Sapura Binti Mohd Noh v Sentosa Medical Centre Sdn. Bhd. (WA-12BNCvC-59-06/2025)

SENTOSA MEDICAL CENTRE SDN BHD [NO. SYARIKAT: 197901006248 (50531-T)]

KPJ HEALTHCARE BERHAD [NO. SYARIKAT: 199201015575 (247079-M)] …RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN (Dalam Perkara Mengenai Mahkamah Sesyen di Kuala Lumpur Dalam Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia Guaman No.: WA-A52NCvC-425-06/2022 Antara Sapura binti Mohd Noh [No. K/P: 680301-06-5150] …Plaintif Dan 1. Sentosa Medical Centre Sdn Bhd [No. Syarikat: 197901006248 (50531-T)]

KPJ Healthcare Berhad [No. Syarikat: 199201015575 (247079-M)] …Defendan-Defendan Yang diputuskan oleh Hakim Puan Wan Nor Aklima binti Wan Salleh di Mahkamah Sesyen Kuala Lumpur pada 27.5.2025) 21/03/2026 18:44:18 WA-12BNCvC-59-06/2025 Kand. 31 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction [1] SARS-CoV-2 is the coronavirus that emerged sometime in December 2019. For that reason, the disease that it causes is known as “Covid-19”. Covid-19 wreaked havoc worldwide for much longer than anyone could have anticipated. In Malaysia, the lockdown commenced on 18th March 2020. Hence, the introduction of vaccination against the Covid-19 in 2021 brought relief to most people then but not to the Appellant/Plaintiff in in this appeal. She is one of those who are strongly against Covid-19 vaccination. [2] The Appellant has filed an action at the Sessions Court below against her employer (the 1st Respondent/Defendant herein) and also naming its holding company as the 2nd Defendant. She pleaded, inter alia, that the Respondents attempted to compel her to accept Covid-19 vaccination, had thereby violated her constitutional rights and breached her employment contract. [2] The Appellant’s claim was dismissed by the learned Sessions Court judge after a full trial. After carefully considering the finding of facts made and the law applied by the learned Sessions Court judge, I found that the minor errors in the judgment of the learned Sessions Court judge did not cause any miscarriage of justice, and are not appealable errors. Had I been the trial judge, I would also have decided to dismiss the Appellant/Plaintiff’s claim. Hence, this Court decided that the Appellant’s appeal ought to be dismissed. [3] My reasons are as explained below. Background Facts [4] The 1st Respondent/Defendant is the owner and operator of KPJ Sentosa KL Specialist Hospital ("KPJ Sentosa KL"). [5] The 1st Respondent is a subsidiary of the 2nd Respondent. Being the holding company of the 1st Respondent, the 2nd Respondent plays an active in forming the management policies of the 1st Respondent. [6] The Appellant/Plaintiff is a pharmacist. She commenced employment with the 1st Respondent as Pharmacist-In-Charge on 17th May 2010 ("the Employment Contract"). As at the date of filing of her claim at the Sessions Court on 9th June 2022, she was drawing a monthly salary of RM14,214.00. [7] The Employment Contract included terms and conditions which require the Appellant to adhere to the 1st Respondent's policies and procedures, including those promulgated from time to time (at Clause 15). [8] It was also stipulated in the Employment Contract that as the 1st Respondent’s employee, the Appellant must abide by the company’s policies, procedure and administrative instructions issued from time to time relating to conditions of service, employee benefits, work; is prohibited from conducting herself in a manner amounting to insubordination, and agrees to the 1st Respondent amending the terms and conditions of the Employment Contract at its absolute discretion upon notification (Clause 19). [9] The Appellant was also required to comply with the 2nd Respondent's Policy on Handling Employee Misconduct which classified wilful insubordination or disobedience to any lawful and reasonable order of a superior as a major form of misconduct. [10] As the Pharmacist-In-Charge, the Appellant had to meet patients as her duties included the dispensing of medication prescribed by medical personnel, managing and overseeing all pharmaceutical services, ensuring quality assurance and optimal patient care. [11] In early year 2021, the Respondents/Defendants had encouraged their employees to be vaccinated against the Covid-19 virus, in line with the Ministry of Health's position that vaccines were effective in preventing and/or minimising the effect of infection. The Respondents had subsequently gone to make it their hospital policy that Covid-19 vaccination is a mandatory requirement to enter and work in the hospital premises. [12] The Appellant/Plaintiff had, until her resignation in 2022, continuously refused to be vaccinated. The Appellant/Plaintiff’s Position [13] Learned counsel for the Appellant/Plaintiff submits that the learned Sessions Court Judge committed serious errors of fact and of law, rendering her decision wrong and liable to be set aside by this Court. [14] It was submitted for the Appellant that the Sessions Court had erred in holding that the Appellant’s claim which is based on “breach of her constitutional rights under Article 5, 6 and 8 of the Federal Constitution” cannot be sustained because the Respondents/Defendants are private bodies, and that the learned Sessions Court judge had also made a finding that “there is no violation of the Plaintiff's constitutional rights in this case." [15] It was submitted for the Appellant that the cause of action for breaches of constitutional rights is sustainable in law because “the underlying contract between the Appellant as employee and the First Respondent as employer was the contract of employment. That contract can only remain valid and enforceable if its consideration and object remain lawful throughout. This is consistent with the principle of lawfulness of contracts as prescribed under Section 24 of the Contracts Act 1950”. [16] Learned counsel for the Appellant/Plaintiff further submits that the consideration under the Employment Contract was for the Appellant to be permitted to carry out her work free from any unlawful interference by the Respondents, and that they have committed “unlawful interference” when they imposed the requirement of Covid-19 vaccination on their employees, including the Appellant, and that this was allegedly a violation of her constitutional rights Articles 5, 6 and 8 of the Federal Constitution. [17] As for the Appellant's unfair dismissal complaint which has been referred to the Industrial Court, her learned counsel submits that it is not relevant to the present common law claim in the subject action under this Appeal. The Respondents/Defendants’ Position [18] The Respondents’ learned counsel submits that in August 2021, new Covid-19 cases in Malaysia spiked to approximately 20,000 cases per day, which caused the Respondents to decide on 20th September 2021, to implement a group-wide policy requiring all employees to be vaccinated against Covid-19 as a condition of entry into any premises and hospitals under the 2nd Respondent's group, effective from 20th October 2021 ("Entry Requirement"). The Entry Requirement provided that the 1st Respondent’s employees wishing to enter its premises were required to produce a valid vaccination certificate, and those employees who fail to meet this requirement without reasonable cause would be placed on leave without salary (“No Pay Leave”). [19] It was further submitted that the Entry Requirement was consistent with the Appellant's terms and conditions of employment, which permitted the Respondents to introduce and promulgate new policies and administrative instructions from time to time, and which required the Appellant to adhere to them, including by complying with any instructions relating to occupational safety and health. [20] As for the relevant events regarding the Appellant/Plaintiff’s conduct, the Respondents’ learned counsel narrated them in chronological order, as follows. [21] On 13th October 2021, the Appellant was reminded of her failure to provide proof of vaccination and given a deadline to do so by 20th October 2021. However, upon receipt of a medical letter confirming that the Appellant had an infection caused by the Chikungunya virus, the 1st Respondent granted the Appellant a temporary exemption from the Entry Requirement. [22] On 3rd January 2022, the attending medical officer confirmed that the Appellant was fit to receive the COVID-19 vaccination. However, she continued to refuse vaccination. [23] On 12th January and 17th January 2022 respectively, consultation sessions were held with the Appellant, during which she was advised of three available options for her. The first option was to proceed with vaccination and continue working, the second option was to be placed on No Pay Leave pending vaccination, and a last option was to obtain a referral letter from a recognised medical practitioner confirming a medical exemption, i.e. that the Appellant was medically unsuitable to receive Covid-19 vaccination. A deadline of 19th January 2022 was given. The Appellant declined all three options and continued to enter the premises of KPJ Sentosa KL past the stipulated deadline. [24] On 20th January 2022, the Appellant was verbally informed that she would not be permitted to enter the premises with effect from 21st January 2022. The Appellant refused to comply, resulting in a formal notice being issued to her. On 8th February 2022, the Appellant was informed that she would be placed on No Pay Leave should she remain unvaccinated as of 28th February 2022. The Respondents contend that this measure was taken in the interest of protecting the health and safety of their other employees, patients, and customers. [25] On 18th February 2022, the Appellant informed the Respondents of her intention not to comply. She also enclosed a police report that she had made against the Respondents on 17th February 2022. The Appellant continued to enter the premises of KPJ Sentosa KL after the 28th February 2022 deadline, openly defying the Respondents. [26] On 2nd March 2022, the Appellant was suspended on full pay for two weeks pending investigation as the Respondents were regarding her conduct as acts of insubordination. Her placement on No Pay Leave, which was to have taken effect from 1st March 2022, was accordingly deferred. The suspension was subsequently extended to 29th March 2022 pending the conclusion of the disciplinary process. A notice of domestic inquiry was issued on 18th March 2022, requiring the Appellant's attendance at an inquiry on 28th March 2022. The inquiry had to be adjourned as the Appellant had undergone a surgery and was still on medical leave on 28th March 2022. [27] The Appellant was on hospitalisation/medical leave from 30th March 2022 to 4th May 2022. On 12th May 2022, following an announcement by the Ministry of Health that vaccination status was no longer a prerequisite for entry into public buildings, the Respondents duly revoked the Entry Requirement and instructed the Appellant to return to work immediately. [28] On 17th May 2022, the domestic inquiry was conducted and the Appellant was thereafter suspended on full pay pending the outcome of the inquiry. On 30th May 2022, the Appellant was found guilty of intentionally entering the premises of KPJ Sentosa KL on RAYUAN SIVIL NO: WA-12BNCVC-59-06/2025 1st, 2nd and 3rd March 2022 in violation of express instructions. She was let off with just a final warning. [29] The Appellant was given further medical leave from 31st May 2022. She resigned on 12th August 2022, alleging that she was forced to resign. She filed a claim which was referred to the Industrial Court and registered as Case No. 11/4-1159/23. [30] Learned counsel for the Respondents contend that there was no error in the judgment of the Sessions Court in dismissing the Appellant’s claim and in holding that the Appellant's cause of action for breach of constitutional rights against private bodies was unsustainable; that the Respondents did not breach their duties under the Occupational Safety and Health Act 1994 or any duty of care owed to the Appellant or the Employment Contract. It was lastly submitted that in any event, the Appellant’s claim had been rendered academic by the cessation of the Entry Requirement with effect from 12th May 2022. Analysis of Facts and Law [31] The Appellant’s prayers in her Statement of Claim filed at the Sessions Court consisted of 9 items, in para 14.1 to 14.9 thereof. [32] Even though learned counsel for the Appellant/Plaintiff had framed the main plank of her suit as one of breach of constitutional rights, it is actually one about her employment contract. No constitutional issue arises out of the facts of her case. [33] With respect, I find that the Appellant’s plea of violation of her constitutional rights is debunked by both the law and the facts of this case. [34] In Beatrice a/p Fernandez v Sistem Penerbangan Malaysia & Anor [2005] 2 CLJ 713; [2005] 3 MLJ 681, the Federal Court reaffirmed that causes of action based on violation of constitutional rights could arise only if the ‘violating party’ is the Legislature or the Executive or its agencies, i.e. has statutory authority and wields statutory powers. Since the Respondents in this appeal are just two private limited companies with neither statutory authority nor powers, the Appellant's cause of action (if any has arisen) could only have been based on the Employment Contract, i.e. of a contractual nature, or based on an alleged tort. The relevant passage in the judgment of Abdul Malek Ahmad PCA (as he then was) reads as follows: “To invoke art 8 of the Federal Constitution, the applicant must show that some law or action of the Executive discriminates against her so as to controvert her rights under the said Article. Constitutional law, as a branch of public law, deals with the contravention of individual rights by the Legislature or the Executive or its agencies. Constitutional law does not extend its substantive or procedural provisions to infringements of an individual’s legal right by another individual.” (emphasis added) [35] The judgment of the Federal Court in Beatrice Fernandez (supra) was followed by the Court of Appeal in Airasia Bhd v Rafizah Shima Mohamed Aris [2015] 2 CLJ 510; [2014] 5 MLJ 318 where Zawawi Salleh JCA (as he then was) writing for the Court of Appeal, issued a stern reminder that High Court judges ought to follow precedents set by the Federal Court with his following words: “[25] In our considered opinion, the learned judge erred in law and facts in not following the Federal Court’s decision in Beatrice’s case. There is no rhyme nor reason for the learned judge not to follow the decision of the highest court in Malaysia. It is clear that the agreement entered between the appellant and the respondent is a lawful contract between private parties though it requires the respondent to resign upon being pregnant or termination would take place in the event of refusal to resign. [26] The interpretation accorded by Beatrice’s case on the constitutional effect is called ‘vertical effect’ which essentially stipulates that constitutional law, as a branch of public law, only addresses the contravention of an individual’s rights by a public authority. We must remind High Court judges that they must observe judicial precedents in the interest of finality and certainty in the law and for orderly development of legal rules.” (emphasis added) [36] After Airasia Bhd v Rafizah Shima Mohamed Aris (supra), the reported judgments in the law journals show a consistent application of the principle that the provisions of the Federal Constitution cannot be invoked in a claim against private parties by alleging violation of constitutional rights. A recent example of this approach is seen in the judgment of Ahmad Bache J (as he then was) in Gabungan Pertubuhan Teksi, Kereta Sewa, Limosin Dan Teksi Lapangan Terbang Semalaysia-Gtsm v Grabcar Sdn Bhd [2022] 1 CLJ 956 which was about a dispute between Grabcar and an union of associations of taxis, rental cars and airport taxis. It was held that: “the Constitution does not have a horizontal effect to confer rights for individual to bring claims against another individual and that the Society's constitutional claims against GrabCar for breach of arts. 5, 6, 8 and 13 of the Federal Constitution in paras. 9(iii) and 25(a)(iii) of the statement of claim be dismissed.” [37] In the circumstances, I find that the learned Sessions Court judge was right in rejecting the part of the Appellant/Plaintiff’s plea of alleged violation of her constitutional rights by the Respondents. [38] Factually, as could be gleaned from the chronology of events, the learned Sessions Court judge was also right in holding that the Appellant's allegations of "violation of constitutional rights" are unsustainable. First, despite all the pressure which the Appellant had allegedly suffered, she did not receive Covid-19 vaccination. In fact, the Respondents granted her three options, one of which allowed her to produce a letter from a qualified medical practitioner certifying that she was unfit to receive Covid-19 vaccination. As a matter of fact, a temporary exemption was granted in October 2021 as she was recovering from Chikungunya virus infection. [39] Further, on 30th May 2022, even though the Appellant was found guilty of intentionally entering the premises of KPJ Sentosa KL on 1st, 2nd and 3rd March 2022 in violation of express instructions to comply with the Entry Requirement, she was let off with just a final warning. In other words, the Appellant could have just returned to work thereafter without suffering any disciplinary punishment despite her having openly defied her employer’s instructions for several months earlier. [40] The chronology of events and evidence show that the Appellant/Plaintiff was not dismissed due to her refusal to be vaccinated. If her grievances against the Respondents was that the 1st Respondent’s conduct against her amounted to constructive dismissal, her remedy should be, pursuant to s.20 of the Industrial Relations Act 1967, to pursue her claim for “constructive dismissal” at the Industrial Court – which upon her complaint, had been registered as Industrial Court Case No. 11/4-1159/23. [41] Prayer 14.2 in the Appellant/Plaintiff’s Statement of Claim reads: Factually, this prayer is unsustainable as the Appellant did not receive vaccination, and was in fact on medical leave throughout the material period, and she had chosen to resign on her own volition. There was no letter issued by the Respondents/Defendants to terminate her employment. Thus, it is abundantly clear that her claim – based on alleged pressure to resign – ought to be pursuant to the Industrial Relations Act 1967 at the Industrial Court, not by way of seeking various declarations at the Sessions Court. [42] As the Appellant’s working place (KPJ Sentosa KL) is a hospital, I find that it was reasonable for the Respondents to require all their staff, medical and non-medical alike, to adhere to the highest and strictest standard of precautionary measures in avoiding Covid-19 infection – so as to reduce the chances of patients and visitors to their hospital being infected. This Court takes judicial notice of the fact the Covid-19 virus is highly contagious. Even though the effectiveness of Covid-19 vaccination is not absolute, it is only fair to judge the Respondents/Defendants based on medical knowledge available then – which was that vaccination would reduce the risk of infection and/or death from infection. [43] As an undisputed fact, the Appellant/Plaintiff did not receive any Covid-19 vaccination. Since it was reasonable, at the material time, for all hospitals to require their staff to receive Covid-19 vaccination, it follows that it was not unreasonable to require those who had refused to accept vaccination to go on No Pay Leave until the transition from pandemic to the endemic stage or until such time when the Ministry of Health had declared it safe for unvaccinated people to enter public buildings. With the benefit of hindsight, everyone is wiser. However, this Court must look at the prevailing situation and the precautionary measures taken by the Ministry of Health and the hospitals in Malaysia, not with the benefit of hindsight in judging the decision of the learned Sessions Court judge to dismiss the Appellant/Plaintiff’s claim. [44] Several authorities were cited by learned counsel for the Appellant and Respondents respectively. I find most of those authorities to be of little assistance. The one authority with facts resembling our present case was the judgment of the Supreme Court of British Columbia in Canada. I find Deepk Parmar v. Tribe Management Inc. [2022] BCSC 1675 to be relevant as it is about whether an employer is entitled to place an employee on No Pay Leave for failing to comply with a mandatory vaccination policy (“MVP”) – similar to our present case. [45] As could be gleaned from the judgment of MacNaughton J in Deepk Parmar v. Tribe Management Inc (supra), the plaintiff there (Ms. Parmar) actually had plausible reasons to refuse Covid-19 vaccination as her father and aunt had apparently experienced some serious side effects after receiving Covid-19 vaccination. Yet, it was held that her employer’s decision to place her on No Pay Leave – due to her refusal to be vaccinated – did not amount to constructive dismissal. [46] The other point in Deepk Parmar v. Tribe Management Inc (supra) which makes it suitable for comparison with our present case is that Ms. Parmar’s employment contract with her employer (the defendant) too expressly provided that she would comply with all of its policies, as amended from time to time at the employer’s discretion. That provision allowed her employer to implement and amend workplace policies and obliged her to comply with them. It was held that her employer’s right to implement policies was only subject to the implied qualification that any such policy would be reasonable and lawful. This term of employment is similar in effect to the Employment Contract between the Appellant and the Respondents in our present case. [47] MacNaughton J in Deepk Parmar v. Tribe Management Inc (supra) opined that the employer faced a delicate task of balancing Ms. Parmar’s personal beliefs (regarding Covid-19 vaccination) as against its interest in ensuring that it protected the health and safety of all other employees in its workplace, and that allowing for exemptions would result in selective application of the MVP. The learned judge pointed out that individual views of the appropriateness of the employer’s MVP do not undermine the reasonableness of the policy, and an employee’s personal belief must give way to the health and safety concerns that form the basis for the MVP. I humbly agree with his reasoning. [48] As mentioned in para [43] above, I hold the view that the reasonableness of the Respondents’ decision to adopt a mandatory vaccination policy in year 2021 was reasonable then. I find support in the judgment of Justice MacNaughton J in Deepk Parmar v. Tribe Management Inc (supra) who held that the employer’s MVP was a reasonable and lawful response to the uncertainty created by the COVID-19 pandemic based on the information that was then available to it as the MVP reflected the prevailing approach at the time, striking an appropriate balance between the employer’s business interests, the rights of its employees to a safe work environment, its clients’ interests, and the interests of the residents in the properties it serviced. MacNaughton J concluded by finding that the employer’s policy of making No Pay Leave an option for Ms. Parmar who refused to be vaccinated as it ensured that individuals like her could maintain a principled stance against vaccination without losing their employment by being put on a leave of absence. [49] Even though Canada is geographically one of the furthest country from Malaysia, the facts as narrated by the learned Canadian judge in Deepk Parmar v. Tribe Management Inc (supra) show us that the dilemma faced by the Respondents/Defendants in our present case was universal then. [50] The circumstances prevailing in 2021/2022 – when Malaysia was facing extraordinary health challenges posed by the global COVID- 19 pandemic – made the Respondents’ mandatory vaccination policy a reasonable policy then. It was reasonable to give their employees a choice of getting vaccinated and continuing to earn an income or remaining unvaccinated and losing their income. [51] Although our Ministry of Health did not make it mandatory then for all citizens of Malaysia to be vaccinated, the Government did strongly encourage vaccination. I take judicial notice that many people were then vying to receive Covid-19 vaccination as soon as possible to protect themselves. [52] Again, comparing the facts of our present case with Deepk Parmar v. Tribe Management Inc (supra), I find that the Respondents here had an even more compelling reason to require their employees to be vaccinated because KPJ Sentosa KL is a hospital that treats those with weakened immune systems, pregnant women, frail and elderly folks, children and other patients with comorbidities, i.e. patients in the highest risk category of being infected and killed by the Covid-19 virus. [53] Thus, it is the judgment of this Court that it was perfectly reasonable for the Respondents to require their employees to be duly vaccinated in order to continue working as healthcare professionals in the Respondents’ hospitals. [54] Further, it is pertinent to note that as the Pharmacist-in-Charge, the Appellant was responsible for the management and operations of pharmaceutical services at KPJ Sentosa KL, and would inevitably be required to hold discussions with her subordinates and patients for the purpose of dispensing pharmaceutical drugs prescribed by the doctors, managing plans, directing and overseeing all activities of the services to ensure proper provision and dispensing of medication. The Respondents were not acting unreasonably in requiring their Pharmacist-in-Charge to receive Covid-19 vaccination. At this juncture, I must reiterate that this appeal must be adjudicated based on the situation in year 2021 – when border lockdowns were still in force and hospitals nationwide were being required to observe the highest standard of care in preventing the spread of the Covid-19 virus. [55] The Appellant/Plaintiff had actually suffered no loss or prejudice. She resigned and had exercised her rights to request a reference to the Industrial Court, and indeed that is the correct forum for her to ventilate her grievances regarding 'constructive dismissal'. This has been reaffirmed in the judgment of Nantha Balan JCA (as he then was) in 7-Eleven Malaysia Sdn. Bhd. v. Ashvine Hari Krishnan [2023] 3 MLJ 469 in following the judgment of the Federal Court in Fung Keong Rubber Manufacturing (M) Sdn. Bhd. v. Lee Eng Kiat & Ors [1981] 1 MLJ 238 – both of which are authorities binding on this Court and the Sessions Court below. In 7-Eleven Malaysia v. Ashvine (supra), it was held as follows: “[44] The Industrial Court is a creature of the Act, which is in turn, a piece of social legislation, enacted as a speedy form of statutory remedy to resolve industrial disputes between employers and employees and trade unions. [45] In our view, having regard to the purpose for which the Act was enacted, it was wholly incumbent upon the plaintiff, who complains that she had been constructively dismissed, to invoke the statutory remedy under the Act, instead of filing a civil action and claiming substantial damages of the type as stated in the statement of claim. … [46] Whilst an employee may file a common law claim in the civil court, such a claim is confined, as a matter of law, to ‘meagre’ damages in the form of salary in lieu of notice (see: Federal Court in Fung Keong Rubber). The legal position in this regard was also reiterated by the Court of Appeal in Aetna Universal Insurance Sdn. Bhd. v. Ooi Meng Sua [2001] 3 MLJ 502; [2001] 3 CLJ 1 (CA) (‘Aetna’). [47] Having regard to the principles of law adverted to earlier vis a vis the claim at common law, it is necessary to now examine the plaintiff’s common law claim in Suit 694. In the present case, there is nothing which is due by the defendant to the plaintiff under the employment contract. Hence, even if the case proceeds to trial and the plaintiff succeeds in proving that she was constructively dismissed, she will not even be entitled to salary in lieu of notice, as that has already been paid. [48] Counsel for the plaintiff said that it is the plaintiff’s choice whether she wants to pursue a claim in the Industrial Court or to go to the civil court. That is true to an extent. But, if she decides not to go to the Industrial Court then she will have to accept the consequences of going to the civil court — ‘meagre’ damages per Fung Keong Rubber. But here she maintains that she is entitled to the colossal damages as pleaded in the statement of claim (totalling RM96,032,956.40), which in our view, is not claimable as a matter Counsel for the Appellant: Chanravathane S. Ponnudurai SOLICITORS FOR THE APPELLANT: MESSRS SP CHANRA Advocates & Solicitors No. 184-A, Jalan Mahkota Taman Maluri, 55100 KUALA LUMPUR. Counsel for the Defendants: Amardeep Singh Toor (Roseveen Kaur Tyndall with him) SOLICITORS FOR THE DEFENDANTS: MESSRS LEE HISHAMMUDDIN ALLEN & GLEDHILL Advocates & Solicitors Level 6, Menara 1 Dutamas, Solaris Dutamas, No.1, Jalan Dutamas 1, 50480 KUALA LUMPUR.

Beatrice a/p Fernandez v Sistem Penerbangan Malaysia & Anor [2005] 2 CLJ 713; [2005] 3 MLJ 681

Airasia Bhd v Rafizah Shima Mohamed Aris [2015] 2 CLJ 510; [2014] 5 MLJ 318

Gabungan Pertubuhan Teksi, Kereta Sewa, Limosin Dan Teksi Lapangan Terbang Semalaysia-Gtsm v Grabcar Sdn Bhd [2022] 1

Deepk Parmar v. Tribe Management Inc. [2022] BCSC 1675

7-Eleven Malaysia Sdn. Bhd. v. Ashvine Hari Krishnan [2023] 3

Fung Keong Rubber Manufacturing (M) Sdn. Bhd. v. Lee Eng Kiat & Ors [1981] 1 MLJ 238

Article 5, 6 & 8 Federal Constitution

S.20 Industrial Relations Act 1967