In refusing the appellant's application, the learned judge was of the view that the appellant would not obtain a judgment for substantial damages at trial later 180 because the appellant had not proven that his condition had deteriorated in the two years since the accident. With respect, we did not agree with the learned judge. We agreed with the learned counsel for the appellant that the learned judge misunderstood the purpose of O 22A and its application. As adverted to earlier, the purpose of O 22A is to provide an interim payment to alleviate a 185 plaintiff's hardship during the period before trial. There was no necessity for the appellant to make out a case that his condition had deteriorated so that an interim payment was needed to meet a worsening medical condition. It is worthy of note that O 22A is available to any plaintiff and not limited only to a plaintiff whose condition is deteriorating." 190 - Shearson Lehman Bros Inc and others v Maclaine Watson & Co Ltd and others [1987] 2 All ER 181, CA Eng: "at page 187 …Something more than a prima facie case is clearly required but not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden is high. But it is a civil burden on the balance of 195 probabilities, not criminal. This involves no lasting hardship on the defendants since there is a provision for readjustment at the trial in the case of an overpayment. … at page 190 200 This leads me to my next point. Although the power given by each rule is separate, the underlying purpose of the two rules is the same: to mitigate hardship or prejudice to a defendant which may exist during the period from the commencement of an action to the trial. Further, the underlying task of the court under each rule is the same: ordering an interim payment of such amount as is 205 just, having regard to all the circumstances. Accordingly, when construing each rule, the court should be slow to adopt a construction which would significantly defeat the evident purpose of both rules, forming, as they do, part of a single code." - Josu Engineering Construction Sdn Bhd v. TSR Bina Sdn Bhd [2016] 1 CLJ, CA observed: 210 "Legal Principles on Interim Payment [8] An interim payment of damages can be made in accordance with O. 22A of the RC 2012, where the court is "satisfied" that "the plaintiff has obtained a judgment against the defendant for damages to be assessed" (see r. 3(b)), or "if the action proceeded to trial, the plaintiff would obtain a judgment for 215 substantial damages against the defendant" (see r. 3(c)). [9] As shown above, r. 3(c) allows interim payment of damages even though liability is still in question. [10] Courts in England have interpreted the burden placed upon a plaintiff seeking interim payment to be Something more than a prima facie (at first glance) 220 standard, but Something less than the criminal standard. [18] Order 22A of the RC 2012 does not restrict interim payment of damages to any type of action. In England, where the approach is to identify particular types of claims in which an interim payment may be made, the rules essentially cover every type of action. 225 [21] Thus, in our view, interim payments can be ordered in actions other than personal injury cases, such as proceedings for contractual claims, actions for wrongful death, product liability actions, wrongful dismissal claims, trespass to land, misappropriation of funds, and actions for property damaged. [22] There are strong policy grounds for the courts to order interim payments in an 230 appropriate case. It is in the interests of the administration of justice and plaintiffs in particular that defendants be encouraged to make early voluntary interim payments to alleviate financial hardship on the part of the plaintiffs ." - Uthama Kumara Naidu a/l Sundara Rajoo & Anor v HSBC Bank Malaysia Bhd & Ors [2021] MLJU 1143, HC observed: 235 "[15] Discussing the current English rules (which are in pari materia with those contained in the Malaysian O. 22A of RC 2012), this is how the required standard of proof is treated in Blackstone's Civil Practice, 2008 (at p. 454, para. 36.9): On an application under CPR, r. 25.7(1)(c), (d), the court has to be satisfied on 240 the balance of probabilities that the claimant 'would' obtain a judgment. This wording is identical to that used in the old rules (RSC, O. 29, rr. 11(1 )(c) and 12(1)(c)), and it ought to be the case, despite the new approach to interpretation, that the same principles will apply regarding the standard of proof on these two grounds. If so, it has to be shown that the claimant will win 245 on the balance of probabilities, but at the upper end of the scale, the burden being a high one. Being likely to succeed at trial is not enough. [20] To succeed in his application, the 3 rd Defendant here has the burden of proving on a balance of probabilities that he will succeed in his Counterclaim if the action proceeds to trial, that the Plaintiffs would be held liable to pay to 250 the 3 rd Defendant a sum of money in respect of the Plaintiffs use and occupation of the property even if a final judgment or order were given or made in favor of the Plaintiffs. [37] On the circumstances of this case, the 3rd Defendant, in my view, is entitled to interim payment to alleviate his hardship until the trial is concluded while the 255 Plaintiffs and/or their relatives, despite the 1st Defendant's termination of possession upon recall of the loan, continue in occupation and enjoyment of the property without paying anything. Simply put, not ordering interim payment would be grossly unfair to the 3rd Defendant. After all, justice should also be for the 3rd Defendant and not just the Plaintiffs."