Scmm Bina Sdn. Bhd. v Lien Dak Construction Co. Sdn. Bhd. (WA-24C-49-04/2026)

These grounds concern two Originating Summons heard together before me with the consent of the parties.

OS 46 concerns two applications by Lien Dak Construction Co. Sdn Bhd ("LDC"): first, the application in Enclosure 1 to set aside the adjudication decision dated 12.3.2026 ("AD") pursuant to sections 15(b) and (d) of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 ("CIPAA") ("Setting Aside Application"); and second, the application in Enclosure 6 to stay the AD pending the determination of the arbitration proceedings ("Arbitration") initiated by LDC pursuant to section 16(1)(b) of CIPAA ("Stay Application").

OS 49 concerns SCMM Bina Sdn Bhd's ("SCMM") application to enforce the AD pursuant to section 28 of CIPAA ("Enforcement Application").

At the case management on 7.5.2026, in respect of Prayer (1) of Enclosure 6 for a stay pending the disposal of the Setting Aside Application, the parties informed the Court that SCMM had agreed to an ad interim stay. Accordingly, I directed that written submissions be filed and that the applications be heard and determined in the following sequence:

first, the Setting Aside Application (Encl. 1, Prayer (1) of OS 46);

secondly, if the AD is not set aside, the Stay Application (Encl. 6, Prayer (2) of OS 46); and

finally, the Enforcement Application (Encl. 1 of OS 49).

This sequence is both logical and jurisdictionally appropriate. If the AD is set aside, there is nothing left to stay or enforce. If it is not set aside, the Court must then consider whether there is any basis to temporarily stay its enforceability pending the disposal of the arbitration. Only if neither the setting aside nor the stay is warranted does the question of enforcement arise.

Although procedurally distinct, these three applications are substantively intertwined. Each must be considered within the statutory framework of CIPAA, which seeks to balance two competing objectives:

the need to provide a speedy interim cash flow remedy for the construction industry; and

(ii) the preservation of the parties' substantive rights to have their disputes finally determined by arbitration. C. DECISION

Having considered the cause papers in their entirety, in particular the AD, together with the written submissions and reply submissions filed by the parties, and the relevant provisions of CIPAA, I am not satisfied that LDC has met the high threshold required to set aside the AD under sections 15(b) and 15(d) of CIPAA.

Accordingly, the Setting Aside Application (Encl. 1 of OS 46) is dismissed. Having considered the affidavits, the applicable law and the authorities relied upon by the parties, I likewise dismiss the Stay Application (Encl. 6 of OS 46). Conversely, the Enforcement Application (Encl. 1 of OS 49) is allowed.

LDC has since filed three related appeals against my decisions in the two Originating Summonses. These constitute my full grounds for those decisions.

Pursuant to a Letter of Award dated 1.3.2017, SCMM was appointed as the main contractor by LDC (being the employer) for a commercial/SOHO project known as "Construction and Completion of the Proposed 10 Storey Commercial Cum SOHO On Lots 33, 71 & 72 (Plot 1), Section 21, KLTD at Jalan Tun Haji Openg, Kuching, Sarawak ("Project") in respect of-Package 2 - "Structural Works (Above LG Slab), Civil Works, Architectural Works And M&E Works" ("Works") for a contract value of RM88,491,380.00.

SCMM duly carried out and completed the Works under the Project. On 13.10.2023, the Architect issued the Final Certificate to SCMM, certifying that the Works had been completed in accordance with the Contract. Notwithstanding the issuance of the Final Certificate, SCMM contended that LDC has failed, neglected and/or refused to pay the amount certified therein.

SCMM commenced adjudication proceedings against LDC, claiming a total sum of RM9,291,999.88, together with interest and costs. The claim comprised: (a) outstanding certified sums of RM9,040,693.23; and (b) RM251,306.65 being Sales and Service Tax ("SST") allegedly paid by SCMM to its subcontractor.

In response, LDC raised, inter alia, a cross-claim amounting to RM15,013,780.04, comprising: (a) liquidated damages for Section A of RM1,635,000.00; (b) liquidated damages for Section B of RM8,925,000.00; and (c) rectification costs of RM4,453,780.04.

The learned adjudicator, Mr. Chong Kiam Fook ("Adjudicator"), on 12.3.2026, allowed SCMM's claim in its entirety, including the claims for the outstanding certified sums and SST amounting to RM9,291,999.88. As for LDC's cross-claim, only the claim for liquidated damages in respect of Section A in the sum of RM1,635,000.00 was allowed, whilst its claims for liquidated damages for Section B (RM8,925,000.00) and rectification costs (RM4,453,780.04) were dismissed.

Consequently, the learned Adjudicator determined that LDC was liable to pay SCMM the adjudicated sum of RM7,656,999.88, together with interest and costs. ("Adjudicated Sum").

Thereafter, LDC referred the disputes arising from the Project and AD, including its cross-claim in the sum of RM15,013,780.04, to the Arbitration.

The Court's Supervisory Jurisdiction under CIPAA: Before considering the specific grounds relied upon by LDR, it is appropriate to restate the principles governing the Court's supervisory jurisdiction over adjudication decisions under the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 ("CIPAA"). Those principles are now well settled.

The Interim Nature of Adjudication — "Pay Now, Argue Later": CIPAA was enacted to promote cash flow within the construction industry by providing a speedy and temporary mechanism for resolving payment disputes. An adjudication decision is therefore intended to be interim in nature and does not finally determine the parties' substantive rights or liabilities.

The legislative philosophy underpinning CIPAA has consistently been described as one of "pay now, argue later". The successful claimant obtains prompt payment, while the parties remain at liberty to have the underlying dispute finally determined through arbitration or litigation. This principle was affirmed by the Federal Court in View Esteem Sdn Bhd v Bina Puri Holdings Bhd [2018] 2 MLJ 22 and continues to guide the Court in determining applications brought under sections 15 and 16 of CIPAA.

The Restricted Grounds for Setting Aside: Judicial intervention under section 15 of CIPAA is deliberately limited. An adjudication decision may only be set aside on one or more of the statutory grounds, namely where it has been improperly procured by fraud or bribery, where there has been a denial of natural justice, where the adjudicator has failed to act independently or impartially, or where the adjudicator has acted in excess of jurisdiction. The statutory grounds are exhaustive and do not confer a general appellate jurisdiction upon the Court.

Consistent with that legislative scheme, the appellate courts have repeatedly emphasised that the circumstances warranting judicial interference are both rare and exceptional. The Court must therefore exercise considerable restraint and resist invitations to revisit the merits of the adjudicator's factual or legal conclusions. As observed by the Court of Appeal in ACFM Engineering & Construction Sdn Bhd v Esstar Vision Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2016] 1 LNS 1522, section 15 of CIPAA is not a vehicle for reviewing the correctness of an adjudicator's findings.

Materiality of the Alleged Breach: Equally well established is the principle that not every procedural irregularity will justify setting aside an adjudication decision. The authorities demonstrate that three requirements must ordinarily be satisfied:

the alleged breach of natural justice must first be established;

the breach must concern a matter of substance rather than a procedural or technical irregularity; and

there must be a real possibility that the breach affected the outcome of the adjudication, although the Court is not required to speculate as to what the adjudicator would necessarily have decided. These cumulative requirements underscore the high threshold that must be met before the Court will intervene.

Presumption that the Adjudicator Considered the Parties' Case: Absent clear indications to the contrary, an adjudicator is presumed to have considered the submissions and evidence presented by the parties. As recognised in Dekinjaya Builder Sdn Bhd v Chong Lek Engineering Works Sdn Bhd and another case [2020] MLJU.2455, an adjudicator is under no obligation to discuss every submission, authority or document relied upon.

It is sufficient that the adjudication decision discloses the essential reasoning leading to the conclusions reached on the material issues. In exercising its jurisdiction under section 15, the Court is concerned only with whether the adjudication process was conducted fairly and within jurisdiction. It is not the Court's function to reassess the evidence, determine whether the adjudicator's conclusions were correct, or evaluate whether fuller reasons ought to have been given: Ireka Engineering and Construction Sdn Bhd v PWC Corporation Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2019] MLJU 35.

It is against the foregoing principles that the grounds advanced by LDC fall to be considered. F. ISSUES & COURT'S ANALYSIS

LDC's central complaint is that SCMM raised, for the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ time in its Adjudication Reply, the argument that the liquidated damages ("LD") clause for Section B was inoperative and unenforceable due to multiple Certificates of Practical Completion ("CPC") rendering calculation unascertainable.

The Adjudicator accepted this argument and rejected LDC's Section B LD cross-claim of RM8,925,000.00 without affording LDC any opportunity to respond.

LDC's arguments are: a) LDC had no automatic right to file a rejoinder any such right was subject to the Adjudicator's discretion under ss. 25(a), 25(i) and 25(j) of CIPAA. The Adjudicator ought to have proactively directed LDC to file a further response, given the decisive importance and substantial value of the Section B LD issue. b) LDC relies on Kining Exeton Sdn Bhd v Majlis Perbandaran Kuantan and Another Summons [2020] MLJU 659, where the High Court set aside an AD because the adjudicator accepted a new issue raised in the Adjudication Reply (time at large) without affording the respondent an opportunity to address it, and the respondent had actively sought leave to do so. c) The breach is material because the combined Sections A and B LD of RM10,560,000.00 would have extinguished SCMM's entire claim of RM9,291,999.88, meaning the outcome would have been entirely different. d) Had LDC been heard, it would have argued:

the LD clause was operative as the Section B completion date was clearly identifiable (2.11.2020);

(ii) the court should uphold bargains per Charles Grenier Sdn Bhd v Lau Wing Hong [1996] 3 MLJ 327; and

(iii) Cubic Electronics Sdn Bhd v. Mars Telecommunications Sdn Bhd [2018] MLJU 1935 (cited by SCMM) was wholly inapplicable to construction LD clauses. SCMM's Position

SCMM's multi-layered response is, in substance: a) LDC never applied for leave to file a Rejoinder. SCMM argues the burden lay squarely on LDC to seek leave, and it wholly failed to do so or to offer any explanation in its affidavits for not doing so. LDC cannot now complain that the Adjudicator did not invite what LDC itself never sought. b) The Adjudicator's powers under s.25 are discretionary, not mandatory. Relying on Ann Joo Integrated Steel Sdn Bhd v Lim Chuan Hock & Sons Sdn Bhd [2017] MLJU 1552 and PCP Construction v Leap Modulation Sdn Bhd & Other Appeals [2018] MLJU 1357, SCMM submits the Adjudicator is not obliged to exercise any of the s.25 powers, and the Court will not interfere with that discretion on a setting aside application. c) Kining Exeton(supra) is distinguishable on two material grounds: (a) in Kining Exeton(supra), the respondent had actively written to the adjudicator the very next day seeking leave but was denied — LDC made no such application whatsoever; and (b) in Kining Exeton(supra), the decisive issue (time at large) was raised by neither party the adjudicator imported it from his own knowledge. d) Here, the LD clause operability issue was expressly raised by SCMM in direct response to LDC's own cross-claim pleaded in the Adjudication Response. The issue was squarely before both parties. e) Samaiden Sdn Bhd v Ditrolic Sdn Bhd [2024] MLJU 14 is on point. In Samaiden(supra), the High Court rejected a nearidentical natural justice complaint where the respondent raised an LAD set-off for the first time in the Adjudication Response, SCMM replied to it, and the respondent never sought leave to respond further. f) The court held the respondent had slept on its rights. SCMM notes LDC's attempt to distinguish Samaiden(supra) (on the basis that in Samaiden(supra), the issue was already known from prior proceedings) but argues the key principle that a party must actively seek leave if it wants to be further heard remains applicable. g) The Adjudicator substantively deliberated on the LD issue. He reached two different conclusions on Sections A and B respectively, demonstrating he engaged carefully and not with a closed mind. The fact he allowed LDC's Section A LD claim refutes any suggestion of unfairness. h) The alleged breach is neither material nor decisive. LDC has not demonstrated it would have persuaded the Adjudicator to reach a different conclusion, nor that it would even have been granted leave to file a rejoinder. Mere assertion that "we would have won" is insufficient.

In my judgment, LDC has not established any breach of natural justice sufficient to warrant setting aside the AD under section 15(b) of CIPAA.

LDC's complaint rests on the premise that SCMM introduced, for the first time in its Adjudication Reply, an entirely new issue concerning the operability of the LD clause for Section B, and that the Adjudicator accepted that argument without first affording LDC an opportunity to respond.

The question, however, is not simply whether a point was first articulated in the Adjudication Reply. Rather, the inquiry is whether the issue was one which took LDC by surprise, such that procedural fairness required the Adjudicator to invite a further response before determining it.

I do not consider that to be the case. The issue arose directly from LDC's own cross-claim for LD in respect of Section B, which was pleaded in the Adjudication Response. Once that cross-claim was advanced, it was entirely foreseeable that SCMM would challenge both the factual and legal basis upon which the claim rested, including the enforceability or operability of the relevant LD provision. The argument advanced by SCMM was therefore responsive to LDC's own case and did not constitute an issue introduced independently by the Adjudicator.

This materially distinguishes the present case from Kining Exeton(supra). In that case, the adjudicator determined the dispute on the basis of "time at large", an issue which neither party had raised, and the respondent had promptly sought leave to address the point but was denied the opportunity to do so. Those features were central to the court's finding that there had been a denial of natural justice.

Neither feature is present here. First, the issue concerning the Section B LD clause arose directly from LDC's own pleaded cross claim. Secondly, it is undisputed that LDC never sought leave from the Adjudicator to file any further submissions or rejoinder after receiving the Adjudication Reply. Unlike the respondent in Kining Exeton(supra), LDC did not request an opportunity to address the point before the AD was delivered.

This distinction assumes considerable significance. Whilst sections 25(a), 25(i) and 25(j) of CIPAA empower an adjudicator to call for further submissions or documents, those powers are discretionary in nature. They do not impose an obligation upon the adjudicator to invite further submissions whenever a party advances a new argument in reply. The authorities relied upon by SCMM, including Ann Joo Integrated(supra) and PCP Construction(supra), recognise the breadth of the adjudicator's procedural discretion in this regard.

Equally significant is the decision in Samaiden(supra). Although LDC sought to distinguish that decision on its facts, the broader principle remains applicable. Where a party considers that fairness requires a further opportunity to respond, it ought, at the very least, to seek leave from the adjudicator. Having elected not to do so, it is difficult to subsequently contend that the adjudicator acted unfairly by not extending an invitation which was never requested.

This approach is also consistent with the observations of the Court of Appeal in TSR Bina Sdn Bhd v Syarikat Pembinaan Yeoh Tiong Lay Sdn Bhd [2024] 4 MLJ 405, endorsing the Singapore Court of Appeal's decision in Glaziers Engineering Pte Ltd v WCS Engineering Construction Pte Ltd [2018] SGCA 66, that a party cannot ordinarily complain of procedural unfairness where the issue was reasonably foreseeable and could have been addressed during the adjudication process.

Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that LDC ought to have been afforded a further opportunity to respond, section 15(b) requires more than the existence of a procedural irregularity. The alleged breach must be material. As explained in Ranhill E&C v Tioxide (M) Sdn Bhd and other appeals [2015] MLJU 1873, the procedural defect must have been decisive or of considerable potential importance to the outcome.

LDC submits that the alleged denial was material because, had its Section B LD claim succeeded, the combined LD claims for Sections A and B would have extinguished SCMM's adjudication claim. That submission, however, assumes that the Adjudicator would necessarily have accepted LDC's proposed response.

I am unable to make such an assumption. Whether the Adjudicator would ultimately have accepted LDC's arguments concerning the operability of the LD clause, the significance of the multiple CPCs, or the applicability of Charles Grenier(supra) and Cubic Electronics(supra) remains entirely speculative.

It is also noteworthy that the Adjudicator did not reject LDC's LD claims wholesale. He accepted the LD claim relating to Section A whilst rejecting the claim relating to Section B. This demonstrates that he considered each claim on its own merits rather than approaching LDC's cross-claim with a closed mind. That circumstance further weakens LDC's contention that the adjudication process was procedurally unfair.

LDC contends that the Adjudicator exceeded his jurisdiction by allowing SCMM's claims for RM9,040,693.23 and RM251,306.65 at paragraphs 134 and 139 of the AD without identifying the contractual provisions upon which those awards were based.

Relying principally on Anas Construction Sdn Bhd v JKP Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2024] 2 MLJ 543, LDC submits that, just as section 5 of CIPAA requires a payment claim to identify the contractual basis of the claim, an adjudication decision must likewise specify the contractual provisions supporting the adjudicator's determination. According to LDC, the failure to do so renders the AD one made in excess of jurisdiction.

SCMM disputes that contention on three principal grounds:

First, Anas Construction(supra) does not support the proposition advanced by LDC. The Federal Court in that case was concerned with the jurisdictional requirements of a valid payment claim under section 5 of CIPAA, and not with the form or content of an adjudication decision. LDC has therefore misconstrued the ratio of that decision.

Secondly, the AD does, in any event, refer to the relevant contractual provisions. The Adjudicator considered, among others, Clauses 21.0, 22.0, 26.0 and 30.14 to 30.17 of PAM 2006, together with Clauses 9.3 and 26.1 of the Letter of Award. At its highest, LDC's complaint relates to the adequacy of the Adjudicator's reasoning rather than any excess of jurisdiction.

Thirdly, section 12(4) of CIPAA merely requires an adjudication decision to be in writing and to contain reasons. It does not require every contractual provision relied upon by the adjudicator to be expressly identified or reproduced in the decision.

I am unable to accept LDC's submission. In my judgment, it is founded on a misapprehension of both the Federal Court's decision in Anas Construction(supra) and the concept of jurisdiction under CIPAA.

The issue before the Federal Court in Anas Construction(supra) concerned the statutory requirements of a valid payment claim under section 5 of CIPAA. The court was not concerned with prescribing the form or contents of an adjudication decision under section 12. Nothing in that decision suggests that an adjudicator acts in excess of jurisdiction merely because every contractual provision relied upon is not expressly identified in the written decision.

More fundamentally, the complaint advanced by LDC does not, in substance, concern jurisdiction. Jurisdiction under section 15(d) is directed at cases where an adjudicator determines matters beyond the scope of the payment claim or payment response, or otherwise exceeds the authority conferred by CIPAA. It is not engaged simply because a party considers the adjudicator's reasoning to be inadequate or insufficiently articulated.

In the present case, the AD demonstrates that the Adjudicator considered the contractual framework governing the parties' relationship, including the relevant provisions of PAM 2006 and the Letter of Award. The fact that paragraphs 134 and 139 of the AD do not expressly repeat the contractual provisions relied upon does not mean that the awards were made without jurisdiction.

At its highest, LDC's complaint concerns the adequacy or correctness of the Adjudicator's reasoning. Such complaints fall outside the limited supervisory jurisdiction conferred upon the Court by section 15 of CIPAA.

I therefore agree with SCMM that Anas Construction(supra) does not assist LDC. On the contrary, the authorities, including View Esteem(supra),reinforce the principle that a setting aside application is not an avenue for reviewing the correctness or sufficiency of an adjudicator's reasoning.

Having considered each of the grounds advanced by LDC, both individually and cumulatively, I find that none justifies the exercise of this Court's supervisory jurisdiction under section 15 of CIPAA.

Properly analysed, LDC's complaints are directed at the Adjudicator's evaluation of the evidence, findings of fact and conclusions on the merits, rather than any material breach of natural justice, want of independence or impartiality, or excess of jurisdiction within the meaning of section 15.

The adjudication was conducted in accordance with the procedural requirements of CIPAA and the principles of natural justice. LDC's dissatisfaction with the outcome does not, without more, furnish a basis for setting aside the AD. The Setting Aside Application is therefore dismissed.

This conclusion accords with the limited supervisory role assigned to the Court under section 15 of CIPAA. As the Court of Appeal observed in ACFM Engineering(supra): "This was simply a case where the losing party was not happy that it had obtained an unfavourable decision and tried its chance in the judicial system. The law as it exists now correctly limits the Court's functions which expressly do not include to review the correctness of the adjudicator's decision."

The present application falls squarely within that observation. In substance, LDC seeks a reconsideration of the merits of the Adjudicator's decision. That is not the function of this Court on an application brought under section 15 of CIPAA.

To hold otherwise would undermine the statutory scheme of CIPAA, under which adjudication is intended to provide a speedy and interim determination of payment disputes on a "pay now, argue later" basis, leaving the parties' substantive rights to be finally determined in arbitration or litigation.

The Setting Aside Applications is therefore dismissed.

Since the above Setting Aside Application is unsuccessful, I will now consider LDC's stay application of the AD under Section 16(1)(b) CIPAA pending resolution of an Arbitration between the parties.

Legal Principles Applied: Pursuant to the Federal Court's guidance in View Esteem(supra), a stay of execution under Section 16 of CIPAA may be granted in two broad scenarios: (i) where there are "clear and unequivocal errors" in the AD, or (ii) to meet the "justice of the case". The threshold is high, and a stay should not be granted readily.

I note that the arbitration is at a very early stage — notice only issued on 2.4.2026, no arbitrator appointed, no tribunal constituted, and critically SCMM points out LDC has not paid the Provisional Advance Deposit ("PAD") to AIAC.

This undermines LDC's assertion of bona fide arbitration proceedings and, per Pasukhas Sdn Bhd v Empire Multiple Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2019] MLJU 1393 and Dorsett Bukit Bintang Sdn Bhd v Dian Makmur Sdn Bhd and another summons [2026] MLJU 1183, the mere commencement of arbitration without more is insufficient to warrant a stay.

In the present case, the mere existence of Arbitration initiated by LDC only meets the threshold for a stay application under Section 16(1)(b) of CIPAA. However, it does not, under any circumstance, make the granting of a stay mandatory. LDC's right to fully argue the merits of the dispute with SCMM, including the Adjudicator's alleged errors, remains intact in the Arbitration proceedings. As held in Teguh Wiramas Sdn Bhd v Thien Seng Chan Sdn Bhd And Another Application [2017] MLJU 633, a stay solely pending a pending suit would effectively render the adjudication process nugatory.

In any event, for the reasons outlined in my dismissal of the Setting Aside Application, I do not find that the AD contains "clear and unequivocal errors" of the kind that would "prick the conscience of the court". The alleged errors are, again, disputes over the Adjudicator's contractual interpretation and factual findings. They are not blatant errors of law or a disregard of binding statutory provisions or authority.

I am also not persuaded that the justice of this case requires a stay. The existence of a parallel arbitration is a standard feature of the construction industry and is, in fact, the scenario contemplated by CIPAA's "pay now, argue later" regime. Granting a stay simply because an arbitration that is pending would undermine this fundamental objective of CIPAA.

Section 13 of CIPAA provides that an adjudication decision is of temporary finality only, and will not produce any inconsistency with the final arbitral award. The Federal Court in Martego Sdn Bhd v Arkitek Meor & Chew Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2020] 6 MLJ 224 made clear that the scheme of statutory adjudication is not mutually exclusive with arbitration or litigation, and that the two processes are designed to operate in parallel.

Accordingly, the Stay Application under section 16(1)(b) of CIPAA is refused.

SCMM applies under Section 28 CIPAA to enforce the AD as if it were a judgment of the High Court. Having found that the AD stands valid and has not been set aside or stayed, there is no impediment to enforcement. SCMM has met the requirements for enforcement under s.28 of CIPAA. It has produced a valid AD in its favour, and it is uncontested that LDC has not paid the adjudicated sum.

This is in line with the binding precedent of the Court of Appeal in Inai Kiara Sdn Bhd v Puteri Nusantara Sdn Bhd [2019] 2 MLJ 362 which held: [25] From a reading of the CIPAA 2012, in particular, ss 13, 15, 16, 27 and 31, it is plain that though s 28 vests the High Court with discretionary power, it does not extend to requiring the applicant to show that there are no grounds for setting aside the adjudication decision under s 15. All that the applicant needs to do is to satisfy the High Court that there is an adjudication decision that has been rendered in the applicant's favour, that there has been non-payment of the adjudicated sum by the date specified in the adjudication decision, and that there is no prohibition to the grant of the order that is sought."

Hence my discretionary power under Section 28 CIPAA is limited in these circumstances. Once the prerequisites are met, the order to enforce ought to be granted.

SCMM is therefore entitled to enforcement of the Adjudication Decision as a judgment of the Court pursuant to section 28 of CIPAA.

Hence the Adjudication Decision dated 12.3.2026 is to be enforced as a judgment of this Court.

For all the foregoing reasons, it is my judgment that the learned Adjudicator acted within the Adjudicator's jurisdiction and in compliance with the rules of natural justice and is not in excess of jurisdiction. LDC's challenges are, in essence, a disguised attack on the merits of the decision, which is not permitted at this stage.

Accordingly, I hereby order as follows: a) LDC's Application to Set Aside the Adjudication Decision (Encl. 1) in OS 46) is dismissed with RM10,000.00 subject to allocatur. b) LDC's Application to Stay the Adjudication Decision pending Arbitration (Encl.6 in OS 46) is also dismissed with RM5,000.00 subject to allocatur. c) SCMM's Application to Enforce the Adjudication Decision (Encl.1 in OS 49) is allowed with RM5,000.00 subject to allocatur. Dated this 26th day of June 2026 RAJES RAGHAVJI JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER HIGH COURT CONSTRUCTION COURT 1 KUALA LUMPUR COUNSEL: For the Plaintiff : Lee Yee Teng (Messrs Khalif Isaac Lee) For the Defendant : Lim Yuan Theng (Messrs Y Kong, Wong & Partners) CASES REFERRED TO: View Esteem Sdn Bhd v Bina Puri Holdings Bhd [2018] 2 MLJ 22 ACFM Engineering & Construction Sdn Bhd v Esstar Vision Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2016] 1 LNS 1522 Dekinjaya Builder Sdn Bhd v Chong Lek Engineering Works Sdn Bhd and another case[2020] MLJU 2455 Ireka Engineering and Construction Sdn Bhd v PWC Corporation Sdn Bhd and another appeal[2019] MLJU 35 Kining Exeton Sdn Bhd v Majlis Perbandaran Kuantan and Another Summon [2020] MLJU 659