Securiforce Fleets Sdn Bhd v Nurnadiah Binti Khalid (JA-29NCC-209-03/2024)

Pemiutang Penghakiman (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai JC) telah memulakan suatu tindakan sivil terhadap Penghutang Penghakiman (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai JD) dan terhadap Nurshahirah Binti Khalid (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “Nurshahirah”) di Mahkamah Sesyen Kuala Lumpur Guaman Sivil WA-B52NCvC-287-08/2022.

Suatu Penghakiman Persetujuan bertarikh 15.09.2022 telah direkodkan antara JC selaku Plaintif dan JD serta Nurshahirah selaku Defendan-defendan. Penghakiman Persetujuan tersebut memperuntukkan antara lain bahawa kedua-dua Defendan membayar jumlah sebanyak RM373,365.40 kepada JC secara ansuran bulanan.

Berpandukan penghakiman tersebut, JC telah memfailkan Notis Kebankrapan bertarikh 20.3.2024 terhadap JD. Pada 21.4.2024, JD telah melantik peguam dan peguam JD telah memfailkan permohonan Saman Dalam Kamar pada 28.5.2024, antara lain untuk mengetepikan Notis Kebankrapan JC yang menjadi subjek pertikaian di hadapan Mahkamah. Analisis dan keputusan Mahkamah Isu Pertama: Jumlah tuntutan dalam Notis Kebankrapan adalah berlebihan

JD berhujah bahawa menerusi Notis Kebankrapan (Lampiran 2), JC menuntut sejumlah RM331,772.82 setakat 20.03.2024 terhadap JD yang merupakan jumlah baki Penghakiman Persetujuan tersebut yang masih belum dijelaskan. JD mendakwa JC turut telah mengambil prosiding kebankrapan bagi jumlah yang sama ke atas Nurshahirah dalam kes kebankrapan JA-29NCC-210-03/2024.

JD berhujah bahawa jumlah yang dituntut oleh JC di dalam Notis Kebankrapan terhadap kedua-dua JD dan Nurshahirah secara berasingan atas satu jumlah yang sama adalah berlebihan dan tidak tepat serta tidak mengikuti terma Penghakiman Persetujuan.

Sebagai sokongan kepada hujahan ini, JD merujuk kepada kes Sumathy a/p Subramaniam v Subramaniam a/l Gunasegaran and another appeal [2017] 6 MLJ 753; [2017] MLRAU 280; [2018] 2 CLJ 305; [2017] 5 AMR 346 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa:- “[12] It is the argument of both appellants that while the respondent may be entitled to enter judgment for the same single sum, which the respondent did, the liability of each of them is necessarily joint. This is because, the summary judgment that was entered has not specified that both appellants are jointly and severally liable for that single sum. Where the judgment is silent or has not specified that liability is joint and several, the liability is necessarily joint. Where liability is joint, each of the appellant as defendant, shares that liability equally - see In Re Dato' Dr Elamaran M Sabapathy; ex p RHB Bank Bhd [2011] 10 CLJ 262. And so, when it comes to enforcing the judgment, the respondent has a right to enforce only half the judgment sum against each appellant. The respondent is not entitled to enforce the full sum against both of them, certainly not at the same time. [13] We agree with the submissions of learned counsel for the appellants…”

Mahkamah dapati asas untuk permohonan mengetepikan Notis Kebankrapan oleh JD adalah keberhutangan di bawah penghakiman tersebut wajar ditanggung oleh kedua-dua Defendan secara sama rata memandangkan Penghakiman yang dimasukkan tidak menyatakan JD bertanggungan “bersesama dan berasingan” dengan defendan yang lain.

JC berhujah bahawa JD merupakan seorang rakan kongsi bersama Nurshahirah, berniaga atas nama dan gaya “Kyra Management & Agency (KYRA)” dan mempunyai liabiliti bersesama dan berasingan dengan rakan kongsi seperti yang diperuntukkan menurut seksyen 11 Akta Perkongsian 1961 dan seksyen 44(1) Akta Kontrak 1950. JC juga merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Persekutuan Lembaga Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja v Edwin Cassian Nagappan [2021] 5 MLJ 253; [2021] 5 MLRA 178; [2021] 7 CLJ 823; [2021] 6 AMR 429 sebagai asas kepada hujahan JC.

JD berhujah balas bahawa kes Mahkamah Persekutuan tersebut adalah khusus berkaitan tafsiran seksyen 46 Akta Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja 1991 dan Mahkamah Persekutuan tidak menterbalikkan keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Sumathy (supra). Maka, JD berhujah bahawa keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan Sumathy (supra) masih lagi terpakai dan merupakan undang-undang yang baik.

Mahkamah dalam hal ini tidak bersetuju dengan hujahan JD. Walaupun Mahkamah Persekutuan tidak menyatakan secara nyata (express) bahawa Mahkamah Persekutuan telah menterbalikkan keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan dalam Sumathy (supra), namun penghakiman tersebut secara keseluruhan menunjukkan bahawa Mahkamah Persekutuan tidak bersetuju dengan tafsiran Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Sumathy (supra). Malah, nas-nas yang diputuskan selepas kes tersebut dengan jelas memutuskan bahawa Mahkamah Persekutuan telah menterbalikkan keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Sumathy (supra). Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Re Mohd Saiful Azuar Md Isa; Ex P Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia Bhd [2021] 12 MLJ 474; [2021] MLRHU 895; [2021] 8 CLJ 785; [2021] AMEJ 1029 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan seperti berikut:- “Postscript [75] I had settled the grounds of this judgment on 14 July 2021 in preparation for the delivery of my decision on 16 July 2021. However, before releasing the grounds of this judgment, it came to my attention that the Federal Court had delivered its grounds of decision on 19 July 2021 in Lembaga Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja v.Edwin Cassian Nagappan [2021] 7 CLJ 823 wherein the Federal Court overturned the decision of the Court of Appeal in Edwin Cassian (supra), overruled the Court of Appeal decision in Sumathy (supra) and approved the reasoning which led to the conclusion of the Court of Appeal in Kejuruteraan Bintai Kindenko (supra) that a judgment entered for payment of a sum of money against several judgment debtors imposed upon each of them, a joint and several liability to honour the entire judgment debt, and not merely an equal portion of it, unless otherwise stated…”

Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada kes Isa Al-Husam Suhaimi v Sheikh Muhammad Shakir & Anor [2023] CLJU 1174 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[7] The decision in Sumathy above was overruled by the later decision of the Federal Court in Lembaga Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja v. Edwin Cassian a/l Nayappan @ Marie [2021] 7 CLJ 823; [2021] MLJU 1207. (Edwin Cassian case).”

Malah, berbeza dengan hujahan JD, nas-nas diputuskan terkemudian juga mengesahkan bahawa keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan tersebut tidak terhad pemakaiannya hanya kepada Akta Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja 1991. Umpamanya, Mahkamah dalam kes Isa Al-Husam (supra) Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[8] The above submission is plainly misconceived, since the Edwin Cassian judgment did not hold that the principle of law laid down applies only to debts arising under the provision of the Akta KWSP 1991 or that it is only applicable to a debt arising from a consent judgment. In fact, the decision in Edwin Cassian was followed by other cases not arising from the Akta KWSP.”

Perkara yang sama diputuskan Mahkamah dalam kes Per: Chan Wai Fong v Ex-Parte: Everest Web Sdn Bhd [2022] MLJU 1253; [2022] 1 LNS 1277; [2022] AMEJ 0733 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[6] Thus, based on the above Federal Court decision, it is clear that the said decision was not limited to the Employees Provident Fund Act 1991 only but that the liability of the JD herein is joint and several and as the said Judgment has not been satisfied, the JD continues to remain in law jointly and severally liable for the same under section 44 of the Contracts Act 1950.”

Memandangkan keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan Edwin Cassian (supra) mengikat kesemua Mahkamah bawahan, Mahkamah merujuk kepada prinsip-prinsip yang diputuskan dalam kes tersebut seperti berikut:- “The Position In Malaysia [24] In this jurisdiction in any event, the common law is inapplicable, as we are governed by the Contracts Act 1950. Section 44 of the Contracts Act 1950 (Act 136) ("the Contracts Act") is the relevant provision relating to joint liability… [26] In summary therefore, unless a contrary intention is expressed in the contract, all joint contracts effectively impose a full liability for the debt on each of the promisors, by virtue of s. 43 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872: see Pollock & Mulla: Indian Contract and Specific Relief Acts - vol. 1, 13th edn., (India: LexisNexis, 2009), at p. 1043-1044. Thus, where the debts are jointly incurred, each promisee is liable for the whole amount: see Dhanki Mahajan v. Rana Chandubha Vakhatsing AIR 1969 SC 69. [27] Accordingly, so long as a judgment debt remains unrealised, the judgment creditor is entitled to proceed against one or any number of judgment debtors to secure the performance of an obligation in its entirety… [39] In our considered opinion, the courts below erred in law in invoking the presumption that joint liability means liability for only half the debt and not the full amount. As mentioned earlier, joint and several liability gives rise to one joint obligation and to as many several obligations as there are joint and several promises. The promisee, ie, the Board, is therefore entitled to proceed against one promisor, or the other, or both, in order to procure full performance as is evident from s. 44 of the EPF Act.”

Secara spesifik, Mahkamah Persekutuan juga memutuskan bahawa ketiadaan perkataan “joint and several” dalam penghakiman tidak menghalang Pemiutang Penghakiman dari menuntut keseluruhan penghakiman dari setiap Defendan. Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan bahawa:- “[40] Furthermore, there is a notable absence of terms creating "joint" liability in the judgment itself. Even if such a term had been inserted that would not entitle the courts to conclude that liability is somehow halved between the two obligors or promisors. Given the prevailing interpretation of s. 44 of the EPF Act, merely inserting the word "jointly" in the consent judgment would not suffice to halve liability as there must be express words to that effect to state that the liability of the joint promisors is to be borne in equal proportions. Moreover, such halved liability should take root from the original promise whereby the liability of a promisor for a debt owed to a creditor is expressly stated to be only half of the debt. If we are to accept the premise that "joint and several liability" cannot be read into the judgment due to an absence of such words, it similarly follows that a silent judgment cannot automatically be inferred to impose "joint" liability where there is no such mention. This is especially so when the liability that arises is explicitly stipulated by statute. In the circumstances, liability under the consent judgment must necessarily be both joint and several in light of our discussion above.”

Malah, perkara ini juga kelihatan jelas apabila Mahkamah Persekutuan mengendors prinsip-prinsip kes Kejuruteraan Bintai Kindenko Sdn Bhd v Fong Soon Leong [2021] 2 MLJ 234; [2021] 3 MLRA 594; [2021] 5 CLJ 1; [2021] 2 AMR 676 seperti berikut:- “…The Court of Appeal, speaking through Justice Darryl Goon Siew Chye, in a meticulous and comprehensive judgment examining a long line of cases, concluded that it differed in reasoning with Sumathy. However, the Court of Appeal was constrained to dismiss the appeal as it regarded itself bound by the decision in Sumathy based on the rule of stare decisis as enunciated in Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd [1944] KB 718. We would, with respect concur with the reasoning in Kejuruteraan Bintai Kindenko Sdn Bhd v. Fong Soon Leong [2021] 5 CLJ 1; [2021] 2 MLJ 234.”

Dalam kes Kejuruteraan Bintai (supra), Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa:- “[49] Where an order is made or judgment recovered against two or more parties for payment of a sum of money, without more, it simply means that all the judgment debtors and each of them is liable for the amount adjudged to be due. There is no need to read into such a judgment or order the idea of joint and several liability because in the manner of its pronouncement that is already its effect, unless stated otherwise. In this, we agree with the observation of Lee Swee Seng JC in Lim Koon Chow v. AmBank (M) Bhd at para. [109] of His Lordship's judgment, referred to above. [50] Indeed, what should also not be done is to read into and to qualify such a judgment as only creating a "joint liability" for the sum adjudged or ordered, with the additional consequence that each defendant is only liable for an equal portion of the judgment debt. [51] If a borrower of a fixed sum of money is adjudged liable to repay that sum, he remains liable for that sum. It cannot be that if there exists a guarantor found to be jointly liable, the principal debtor's debt and liability therefore becomes half the amount if judgment is entered against both the principal debtor and his guarantor. Without having to be expressed, the liability of the principal for the whole amount borrowed remains. The guarantor's liability is also necessarily for the same amount guaranteed. They are both thus jointly liable for the same amount adjudged or ordered. They are also each individually liable for that amount. They are both jointly and severally liable… [56] Upon the authorities discussed and the consistency of judicial views expressed, we are inclined to conclude that a judgment entered for payment of a sum of money against several judgment debtors imposes upon them and each of them, a joint and several liability to honour the entire judgment debt, and not merely an equal portion of it, unless otherwise stated. It is unfortunate that the conclusion that has been arrived at in this case is at variance with the decision in Sumathy.”

Malah, sebagaimana dihujahkan oleh peguam JC, seksyen 11 Akta Perkongsian 1961 dengan jelas membolehkan JC untuk menuntut bersesama dan berasingan daripada JD dan Nurshahira. Seksyen 11 Akta Perkongsian 1951 memperuntukkan bahawa:- “Every partner in a firm is liable jointly with the other partners for all debts and obligations of the firm incurred while he is a partner; and after his death his estate is also severally liable in a due course of administration for such debts and obligations, so far as they remain unsatisfied but subject to the prior payment of his separate debts.”

Dalam mentaksirkan peruntukan ini, Mahkamah dalam kes Chan Tse Yuen & Co v M Wealth Corridor Sdn Bhd [2020] MLJU 1828; [2020] CLJU 1616 memutuskan bahawa:- “[9] As to whether the bankruptcy proceedings is an abuse of the process of the court as there were 2 other bankruptcy proceedings against the partners of the Firm i.e. being in WA-29NCC-901-03/2019 (Bankruptcy 901) and WA- 29NCC-902-03/2019 (Bankruptcy 902) respectively which the JD submits amounted to a duplicity, this Court holds the view that the JC is at liberty to commence the bankruptcy proceedings against any or all of the individual partners of the Firm whether jointly or severally and that the same is not an abuse of court process as it is the right of a JC to initiate whatever execution proceedings including separate bankruptcy proceedings against the partners of a firm wherein judgment has been obtained against the firm… [10] It is thus self evident that in partnership law, the partners are jointly and severally liable and thus the JC in a bankruptcy proceedings is entitled to pursue against all or any of the partners as it thinks fit…”

Maka, berdasarkan nas-nas di atas, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa bantahan yang dikemukakan JD adalah wajar ditolak. Mahkamah seterusnya merujuk kepada hujahan JD bahawa JD telah membuat pembayaran berjumlah RM2,000.00 kepada JC pada 31.03.2024. Sebagaimana dihujahkan oleh JC, pembayaran ini hanya dibuat setelah Notis Kebankrapan telah dikeluarkan JC pada 20.3.2024. Persoalan yang perlu diputuskan Mahkamah adalah sama ada pembayaran RM2,000.00 yang dibuat JD setelah pemfailan Notis Kebankrapan, akan menyebabkan tuntutan kebankrapan tersebut cacat kerana jumlah yang dituntut telah terkurang.

Berkenaan isu ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Per: Shila Khubchand; Ex-Parte: HSBC Amanah Malaysia Bhd [2016] MLRHU 760; [2016] 1 LNS 691; di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[21] Furthermore, as correctly submitted by the JC, the guarantee of RM350,000 clearly cannot constitute a complete accord and satisfaction of the debt owed by the JD. It still falls fairly significantly short of the amount outstanding from the JD as stated in the Bankruptcy Notice. Even if the full guarantee was to be deducted from the outstanding sum (which it should not), the balance of RM352,815.57 as at 14 May 2015 is manifestly well in excess of the statutory threshold of RM30,000, which plainly therefore, in pursuance of Sections 4 and 5 (1) (a) of the Act entitles the JC to present a creditor's petition and apply for a receiving order against the JD…”

Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Rayuan Goh Kein Hooi v OCBC Bank (M) Bhd and another appeal [2014] 1 MLJ 516; [2014] 1 MLRA 287; [2014] 4 CLJ 274; [2013] 5 AMR 635 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa:- “[11] Continuing in the same page, in serious vein, His Lordship Mohamed Dzaiddin J (later the Chief Justice of Malaysia) held that even if the judgment debt had been substantially reduced, the court could still make a receiving order if the debt exceeds the statutory minimum. This was what His Lordship said (see p. 185 of the report): Thirdly, in my opinion, where the judgment debt on which the bankruptcy petition is founded has, by the date of the hearing of the petition, been substantially reduced, this Court can still make a receiving order unless the debt was less than the statutory minimum of RM2,000 since on the true construction of s. 6(2) read with s. 5(1)(a) of the Act it is necessary to prove that a debt exceeding the statutory minimum of RM2,000 is still due and owing to the bank at the date of the hearing of the petition. (See: Re Patel (a debtor) [1986] 1 All ER 522). [12] Here, before us, the JD alleges that there is an excess of RM6,509.67 claimed in the BN. It must be stated that the BN has been issued in respect of a judgment debt to the tune of RM3,543,401.80. That being the case, even if the sum of RM6,509.67 were deducted from the judgment debt claimed, the amount would still exceed the statutory minimum of RM30,000 as stipulated in s. 5(1)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act 1967…”

Berdasarkan nas-nas di atas, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa memandangkan hutang JD yang tertunggak sememangnya akan melebihi RM100,000.00 walaupun JD telah membuat pembayaran berjumlah RM2,000.00 selepas pemfailan Notis Kebankrapan, JC sememangnya boleh meneruskan untuk memfailkan Petisyen Pemiutang bagi jumlah terkurang tersebut setelah menerangkan pembayaran RM2,000.00 tersebut dalam Petisyen Pemiutang. Berdasarkan nas-nas di atas, Mahkamah sememangnya mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk membuat Perintah Kebankrapan atas jumlah terkurang dari Notis Kebankrapan sekiranya tuntutan tersebut adalah melebihi dari ambang kebankrapan sebagaimana diperuntukkan di bawah seksyen 5(1)(a) Akta Insolvensi 1967 (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “Akta Tersebut”).

Berdasarkan alasan-alasan yang dinyatakan di atas, Mahkamah menolak hujahan JD berkenaan isu pertama di atas. Isu Kedua: Notis Kebankrapan tidak diserahkan secara kediri kepada

JD berhujah bahawa Notis Kebankrapan pada hakikatnya tidak diserahkan menurut peruntukan undang-undang terhadap JD.

23.

24.

Sebelum memutuskan isu pertikaian versi bertentangan kedua-dua pihak, Mahkamah menilai terlebih dahulu undang-undang berkaitan penyampaian Notis Kebankrapan menurut Akta dan Kaedah Tersebut.

Kaedah 95 Kaedah Tersebut juga turut memperuntukkan bahawa penyampaian Notis Kebankrapan adalah sebagaimana kaedah penyampaian Petisyen Pemiutang menurut Kaedah 108 Kaedah Tersebut iaitu secara kediri. Menurut Kaedah 108 tersebut, penyampaian kediri dilaksanakan “dengan menyerahkan sesalinan petisyen bermeterai kepada penghutang” (delivering a sealed copy of the petition to the debtor).

Secara analogi, peruntukan Aturan 62 Kaedah 3 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012 memperuntukkan bahawa penyampaian kediri dilaksanakan dengan “meninggalkan dokumen kepada orang yang hendak disampaikan”. Dalam mentaksirkan frasa “meninggalkan dokumen kepada orang yang hendak disampaikan”, Mahkamah dalam kes Khooi Beng Aun v Koh Chin Lean [1994] MLJU 377; [1994] 2 MLRH 398; [1994] 4 CLJ 138 memutuskan bahawa:- “I take it that by leaving a sealed copy of the document would mean handing it to that person, or at the very least, leaving it physically close to him so that an assumption of possession can arise and, at the same time, telling him of the purpose of the exercise. All the authorities require knowledge on the part of the recipients of the existence of the documents so served. Thus, in Thompson v. Pheney 1 Down 443 where the copy was thrown near the defendant and, in his presence, that copy was opened and the defendant refused to accept it, it was held to be sufficient service. And where the solicitor's clerk pushed the copy of the order in the inner fold of the defendant's coat which was unbuttoned and that copy fell as the defendant opened his coat, it was held that that was good service (Roase v. Kemphouse 103 LT 730; 27 TLR 132).”

Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada kes Re Azizul Nizam Bin Bidin; Ex-Parte Solsis (M) Sdn Bhd [2017] 11 MLJ 459; [2017] 1 LNS 581 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[14] More importantly, it should be stated that Rule 109 of the Bankruptcy Rules 1969 does not stipulate that it is mandatory that there must be evidence of actual physical acceptance of the creditor's petition or bankruptcy notice by a judgment debtor in the corporeal sense of the document having to be handed over to and received by the judgment debtor. Rule 109 does not define delivery by personal service. In the case of Allied Bank (Malaysia) Bhd v. Yau Jiok Hua [1998] 2 CLJ 33, in discussing the manner of effecting personal service of a notice of demand, the High Court made reference to the Supreme Court Practices [1985] Vol. 1 ("RSC") (page 996) which stated the following:- "To effect personal service the clerk or other person entrusted with the task should first satisfy himself that he has found the right man. He should then hand to or leave with the person to be served a copy of the writ. If the person served will not take the copy, he should tell him what it contains and leave it as nearly in his possession or control as he can." [15] As such, a proper construction of Rule 109 does not, in my view, require actual physical personal service… [16] There is thus no necessity for a judgment debtor to sign and acknowledge receipt of service of the creditor's petition, or a bankruptcy notice for that matter.”

Berdasarkan nas-nas di atas, Mahkamah berpendapat undang-undang adalah mantap bahawa tiada keperluan mandatori untuk Penghutang Penghakiman menandatangani akuan terima dokumen yang ingin disampaikan tersebut bagi sesuatu penyampaian kediri berjaya.

Namun, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa kesemua autoriti-autoriti di atas memerlukan kehadiran (presence of) orang yang ingin disampaikan bagi membolehkan penyampaian kediri berjaya melalui peninggalan dokumen. Dalam kes ini, JC merujuk kepada pernyataan penyampai saman bahawa menurut seorang wanita yang mengakui bahawa JD adalah anaknya, “Penghutang Penghakiman enggan keluar dari rumah”. Berdasarkan penelitian Afidavit Penyampaian tersebut, penyampai saman bergantung kepada pernyataan wanita itu semata-mata dan tidak pernah mengakui telah melihat sendiri bahawa JD berada di dalam rumah tersebut.

Dalam keadaan JD mendeposkan melalui Afidavit menafikan kandungan Afidavit Penyampaian tersebut, wujud persoalan sama ada pernyataan seorang wanita tersebut dapat diterima masuk memandangkan keterangan tersebut adalah keterangan dengar cakap. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah tidak terlepas pandang berkenaan hujahan JC dengan merujuk kepada kes Re Azizul Nizam (supra) seperti berikut:- “[19] In the instant case, the non-denial by the JD of the visit by the process server meant that he was aware of the Bankruptcy Notice as the same would have been told to him by the process server, as indeed the Affidavit of Service so averred. The fact that he argued that he did not sign the acknowledgement is thus immaterial, based on case-law authorities, as I have shown above. Even if it was true that the wife was the one who accepted service (which I already found to be not acceptable, in the absence of an affidavit affirmed by her), there is no rebuttal by the JD to even suggest that the wife did not, for whatever reasons, subsequently apprise the JD of the Bankruptcy Notice, more so since based on the JD's averment that his wife could have signed the acknowledgement meant that his wife is, as to be naturally expected, residing with him at the same address.”

Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa prinsip kes tersebut sewajarnya wajar dibezakan dengan kes ini. Pertamanya, menurut fakta kes Re Azizul (supra), penyampai saman dalam kes tersebut mendeposkan bahawa beliau telah membuat penyampaian kediri kepada JD manakala JD menafikan penyampaian kediri ke atas dirinya dan penyerahan hanya dibuat kepada isterinya. Maka, prinsip kes tersebut wajar dilihat dalam konteks fakta kes tersebut. Perkara ini dapat dilihat menerusi perenggan-perenggan berikut dalam penghakiman tersebut:- “[7] As I mentioned earlier, the Affidavit of Service of the JC was affirmed and filed on 22 January 2016. The deponent, Mohd Fahmi Roslan, the process server for the JC clearly averred the following key points:-

On 21 December 2015 at 10.50 am he went to the last known address of the JD, and after the JD identified himself as the JD and the deponent informing the JD that the Bankruptcy Notice had been issued against him, the deponent served the Bankruptcy Notice on the JD;

The JD then signed on the letter dated 7 December 2015, attaching the Bankruptcy Notice as well as stating the date and time of acceptance of service. [8] The JD, on the other hand averred in his affidavit affirmed on 11 July 2016 that first, he denied signing on the said letter, and secondly the signature which did appear on the letter appears to resemble that of the JD's wife…

Maka, fakta tersebut berbeza dengan fakta kes di hadapan Mahkamah ini di mana dalam kes ini, penyampai saman sememangnya tidak dapat menyampaikan kertas kausa secara kediri sebagaimana dalam kes tersebut di atas dan hanya diserahkan secara peninggalan tanpa kehadiran JD di situ.

Keduanya, kes Azizul Nizam (supra) tersebut diputuskan pada 25.1.2017. Melalui Akta Kebankrapan (Pindaan) 2017 yang berkuatkuasa selepas keputusan tersebut iaitu pada 6.10.2017, penyampaian Notis Kebankrapan menurut seksyen 3(2) Akta Tersebut telah dipinda dari "in the prescribed manner" kepada "personally to a debtor". Lebih-lebih lagi, Parlimen juga telah memasukkan seksyen 3(2A) kepada seksyen 3 Akta Tersebut iaitu peruntukan baru yang antara lain memperuntukkan bahawa sekiranya seseorang JD mengelak penyampaian dengan menyembunyikan diri di dalam rumahnya, maka Mahkamah boleh memerintahkan penyampaian Notis Kebankrapan tersebut secara penyampaian ganti. Seksyen 3(2A) Akta Tersebut yang memperuntukkan bahawa:- “(2A) Notwithstanding subsection (2), the court may make an order for substituted service of a bankruptcy notice as prescribed if the creditor can prove to the satisfaction of the court that the debtor, with intent to defeat, delay or evade personal service-…

departs from his dwelling house or otherwise absents himself, or secludes himself in his house or closes his place of business.”

Dalam hal ini, JC sendiri menghujahkan bahawa JD mengelak penerimaan Notis Kebankrapan dalam perenggan 7 hujahan bertulis JC seperti berikut:- “Pernyataan di Afidavit Penyampaian jelas menunjukkan kelakuan JD yang enggan dan atau mengelak penerimaan Notis Kebankrapan”

Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa apabila wujud fakta bahawa JD mengelak penerimaan Notis Kebankrapan, dan secara spesifik kes JC adalah JD dengan sengaja enggan keluar dari rumah untuk menerima penyampaian kertas kausa, maka JC sewajarnya membuat permohonan untuk penyampaian ganti Notis Kebankrapan sebagaimana diperuntukkan dalam seksyen 3(2A) Akta Tersebut sebagaimana dinyatakan di atas. Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa sekiranya niat parlimen adalah untuk membolehkan penyampaian secara peninggalan apabila seseorang JD dengan sengaja menyembunyikan diri dalam premis dan enggan keluar, maka sememangnya seksyen 3(2A) Akta Tersebut tidak akan digubal dalam bentuk yang dinyatakan di atas.

Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada kes Zschimmer & Schwarz GMBH & Co KG Chemische Fabriken v Persons Unknown & Anor (No.2) [2021] MLJU 187; [2021] MLRHU 247; [2021] 3 CLJ 587; [2021] AMEJ 0155 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[70] The Singapore High Court in BNP Paribas (aka Banque National De Paris) v. Polynesia Timber Services Pte Ltd [2002] 1 SLR(R) 539 held that substitution of service may be ordered if circumstances are such as to render personal service, within or out of the jurisdiction impracticable, for the defendant avoids such service. The inference is made when evidence shows that the defendant was unavailable because he knew that an action was being taken against him. [71] Given the circumstances above, the second defendant is likely to be evading service after being aware of this suit against him. Therefore, this application for substituted service should be allowed as it would be impractical for the plaintiff to effect personal service of the cause papers…”

Berdasarkan perbincangan-perbincangan di atas, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa penyampaian Notis Kebankrapan dalam kes ini tidak teratur.

Namun, persoalan lanjut yang perlu diputuskan adalah sama ada fakta tersebut sahaja mewajarkan Mahkamah mengetepikan Notis Kebankrapan yang difailkan JC. Sebagaimana dibincangkan di atas, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa tuntutan JC dalam Notis Kebankrapan adalah teratur, maka Mahkamah tidak bersedia untuk mengetepikan Notis Kebankrapan tersebut hanya semata-mata kerana penyampaian tidak teratur. Mahkamah dalam hal ini mengambil panduan dari keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan Abdul Rashid Bin Mohamad Isa v PTT International Trading Pte Ltd [2024] 5 MLJ 1; [2024] 5 MLRA 603; [2024] 8 CLJ 181 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[10] Put in this perspective, it is apparent that to require a judgment creditor to embark on the whole process of initiating bankruptcy proceedings afresh, by reason of a typographical or inadvertent error does not serve the purpose and intent of the Act, but conversely, results in considerable delay and expense and more significantly dissipation of the judgment debtor’s estate, leaving little to no recourse for other creditors. For this reason, each case ought to be perused with care and caution to ascertain whether the error in the Creditor’s Petition is substantive, going to the root of the act of bankruptcy or to the viability of the creditor’s petition, or on the other hand an error that is capable of remedy by reason that it is de minimis and/or inadvertent, and causes no substantive prejudice to the judgment debtor…”

Mahkamah juga berpendapat bahawa Mahkamah ini mempunyai bidang kuasa yang luas untuk melanjutkan tempoh keesahan penyampaian Notis Kebankrapan menurut seksyen 93(4) Akta Tersebut walaupun selepas tempoh Notis Kebankrapan tersebut telah luput sebagaimana diputuskan dalam kes Rohani @ Hamidah bt Nor v Sincere Leasing Sdn Bhd [1993] 1 AMR 225 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “The judgment creditor's solicitor also referred me to Re Walter Su Ex parte United Malayan Banking Corporation Berhad [1987] 1 MLJ p 44 where YA Mohd Dzaiddin held at p 45 that the court had a discretion to allow an extension of time to serve the bankruptcy notice even though such application was made after the expiration of one month from the issue thereof. The power of the court to do this is not in doubt. The special circumstances and the good cause to be shown are a sine qua non.”

Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa memandangkan Mahkamah telah memutuskan penyampaian Notis Kebankrapan adalah tidak teratur dalam kes ini, maka perkara tersebut adalah alasan yang baik untuk membenarkan lanjutan masa bagi menyampaikan Notis Kebankrapan kepada JD. Malah, prayer (4) dalam permohonan JD dalam lampiran 7 iaitu “Apa-apa relif dan/atau perintah yang difikirkan suai, manfaat dan adil oleh Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini” bukan sekadar pernyataan semata-mata tetapi memberi kuasa luas kepada Mahkamah memberi relif yang berpatutan dalam kes ini. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Sinar Wang Sdn Bhd v. Ng Kee Seng [2001] 1 MLRA 781; [2005] 2 MLJ 42; [2004] 3 CLJ 679 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa:- "In his statement of claim the plaintiff also sought a prayer for "other relief that this Honourable Court deems fit and just. " Now these are not empty words. As Salleh Abbas FJ observed in another context in Lim Eng Kay v. Jaafar bin Mohamed Said [1982] 1 MLRA 71; [1982] 2 MLJ 156; [1982] CLJ (Rep) 190: In any case, prayer (e) in paragraph (7), 'Any other relief which this Honourable Court deem fit to grant' must not be treated as a mere ornament to pleadings devoid of any meaning. In our judgment the formulation in the plaintiff's statement of claim quoted above is sufficient for the exercise of equitable jurisdiction to mould the decree of specific performance to fit the facts as found by the learned judge."

Berdasarkan nas undang-undang dan peruntukan-peruntukan di atas, Mahkamah dengan ini memerintahkan supaya tempoh masa penyampaian Notis Kebankrapan menurut Kaedah 95 Kaedah Tersebut, dilanjutkan dari tarikh perintah Mahkamah ini iaitu 13.10.2024 hingga 13.12.2024, untuk JC membuat percubaan penyampaian Notis Kebankrapan secara temujanji menurut Arahan Amalan 1/1968 dan sekiranya gagal, JC boleh memfailkan permohonan untuk penyampaian ganti Notis Kebankrapan. Isu Ketiga: Sama ada perintah penggantungan interim wajar dibenarkan

Mahkamah dapati pihak-pihak berhujah secara terperinci berkenaan sama ada JD wajar dibenarkan “perintah penggantungan interim prosiding kebankrapan sehingga pelupusan lampiran 7”. Mahkamah dalam hal ini merujuk kepada kaedah 93(2) Kaedah Tersebut yang memperuntukkan bahawa tiada perbuatan kebankrapan berlaku sehingga permohonan JD untuk mengetepikan Notis Kebankrapan diputuskan oleh Mahkamah.

Maka, apabila JD memfailkan permohonan dalam lampiran 7, maka secara tidak langsung tindakan kebankrapan tersebut sememangnya telah digantung sehingga pelupusan lampiran 7 tersebut. Dalam apa jua keadaan, permohonan tersebut kini telah menjadi akademik kerana Mahkamah telah kini memutuskan lampiran 7 tersebut.

Memandangkan hujahan JD berkenaan isu penyampaian Notis Kebankrapan mempunyai merit sebagaimana dibincangkan di atas, Mahkamah memutuskan supaya tiada perintah terhadap kos bagi lampiran 7.

Berdasarkan alasan-alasan yang dinyatakan di atas, Mahkamah menolak lampiran 7 tanpa perintah terhadap kos.

Mahkamah dengan ini memerintahkan supaya tempoh masa penyampaian Notis Kebankrapan menurut Kaedah 95 Kaedah Tersebut dilanjutkan dari tarikh perintah Mahkamah ini iaitu 13.10.2024 hingga 13.12.2024 untuk JC membuat percubaan penyampaian Notis Kebankrapan secara temujanji menurut Arahan Amalan 1/1968 dan sekiranya gagal, JC boleh memfailkan permohonan untuk penyampaian ganti Notis Kebankrapan. Bertarikh: 13 Oktober 2024 Disediakan oleh, ………………………………….

TETUAN SAROJINI LAW PRACTICE Peguambela & Peguamcara Peguam Pemiutang Penghakiman No.15, Lorong Dato Dagang 50B, Taman Sentosa, 41200 Klang Selangor (Ruj: SLP/LIT/136/24 (Nurnadiah) …Puan Sarojini Devi A/P R. Kaniappen 2. TETUAN AZWAD IHSAN & CO Peguambela & Peguamcara Peguam Penghutang Penghakiman No.05-01, Jalan Padi Emas 1/5, UDA Business Centre Bandar Baru UDA 81200 Johor Bahru Johor (Ruj: S.1532.24) … Encik Mohammad Syahmi Bin Nawawi Kes-kes yang dirujuk:

Sumathy a/p Subramaniam v Subramaniam a/l Gunasegaran and another appeal [2017] 6 MLJ 753; [2017] MLRAU 280; [2018] 2 CLJ 305; [2017] 5 AMR 346

Lembaga Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja v Edwin Cassian Nagappan [2021] 5 MLJ 253; [2021] 5 MLRA 178; [2021] 7 CLJ 823; [2021] 6 AMR 429

Re Mohd Saiful Azuar Md Isa; Ex P Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia Bhd [2021] 12 MLJ 474; [2021] MLRHU 895; [2021] 8 CLJ 785; [2021] AMEJ 1029

Isa Al-Husam Suhaimi v Sheikh Muhammad Shakir & Anor [2023] CLJU 1174

Per: Chan Wai Fong v Ex-Parte: Everest Web Sdn Bhd [2022] MLJU 1253; [2022] 1 LNS 1277; [2022] AMEJ 0733

Kejuruteraan Bintai Kindenko Sdn Bhd v Fong Soon Leong [2021] 2 MLJ 234; [2021] 3 MLRA 594; [2021] 5 CLJ 1; [2021] 2 AMR 676

Chan Tse Yuen & Co v M Wealth Corridor Sdn Bhd [2020] MLJU 1828; [2020]

CLJU 1616 Per: Shila Khubchand; Ex-Parte: HSBC Amanah Malaysia Bhd [2016] MLRHU 760; [2016] 1 LNS 691

Goh Kein Hooi v OCBC Bank (Malaysia) Berhad & Another Appeal [2014] 1 MLJ 516; [2014] 1 MLRA 287; [2014] 4 CLJ 274; [2013] 5 AMR 635

Khooi Beng Aun v Koh Chin Lean [1994] MLJU 377; [1994] 2 MLRH 398; [1994] 4 CLJ 138;

Re Azizul Nizam Bin Bidin; Ex-Parte Solsis (M) Sdn Bhd [2017] 11 MLJ 459; [2017] 1 LNS 581

Zschimmer & Schwarz GMBH & Co KG Chemische Fabriken v Persons Unknown & Anor (No.2) [2021] MLJU 187; [2021] MLRHU 247; [2021] 3 CLJ 587; [2021] AMEJ 0155

Abdul Rashid Bin Mohamad Isa v PTT International Trading Pte Ltd [2024] 5 MLJ 1; [2024] 5 MLRA 603; [2024] 8 CLJ 181;

Rohani @ Hamidah bt Nor v Sincere Leasing Sdn Bhd [1993] 1 AMR 225

Sinar Wang Sdn Bhd v. Ng Kee Seng [2001] 1 MLRA 781; [2005] 2 MLJ 42; [2004] 3 CLJ 679