Court DecisionMY-HC

WA-22NCC-344-06/2025

See Hong Cheen @ See Hong Chen v CHEE CHI NYEN (WA-22NCC-344-06/2025)

High Court of Malaysia2 Jan 2026

The written judgment as the court issued it, with the coram, case number, and source links. Every paragraph has its own anchor.

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Outcome

What the court ordered

Applying these legal principles, it is my finding that the present Kuala Lumpur suit by P against the relevant defendants is an abuse of the process of the court. This is a plain and obvious case for striking out. Here is my explanation.
Under Order 18 rule 19 (1) (d) of the ROC 2012, the court has the power to strike out an action on the ground of abuse of process at any stage of the proceedings. An abuse of process of the court is where the or not bona fide. Such circumstances are varied and numerous. The categories of such cases are not closed.
In Jasa Keramat Sdn Bhd & Anor v Monatech (M) Sdn Bhd [1999] 4 MLJ 637 at 645, the Court of Appeal said : process to obtain redress. But cases may arise where the true purpose for by law. It may be to oppress a defendant. Or it may be to apply pressure upon him which the law regards as illegitimate. Since the circumstances in which varied and numerous, the categories of such cases are therefore not closed s process, it may
This was applied in the case of Ho Num Chon & Anor v Tech - Lab Manufacturing Sdn Bhd [2017] 9 MLJ 32 at 44, where the High Court ruled that multiplicity of proceedings is an abuse of process. It was held that the court has the power to dismiss under its inherent jurisdiction or in pursuance of section 25 (2) of the CJA 1964.
In Mayban Allied Bhd (formerly known as Phileo Allied Bank (M) Bhd) v Kenneth Godfrey Gomez & Anor [2011] 5 MLJ 219 at 225, the Court of Appeal observed : use of the court process must be bona fide Jurisdiction of the High Court
The civil jurisdiction of the High Court is conferred by statute, namely section 23 of the CJA 1964, as enacted pursuant to the Federal Constitution. Jurisdictional powers are demarcated by statute. This is the elementary source of jurisdiction, and must be the starting point for the consideration of the present application.
Article 121 (1) of the Federal Constitution reads :
There shall be two High Courts of co - ordinate jurisdiction and status, namely -
one in the States of Malaya, which shall be known as the High Court in Malaya ; and
one in the States of Sabah and Sarawak, which shall be known as the High Court in Sabah and Sarawak ; and such inferior courts as may be provided by federal law; and the High Courts and inferior courts shall have such jurisdiction and powers as may be conferred by or under federal law
Section 23 of the CJA 1964 reads : Civil jurisdiction - general
Subject to limitations contained in Article 128 of the Constitution the High Court shall have jurisdiction to try all civil proceedings where -
the cause of action arose;
the defendant or one of several defendants resides or has his place of business;
the facts on which the proceedings are based exist or alleged to have occurred; or
any land the ownership of which is disputed is situated, within the local jurisdiction of the Court and notwithstanding anything contained in this section in any case where all parties consent in writing within
Thus, the question for determination is straightforward - has the statutory requirement under section 23 of the CJA 1964 been satisfied? The court within whose jurisdiction any one of the elements in section 23
of the CJA 1964 is engaged, is the court properly seized with local jurisdiction to try the dispute under the law. Local jurisdiction - the Kota Kinabalu High Court
Pursuant to s relevant defendants in the present Kuala Lumpur suit falls squarely within the local jurisdiction of the Kota Kinabalu High Court, for the following reasons :
the cause of action arose in Sabah;
the relevant defendants maintain their principal place of business in Sabah; and
the material facts on which these proceedings are based exist, or are alleged to have occurred, in Sabah.
The Federal Court in Fung Beng Tiat v Marid Construction Co [1997] 2 CLJ 1; [1996] 2 MLJ 413, affirming the High Court decision of Dayasar Corp Sdn Bhd v CP Ng & Co Sdn Bhd [1990] 1 CLJ 262; [1990] 1 MLJ 191, made clear that a High Court of coordinate jurisdiction should not assume jurisdiction in a matter which properly belongs before a Sabah or Sarawak Court.
The Federal Court said (at page 420 - 421, MLJ) : Co Sdn Bhd (1990] 1 MLJ 191 adopted the correct approach to the question of jurisdiction. Although that was a case which concerned corporate and not personal insolvency, the views there expressed are of relevance to the instant appeal. For present purposes, we find it sufficient to quote from the headnote of the report : The respondent company was incorporated on 1 September 1982 and had its registered office in Kuching, Sarawak. The petitioner alleged that the respondent was indebted to the petitioner in the sum of $ 107,357.66 for the price of goods sold and delivered. On 5 September 1988, the petitioner served on the respondent the statutory notice pursuant to s 218 of the Companies Act 1965 but no payment was received. Hence the petitioner filed the petition to wind up. Held, striking out the petition :-
The issue of which High Court has jurisdiction over a matter is determined by s 23 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964. It is clear that the respondent, residing in Kuching, would come under s 23 (1) (b) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964.
While matters can be heard in any court of the courts of Malaya, it was not the intention of the legislature for any court in Malaya to assume jurisdiction of a mater arising in or which should be filed in a Borneo court. Since the respondent is residing in Kuching, the matter should really be filed in the Borneo High Court, in particular Kuching.
From the point of view of convenience, Kuching would be more convenient, with the respondent residing there and the witnesses being there
The Court of Appeal in Malaysian Assurance Alliance Bhd v Comsa Properties Sdn Bhd [2013] 1 CLJ 69, applying Fung Beng Tiat (supra), is also instructive. The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of a winding up petition filed in Kuala Lumpur, holding that jurisdiction properly lay with the High Court in Sabah. Where the characteristics of the defendants fall within the local jurisdiction of the High Court in Sabah, the jurisdiction of the Kuala Lumpur High Court is excluded.
The Court of Appeal said (at page 74 - 75, CLJ) : The characteristic aforesaid of the respondent falls squarely within the local jurisdiction of the High Court in Sabah thereby excluding jurisdiction of the Kuala Lumpur High Court. The respondent company being a Sabah company with its registered office in Tawau, Sabah would clearly fall within the ambit of s. 23 (1) (b) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 so as to confer jurisdiction to the High Court in Sabah. [11] Section 23 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 being the determinant provision on the issue of jurisdiction was addressed by Abu Mansor J (as he then was) in Dayasar Corp Sdn Bhd v. CP Ng & Co Sdn Bhd [1990] 1 CLJ 262; [1990] 2 CLJ (Rep) 11 which he ruled in the affirmative. He went further to hold that it was never the legislative intention for the High Court in Malaya to assume jurisdiction over a matter arising in or which should be filed in the Kuching court. The principle distilled in Dayasar 's case (supra) was approved by the Federal Court in Fung Beng Tiat v. Marid Construction Co [1997] 2 CLJ 1. [12] It is also pertinent to emphasize that the High Court Judge in his grounds of judgment dismissing the winding up petition found that the appellant has failed to produce written consent of all parties so as to confer jurisdiction to the Kuala Lumpur High Court. This was what the learned judge stated in his written grounds appearing at p. 25 of the appeal record : On the issue of jurisdiction the petitioner has not produced consent of all parties in writing for the matter to be heard in the High Court of Malaya as set out in section 23 of Courts of Judicature Act 1964. In consequence the petition must be dismissed in limine. (see Bumiputra-Commerce Leasing Bhd v. Nethaven Pacific Sdn Bhd & Ors [2008] 5 CLJ 69). However I have taken the safer approach to also consider the petition on merits. [13] By reason aforesaid we are in agreement with the findings of the learned High Court Judge and coupled with the further reasons as alluded to above there is merit in the preliminary objection on the issue of jurisdiction which warrants us
not Kuala Lumpur.
At paragraphs 145 to 155 of the statement of claim (mirroring paragraphs 24 to 33 of his defence and counterclaim filed in the Kota Kinabalu suit), P particularises the alleged hijacking of his moneylending businesses in Sabah, Sarawak and Labuan by the Chee brothers.
At paragraphs 156 to 166 of the statement of claim (substantially similar to paragraphs 48 to 58 of the defence and counterclaim in the Kota Kinabalu suit), P sets out events surrounding the alleged usurpation of his moneylending businesses in Sabah and Sarawak by the Chee brothers, including the following :
the denial of his attempt to install computer systems at premises in Miri, Bintulu and Sibu;
the circulation of WhatsApp messages denying his interests in the moneylending businesses in Sabah, Sarawak and Labuan;
a meeting convened at the Kota Kinabalu Marriott hotel between P and 28 individuals, said to be employees of his moneylending businesses, during which these employees expressed their desire to continue working for him; and
the lodging of a police report at the Tanjung Aru police station, subsequently circulated among employees of the moneylending businesses via WhatsApp.
In relation to the meeting at the Kota Kinabalu Marriott hotel on 14.10.2024, P listed the names of 28 individuals whom he claims to be employees of his moneylending businesses. All are resident in Sabah.
P specifically pleaded the involvement of two individuals, involved in the events described above. Both reside in Sabah and are likely to be called as witnesses at the trial.
P asserted that the genesis of his business partnership with the Chee brothers, and the formation of moneylending businesses in Sabah, Sarawak and Labuan are alleged to have taken place in Sabah.
Initial meetings and involvement between P and the Chee b Chee brothers in relation to moneylending operations, all of which occurred in Sabah.
The formulation of the standard operating procedures which, according to P, had been in place since the 1990s and governed the management of his moneylending businesses.
T and Labuan in or around the year 2000, stemming from the business foundation laid in Sabah.
I conclude that the Kuala Lumpur High Court has neither local jurisdiction nor territorial jurisdiction as required under section 23 of the CJA 1964. By statutory provisions, jurisdiction lies with the Kota Kinabalu High Court, where the cause of action arose, the relevant defendants reside and carry on business, and the material facts are said to have occurred. Real and substantial connection with the dispute
the court most accessible and appropriate in the interest of all parties. As observed by the High Court in Malacca Securities Sdn Bhd v Loke Yu [1999] 6 MLJ 112 at 119 the critical issue for determination is whether this court is the forum conveniens to hear the dispute between the parties notwithstanding that it has jurisdiction to do so .
The principle was applied in Bank Utama (M) Bhd v Perkapalan Dai Zhun Sdn Bhd [2003] 5 MLJ 40, where the High Court upheld the decision of the senior assistant registrar to set aside the writ and statement of claim filed in the Johor Bahru High Court. The court held that the High Court of Sabah and Sarawak at Kuching was not only vested with jurisdiction, but was the forum conveniens and the most appropriate court to determine the matter.
The High Court said (at page 48) : jurisdiction but is the forum convenience and the most appropriate court to determine this matter on the following grounds :
The cause of action arose in Kuching, Sarawak.
The , which incidentally is also the office that granted the bank guarantee facilities as well as issued the bank guarantees / letters of undertaking.
The in Kuching, Sarawak, notwithstanding the fact that its registered office had moved to Kuala Lumpur in 1999.
All the relevant documents - - - and / business in Kuching, Sarawak.
The material witnesses for the trial of this matter must surely reside in Kuching, Sarawak as all transactions between the parties took place in Kuching
The same considerations apply here. As discussed earlier, the Kota Kinabalu High Court has the territorial and jurisdictional nexus with the relevant facts and main witnesses. It is the most suitable and appropriate forum to determine the dispute between P and the relevant defendants, in that it has the most real and substantial connection to the factual and legal issues in dispute.
The Supreme Court in American Express Bank Ltd v Mohamed Toufic Al - Ozeir & Anor [1995] 1 MLJ 160 at 168 emphasised : variety of factors that a Malaysian court ought to consider in applying the said doctrine; the prominent one being that whether any particular forum is one with which the action has the most real and substantial connection. One Forum shopping and abuse of process
In respect of the Kota Kinabalu defendants, I consider that the filing of the present Kuala Lumpur suit in a forum that has no territorial jurisdiction, and which covers matters already in dispute before the Kota Kinabalu High Court, is an abuse of process and a deliberate attempt to oust that c Kota Kinabalu suit was filed first in time on 13.11.2024. P only commenced the present Kuala Lumpur suit on 3.6.2025 and filed his statement of claim on 9.6.2025.
Any overlap of facts or issues between the present Kuala Lumpur suit and the Kota Kinabalu suit of proceedings and the attendant risk of inconsistent findings arise solely Kota Kinabalu defendants herein to proceed, when the Kota Kinabalu suit is already afoot, would be to condone forum shopping and to sanction duplicative litigation over the same facts and issues.
P could, if he wished, have sought to add the relevant East Malaysia defendants as parties to the existing Kota Kinabalu suit, since he has already pleaded substantially the same facts and relief in his amended defence and counterclaim therein. Instead, P chose to commence a fresh action in Kuala Lumpur, a forum with no jurisdictional nexus to the dispute.
P argues that the present Kuala Lumpur suit is necessary for a broader determination of his alleged status as the ultimate beneficial owner of all the defendants named herein. e present Kuala Lumpur s Kota Kinabalu suit, the Shah Alam s capable of resolving once and for all the true ownership and control of the shopping and to wrest jurisdiction away from Kota Kinabalu High Court.
The determination of the dispute between P and the relevant defendants does not require the involvement of the West Malaysian entities, including those who are parties to the Shah Alam suit. Indeed, the facts were distinctly pleaded in the statement of claim. The Kota Kinabalu High Court, vested with local jurisdiction, is already seized of continue in the present Kuala Lumpur suit would be to sanction an improper attempt to displace the jurisdiction of the Kota Kinabalu High Court.
The issues in dispute in the Kota Kinabalu suit are not confined to the competing claims over the alleged ownership of the Kota Kinabalu defendants, as asserted by P. The Kota Kinabalu suit wrongful interference with the Kota Kinabalu defendants has allegedly caused loss and damage to them. P could simply have filed a counterclaim in the Kota Kinabalu suit to ventilate all the issues sought to be raised in the present Kuala Lumpur suit against both the Kota Kinabalu defendants and the East Malaysia defendants.
I conclude that the filing of the present Kuala Lumpur suit amounts to forum shopping and abuse of process. The present Kuala Lumpur suit is the later action, and lacks any territorial or factual connection to the facts in dispute. None of the parties in the present Kuala Lumpur suit, including P himself, reside in or carry on business in Kuala Lumpur. None of the facts pleaded by P occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of the Kuala Lumpur High Court. P does not deny this. None of the requirements in section 23 of the CJA 1964 are satisfied so as to clothe this court with jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dispute. Striking out for abuse of process
The c Kota Kinabalu defendants without the need to consider its merits. I refer to S L Ng Trading Agency Sdn Bhd v Tohtonku Sdn Bhd [2025] 9 MLJ 946, where the High Court struck out a claim on the ground that it was an abuse of process of the court for a litigant, with clear knowledge of a prior lawsuit filed against him in one court, to commence a separate action on the same subject matter against the counterparty in a different court.
The High Court said : [49] In the present case:-
P was already aware that D had filed the KLHC suit on the same subject matter in the Kuala Lumpur High Court at the time P filed the PGHC suit on 11 January 2025 in the Penang High Court;
this is especially so when the natural forum for the disputes is in the Kuala Lumpur High Court as :
the clauses in the master distributor agreement show P was aware that any dispute ought to be resolved in the Kuala Lumpur High Court, as opposed to the Penang High Court;
the main business operations under the master distributor respective offices and distribution centers located within the Klang Valley;
the main representatives of D are based in and reside in the Klang Valley; and
the solicitors for both parties themselves are based in Kuala
two pre - existing proceedings already afoot, namely (i) the Kota Kinabalu suit concerning P and the Chee brothers, and (ii) the Shah Alam suit concerning P and one of the Lee brothers, P deliberately initiated a fresh action in the present Kuala Lumpur suit. Such duplicity of proceedings is the hallmark of forum shopping.
As observed in S L Ng Trading Agency (supra), a litigant who files a new suit when a counterclaim could have been pursued in an earlier action is guilty of abuse of process. In the present case, a counterclaim has in fact been filed in the Kota Kinabalu suit, showing the duplicative nature of these proceedings. Next, a litigant who files a new suit, giving rise to a duplicity of proceedings when it could have counterclaimed in an earlier suit, is also guilty of abuse of process (see the High Court case of Seetha a/p Kumarasamy v Aker Solutions Malaysia Sdn Bhd (se belum ini di kenali sebagai Aker Kvaerner Malaysia Sdn Bhd) & Ors [2022] MLJU 3277; [2022] CLJU 3049). [56]
To wit, two days after my decision on 10 February 2025 dismissing the ad interim injunction application. It raises identical and overlapping issues as those raised by P in the PGHC suit. [57] P could have counterclaimed in the KLHC suit. But instead chose to file this Failure to specify relevant limb of Order 18 rule 19 of the Rules of Court 2012
P contends that the striking out applications are defective, as the relevant defendants do not specify which limb of Order 18 rule 19 of the ROC 2012 it is based upon. I disagree.
In Monatech (M) Sdn Bhd v Jasa Keramat Sdn Bhd & Anor [1999] 4 MLJ 629, the High Court had held : s writ of summon and statement of claim under O 18 rr 19(b) and (d) of the RHC. This prayer is defective right from its inception. The first defendant s summons in chambers (encl 14) is defective because in the second prayer the plaintiff has prayed for a striking out under O 12 r 5(7) RHC and under O 12 RHC there is no r 5(7) in existence. Therefore the prayer is defective and there is no provision in the RHC to amend the SIC and therefore the prayer is hereby dismissed in limine. In the case of Sambu (M) Sdn Bhd v Stone World Sdn Bhd & Anor [1997] 1 CLJ 775 it the RHC is disjunctive in effect. The second defendant when resorting to O 18 r 19(1) must therefore be very specific and must not cumulatively add (a), (b), (c) and (d) together and lump them as one as it would run counter to the explicit provisions of the r 19(2) O 18 RHC. In the instant case the first defendant has prayed for (b) and / or (d) which is contrary to the RHC and therefore the
This decision was overruled by the Court of Appeal, which in fact allowed the striking out application on appeal. Hence, a striking out application can be heard, and allowed, even if the exact limb of Order 18 rule 19 (1) of the ROC 2012 is not stated.
In any event, this is a purely procedural and technical objection. P has been aware from the outset that the striking out applications are predicated on the present Kuala Lumpur suit being an abuse of the process of the court. To wit, on Order 18 rule 19 (1) (d) of the ROC 2012. Alternatively, under the c nt to section 25 (2) of the CJA 1964, read together with item 11 of the Schedule thereto (as expressly stated in the striking out applications). There is therefore no prejudice caused to P. (See Order 1A and Order 92 rule 4 of the ROC 2012). Conclusion
For the reasons above, I allowed the striking out applications. I awarded costs of RM 10,000 for Enclosure 29 to the Kota Kinabalu defendants, and costs of RM 10,000 for Enclosure 31 to the East Malaysia defendants. Dated 2 January 2026 Quay Chew Soon Judge High Court of Kuala Lumpur (Commercial Division NCC 2 & Admiralty 9) Counsels Kwan Will Sen, Lee Suan Cui and Celin Khoo Roong Ten (Messrs. Lim Chee Wee Partnership) for the Plaintiff Alicia Sabrina Gomez (Messrs. Tommy Thomas) for the 1st to 16th, 18th to 39th, 42nd to 44th, 46th to 47th, 49th to 54th, 56th, 58th, 60th, and 62nd to 108th Defendants Case reference 1. Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 2 AMR 1969; [1993] 4 CLJ 7; [1993] 3 MLJ 36 2. Raja Zainal Abidin bin Raja Haji Tachik & 3 Ors v British - American Life & General Insurance Bhd [1993] 3 CLJ 606
[2013] 4 MLJ 173 4. Jasa Keramat Sdn Bhd & Anor v Monatech (M) Sdn Bhd [1999] 4 CLJ 533; [1999] 4 MLJ 637 5. Ho Num Chon & Anor v Tech - Lab Manufacturing Sdn Bhd [2017] 9 MLJ 32 6. Mayban Allied Bhd (formerly known as Phileo Allied Bank (M) Bhd) v Kenneth Godfrey Gomez & Anor [2011] 5 MLJ 219 7. Fung Beng Tiat v Marid Construction Co [1997] 2 CLJ 1; [1996] 2 MLJ 413 8. Dayasar Corp Sdn Bhd v CP Ng & Co Sdn Bhd [1990] 1 CLJ 262; [1990] 1 MLJ 191 9. Malaysian Assurance Alliance Bhd v Comsa Properties Sdn Bhd [2013] 1 CLJ 69
Malacca Securities Sdn Bhd v Loke Yu [1999] 6 MLJ 112
Bank Utama (M) Bhd v Perkapalan Dai Zhun Sdn Bhd [2003] 5 MLJ 40
American Express Bank Ltd v Mohamed Toufic Al - Ozeir & Anor [1995] 1 MLJ 160
S L Ng Trading Agency Sdn Bhd v Tohtonku Sdn Bhd [2025] 9 MLJ 946
Monatech (M) Sdn Bhd v Jasa Keramat Sdn Bhd & Anor [1999] 4 MLJ 629 Legislation reference 1. Order 18 rule 19 (1), Order 1A and Order 92 rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012 2. Sections 23 and 25 (2) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 3. Article 121 (1) of the Federal Constitution

How this case connects

Citations and treatment detected automatically from later judgments and the authorities this decision relies on.

Cited by

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Authorities cited

Earlier cases and laws this decision relies on

Refers toCompanies ActExternal
“and the 25th to 109th Defendants to recognise and register, **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 accordance with the provision of the Companies Act 2016, the Defendant as owning the aforesaid beneficial interests. in accordance with the Companies Act 2016 ,”
Refers toFederal ConstitutionLegislation
“33. The civil jurisdiction of the High Court is conferred by statute, namely section 23 of the CJA 1964, as enacted pursuant to the Federal Constitution. Jurisdictional powers are demarcated by statute. This is the elementary source of jurisdiction, and must be the starting point for the consideration of the present ap”
Refers toJudicature ActExternal
“(1) The issue of which High Court has jurisdiction over a matter is determined by s 23 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964. It is clear that the respondent, residing in Kuching, would come under s 23 (1) (b) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964.”
Cites[2022] CLJU 3049External
“guilty of abuse of process (see the High Court case of Seetha a/p Kumarasamy v Aker Solutions Malaysia Sdn Bhd (se belum ini di kenali sebagai Aker Kvaerner Malaysia Sdn Bhd) & Ors [2022] MLJU 3277; [2022] CLJU 3049). [56]”
Cites[2022] MLJU 3277External
“lier suit, is also guilty of abuse of process (see the High Court case of Seetha a/p Kumarasamy v Aker Solutions Malaysia Sdn Bhd (se belum ini di kenali sebagai Aker Kvaerner Malaysia Sdn Bhd) & Ors [2022] MLJU 3277; [2022] CLJU 3049). [56]”

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Refers toFederal ConstitutionLegislation
“23. (1) Subject to limitations contained in Article 128 of the Constitution the High Court shall have jurisdiction to try all civil proceedings where -”

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Content

1 Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya Di Kuala Lumpur Dalam Negeri Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur (Bahagian Dagang) Guaman Sivil No. : WA - 22 NCC - 344 - 06 / 2025 Antara See Hong Cheen @ See Hong Chen Dan

Chee Chi Nyen 2. Chee Chi Vui 3. Chee Chi Seng 4. Chee Chi Vun 5. Lee Hyen Sip @ Simon 6. Lee Hyen Yan 7. Anchor Ways Sdn. Bhd.

Aneka Mega Sdn. Bhd.

Angkasa Tekad Sdn. Bhd.

Arena Usahajaya Sdn. Bhd.

Asas Tunai Sdn. Bhd.

Astana Wang Budi Sdn. Bhd.

Bakti Alunan Sdn. Bhd.

Beribu Sakti Sdn. Bhd.

Best Secret Loan & Mortgage Sdn. Bhd.

Bestpure Harvest (Money Lender) Sdn. Bhd.

Borasmas Sdn. Bhd.

Borneo Bumi Erabaru Sdn. Bhd.

Botung Credit & Leasing Sdn. Bhd.

Bumi Wang Jaya Sdn. Bhd.

CCV Money Lender Sdn. Bhd.

Chee Chi Seng Mortgage Sdn. Bhd.

Chee Chi Vui Money Lender Sdn. Bhd.

Chong Su Ping 25. Double Eight Consult Sdn. Bhd.

Era Tunai Sdn. Bhd.

Fajar Wiramas Sdn. Bhd.

Fast Prove Mortgage Sdn. Bhd.

Golden CCN Sdn. Bhd.

Golden One Entity (Money Lender) Sdn. Bhd.

Golden One Entity Sdn. Bhd.

Golden Leader Sdn Bhd 33. Good Focus Mortgage Sdn. Bhd.

Great Eden (Money Lender) Sdn. Bhd.

Great Plan Station Sdn. Bhd.

Harapan Dominasi Money Lender Sdn. Bhd.

Hasil Kosmik Loan & Mortgage Sdn. Bhd.

Inter Capital Mortgage Sdn. Bhd.

Jalur Popular Sdn. Bhd.

Jasa Credit Sdn. Bhd.

Kimpomas Sdn. Bhd.

Kina Era Sdn. Bhd.

Kukuh Maju Sdn. Bhd.

Kunia Plantation (Sabah) Sdn. Bhd.

L.S.P. Money Lender Sdn. Bhd.

Laju Indah Loan & Mortgage Sdn. Bhd.

LHY Development Resources Sdn. Bhd.

Lega Maju Enterprise Sdn Bhd 49. Maju Bosku Sdn. Bhd.

Master City Sdn. Bhd.

Max Advance Centre Sdn. Bhd.

Megaday Capital (Money Lender) Sdn. Bhd.

Milenium Waja Sdn. Bhd.

Miri Best Yield Sdn. Bhd.

Murni Simbol Sdn. Bhd.

Niaga Tunaijaya Sdn. Bhd.

Nilam Muhibbah Sdn. Bhd.

Nyata Jadi Sdn. Bhd.

Panorama Mulia Sdn. Bhd.

Pasti Niagamaju Sdn. Bhd.

Pasti Tunai Jaya Sdn. Bhd.

Pimpin Abadi Sdn. Bhd.

Pimpinan Ceria (Money Lender) Sdn. Bhd.

Pimpinan Ceria Sdn. Bhd.

Pimpinan Jujur (Money Lender) Sdn. Bhd.

Pimpinan Jujur Sdn. Bhd.

Pimpinan Utama Sdn. Bhd.

Platinum Oriental Sdn. Bhd.

Radiant Palm Sdn. Bhd.

Rentas Jujur Sdn. Bhd.

Ribuan Tekad Sdn. Bhd.

Rundingan Bagus Sdn. Bhd.

Sabagood Consult Sdn. Bhd.

Sasa Gold Sdn. Bhd.

Satulogat Jaya Sdn. Bhd.

Senang Lulus Sdn. Bhd.

Sinabarisan Sdn. Bhd.

Sinawira Sdn. Bhd.

SK Tunai Sdn. Bhd.

Success Ways Planner Sdn. Bhd.

Sudi Bantu Sdn. Bhd.

Super Best Sdn. Bhd.

Superbest Mortgage Sdn. Bhd.

Superdeals Resources Sdn. Bhd.

Supergold Commerce (Money Lender) Sdn. Bhd.

Syarikat Emas Kota Belud Sdn. Bhd.

Syarikat Emas Kota Marudu Sdn. Bhd.

Syarikat Emas Kudat Sdn. Bhd.

Tek Ley Money Lender Sdn. Bhd.

Tenny Wong Chi Kiong Money Lender Sdn. Bhd.

Tetap Layan Sdn. Bhd.

Tetap Tunai Sdn. Bhd.

Timjuta Sdn. Bhd.

Top Serve Planner Sdn. Bhd.

Trusjujur Sdn. Bhd.

Truskinabalu Sdn. Bhd.

Truslulus Sdn. Bhd.

Trusstunai Sdn. Bhd.

Tunai Eramas Sdn. Bhd.

100

Tunai Korporat Sdn. Bhd.

101

Tunai Segera Sdn. Bhd.

102

Tunai Sekawan Sdn. Bhd.

103

U Wang Bersatu Servis Sdn. Bhd.

104

Waja Tunai Sdn. Bhd.

105

Wangmaju Bersatu Sdn. Bhd.

106

Wilayan Capital (Money Lender) Sdn. Bhd.

107

World Class Mortgage Sdn. Bhd.

108

Yuwang Moneylender Sdn. Bhd.

109

YW Lega Taiping Sdn. Bhd. - Defendan

Grounds of Decision

Introduction

The 18th, 24th to 25th 30th, 73rd and 75th defendants herein Kota Kinabalu defendants filed a notice of application dated 27.8.2025 in Enclosure 29 to strike out the Plaintiff P claim Kota Kinabalu defendants striking out application . In the alternative claim against them be stayed pending the disposal of the Kota Kinabalu Civil Suit No. : BKI - 23 NCvC - 10 - 11 / Kota Kinabalu suit .

Similarly, the 1st to 4th, 6th to 7th, 9th to 16th, 18th to 31st, 33rd to 39th, 42nd, 44th, 46th to 47th, 51st to 54th, 56th, 58th, 60th, 62nd to 81st, 83rd to 108th defendants herein East Malaysia defendants filed a notice of application dated 27.8.2025 in Enclosure 31 to strike out East Malaysia d striking out application . In the alternative, that be stayed pending the disposal of the Kota Kinabalu suit.

Enclosure 29 and Enclosure 31 are made under section 23 and paragraph 11 of the Schedule to section 25 (2) of the Courts of Judicature CJA 1964 ROC 2012 e court.

The Kota Kinabalu defendants and the East Malaysia defendants are collectively referred to herein relevant defendants Kota Kinabalu defendants and the East Malaysia are collectively referred to herein as striking out applications

On 2.1.2026, I allowed the striking out applications. Here are the grounds of my decision. Background facts The parties

At the outset, it is pertinent to note that none of the 109 defendants named in the present Kuala Lumpur suit, nor P himself, are based in or carry on business in Kuala Lumpur. Instead :

four individuals reside in Sabah and Labuan;

65 companies are based in and carry on business in Sabah and

Labuan;

one individual resides in Sarawak;

21 companies are based in and carry on business in Sarawak;

five companies, while having their registered business addresses in Selangor, carry on business in Sarawak; and

P himself claims to operate his business from Banting, Selangor, and not from Kuala Lumpur.

The relevant defendants reside or maintain their principal place of business in Sabah, Sarawak and Labuan, not Kuala Lumpur. In addition, the Kota Kinabalu defendants are already engaged in ongoing proceedings with P in the Kota Kinabalu suit before the Kota Kinabalu High Court. The Kota Kinabalu suit

The Kota Kinabalu suit was first commenced on 13.11.2024, followed by the Shah Alam suit (defined below) on 14.2.2025. Only thereafter, on 3.6.2025, did P commence the present Kuala Lumpur suit.

The sole P herein is the sole defendant in the Kota Kinabalu suit. The parties to the Kota Kinabalu suit, and their corresponding positions in the present Kuala Lumpur suit, are as follows : Kota Kinabalu suit Parties Kuala Lumpur suit 1st Plaintiff Golden One Entity Sdn Bhd 30th Defendant 2nd Plaintiff Sabagood Consult Sdn Bhd 73rd Defendant 3rd Plaintiff Borneo Bumi Erabaru Sdn Bhd 18th Defendant 4th Plaintiff Satulogat Jaya Sdn Bhd 75th Defendant 5th Plaintiff Double Eight Consult Sdn Bhd 25th Defendant 6th Plaintiff Chong Su Ping (trading under the name and style of Kawan Goldsmith) 24th Defendant

Defendant

See Hong Cheen @ See Hong

Chen

Plaintiff

The Kota Kinabalu defendants carry on moneylending businesses and operate pawnbroking shops in Kota Kinabalu and Penampang, Sabah. In the Kota Kinabalu suit closure and disruption of their business operations. In particular, P is said to have falsely represented to their managers and employees that he was the true owner of the Kota Kinabalu defendants companies and the moneylending businesses. P also induced key members of their management to leave their employment. These acts, the Kota Kinabalu defendants contend, were calculated to cause serious harm to their businesses.

The Kota Kinabalu defendants seek damages together with the following declaratory and injunctive reliefs against P:- (a) a declaration that P had wrongfully interfered with the Kota Kinabalu defendants businesses; (b) a declaration that P is neither the legal nor equitable owner of any of the shares of any of the Kota Kinabalu defendants companies; (c) an injunction restraining P from asserting any interest over any of the Kota Kinabalu defendants

an injunction restraining P from interfering in the businesses of the Kota Kinabalu defendants, including restraining P from inducing any of the Kota Kinabalu defendants Kota Kinabalu defendants or inducing any breach of the duties owed by them to the Kota Kinabalu defendants.

On 16.12.2024, P filed his statement of defence and counterclaim in the Kota Kinabalu suit, which he later amended on 18.2.2025. In that defence and counterclaim, P asserts that he is the Kota Kinabalu defendants approximately 200 other companies carrying on moneylending businesses in Sabah, Sarawak and Labuan. P claims that these companies are managed by the Chee brothers (the 1st to 4th defendants herein) and the Lee brothers (the 5th to 6th defendants herein), whom he described as his business partners. P alleges that he is the true founder of these companies and therefore, the ultimate beneficial owner of their businesses.

The reliefs sought by P in his counterclaim in the Kota Kinabalu suit, are identical to those sought by him in the present Kuala Lumpur suit. P seeks declaratory relief recognising him as the ultimate beneficial owner of the Kota Kinabalu defendants. For comparison, the parallel reliefs sought in the Kota Kinabalu suit and the present Kuala Lumpur suit are set out in the table below. Kota Kinabalu suit (Defence and Counterclaim) Kuala Lumpur suit (Statement of Claim)

A declaration that the Defendant is the ultimate beneficial owner of the 1st to 5th Plaintiffs from their respective inceptions, owner the following shares : 1st Plaintiff : 55 % of its total issued shares; 2nd Plaintiff : 55 % of its total issued shares; 3rd Plaintiff : 55 % of its total issued shares; 4th Plaintiff : 55 % of its total issued shares; 5th Plaintiff : 55 % of its total issued shares. (216.1) A declaration that the Plaintiff is the ultimate beneficial owner of the 5th Defendant th to 109 Defendants from the dates of their respective incorporation.

The directors and company secretaries of the Plaintiffs shall, within 14 days from the date of judgment, recognise and register, in (216.5) An Order for the directors and company secretaries of the 7th to 23rd Defendants and the 25th to 109th Defendants to recognise and register, accordance with the provision of the Companies Act 2016, the Defendant as owning the aforesaid beneficial interests. in accordance with the Companies Act 2016 , the Plaintiff as the ultimate beneficial owner of the 7th to 23rd Defendants and the 25th to 109th Defendants within 14 days from the date of judgment.

A declaration that the Defendant is the ultimate beneficial owner of the 6th Plaintiff, owning 55 % of his business under the name and style of Kawan Goldsmith. (216.6) An Order for the 5th and 24th Defendant to recognise and register the Plaintiff as the ultimate beneficial th Defendant (under the same and style of Kawan Goldsmith) within 14 days from the date of judgment.

All Plaintiffs shall account for their profits to the Defendant for the year since 2019, to be assessed by the deputy / senior assistant registrar, and be paid over within 14 days from the conclusion of the said proceedings. (216.8) An account of profits by the Defendants. The Shah Alam suit

On 14.2.2025, under Shah Alam High Court Civil Suit No. : BA - 22 NCvC - 63 - 02 / Shah Alam suit suit was commenced by the 5th, 8th, 32nd, 43rd, 49th, 50th and 82nd defendants herein, against P, his brother See Fong Seng, as well as the 48th, 57th, 61st and 109th defendants herein.

P filed his defence on 27.5.2025. P did not file a counterclaim in the Shah Alam suit. The Shah Alam suit is presently fixed for trial for two weeks in January 2027. stay application and this Kuala Lumpur suit

The filing of the present Kuala Lumpur suit must be viewed in its proper chronological context. It was commenced after the Kota Kinabalu suit and the Shah Alam suit were already afoot. It represents a duplicative attempt to re - litigate matters pending before other courts.

The parties have taken steps in the Kota Kinabalu suit.

On 22.1. defence and counterclaim, in response to the Kota Kinabalu defendants request.

The pleadings in the Kota Kinabalu suit closed on 5.3.2025. P filed his amended defence and counterclaim on 18.2.2025. The Kota Kinabalu defendants filed their amended reply to the amended statement of defence and amended defence to the amended counterclaim on 19.2.2025.

Kota Kinabalu suit could already have been fixed for trial. At the case management on 21.5.2025, the counsel for the Kota Kinabalu defendants requested that the matter be set down for an early trial. The counsel for P informed the Kota Kinabalu High Court basis, the court fixed a further case management for 4.6.2025. That statement was inaccurate. No new suit had been commenced in West Malaysia in the days or weeks prior to 21.5.2025.

On 3.6.2025, 13 days after the case management in the Kota Kinabalu suit and one day before the next case management on 4.6.2025, P commenced the present Kuala Lumpur suit against the Kota Kinabalu defendants and 103 others.

On the same day (3.6.2025), P applied to stay the Kota Kinabalu suit pending the disposal of the present Kuala Lumpur suit. On 9.6.2025, six days later, the statement of claim in the present Kuala Lumpur suit was filed. The relevant d

The striking out applications are advanced on the following grounds :

relevant defendants falls squarely within the local jurisdiction of the Kota Kinabalu High Court; and

the Kuala Lumpur High Court has no real jurisdictional nexus with the disputes between the parties and is not the natural forum for their resolution.

For the Kota Kinabalu defendants, it is further submitted that the institution of these proceedings in the Kuala Lumpur High Court, when the Kota Kinabalu suit is already pending before the Kota Kinabalu High Court, amounts to forum shopping. It is an abuse of process and represents a deliberate attempt to oust the proper jurisdiction of the Kota Kinabalu High Court. The Plaintiff s case

P argues that the striking out applications should be dismissed because :

The relevant defendants failed to specify the limbs under Order 18 rule 19 of the ROC 2012, which renders the striking out applications flawed;

The Kuala Lumpur High Court is the most suitable forum to determine the disputes between parties; and

There is no forum shopping and abuse of process by filing the present Kuala Lumpur suit. The law on striking out

The law pertaining to striking out of rule 19 of the ROC 2012 is settled. It is only in a plain and obvious case that recourse should be had to the summary process under this rule. This summary procedure should only be adopted when it can be clearly seen that a claim is on the face of it obviously unsustainable. It cannot be exercised by a minute examination of the documents and facts of the case, in order to see whether the party has a cause of action. (See the Supreme Court decision in Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 2 AMR 1969; [1993] 4 CLJ 7; [1993] 3 MLJ 36).

The court must be satisfied that there is no reasonable cause of action or that the claim is frivolous or vexatious. The court is not concerned at this stage with the merits of the claim. So long as the pleadings disclose some cause of action or raise some questions fit to be decided by the judge, the mere fact that the case is weak and not likely to succeed at the trial is no ground for the pleadings to be struck out.

In Raja Zainal Abidin bin Raja Haji Tachik & 3 Ors v British - American Life & General Insurance Bhd [1993] 3 CLJ 606 at 612, the Supreme Court remarked that the lower court should have scrutinized the evidence in order to decide whether the action was bound to fail. The Supreme Court said that an action can be summarily disposed if there is an absence of conflict of material evidence or of conflict of affidavits on material points. So that seemingly triable or difficult issues could be readily decided in such a way as to lead to the conclusion that the action was bound to fail.

In a suit involving complex questions of law but where the essential facts are not in dispute, the complexity of the questions of law should not be a reason for refusing relief under Order 18 rule 19 of the ROC 2012. If satisfied that the questions of law are unarguable, the court is not law is at first blush of some complexity and therefore takes a little longer Khairy Jamaluddin v [2013] 4 MLJ 173 at 182).

Decision

Applying these legal principles, it is my finding that the present Kuala Lumpur suit by P against the relevant defendants is an abuse of the process of the court. This is a plain and obvious case for striking out. Here is my explanation.

Under Order 18 rule 19 (1) (d) of the ROC 2012, the court has the power to strike out an action on the ground of abuse of process at any stage of the proceedings. An abuse of process of the court is where the or not bona fide. Such circumstances are varied and numerous. The categories of such cases are not closed.

In Jasa Keramat Sdn Bhd & Anor v Monatech (M) Sdn Bhd [1999] 4 MLJ 637 at 645, the Court of Appeal said : process to obtain redress. But cases may arise where the true purpose for by law. It may be to oppress a defendant. Or it may be to apply pressure upon him which the law regards as illegitimate. Since the circumstances in which varied and numerous, the categories of such cases are therefore not closed s process, it may

This was applied in the case of Ho Num Chon & Anor v Tech - Lab Manufacturing Sdn Bhd [2017] 9 MLJ 32 at 44, where the High Court ruled that multiplicity of proceedings is an abuse of process. It was held that the court has the power to dismiss under its inherent jurisdiction or in pursuance of section 25 (2) of the CJA 1964.

In Mayban Allied Bhd (formerly known as Phileo Allied Bank (M) Bhd) v Kenneth Godfrey Gomez & Anor [2011] 5 MLJ 219 at 225, the Court of Appeal observed : use of the court process must be bona fide Jurisdiction of the High Court

The civil jurisdiction of the High Court is conferred by statute, namely section 23 of the CJA 1964, as enacted pursuant to the Federal Constitution. Jurisdictional powers are demarcated by statute. This is the elementary source of jurisdiction, and must be the starting point for the consideration of the present application.

Article 121 (1) of the Federal Constitution reads :

121

(1) There shall be two High Courts of co - ordinate jurisdiction and status, namely -

one in the States of Malaya, which shall be known as the High Court in Malaya ; and

one in the States of Sabah and Sarawak, which shall be known as the High Court in Sabah and Sarawak ; and such inferior courts as may be provided by federal law; and the High Courts and inferior courts shall have such jurisdiction and powers as may be conferred by or under federal law

Section 23 of the CJA 1964 reads : Civil jurisdiction - general

(1) Subject to limitations contained in Article 128 of the Constitution the High Court shall have jurisdiction to try all civil proceedings where -

the cause of action arose;

the defendant or one of several defendants resides or has his place of business;

the facts on which the proceedings are based exist or alleged to have occurred; or

any land the ownership of which is disputed is situated, within the local jurisdiction of the Court and notwithstanding anything contained in this section in any case where all parties consent in writing within

Thus, the question for determination is straightforward - has the statutory requirement under section 23 of the CJA 1964 been satisfied? The court within whose jurisdiction any one of the elements in section 23

of the CJA 1964 is engaged, is the court properly seized with local jurisdiction to try the dispute under the law. Local jurisdiction - the Kota Kinabalu High Court

Pursuant to s relevant defendants in the present Kuala Lumpur suit falls squarely within the local jurisdiction of the Kota Kinabalu High Court, for the following reasons :

the cause of action arose in Sabah;

the relevant defendants maintain their principal place of business in Sabah; and

the material facts on which these proceedings are based exist, or are alleged to have occurred, in Sabah.

The Federal Court in Fung Beng Tiat v Marid Construction Co [1997] 2 CLJ 1; [1996] 2 MLJ 413, affirming the High Court decision of Dayasar Corp Sdn Bhd v CP Ng & Co Sdn Bhd [1990] 1 CLJ 262; [1990] 1 MLJ 191, made clear that a High Court of coordinate jurisdiction should not assume jurisdiction in a matter which properly belongs before a Sabah or Sarawak Court.

The Federal Court said (at page 420 - 421, MLJ) : Co Sdn Bhd (1990] 1 MLJ 191 adopted the correct approach to the question of jurisdiction. Although that was a case which concerned corporate and not personal insolvency, the views there expressed are of relevance to the instant appeal. For present purposes, we find it sufficient to quote from the headnote of the report : The respondent company was incorporated on 1 September 1982 and had its registered office in Kuching, Sarawak. The petitioner alleged that the respondent was indebted to the petitioner in the sum of $ 107,357.66 for the price of goods sold and delivered. On 5 September 1988, the petitioner served on the respondent the statutory notice pursuant to s 218 of the Companies Act 1965 but no payment was received. Hence the petitioner filed the petition to wind up. Held, striking out the petition :-

The issue of which High Court has jurisdiction over a matter is determined by s 23 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964. It is clear that the respondent, residing in Kuching, would come under s 23 (1) (b) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964.

While matters can be heard in any court of the courts of Malaya, it was not the intention of the legislature for any court in Malaya to assume jurisdiction of a mater arising in or which should be filed in a Borneo court. Since the respondent is residing in Kuching, the matter should really be filed in the Borneo High Court, in particular Kuching.

From the point of view of convenience, Kuching would be more convenient, with the respondent residing there and the witnesses being there

The Court of Appeal in Malaysian Assurance Alliance Bhd v Comsa Properties Sdn Bhd [2013] 1 CLJ 69, applying Fung Beng Tiat (supra), is also instructive. The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of a winding up petition filed in Kuala Lumpur, holding that jurisdiction properly lay with the High Court in Sabah. Where the characteristics of the defendants fall within the local jurisdiction of the High Court in Sabah, the jurisdiction of the Kuala Lumpur High Court is excluded.

The Court of Appeal said (at page 74 - 75, CLJ) : The characteristic aforesaid of the respondent falls squarely within the local jurisdiction of the High Court in Sabah thereby excluding jurisdiction of the Kuala Lumpur High Court. The respondent company being a Sabah company with its registered office in Tawau, Sabah would clearly fall within the ambit of s. 23 (1) (b) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 so as to confer jurisdiction to the High Court in Sabah. [11] Section 23 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 being the determinant provision on the issue of jurisdiction was addressed by Abu Mansor J (as he then was) in Dayasar Corp Sdn Bhd v. CP Ng & Co Sdn Bhd [1990] 1 CLJ 262; [1990] 2 CLJ (Rep) 11 which he ruled in the affirmative. He went further to hold that it was never the legislative intention for the High Court in Malaya to assume jurisdiction over a matter arising in or which should be filed in the Kuching court. The principle distilled in Dayasar 's case (supra) was approved by the Federal Court in Fung Beng Tiat v. Marid Construction Co [1997] 2 CLJ 1. [12] It is also pertinent to emphasize that the High Court Judge in his grounds of judgment dismissing the winding up petition found that the appellant has failed to produce written consent of all parties so as to confer jurisdiction to the Kuala Lumpur High Court. This was what the learned judge stated in his written grounds appearing at p. 25 of the appeal record : On the issue of jurisdiction the petitioner has not produced consent of all parties in writing for the matter to be heard in the High Court of Malaya as set out in section 23 of Courts of Judicature Act 1964. In consequence the petition must be dismissed in limine. (see Bumiputra-Commerce Leasing Bhd v. Nethaven Pacific Sdn Bhd & Ors [2008] 5 CLJ 69). However I have taken the safer approach to also consider the petition on merits. [13] By reason aforesaid we are in agreement with the findings of the learned High Court Judge and coupled with the further reasons as alluded to above there is merit in the preliminary objection on the issue of jurisdiction which warrants us

not Kuala Lumpur.

At paragraphs 145 to 155 of the statement of claim (mirroring paragraphs 24 to 33 of his defence and counterclaim filed in the Kota Kinabalu suit), P particularises the alleged hijacking of his moneylending businesses in Sabah, Sarawak and Labuan by the Chee brothers.

At paragraphs 156 to 166 of the statement of claim (substantially similar to paragraphs 48 to 58 of the defence and counterclaim in the Kota Kinabalu suit), P sets out events surrounding the alleged usurpation of his moneylending businesses in Sabah and Sarawak by the Chee brothers, including the following :

the denial of his attempt to install computer systems at premises in Miri, Bintulu and Sibu;

(ii) the circulation of WhatsApp messages denying his interests in the moneylending businesses in Sabah, Sarawak and Labuan;

III

(iii) a meeting convened at the Kota Kinabalu Marriott hotel between P and 28 individuals, said to be employees of his moneylending businesses, during which these employees expressed their desire to continue working for him; and

(iv) the lodging of a police report at the Tanjung Aru police station, subsequently circulated among employees of the moneylending businesses via WhatsApp.

In relation to the meeting at the Kota Kinabalu Marriott hotel on 14.10.2024, P listed the names of 28 individuals whom he claims to be employees of his moneylending businesses. All are resident in Sabah.

P specifically pleaded the involvement of two individuals, involved in the events described above. Both reside in Sabah and are likely to be called as witnesses at the trial.

P asserted that the genesis of his business partnership with the Chee brothers, and the formation of moneylending businesses in Sabah, Sarawak and Labuan are alleged to have taken place in Sabah.

Initial meetings and involvement between P and the Chee b Chee brothers in relation to moneylending operations, all of which occurred in Sabah.

The formulation of the standard operating procedures which, according to P, had been in place since the 1990s and governed the management of his moneylending businesses.

T and Labuan in or around the year 2000, stemming from the business foundation laid in Sabah.

I conclude that the Kuala Lumpur High Court has neither local jurisdiction nor territorial jurisdiction as required under section 23 of the CJA 1964. By statutory provisions, jurisdiction lies with the Kota Kinabalu High Court, where the cause of action arose, the relevant defendants reside and carry on business, and the material facts are said to have occurred. Real and substantial connection with the dispute

the court most accessible and appropriate in the interest of all parties. As observed by the High Court in Malacca Securities Sdn Bhd v Loke Yu [1999] 6 MLJ 112 at 119 the critical issue for determination is whether this court is the forum conveniens to hear the dispute between the parties notwithstanding that it has jurisdiction to do so .

The principle was applied in Bank Utama (M) Bhd v Perkapalan Dai Zhun Sdn Bhd [2003] 5 MLJ 40, where the High Court upheld the decision of the senior assistant registrar to set aside the writ and statement of claim filed in the Johor Bahru High Court. The court held that the High Court of Sabah and Sarawak at Kuching was not only vested with jurisdiction, but was the forum conveniens and the most appropriate court to determine the matter.

The High Court said (at page 48) : jurisdiction but is the forum convenience and the most appropriate court to determine this matter on the following grounds :

The cause of action arose in Kuching, Sarawak.

The , which incidentally is also the office that granted the bank guarantee facilities as well as issued the bank guarantees / letters of undertaking.

The in Kuching, Sarawak, notwithstanding the fact that its registered office had moved to Kuala Lumpur in 1999.

All the relevant documents - - - and / business in Kuching, Sarawak.

The material witnesses for the trial of this matter must surely reside in Kuching, Sarawak as all transactions between the parties took place in Kuching

The same considerations apply here. As discussed earlier, the Kota Kinabalu High Court has the territorial and jurisdictional nexus with the relevant facts and main witnesses. It is the most suitable and appropriate forum to determine the dispute between P and the relevant defendants, in that it has the most real and substantial connection to the factual and legal issues in dispute.

The Supreme Court in American Express Bank Ltd v Mohamed Toufic Al - Ozeir & Anor [1995] 1 MLJ 160 at 168 emphasised : variety of factors that a Malaysian court ought to consider in applying the said doctrine; the prominent one being that whether any particular forum is one with which the action has the most real and substantial connection. One Forum shopping and abuse of process

In respect of the Kota Kinabalu defendants, I consider that the filing of the present Kuala Lumpur suit in a forum that has no territorial jurisdiction, and which covers matters already in dispute before the Kota Kinabalu High Court, is an abuse of process and a deliberate attempt to oust that c Kota Kinabalu suit was filed first in time on 13.11.2024. P only commenced the present Kuala Lumpur suit on 3.6.2025 and filed his statement of claim on 9.6.2025.

Any overlap of facts or issues between the present Kuala Lumpur suit and the Kota Kinabalu suit of proceedings and the attendant risk of inconsistent findings arise solely Kota Kinabalu defendants herein to proceed, when the Kota Kinabalu suit is already afoot, would be to condone forum shopping and to sanction duplicative litigation over the same facts and issues.

P could, if he wished, have sought to add the relevant East Malaysia defendants as parties to the existing Kota Kinabalu suit, since he has already pleaded substantially the same facts and relief in his amended defence and counterclaim therein. Instead, P chose to commence a fresh action in Kuala Lumpur, a forum with no jurisdictional nexus to the dispute.

P argues that the present Kuala Lumpur suit is necessary for a broader determination of his alleged status as the ultimate beneficial owner of all the defendants named herein. e present Kuala Lumpur s Kota Kinabalu suit, the Shah Alam s capable of resolving once and for all the true ownership and control of the shopping and to wrest jurisdiction away from Kota Kinabalu High Court.

The determination of the dispute between P and the relevant defendants does not require the involvement of the West Malaysian entities, including those who are parties to the Shah Alam suit. Indeed, the facts were distinctly pleaded in the statement of claim. The Kota Kinabalu High Court, vested with local jurisdiction, is already seized of continue in the present Kuala Lumpur suit would be to sanction an improper attempt to displace the jurisdiction of the Kota Kinabalu High Court.

The issues in dispute in the Kota Kinabalu suit are not confined to the competing claims over the alleged ownership of the Kota Kinabalu defendants, as asserted by P. The Kota Kinabalu suit wrongful interference with the Kota Kinabalu defendants has allegedly caused loss and damage to them. P could simply have filed a counterclaim in the Kota Kinabalu suit to ventilate all the issues sought to be raised in the present Kuala Lumpur suit against both the Kota Kinabalu defendants and the East Malaysia defendants.

I conclude that the filing of the present Kuala Lumpur suit amounts to forum shopping and abuse of process. The present Kuala Lumpur suit is the later action, and lacks any territorial or factual connection to the facts in dispute. None of the parties in the present Kuala Lumpur suit, including P himself, reside in or carry on business in Kuala Lumpur. None of the facts pleaded by P occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of the Kuala Lumpur High Court. P does not deny this. None of the requirements in section 23 of the CJA 1964 are satisfied so as to clothe this court with jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dispute. Striking out for abuse of process

The c Kota Kinabalu defendants without the need to consider its merits. I refer to S L Ng Trading Agency Sdn Bhd v Tohtonku Sdn Bhd [2025] 9 MLJ 946, where the High Court struck out a claim on the ground that it was an abuse of process of the court for a litigant, with clear knowledge of a prior lawsuit filed against him in one court, to commence a separate action on the same subject matter against the counterparty in a different court.

The High Court said : [49] In the present case:-

P was already aware that D had filed the KLHC suit on the same subject matter in the Kuala Lumpur High Court at the time P filed the PGHC suit on 11 January 2025 in the Penang High Court;

this is especially so when the natural forum for the disputes is in the Kuala Lumpur High Court as :

the clauses in the master distributor agreement show P was aware that any dispute ought to be resolved in the Kuala Lumpur High Court, as opposed to the Penang High Court;

(ii) the main business operations under the master distributor respective offices and distribution centers located within the Klang Valley;

III

(iii) the main representatives of D are based in and reside in the Klang Valley; and

(iv) the solicitors for both parties themselves are based in Kuala

two pre - existing proceedings already afoot, namely (i) the Kota Kinabalu suit concerning P and the Chee brothers, and (ii) the Shah Alam suit concerning P and one of the Lee brothers, P deliberately initiated a fresh action in the present Kuala Lumpur suit. Such duplicity of proceedings is the hallmark of forum shopping.

As observed in S L Ng Trading Agency (supra), a litigant who files a new suit when a counterclaim could have been pursued in an earlier action is guilty of abuse of process. In the present case, a counterclaim has in fact been filed in the Kota Kinabalu suit, showing the duplicative nature of these proceedings. Next, a litigant who files a new suit, giving rise to a duplicity of proceedings when it could have counterclaimed in an earlier suit, is also guilty of abuse of process (see the High Court case of Seetha a/p Kumarasamy v Aker Solutions Malaysia Sdn Bhd (se belum ini di kenali sebagai Aker Kvaerner Malaysia Sdn Bhd) & Ors [2022] MLJU 3277; [2022] CLJU 3049). [56]

2025

To wit, two days after my decision on 10 February 2025 dismissing the ad interim injunction application. It raises identical and overlapping issues as those raised by P in the PGHC suit. [57] P could have counterclaimed in the KLHC suit. But instead chose to file this Failure to specify relevant limb of Order 18 rule 19 of the Rules of Court 2012

P contends that the striking out applications are defective, as the relevant defendants do not specify which limb of Order 18 rule 19 of the ROC 2012 it is based upon. I disagree.

In Monatech (M) Sdn Bhd v Jasa Keramat Sdn Bhd & Anor [1999] 4 MLJ 629, the High Court had held : s writ of summon and statement of claim under O 18 rr 19(b) and (d) of the RHC. This prayer is defective right from its inception. The first defendant s summons in chambers (encl 14) is defective because in the second prayer the plaintiff has prayed for a striking out under O 12 r 5(7) RHC and under O 12 RHC there is no r 5(7) in existence. Therefore the prayer is defective and there is no provision in the RHC to amend the SIC and therefore the prayer is hereby dismissed in limine. In the case of Sambu (M) Sdn Bhd v Stone World Sdn Bhd & Anor [1997] 1 CLJ 775 it the RHC is disjunctive in effect. The second defendant when resorting to O 18 r 19(1) must therefore be very specific and must not cumulatively add (a), (b), (c) and (d) together and lump them as one as it would run counter to the explicit provisions of the r 19(2) O 18 RHC. In the instant case the first defendant has prayed for (b) and / or (d) which is contrary to the RHC and therefore the

This decision was overruled by the Court of Appeal, which in fact allowed the striking out application on appeal. Hence, a striking out application can be heard, and allowed, even if the exact limb of Order 18 rule 19 (1) of the ROC 2012 is not stated.

In any event, this is a purely procedural and technical objection. P has been aware from the outset that the striking out applications are predicated on the present Kuala Lumpur suit being an abuse of the process of the court. To wit, on Order 18 rule 19 (1) (d) of the ROC 2012. Alternatively, under the c nt to section 25 (2) of the CJA 1964, read together with item 11 of the Schedule thereto (as expressly stated in the striking out applications). There is therefore no prejudice caused to P. (See Order 1A and Order 92 rule 4 of the ROC 2012). Conclusion

For the reasons above, I allowed the striking out applications. I awarded costs of RM 10,000 for Enclosure 29 to the Kota Kinabalu defendants, and costs of RM 10,000 for Enclosure 31 to the East Malaysia defendants. Dated 2 January 2026 Quay Chew Soon Judge High Court of Kuala Lumpur (Commercial Division NCC 2 & Admiralty 9) Counsels Kwan Will Sen, Lee Suan Cui and Celin Khoo Roong Ten (Messrs. Lim Chee Wee Partnership) for the Plaintiff Alicia Sabrina Gomez (Messrs. Tommy Thomas) for the 1st to 16th, 18th to 39th, 42nd to 44th, 46th to 47th, 49th to 54th, 56th, 58th, 60th, and 62nd to 108th Defendants Case reference 1. Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 2 AMR 1969; [1993] 4 CLJ 7; [1993] 3 MLJ 36 2. Raja Zainal Abidin bin Raja Haji Tachik & 3 Ors v British - American Life & General Insurance Bhd [1993] 3 CLJ 606

[2013] 4 MLJ 173 4. Jasa Keramat Sdn Bhd & Anor v Monatech (M) Sdn Bhd [1999] 4 CLJ 533; [1999] 4 MLJ 637 5. Ho Num Chon & Anor v Tech - Lab Manufacturing Sdn Bhd [2017] 9 MLJ 32 6. Mayban Allied Bhd (formerly known as Phileo Allied Bank (M) Bhd) v Kenneth Godfrey Gomez & Anor [2011] 5 MLJ 219 7. Fung Beng Tiat v Marid Construction Co [1997] 2 CLJ 1; [1996] 2 MLJ 413 8. Dayasar Corp Sdn Bhd v CP Ng & Co Sdn Bhd [1990] 1 CLJ 262; [1990] 1 MLJ 191 9. Malaysian Assurance Alliance Bhd v Comsa Properties Sdn Bhd [2013] 1 CLJ 69

Malacca Securities Sdn Bhd v Loke Yu [1999] 6 MLJ 112

Bank Utama (M) Bhd v Perkapalan Dai Zhun Sdn Bhd [2003] 5 MLJ 40

American Express Bank Ltd v Mohamed Toufic Al - Ozeir & Anor [1995] 1 MLJ 160

S L Ng Trading Agency Sdn Bhd v Tohtonku Sdn Bhd [2025] 9 MLJ 946

Monatech (M) Sdn Bhd v Jasa Keramat Sdn Bhd & Anor [1999] 4 MLJ 629 Legislation reference 1. Order 18 rule 19 (1), Order 1A and Order 92 rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012 2. Sections 23 and 25 (2) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 3. Article 121 (1) of the Federal Constitution

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Malaysian judgment

Case metadata

Court: High Court of Malaysia
Decision date: 2 Jan 2026
Case number: WA-22NCC-344-06/2025
Coram: YA Dato' Quay Chew Soon
Practice area: Striking out – Whether parallel reliefs are sought in two different courts – Whether multiciplicity of proceedings and risk of inconsistent findings – Whether forum shopping and abuse of court process – Whether plaintiff’s claim falls within the local jurisdiction of another court – Whether this court has jurisdictional nexus with the present dispute – Whether this court is the natural forum for the resolution of the present dispute
Version: Alasan Penghakiman 1
Published: 9 Jan 2026
Source ID: 55d6387b-9573-4299-b94d-2f6b820dea3c

Catchwords

Striking out – Whether parallel reliefs are sought in two different courts – Whether multiciplicity of proceedings and risk of inconsistent findings – Whether forum shopping and abuse of court process – Whether plaintiff’s claim falls within the local jurisdiction of another court – Whether this court has jurisdictional nexus with the present dispute – Whether this court is the natural forum for the resolution of the present dispute

Parties

See Hong Cheen @ See Hong Chen - plaintiff - ejudgment_parties
1. ) CHEE CHI NYEN - defendant - ejudgment_parties
2. ) CHEE CHI VUI - defendant - ejudgment_parties
3. ) CHEE CHI SENG - defendant - ejudgment_parties
4. ) CHEE CHI VUN - defendant - ejudgment_parties
5. ) LEE HYEN YAN - defendant - ejudgment_parties

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See Hong Cheen @ See Hong Chen v CHEE CHI NYEN (WA-22NCC-344-06/2025)

High Court of Malaysia2 Jan 2026

The written judgment as the court issued it, with the coram, case number, and source links. Every paragraph has its own anchor.

Outcome

What the court ordered

Applying these legal principles, it is my finding that the present Kuala Lumpur suit by P against the relevant defendants is an abuse of the process of the court. This is a plain and obvious case for striking out. Here is my explanation.
Under Order 18 rule 19 (1) (d) of the ROC 2012, the court has the power to strike out an action on the ground of abuse of process at any stage of the proceedings. An abuse of process of the court is where the or not bona fide. Such circumstances are varied and numerous. The categories of such cases are not closed.
In Jasa Keramat Sdn Bhd & Anor v Monatech (M) Sdn Bhd [1999] 4 MLJ 637 at 645, the Court of Appeal said : process to obtain redress. But cases may arise where the true purpose for by law. It may be to oppress a defendant. Or it may be to apply pressure upon him which the law regards as illegitimate. Since the circumstances in which varied and numerous, the categories of such cases are therefore not closed s process, it may
This was applied in the case of Ho Num Chon & Anor v Tech - Lab Manufacturing Sdn Bhd [2017] 9 MLJ 32 at 44, where the High Court ruled that multiplicity of proceedings is an abuse of process. It was held that the court has the power to dismiss under its inherent jurisdiction or in pursuance of section 25 (2) of the CJA 1964.
In Mayban Allied Bhd (formerly known as Phileo Allied Bank (M) Bhd) v Kenneth Godfrey Gomez & Anor [2011] 5 MLJ 219 at 225, the Court of Appeal observed : use of the court process must be bona fide Jurisdiction of the High Court
The civil jurisdiction of the High Court is conferred by statute, namely section 23 of the CJA 1964, as enacted pursuant to the Federal Constitution. Jurisdictional powers are demarcated by statute. This is the elementary source of jurisdiction, and must be the starting point for the consideration of the present application.
Article 121 (1) of the Federal Constitution reads :
There shall be two High Courts of co - ordinate jurisdiction and status, namely -
one in the States of Malaya, which shall be known as the High Court in Malaya ; and
one in the States of Sabah and Sarawak, which shall be known as the High Court in Sabah and Sarawak ; and such inferior courts as may be provided by federal law; and the High Courts and inferior courts shall have such jurisdiction and powers as may be conferred by or under federal law
Section 23 of the CJA 1964 reads : Civil jurisdiction - general
Subject to limitations contained in Article 128 of the Constitution the High Court shall have jurisdiction to try all civil proceedings where -
the cause of action arose;
the defendant or one of several defendants resides or has his place of business;
the facts on which the proceedings are based exist or alleged to have occurred; or
any land the ownership of which is disputed is situated, within the local jurisdiction of the Court and notwithstanding anything contained in this section in any case where all parties consent in writing within
Thus, the question for determination is straightforward - has the statutory requirement under section 23 of the CJA 1964 been satisfied? The court within whose jurisdiction any one of the elements in section 23
of the CJA 1964 is engaged, is the court properly seized with local jurisdiction to try the dispute under the law. Local jurisdiction - the Kota Kinabalu High Court
Pursuant to s relevant defendants in the present Kuala Lumpur suit falls squarely within the local jurisdiction of the Kota Kinabalu High Court, for the following reasons :
the cause of action arose in Sabah;
the relevant defendants maintain their principal place of business in Sabah; and
the material facts on which these proceedings are based exist, or are alleged to have occurred, in Sabah.
The Federal Court in Fung Beng Tiat v Marid Construction Co [1997] 2 CLJ 1; [1996] 2 MLJ 413, affirming the High Court decision of Dayasar Corp Sdn Bhd v CP Ng & Co Sdn Bhd [1990] 1 CLJ 262; [1990] 1 MLJ 191, made clear that a High Court of coordinate jurisdiction should not assume jurisdiction in a matter which properly belongs before a Sabah or Sarawak Court.
The Federal Court said (at page 420 - 421, MLJ) : Co Sdn Bhd (1990] 1 MLJ 191 adopted the correct approach to the question of jurisdiction. Although that was a case which concerned corporate and not personal insolvency, the views there expressed are of relevance to the instant appeal. For present purposes, we find it sufficient to quote from the headnote of the report : The respondent company was incorporated on 1 September 1982 and had its registered office in Kuching, Sarawak. The petitioner alleged that the respondent was indebted to the petitioner in the sum of $ 107,357.66 for the price of goods sold and delivered. On 5 September 1988, the petitioner served on the respondent the statutory notice pursuant to s 218 of the Companies Act 1965 but no payment was received. Hence the petitioner filed the petition to wind up. Held, striking out the petition :-
The issue of which High Court has jurisdiction over a matter is determined by s 23 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964. It is clear that the respondent, residing in Kuching, would come under s 23 (1) (b) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964.
While matters can be heard in any court of the courts of Malaya, it was not the intention of the legislature for any court in Malaya to assume jurisdiction of a mater arising in or which should be filed in a Borneo court. Since the respondent is residing in Kuching, the matter should really be filed in the Borneo High Court, in particular Kuching.
From the point of view of convenience, Kuching would be more convenient, with the respondent residing there and the witnesses being there
The Court of Appeal in Malaysian Assurance Alliance Bhd v Comsa Properties Sdn Bhd [2013] 1 CLJ 69, applying Fung Beng Tiat (supra), is also instructive. The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of a winding up petition filed in Kuala Lumpur, holding that jurisdiction properly lay with the High Court in Sabah. Where the characteristics of the defendants fall within the local jurisdiction of the High Court in Sabah, the jurisdiction of the Kuala Lumpur High Court is excluded.
The Court of Appeal said (at page 74 - 75, CLJ) : The characteristic aforesaid of the respondent falls squarely within the local jurisdiction of the High Court in Sabah thereby excluding jurisdiction of the Kuala Lumpur High Court. The respondent company being a Sabah company with its registered office in Tawau, Sabah would clearly fall within the ambit of s. 23 (1) (b) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 so as to confer jurisdiction to the High Court in Sabah. [11] Section 23 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 being the determinant provision on the issue of jurisdiction was addressed by Abu Mansor J (as he then was) in Dayasar Corp Sdn Bhd v. CP Ng & Co Sdn Bhd [1990] 1 CLJ 262; [1990] 2 CLJ (Rep) 11 which he ruled in the affirmative. He went further to hold that it was never the legislative intention for the High Court in Malaya to assume jurisdiction over a matter arising in or which should be filed in the Kuching court. The principle distilled in Dayasar 's case (supra) was approved by the Federal Court in Fung Beng Tiat v. Marid Construction Co [1997] 2 CLJ 1. [12] It is also pertinent to emphasize that the High Court Judge in his grounds of judgment dismissing the winding up petition found that the appellant has failed to produce written consent of all parties so as to confer jurisdiction to the Kuala Lumpur High Court. This was what the learned judge stated in his written grounds appearing at p. 25 of the appeal record : On the issue of jurisdiction the petitioner has not produced consent of all parties in writing for the matter to be heard in the High Court of Malaya as set out in section 23 of Courts of Judicature Act 1964. In consequence the petition must be dismissed in limine. (see Bumiputra-Commerce Leasing Bhd v. Nethaven Pacific Sdn Bhd & Ors [2008] 5 CLJ 69). However I have taken the safer approach to also consider the petition on merits. [13] By reason aforesaid we are in agreement with the findings of the learned High Court Judge and coupled with the further reasons as alluded to above there is merit in the preliminary objection on the issue of jurisdiction which warrants us
not Kuala Lumpur.
At paragraphs 145 to 155 of the statement of claim (mirroring paragraphs 24 to 33 of his defence and counterclaim filed in the Kota Kinabalu suit), P particularises the alleged hijacking of his moneylending businesses in Sabah, Sarawak and Labuan by the Chee brothers.
At paragraphs 156 to 166 of the statement of claim (substantially similar to paragraphs 48 to 58 of the defence and counterclaim in the Kota Kinabalu suit), P sets out events surrounding the alleged usurpation of his moneylending businesses in Sabah and Sarawak by the Chee brothers, including the following :
the denial of his attempt to install computer systems at premises in Miri, Bintulu and Sibu;
the circulation of WhatsApp messages denying his interests in the moneylending businesses in Sabah, Sarawak and Labuan;
a meeting convened at the Kota Kinabalu Marriott hotel between P and 28 individuals, said to be employees of his moneylending businesses, during which these employees expressed their desire to continue working for him; and
the lodging of a police report at the Tanjung Aru police station, subsequently circulated among employees of the moneylending businesses via WhatsApp.
In relation to the meeting at the Kota Kinabalu Marriott hotel on 14.10.2024, P listed the names of 28 individuals whom he claims to be employees of his moneylending businesses. All are resident in Sabah.
P specifically pleaded the involvement of two individuals, involved in the events described above. Both reside in Sabah and are likely to be called as witnesses at the trial.
P asserted that the genesis of his business partnership with the Chee brothers, and the formation of moneylending businesses in Sabah, Sarawak and Labuan are alleged to have taken place in Sabah.
Initial meetings and involvement between P and the Chee b Chee brothers in relation to moneylending operations, all of which occurred in Sabah.
The formulation of the standard operating procedures which, according to P, had been in place since the 1990s and governed the management of his moneylending businesses.
T and Labuan in or around the year 2000, stemming from the business foundation laid in Sabah.
I conclude that the Kuala Lumpur High Court has neither local jurisdiction nor territorial jurisdiction as required under section 23 of the CJA 1964. By statutory provisions, jurisdiction lies with the Kota Kinabalu High Court, where the cause of action arose, the relevant defendants reside and carry on business, and the material facts are said to have occurred. Real and substantial connection with the dispute
the court most accessible and appropriate in the interest of all parties. As observed by the High Court in Malacca Securities Sdn Bhd v Loke Yu [1999] 6 MLJ 112 at 119 the critical issue for determination is whether this court is the forum conveniens to hear the dispute between the parties notwithstanding that it has jurisdiction to do so .
The principle was applied in Bank Utama (M) Bhd v Perkapalan Dai Zhun Sdn Bhd [2003] 5 MLJ 40, where the High Court upheld the decision of the senior assistant registrar to set aside the writ and statement of claim filed in the Johor Bahru High Court. The court held that the High Court of Sabah and Sarawak at Kuching was not only vested with jurisdiction, but was the forum conveniens and the most appropriate court to determine the matter.
The High Court said (at page 48) : jurisdiction but is the forum convenience and the most appropriate court to determine this matter on the following grounds :
The cause of action arose in Kuching, Sarawak.
The , which incidentally is also the office that granted the bank guarantee facilities as well as issued the bank guarantees / letters of undertaking.
The in Kuching, Sarawak, notwithstanding the fact that its registered office had moved to Kuala Lumpur in 1999.
All the relevant documents - - - and / business in Kuching, Sarawak.
The material witnesses for the trial of this matter must surely reside in Kuching, Sarawak as all transactions between the parties took place in Kuching
The same considerations apply here. As discussed earlier, the Kota Kinabalu High Court has the territorial and jurisdictional nexus with the relevant facts and main witnesses. It is the most suitable and appropriate forum to determine the dispute between P and the relevant defendants, in that it has the most real and substantial connection to the factual and legal issues in dispute.
The Supreme Court in American Express Bank Ltd v Mohamed Toufic Al - Ozeir & Anor [1995] 1 MLJ 160 at 168 emphasised : variety of factors that a Malaysian court ought to consider in applying the said doctrine; the prominent one being that whether any particular forum is one with which the action has the most real and substantial connection. One Forum shopping and abuse of process
In respect of the Kota Kinabalu defendants, I consider that the filing of the present Kuala Lumpur suit in a forum that has no territorial jurisdiction, and which covers matters already in dispute before the Kota Kinabalu High Court, is an abuse of process and a deliberate attempt to oust that c Kota Kinabalu suit was filed first in time on 13.11.2024. P only commenced the present Kuala Lumpur suit on 3.6.2025 and filed his statement of claim on 9.6.2025.
Any overlap of facts or issues between the present Kuala Lumpur suit and the Kota Kinabalu suit of proceedings and the attendant risk of inconsistent findings arise solely Kota Kinabalu defendants herein to proceed, when the Kota Kinabalu suit is already afoot, would be to condone forum shopping and to sanction duplicative litigation over the same facts and issues.
P could, if he wished, have sought to add the relevant East Malaysia defendants as parties to the existing Kota Kinabalu suit, since he has already pleaded substantially the same facts and relief in his amended defence and counterclaim therein. Instead, P chose to commence a fresh action in Kuala Lumpur, a forum with no jurisdictional nexus to the dispute.
P argues that the present Kuala Lumpur suit is necessary for a broader determination of his alleged status as the ultimate beneficial owner of all the defendants named herein. e present Kuala Lumpur s Kota Kinabalu suit, the Shah Alam s capable of resolving once and for all the true ownership and control of the shopping and to wrest jurisdiction away from Kota Kinabalu High Court.
The determination of the dispute between P and the relevant defendants does not require the involvement of the West Malaysian entities, including those who are parties to the Shah Alam suit. Indeed, the facts were distinctly pleaded in the statement of claim. The Kota Kinabalu High Court, vested with local jurisdiction, is already seized of continue in the present Kuala Lumpur suit would be to sanction an improper attempt to displace the jurisdiction of the Kota Kinabalu High Court.
The issues in dispute in the Kota Kinabalu suit are not confined to the competing claims over the alleged ownership of the Kota Kinabalu defendants, as asserted by P. The Kota Kinabalu suit wrongful interference with the Kota Kinabalu defendants has allegedly caused loss and damage to them. P could simply have filed a counterclaim in the Kota Kinabalu suit to ventilate all the issues sought to be raised in the present Kuala Lumpur suit against both the Kota Kinabalu defendants and the East Malaysia defendants.
I conclude that the filing of the present Kuala Lumpur suit amounts to forum shopping and abuse of process. The present Kuala Lumpur suit is the later action, and lacks any territorial or factual connection to the facts in dispute. None of the parties in the present Kuala Lumpur suit, including P himself, reside in or carry on business in Kuala Lumpur. None of the facts pleaded by P occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of the Kuala Lumpur High Court. P does not deny this. None of the requirements in section 23 of the CJA 1964 are satisfied so as to clothe this court with jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dispute. Striking out for abuse of process
The c Kota Kinabalu defendants without the need to consider its merits. I refer to S L Ng Trading Agency Sdn Bhd v Tohtonku Sdn Bhd [2025] 9 MLJ 946, where the High Court struck out a claim on the ground that it was an abuse of process of the court for a litigant, with clear knowledge of a prior lawsuit filed against him in one court, to commence a separate action on the same subject matter against the counterparty in a different court.
The High Court said : [49] In the present case:-
P was already aware that D had filed the KLHC suit on the same subject matter in the Kuala Lumpur High Court at the time P filed the PGHC suit on 11 January 2025 in the Penang High Court;
this is especially so when the natural forum for the disputes is in the Kuala Lumpur High Court as :
the clauses in the master distributor agreement show P was aware that any dispute ought to be resolved in the Kuala Lumpur High Court, as opposed to the Penang High Court;
the main business operations under the master distributor respective offices and distribution centers located within the Klang Valley;
the main representatives of D are based in and reside in the Klang Valley; and
the solicitors for both parties themselves are based in Kuala
two pre - existing proceedings already afoot, namely (i) the Kota Kinabalu suit concerning P and the Chee brothers, and (ii) the Shah Alam suit concerning P and one of the Lee brothers, P deliberately initiated a fresh action in the present Kuala Lumpur suit. Such duplicity of proceedings is the hallmark of forum shopping.
As observed in S L Ng Trading Agency (supra), a litigant who files a new suit when a counterclaim could have been pursued in an earlier action is guilty of abuse of process. In the present case, a counterclaim has in fact been filed in the Kota Kinabalu suit, showing the duplicative nature of these proceedings. Next, a litigant who files a new suit, giving rise to a duplicity of proceedings when it could have counterclaimed in an earlier suit, is also guilty of abuse of process (see the High Court case of Seetha a/p Kumarasamy v Aker Solutions Malaysia Sdn Bhd (se belum ini di kenali sebagai Aker Kvaerner Malaysia Sdn Bhd) & Ors [2022] MLJU 3277; [2022] CLJU 3049). [56]
To wit, two days after my decision on 10 February 2025 dismissing the ad interim injunction application. It raises identical and overlapping issues as those raised by P in the PGHC suit. [57] P could have counterclaimed in the KLHC suit. But instead chose to file this Failure to specify relevant limb of Order 18 rule 19 of the Rules of Court 2012
P contends that the striking out applications are defective, as the relevant defendants do not specify which limb of Order 18 rule 19 of the ROC 2012 it is based upon. I disagree.
In Monatech (M) Sdn Bhd v Jasa Keramat Sdn Bhd & Anor [1999] 4 MLJ 629, the High Court had held : s writ of summon and statement of claim under O 18 rr 19(b) and (d) of the RHC. This prayer is defective right from its inception. The first defendant s summons in chambers (encl 14) is defective because in the second prayer the plaintiff has prayed for a striking out under O 12 r 5(7) RHC and under O 12 RHC there is no r 5(7) in existence. Therefore the prayer is defective and there is no provision in the RHC to amend the SIC and therefore the prayer is hereby dismissed in limine. In the case of Sambu (M) Sdn Bhd v Stone World Sdn Bhd & Anor [1997] 1 CLJ 775 it the RHC is disjunctive in effect. The second defendant when resorting to O 18 r 19(1) must therefore be very specific and must not cumulatively add (a), (b), (c) and (d) together and lump them as one as it would run counter to the explicit provisions of the r 19(2) O 18 RHC. In the instant case the first defendant has prayed for (b) and / or (d) which is contrary to the RHC and therefore the
This decision was overruled by the Court of Appeal, which in fact allowed the striking out application on appeal. Hence, a striking out application can be heard, and allowed, even if the exact limb of Order 18 rule 19 (1) of the ROC 2012 is not stated.
In any event, this is a purely procedural and technical objection. P has been aware from the outset that the striking out applications are predicated on the present Kuala Lumpur suit being an abuse of the process of the court. To wit, on Order 18 rule 19 (1) (d) of the ROC 2012. Alternatively, under the c nt to section 25 (2) of the CJA 1964, read together with item 11 of the Schedule thereto (as expressly stated in the striking out applications). There is therefore no prejudice caused to P. (See Order 1A and Order 92 rule 4 of the ROC 2012). Conclusion
For the reasons above, I allowed the striking out applications. I awarded costs of RM 10,000 for Enclosure 29 to the Kota Kinabalu defendants, and costs of RM 10,000 for Enclosure 31 to the East Malaysia defendants. Dated 2 January 2026 Quay Chew Soon Judge High Court of Kuala Lumpur (Commercial Division NCC 2 & Admiralty 9) Counsels Kwan Will Sen, Lee Suan Cui and Celin Khoo Roong Ten (Messrs. Lim Chee Wee Partnership) for the Plaintiff Alicia Sabrina Gomez (Messrs. Tommy Thomas) for the 1st to 16th, 18th to 39th, 42nd to 44th, 46th to 47th, 49th to 54th, 56th, 58th, 60th, and 62nd to 108th Defendants Case reference 1. Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 2 AMR 1969; [1993] 4 CLJ 7; [1993] 3 MLJ 36 2. Raja Zainal Abidin bin Raja Haji Tachik & 3 Ors v British - American Life & General Insurance Bhd [1993] 3 CLJ 606
[2013] 4 MLJ 173 4. Jasa Keramat Sdn Bhd & Anor v Monatech (M) Sdn Bhd [1999] 4 CLJ 533; [1999] 4 MLJ 637 5. Ho Num Chon & Anor v Tech - Lab Manufacturing Sdn Bhd [2017] 9 MLJ 32 6. Mayban Allied Bhd (formerly known as Phileo Allied Bank (M) Bhd) v Kenneth Godfrey Gomez & Anor [2011] 5 MLJ 219 7. Fung Beng Tiat v Marid Construction Co [1997] 2 CLJ 1; [1996] 2 MLJ 413 8. Dayasar Corp Sdn Bhd v CP Ng & Co Sdn Bhd [1990] 1 CLJ 262; [1990] 1 MLJ 191 9. Malaysian Assurance Alliance Bhd v Comsa Properties Sdn Bhd [2013] 1 CLJ 69
Malacca Securities Sdn Bhd v Loke Yu [1999] 6 MLJ 112
Bank Utama (M) Bhd v Perkapalan Dai Zhun Sdn Bhd [2003] 5 MLJ 40
American Express Bank Ltd v Mohamed Toufic Al - Ozeir & Anor [1995] 1 MLJ 160
S L Ng Trading Agency Sdn Bhd v Tohtonku Sdn Bhd [2025] 9 MLJ 946
Monatech (M) Sdn Bhd v Jasa Keramat Sdn Bhd & Anor [1999] 4 MLJ 629 Legislation reference 1. Order 18 rule 19 (1), Order 1A and Order 92 rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012 2. Sections 23 and 25 (2) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 3. Article 121 (1) of the Federal Constitution

Catchwords

Parties

See Hong Cheen @ See Hong Chen - plaintiff - ejudgment_parties

1. ) CHEE CHI NYEN - defendant - ejudgment_parties

2. ) CHEE CHI VUI - defendant - ejudgment_parties

3. ) CHEE CHI SENG - defendant - ejudgment_parties

4. ) CHEE CHI VUN - defendant - ejudgment_parties

5. ) LEE HYEN YAN - defendant - ejudgment_parties