Saraswathy Shirke Deo v Amutha A/P Ayawoo (WA-22NCvC-366-06/2022)

AND AMUTHA A/P AYAWOO (No. IC: 710429-05-5300)

CHUNG TEK WEI (No. IC: 720830-12-5183)

SHALEENEE A/P SUBRAMANIAM (No. IC: 850205-14-5192)

LAM GHOOI KET (No. IC: 581215-10-6493) … DEFENDANTS 27/12/2025 17:07:44 WA-22NCvC-366-06/2022 Kand. 129 S/N L0oov51zuUCd1ilOv6iZg

[1] The unsuccessful proposed intervener has appealed against this Court’s decision of 6.11.2025 dismissing its application to intervene in this case where a judgment had been meted out by this Court four months prior on 8.7.2025. The unsuccessful proposed intervener had sought to intervene at this stage after the case was closed, judgment ordered and appeals against this Court’s decision on the case had been lodged to the Court of Appeal. The reason cited by the proposed intervener was a breach of natural justice because it claimed it was affected by this Court’s decision on the case. [2] A snapshot of the main case – it was an action of defamation where the Plaintiff, Saraswathy Shirke Deo, an advocate and solicitor of the High Court of Malaya practising under the name and style of Messrs. Sara Deo & Co, sought damages for alleged defamatory statements published between 16.4.2021 and 1.6.2021 by the Defendants, who were members of the Management Committee (MC) of Amadesa Resort Management Corporation (ARMC). [3] The Plaintiff was engaged to investigate allegations of fraud involving employees of the proposed intervener, Amadesa Resource Management Corporation, a management corporation established under s17 of the Strata Titles Act 1985 (SMA). The purpose of the proposed intervener’s establishment was to maintain and manage the condominium building known as Amadesa Resort Condominium. S/N L0oov51zuUCd1ilOv6iZg [4] The Plaintiff sued the Defendants over six statements made when the investigation was still on-going. The Defendants filed a Counterclaim before this Court with allegations that the Plaintiff had defamed them in communications with the residents of the Amadesa Resort Condominium vide WhatsApp group chat. [5] After a full trial, this Court found that both the Plaintiff and the Defendants made defamatory statements. Based on the overwhelming evidence of hostility, bitterness and resentment on the part of the parties, this Court made orders, amongst others that:

The Plaintiff shall immediately remove herself from the Amadesa Homeovers WhatsApp Group chat and any other Amadesa resident communication group chats; and

The Plaintiff is restrained from re-joining or attempting to re-join any Amadesa residential community communication platforms. [6] The proposed intervener claimed that it needed to be made in this case (which is already disposed of and closed at the High Court with the delivery of this Court’s decision on 8.7.2025) because there was a breach of natural justice against it. This Court’s Decision [7] An extract of this Court’s judgement dated 8.7.2025 is as follows: S/N L0oov51zuUCd1ilOv6iZg “[90] Having considered all the evidence, submissions, and applicable legal principles, this Court makes the following orders: A. On the Plaintiff’s Claim:

This Court finds that the Defendants are liable for defamation in respect of Statements 1 to 6 and the Jennifer Lau emails. The statements complained of are defamatory in their natural and ordinary meaning and were published to third parties;

In assessing damages, this Court gives regard and considers the extent of the publication, the standing of the parties, and all circumstances, including the conduct of both parties, and all circumstances, including the conduct of both parties. This Court regarded the Court of Appeal’s case of Raja Syahrir Abu Bakar v Manjeet Singh Dhillon & Ors [2019] 4 CLJ 301; [2019] 4 MLRA 218 and Sandosh Anandan v Sivajanam Sangarapillai [2014] 1 LNS 1861; [2014] MLRHU 1355. While the defamatory statements caused reputational harm to the Plaintiff as a legal practitioner, this Court must also consider several mitigating factors:

The broader context of the professional relationship breakdown and the Plaintiff’s own conduct which gave rise to legitimate concerns;

(ii) Significantly, there is no evidence that either the Commissioner of Buildings or the Malaysian Bar S/N L0oov51zuUCd1ilOv6iZg Council initiated any inquiry or investigation following the publications. This absence of regulatory response suggests the statements did not cause the serious professional damage that might ordinarily be expected from such publications to professional regulatory bodies;

(iii) The reactive nature of the Defendants’ statements to the Plaintiff’s own prior misconduct and public allegations.

Taking all factors into account, particularly the lack of evidence of concrete professional consequences despite publication to regulatory authorities, this Court awards damages of RM25,000 to the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff sought injunctive relief restraining further defamatory publication. Given that the professional relationship has terminated, considerable time has elapsed since the publications, and there is no evidence of continuing publication, this Court declines to grant injunctive relief. B. On the Defendants’ Counterclaim

This Court finds that the Plaintiff is liable for defamation in respect of her WhatsApp statements published in the Amadesa Homeowners Group on 16.4.2021. The S/N L0oov51zuUCd1ilOv6iZg statements made serious allegations against the Defendants’ integrity and conduct as MC members and were published to third parties within their residential community;

This Court has heard evidence of the impact on the Defendants, particularly the 1st Defendant’s loss of income from her tuition business and the social difficulties experienced within their residential community. The allegations of authority abuse, protections of embezzlement, and acting illegally are serious in nature and would naturally cause substantial distress and reputational damage in a close-knit residential environment. In awarding quantum, this Court considers the conduct of the 1st Defendant in the entire episode as it mitigated the quantum ordered against the Plaintiff. This Court awards damages of Rm25,000 to each of the four Defendants, totalling RM100,000;

The Defendants sought injunctive relief restraining the Plaintiff from publishing further defamatory statements. While this Court has found the Plaintiff liable for defamation, the grant of injunctive relief must be justified by evidence of a real likelihood of repetition. The evidence shows that the Plaintiff was engaged as a legal advisor to ARMC but does not reside at Amadesa Resort Condominium and has no continuing connection to the S/N L0oov51zuUCd1ilOv6iZg residential community following the termination of the professional relationship. The defamatory statements arose from the specific circumstances of the professional relationship breakdown. In the absence of evidence suggesting ongoing interaction or a real prospect of future defamatory publication, this Court declines to grant injunctive relief. This Court’s findings are sufficient to put matters to rest between the parties;

However, evidence shows that the defamatory statements were published though the Amadesa Resort Homeowners WhatsApp Group, which the Plaintiff joined despite having no property interest at Amadesa. Given that her presence in this residential community group served no legitimate purpose following the termination of her professional engagement and was the vehicle for the defamatory publication, this Court orders that:

The Plaintiff immediately removes herself from the Amadesa Homeowners WhatsApp Group and any other Amadesa resident communication groups; and

(ii) The Plaintiff is restrained from rejoining or attempting to rejoin any Amadesa residential community communication platforms;

Beyond this specific relief relating to the residential community communications, this Court declines to grant S/N L0oov51zuUCd1ilOv6iZg broader injunctive relief given the absence of evidence suggesting ongoing interaction or a real prospect of future defamatory publication.” [8] The Plaintiff lodged her appeal at the Court of Appeal on 5.8.2025 whilst the Defendants filed theirs on 7.8.2025. The case at the High Court thus since disposed of and closed. The Proposed Intervener’s Application [9] The proposed intervener through this application (Enclosure 109) sought leave to intervene in the proceedings and set the orders that the Plaintiff immediately remove herself from the Amadesa Homeowners WhatsApp Group and any other Amadesa resident communication groups and the injunction on the Plaintiff to rejoin or attempt to rejoin any Amadesa residential community communication platforms as ordered by this Court on 8.7.2025. [10] The proposed intervener alleged that its legal rights were affected. It claimed that the said orders were in breach of natural justice, in breach of statute, or in contravention of the law, as the orders made in the judgment dated 8.7.2025 were made in breach of its fundamental right to be heard, hence, rendering the order or judgment a nullity and liable to be set aside. In its submissions that leave ought to be granted, and the said orders be set aside, the proposed intervener raised the following points: S/N L0oov51zuUCd1ilOv6iZg

the orders involved the rights and interests of the proposed intervener, who was not a party to the suit

the orders were decided without hearing the proposed intervener

the orders considered a permanent injunction which the Defendants did not seek or demand in their Counterclaim

the Amadesa Homeowners WhatsApp Group, including other WhatsApp Group chats administered/managed by the representatives and/or committee members of the proposed intervener after the 6th AGM on 31.7.2021 (Management WhatsApp Group) are owned/belonged to and/or exist for the management interest of the proposed intervener

the Management WhatsApp Group is not trivial for the homeowners to chat on, but is rather the proposed intervener’s instant communication platform and is very important to the proposed intervener as it is an intermediary between the proposed intervener’s committee members with the homeowners, members of the internal accountability committee, and the proposed intervener’s professional and technical service providers

the orders restricted the proposed intervener from obtaining advice of the Plaintiff by usurping the rights and discretion S/N L0oov51zuUCd1ilOv6iZg between the proposed intervener and the Plaintiff in relation to the instant communication platform for management and arrangement of work or services [11] The proposed intervener submitted that this Court shall not deprive it, who was not a party to the main case, of the right and interest to include the Plaintiff, licensed property managers, accountants, auditors and service providers in the Amadesa Homeowners WhatsApp Group to seek assistance in matters of management and protect the common interest of the owners and committee members during the recovery period after being plagued by various financial mismanagement, embezzlement and fraud for many years under the staff of the property manager, Meadow Facilities Sdn Bhd. [12] During the oral arguments, to this Court’s query of where the proposed intervener was during the protracted trial, the counsel replied that the proposed intervener did not have a right to be involved in the trial for the main case. That, if taken as a correct fact, is a perplexing paradox in itself. However, this Court’s records would show that the proposed intervener’s committee members - past and present - had testified as witnesses. Therefore, the fact that the Plaintiff, though not a homeowner at Amadesa Resort Condominium, but in her capacity as the lawyer appointed by the proposed intervener’s committee, was in WhatsApp group chats with the homeowners that enabled her to communicate directly with individual homeowners, was known to the proposed intervener at all material times. S/N L0oov51zuUCd1ilOv6iZg [13] The proposed intervener had also contended that the Defendants did not seek the Applicant’s consent nor approval to file a Defence and Counterclaim against the Plaintiff in the main case. [14] In expanding its argument that leave ought to be granted, the proposed intervener quoted s59 of the Strata Management Act 2013 (SMA) that mandated it to manage the scheme’s affairs expediently. Also cited was s50(3) CMA that empowers the proposed intervener to engage professional service providers (including legal advisors and property managers) for effective administration. It seemed that the proposed intervener utilises WhatsApp Group chats as essential communication platforms with these professionals. The Plaintiff’s presence in these groups is deemed crucial for the swift resolution of management issues. It was contended that the permanent prohibition as per the orders caused operational disruptions and impeded the lawful discharge of its statutory functions, thereby infringing upon its management autonomy. [15] Counsel for the proposed intervener argued that the doctrine of res judicata and functus officio did not apply in this instance, as it was claimed that substantial justice was at stake. This Court heard submissions that the impugned orders are null and void due to illegality or lack of jurisdiction. Additionally, it was submitted that this Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction to set aside the orders ex debito justitae. The proposed intervener insisted that its application was properly made within the existing proceeding rather than through a fresh action or appeal. S/N L0oov51zuUCd1ilOv6iZg [16] The proposed intervener further maintained that its application was filed bona fide and without any inordinate delay. It was submitted that the Defendants suffer no prejudice from its application because they did not originally pray for the reliefs granted by this Court. Furthermore, it was contended that the WhatsApp group chats are owned and administered exclusively by the proposed intervener; the Defendants were neither participants nor administrators of these groups. The proposed intervener argued that the Defendants have no legal right to interfere with its discretion to consult its service providers. The proposed intervener submitted that there is no real risk justifying an injunction against the Plaintiff, particularly as any defamatory conduct originated from the Defendants themselves. The Defendants’ Objections [17] The Defendants contended that this Court is functus officio and no longer possesses the jurisdiction to grant the leave to intervene. They submitted that an application for leave to intervene by a non-party must be made before the delivery of judgment or the final conclusion of pleadings. Given that judgment had already been pronounced and the proceedings were concluded, the proposed intervener was barred from intervening at the post-judgment stage. Order 15 Rule 6 Rules of Court (RoC) was cited by the Defendants, as well as Hong Leong Bank Bhd v Staghorn Sdn Bhd & Other Appeals [2008] 2 CLJ 121 where the Court ruled that the said Order 15 Rule 6 RoC must be complied with and defined “at any stage of the proceedings” as: S/N L0oov51zuUCd1ilOv6iZg “… before judgment, otherwise the proceedings have concluded and there is no longer a proceeding in existence for the party to intervene in. The judge also becomes functus officio.” [18] Counsel for the Defendants submitted that this Court is functus officio and that the proposed intervener’s application ought to be dismissed, especially so when no specific grounds were advanced as to the irregularity of this Court’s judgment and the orders therein, whether on a lack of jurisdiction or a breach of statute. For want of being repetitive, the Defendants pressed that the proposed intervener’s application for leave to set aside the said orders was flawed in limine as there no longer existed a live issue for determination by this Court. The said judgment was now before the Court of Appeal for arguments by the parties of the trial. [19] The Defendants further argued that the proposed intervener lacked the requisite legal interest to justify intervention. The Defendants highlighted that there was a failure to demonstrate a direct legal interest in the subject matter as mere commercial or administrative interest was insufficient to warrant intervention. It was also emphasised that the prohibitions in the order are directed solely to the Plaintiff. They do not restrain the Plaintiff from advising the Applicant in a professional capacity, nor do they fetter the proposed intervener’s corporate functions. Particularly so when this Court’s order is specifically limited to “Amadesa Resort Condominium homeowners/community/residential WhatsApp group communication”. The Defendants stated that the proposed intervener’s contention that the orders disrupted its management platforms was based on a misrepresentation of S/N L0oov51zuUCd1ilOv6iZg the scope of this Court’s orders. This Court was reminded of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Chong Fook Sin v Amanah Raya Bhd & Ors [2010] 7 CLJ 917 that upheld the test that governs intervention is the requisite ‘legal interest’ of the proposed intervener. [20] The Defendants strongly denied that this Court’s orders (and even the entire judgment) were a nullity for breach of natural justice or lack of jurisdiction. The Defendants pointed out that the proposed intervener had failed to advance specific grounds that showed the orders were made in excess of jurisdiction or in breach of statute. The proposed intervener’s members were present throughout the trial and provided testimony. Having elected not to intervene during the trial, the proposed intervener was thereafter estopped, months after the case was concluded, from challenging the orders after their delivery. [21] As a defamation suit, the matter is an action in personam concerning personal reputation. The proposed intervener, a third party, had no cause of action or standing regarding the tortious liability determined by this Court. The Defendants characterised this application as a “back door” attempt to vary a valid order, filed by a party lacking the requisite locus standi. The Plaintiff’s position [22] The Plaintiff did not cast any objections to this application. At the arguments of this application however, it was orally submitted by the Plaintiff’s counsel that the proposed intervener had a right to file in the S/N L0oov51zuUCd1ilOv6iZg application. This Court found that there was a miscomprehension of the orders. The submissions that the proposed interveners’ rights are affected because it cannot have its legal counsel in were most unacceptable. This Court’s orders did not concern any communication between the proposed intervener and its legal counsel. This Court’s order is that the Plaintiff remove herself from the homeowners’ community/residential chat platforms. Reasons for this Court not to exercise its discretion [23] The Court is mindful that the trial in this matter had already been concluded after considerable time and resources were expended. In that context, the filing of this application at such a late stage - the judgment was delivered in July 2025 - and after parties had lodged their appeals at the Court of Appeal, this Court noted with some concern. This Court found it difficult to reconcile the lateness of this application despite the proposed intervener’s prior awareness of the proceedings, and that raised legitimate concerns relating to procedural fairness and finality. [24] At the forefront is as held in Sri Permata Sdn Bhd v PPH Realty Sdn Bhd (Lingkaran Cemerlang Sdn Bhd, Intended Intervenors) [2022] 1 MLJ 552 that maintained the cardinal principle that the power to grant leave to intervene is the court’s discretion. Then, this Court turns to Wan Salimah Bte Wan Jaffar v Mahmood Bin Omar (Anim Bte Abdul Aziz, Intervener) [1998] 5 MLJ 162 that explicitly upheld at p170: “It is a correct statement of the law to say that a person without legal but only a commercial interest cannot be allowed to intervene (Re S/N L0oov51zuUCd1ilOv6iZg Farbenindutrie [1944] Ch 41 (CA). In the same vein, Kerr LJ said in Sanders Load Co Inc v Entores Metal Brokers Ltd [1984] 1 All ER 857 to this effect (at p863): In my view, the rule requires some interest in the would-be intervener which us in some way directly related to the subject matter of the action. A mere commercial interest in its outcome, divorced from the subject matter of the action is not enough..” [25] Vide this application, the proposed intervener had failed to show that its legal right was impeded, disturbed, or affected. The orders were made as a result of the findings of facts in the case. The Plaintiff, not being a homeowner, was ordered to remove herself from the WhatsApp homeowner community/residential group chats, based on the historic events where inflammatory language was used by her that this Court found was defamatory on several occasions. This Court was of the considered view that the Plaintiff ought not to be on such community/residential communication platform because there was no legal need or any necessity especially so when the discord with the committee members of the earlier committee(s) was so bitter, such a platform ignited legal consequences (in the main case, it was defamation). The proposed intervener had not demonstrated to this Court how such orders affected it. Should it wish to re-employ the Plaintiff as its legal counsel, the orders do not bar so. Should it desire to communicate with the Plaintiff via WhatsApp chat communications, the orders do not ban such. Should its’ new committee want to discuss legal matters with the Plaintiff, the orders do not restrain such. See also Chong Fook Sin v. Amanah Raya Bhd & Ors [2010] 7 CLJ 917. S/N L0oov51zuUCd1ilOv6iZg [26] It had to be stated here that this Court is slightly puzzled as the orders are spent and academic. There was no stay in the execution of the orders. Thus, the Plaintiff had removed herself from the Amadesa Resort Condominium WhatsApp Homeowners community/residential communications. Yet, the proposed intervener failed to demonstrate how that had affected any of their legal rights (or even commercial for that matter - no demonstration of how its commercial rights were affected). The homeowners voted the committee members to execute duties relating to the affairs of their residence. Any legal matter arising was to be communicated by the committee members and the legal counsel, not directly by or with the homeowners. There are no breaches of any of the provisions of the SMA. Besides, the fact remained that the orders were complied with long before this application. [27] As to the submissions of the proposed interveners that the Defendants did not plead that the Plaintiff be removed from the WhatsApp community/residential group communications, this Court found it untenable as the pleadings for the main case of defamation include injunctive reliefs. Based on the evidence, the orders were meted out by this Court. The orders did not concern the working operations of the proposed intervener. [28] For the purposes of completion, the facts in the case of Dr Lourdes Dava Raj v Dr Milton Lum & MMC [2020] 5 MLRA 333 are distinguished. The proposed intervener failed to show that it had a direct legal interest in S/N L0oov51zuUCd1ilOv6iZg the orders granted by this Court, nor any evidence to show that it had suffered procedural deprivation or denial of its right to be heard to invalidate the judgment. Requirements under Order 15 Rule 6(2)(b) RoC was not fulfilled. This Court had actually heard the testimony of the members of the proposed intervener at trial. Nonetheless, nothing was said about not obtaining sanction or consent for the Defendants to have filed their Defence and Counterclaim. [29] In any event, the proposed intervener can take that up in another suit against the Defendants, as that is a separate cause of action. The main case was one based on defamation. With the case long concluded and judgment pronounced, the proposed intervener’s allegation had no place in the proceedings that have since been ended. This Court is functus officio. See Hock Hua Bank Bhd v Sahari Murid [1981] 1 MLJ 143 and Order 20 Rule 11 RoC. [30] This Court further finds no special circumstances to warrant any stay of execution of any orders of this Court (see Tropicana Senibong Sdn Bhd v Optimus Development Sdn Bhd & Anor [2016] CLJU 1091 and Tohtonku Sdn Bhd v Superace (M) Sdn Bhd [1992] 2 MLJ 6. First of all, the orders have been spent making such an application too late in the day. Secondly, there was no demonstration of any facts categorised as special circumstances that warranted this Court to exercise its discretion to grant a stay of execution. Thus, this Court declined such a prayer for a stay of execution. S/N L0oov51zuUCd1ilOv6iZg [31] Worthwhile to remark is the Plaintiff’s position. Not objecting to this application shows (herself being an advocate and solicitor and also fully legally represented) that she was supportive of this application which subsumed the backdoor way to annul or quash the orders which are already before the Court of Appeal for determination. This Court found this application and the positions taken by the proposed intervener and the Plaintiff most improper. [32] Based on the facts, submissions and applicable legal principle, this Court was not satisfied that the orders had breached natural justice or the SMA. The orders were not illustrated to be lack of jurisdiction. There was nothing for this Court to exercise its discretion. This application was dismissed, and the proposed intervener is ordered to pay the Defendants costs of RM10,000, subject to allocator. DATED 23 DECEMBER 2025 ROZ MAWAR ROZAIN JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR S/N L0oov51zuUCd1ilOv6iZg For the Plaintiff: Vinodhan A/L Kuppusamy Vinodhan Kuppusamy (Kuala Lumpur) For the Defendants: Ravichandran Selliah, Cik Smita S. Lakhiani together with Cik Wahidah Bakhtiar Shaharudin Sham Sunder & Partners (Kuala Lumpur) S/N L0oov51zuUCd1ilOv6iZg