] Peguam Perayu berhujah bahawa Perayu tidak mengetahui mengenai dadah berbahaya yang dijumpai dalam bagasi P17. Peguam Perayu berlandaskan kepada kes Mahkamah Persekutuan Fakrurrazi Hassan v PP [2017] 2 CLJ 125, di m.s. 139: “[16] When someone is caught carrying a bag containing package of dangerous drugs, the element of accessibility to the thing and the opportunity to inspect is invariably established because of his proximity to the bag and the packages. However, in the absence of additional evidence, for example of him taking a peek at the drugs, it does not necessarily mean that he must have knowledge of the drugs, unless there is a presumption in the law to warrant knowledge to be presumed, and indeed in our view, this is where the presumption under s. 37(d) of the Act may be called into play to presume knowledge of the nature of the thing in the bag. In our view, in the circumstances of this case, accessibility and opportunity to inspect alone are not sufficient to inevitably lead to the inference of knowledge on the part of the appellant. We therefore find that with the evidence of conduct being ruled out by the learned trial judge, there was insufficient factual matrix for her to make the inference of knowledge on the part of the appellant.” [10] Kami sebulat suara menolak hujahan ini. Dalam kes Fakrurrazi (supra) jelas menyatakan: “…unless there is presumption in the law to warrant knowledge to be presumed…s.37(d) of the Act…to presumed knowledge of the nature of the thing in the bag.” 8 Adalah jelas dalam kes Fakrurrazi, Hakim bicara tidak menggunakan anggapan undang-undang di bawah seksyen 37(d) ADB 1952 mengenai pengetahuan. Hakim bicara dalam kes tersebut hanya membuat “inference” mengenai elemen pengetahuan berdasarkan perilaku (conduct) tertuduh sahaja. [11] Fakta kes Fakrurrazi (supra) jelas bertentangan dengan kes rayuan di hadapan kami di mana Hakim bicara dengan jelas telah menggunapakai s.37(d) ADB 1952 untuk elemen “pengetahuan”: “[22] As seen from the above therefore, upon proof of certain primary facts i.e. custody or control, the presumption under section 37(d) will trigger to deem possession on the part of the accused. The primary facts in this case show that the Accused had boarded a flight from India to Hong Kong and then to Penang. He was carrying a bag (P17). The tag to the said bag (P17A) was in the name of the Accused. The baggage identification tag to the bag (P25J) also bore the name of the Accused.” [12] Seterusnya Peguam Perayu yang bijaksana berhujah bahawa elemen pembuktian “pengedaran” tidak dibuktikan. Hujah Peguam berlandaskan fakta “membawa dan mengangkut” (carrying and transporting) gagal dibuktikan. Hakim bicara telah khilaf kerana bergantung kepada keterangan “dengar cakap” (hearsay) kerana pembuat (maker) dokumen-dokumen berkaitan tidak dipanggil. [13] Kami merujuk dapatan Hakim bicara dalam Penghakiman bertulis adalah seperti berikut: 9 “[38] Exhibits ID34, ID36 and ID37 were the Flight Manifest, letter from Cathay Pacific dated 4.10.2013 and certificate under section 90A Evidence Act 1950 as well as a record from the Immigration Department showing exit and entry into the country, respectively. Learned counsel at the close of the prosecution case submitted that these exhibits had remained (“ID”) documents without them having been converted and marked as prosecution exhibits as their makers were not called. [39] The relevance of these documents, it was submitted, is that they would show which flight the accused had taken to come to Penang. It would also show the point of boarding, transit and how many luggage the accused had checked in and indeed whether or not the accused had actually boarded such a flight. He therefore submitted that as the makers of these documents were not called, there was no evidence that the accused had boarded the flight or had checked in the said baggage. [40] With regard to proof that the accused had boarded the said flight and had entered the country, the flight ticket and his passport would provide sufficient evidence of this. The tag to the bag (P17A) was in the name of the accused as was the baggage identification tag (P25J). Evidence was given that the accused at all material times was alone. The failure of the prosecution to convert the (“ID”) documents did not therefore prejudice the prosecution case.” [14] Kami menolak hujah ini. Kami telah meneliti semula Penghakiman Hakim bicara terutamanya di perenggan 27 m.s. 16 RR Jld. 1: “[27] The boarding pass of the Accused (P25K and P25l), showed that the Accused had travelled from New Delhi, India to Hong Kong and then on to Penang on board a Cathay Pacific flight. This is evidence of movement of the drugs carried by him in the bag (P17) from one place to another. [28] Trafficking is defined in section 2 of the DDA as follows: “trafficking” 10 “…includes the doing of any of the following acts, that is to say, manufacturing, importing, exporting, keeping, concealing, buying, selling, giving, receiving, storing, administering, transporting, carrying, sending, delivering, procuring, supplying or distributing any dangerous drug otherwise than under the authority of this Act or the regulations made under the Act. [29] Under the definition of trafficking under section 2 of the DDA, these amount to acts consisting of “carrying and transporting.” See Suzie Adrina Ahmad [2006] 3 CLJ 889”. [15] Pada pengamatan kami adalah jelas Hakim bicara tidak berlandaskan dokumen-dokumen ID34, ID36 dan ID37. Sebaliknya Hakim bicara menggunakan dokumen “Boarding Pass” (P215K dan P25I), Tag Bagasi (P17A) dan “Baggage Identification Tag” (P25J). Malah daripada keterangan yang tidak dicabar, Perayu dilihat berseorangan membawa (carry) bagasi P17 semasa tahanan dibuat. [16] Hakim bicara adalah atas landasan yang betul apabila merujuk kepada kes-kes berkaitan “carrying and transporting” iaitu kes Suzie Adrina Ahmad [2006] 3 CLJ 889 dan Wjchai Onprom v PP [2006] 3 CLJ 724. [17] Hakim bicara juga telah membuat “irresistible inference” apabila jumlah dadah yang dibawa sebegitu banyak, ianya bertujuan pengedaran dan bukannya untuk kegunaan sendiri (Ong Ah Chuan v PP [1981] 1 MLJ 64 - Rujuk perenggan 31 Penghakiman bertulis Hakim bicara). [18] Isu kedua, Hakim bicara gagal memberi pertimbangan yang sewajarnya terhadap kes pembelaan seperti yang digariskan oleh kes Mahkamah Agong Mohamad Radhi Yaakob v PP [1991] 1 CLJ (Rep) 311: 11 “[2] Whenever a criminal case is decided on the basis of the truth of the prosecution case as against the falsity of the defence story, a trial Judge must in accordance with the principle laid down in Mat v PP examine whether even though the Court is not satisfied with the defence story, to ask whether in spite of this, the defence story casts a reasonable doubt on the prosecution case. To satisfy this test, of importance is not the words used by the Judge but rather the actual application of the test to the facts of the case. In this case, the learned Judge offered practically no reason why the defence notwithstanding its falsity and unconvincing nature, had failed to case a reasonable doubt on the prosecution case, other than to state by way of lip service the duty placed by the law on the defence to earn an acquittal. [3] Unless the evidence in a particular case does not obviously so warrant, it is incumbent for the Court to consider whether on a balance of probability on the evidence the defence has rebutted the statutory presumption of trafficking under s.37(da) of the Act as a separate exercise even though the Court is satisfied on a balance that the presumption of possession under s. 37(d) of the Act has not been rebutted. In this case, the failure to do so was material misdirection and was fatal to the conviction. [4] On the issue of trafficking, the learned judge had failed sufficiently to consider the evidence of defence witnesses, particularly that of DW9 which clearly indicated that on the night in question H was in all probability the trafficker of the cannabis. The learned Judge had acted on the wrong premise that once the appellant had failed to rebut the presumption of possession under s.37(d) of the Act, the presumption of trafficking under s.37(da) of the Act became irrebuttable so as to relieve the Court from the duty to consider separately on a balance of probabilities whether the presumption under s.37(da) of the Act had been rebutted; this error of law had occasioned a miscarriage of Justice.” [19] Peguam Perayu berhujah bahawa pihak polis telah gagal menyiasat mengenai kewujudan pihak ketiga “Sammy” dan “Judy”. Pembelaan dengan 12 jelas menyatakan bahawa “Sammy” mengarahkan Perayu untuk membawa bagasi P17 (berisi dadah berbahaya yang tersorok) untuk diserahkan kepada “Judy” di Pulau Pinang. “Sammy” dan “Judy” adalah pengedar sebenar. [20] Kami juga menolak hujah ini. Jika diteliti Penghakiman Hakim bicara di perenggan 56 hingga 59, adalah jelas Hakim bicara sedar dan memahami prinsip undang-undang yang dihujahkan oleh Peguam Perayu. [21] Hakim bicara dengan jelas mengolah kes pembelaan mengenai “Sammy” dan “Judy” serta pemakaian “Radhi’s direction” di perenggan 64 Penghakiman beliau. Kami tiada sebab untuk mengganggu dapatan tersebut. [22] Dapatan fakta Hakim bicara bahawa “Sammy” dan “Judy” bukanlah “fictitious”. Pembuktian kewujudan pihak ketiga sahaja tidak membebaskan (exonerate) Perayu. Di bawah seksyen 39B ADB 1952 ianya mengenai kesalahan “pengedaran” dan bukan “ketuanpunyaan” dadah tersebut. [23] Kewujudan “Sammy” dan “Judy” disahkan oleh SD2. Malangnya SD2 dan Perayu sendiri tidak mengetahui nama penuh mereka. “Sammy” adalah Ketua Pejabat mereka, adalah ganjil mereka tidak mengetahui nama penuh, alamat atau nombor telefon “Sammy”. Sehubungan dengan ini, kami merujuk kes Teng Howe Sing v PP [2008] 5 CLJ 186. Mahkamah Rayuan telah mengesahkan dapatan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi selaku Hakim bicara: 13 “[13] In my judgment the quality, extent and results of any police investigation into “Ho Seng”, depended very much on proper information or leads being provided to the police by the accused himself. Since the accused was referring to “Ho Seng” by nickname only it was crucial that he make the police aware of this fact, and since it was the accused who knew the real name of “Ho Seng” it was imperative that he informed the police about this too, but he did not. Likewise, it would be the accused himself; who would know who his circle of friends were and who amongst them knew “Ho Seng”, whether by his nickname or real name. It was therefore imperative that the accused furnished this information to the police for their investigation purposes but without his having done so there is no basis for his complaint about the police investigations.” [24] Kes Teng Howe Sing v PP [2009] 3 CLJ 733, Mahkamah Persekutuan telah mengesahkan sabitan dan hukuman: “[30] …on this point we would like to refer to the case of PP v Badrulsham bin Baharom [1988] 2 MLJ 585 wherein Lim Beng Choon J at p.592 said: So we are left with nothing more than the bare assertion of the accused that it was Noor Azlan who asked him to collect the bag on behalf of the former and that the accused himself had no knowledge of the contents of P3. If that be the case, one would hardly imagine that he would not have told either PW3 or PW5 at the railway station at Alor Star at the time of his arrest that P3 belonged to Noor Azlan instead of saying that there was nothing in P3. ……. 14 [32] Applying the principle in Badrulsham’s case to the facts of the instant case, the learned trial judge was correct to conclude that the appellant has two opportunities to provide information about “Ho Seng”, i.e. at the time of his arrest and five days later during the recording of his cautioned statement but he failed to do so. We are therefore of the view that in the circumstances, the appellant’s failure to provide relevant information about “Ho Seng” for the police to carry out a thorough investigation in the probability of his defence, entitled the learned trial judge to disbelieve him.” [25] Hakim bicara seterusnya meneliti dan mengolah kes Pembelaan sebagai “innocent carrier”. Hakim bicara juga telah meneliti sama ada prinsip “wilful blindness” terpakai, di mana akhirnya Hakim bicara berpuas hati bahawa prinsip tersebut adalah terpakai (rujuk PP v Herlina Purnama Sari [2017] MLRA 499). [26] Dapatan fakta Hakim bicara berlandaskan fakta iaitu Perayu tidak memeriksa beg P17 kerana tidak mengesyaki apa-apa semasa menerima P17 daripada “Sammy”. Keterangan ini perlu diuji dengan keterangan saksi pendakwaan SP3 yang menyatakan apabila P17 dikosongkan, ia berat daripada biasa (rujuk m.s. 16 RR Jld. 2). Daripada laporan kimia P10, berat bersih dadah dan racun yang dijumpai dari P17 melebihi 3 kilogram (2,009.5 gram + 1,009.8 gram). Malah menurut SP5 pula terdapat “kembung” di sekeliling P17 (rujuk m.s. 48 RR Jld. 2) yang boleh dilihat dengan mata kasar. [27] Hakim bicara juga meneliti pembelaan perayu yang menyatakan bahawa “Sammy” mengarahkan Perayu untuk ke Pulau Pinang sehari sebelum berlepas untuk mengikuti latihan perniagaan syarikat mereka. 15 Malangnya tiada apa-apa dokumen berkaitan latihan tersebut sama ada daripada syarikat mereka di India mahupun di Pulau Pinang. Menurut Perayu lagi semua urusan tiket, paspot dan visa diuruskan oleh “Sammy”. Adalah ganjil perayu mendapat arahan sehari sebelum berlepas, ini kerana Perayu sendiri mengesahkan untuk mendapatkan visa ke Malaysia, memerlukan masa 5 hari bekerja (rujuk perenggan 80 dan 81 Penghakiman Hakim bicara). [28] Dengan alasan-alasan di atas, kami sebulat suara menolak hujah-hujah Peguam Perayu sebagai tidak bermerit. Keterangan adalah kukuh. Sabitan adalah selamat. Justeru rayuan ditolak. Sabitan dan hukuman dikekalkan dan disahkan. t.t. MOHTARUDIN BIN BAKI 4 Mac 2019 Counsel: Pihak Perayu : Dato’ Ranjit Singh & Cik Tan Guat Cheng Solicitors & Advocates No. 5-1 & 7-1, 1st Floor, Logan Heritage Union Street 10200 Penang Pulau Pinang Pihak Responden : Mohd Faizal bin Mohamed Fedder Jabatan Peguam Negara, Presint 4, 62100 Putrajaya.