Court DecisionMY-HC

WA-22NCC-344-06/2025

See Hong Cheen @ See Hong Chen v CHEE CHI NYEN (WA-22NCC-344-06/2025)

High Court of Malaysia2 Jan 2026

The written judgment as the court issued it, with the coram, case number, and source links. Every paragraph has its own anchor.

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Outcome

What the court ordered

I allowed the transfer application in Enclosure 34 for the following reasons :
the requirements for transfer under Order 57 rule 1 of the ROC 2012 are met. All of the facts pleaded by SHC in his statement of claim in the present Kuala Lumpur suit against the Shah Alam plaintiffs occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of the Shah Alam High Court;
the Kuala Lumpur High Court has no jurisdictional nexus with the disputes between SHC and the Shah Alam plaintiffs, and is not the natural forum for the disputes in the Shah Alam suit;
S s conduct amounts to forum shopping and is an abuse of the process of the court; and
there would be no prejudice to SHC if this transfer application is allowed.
Here is my explanation. Order 57 rule 1 requirements and no jurisdictional nexus
The transfer application is premised on Order 57 rule 1 of the ROC 2012. Under Order 57 rule 1 (1) of the ROC 2012, the c more conveniently or fairly tried in some other c
Order 57 rule 1 (4) of the ROC 2012 mandates that the court consider whether the proposed transferee court is located at or nearest to :
where the cause of action arose;
where the defendant resides or has his place of business;
where the material facts exist or are alleged to have occurred;
where any disputed land is situated; or
whether, for other reasons, it is desirable in the interests of justice that the proceedings be transferred.
On the facts of this case, all of the factors in Order 57 rule 1 (4) (i) to
support transferring the present Kuala Lumpur suit to Shah Alam. None of the pleaded facts in the present Kuala Lumpur suit, nor those in SHC defence in the Shah Alam suit, occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of the Kuala Lumpur High Court.
Even in his own statement of claim filed in the present Kuala Lumpur suit, SHC
In Low Long Yoong & Anor v Lok Kok Choon & Anor [2014] 4 CLJ 577, the High Court emphasised that the most important task in a transfer application is to ascertain which court has the closest nexus to the dispute. There, the transfer was allowed to Muar, Johor (from Penang) because the witnesses resided in Johor, and the pleaded facts (on extortion, forgery and misrepresentation) all occurred in Johor.
The court said (at page 598) : In my view, the most important task in a transfer application is to ascertain which court has the closest nexus to the dispute. In Sin Hai Estate Berhad & Ors v. Lim Jit Kim & Ors [2003] 1 LNS 16; [2003] 2 AMR 336 His Lordship Justice Abdul Malik Ishak (after examining all the factors) expressed it in the following manner: Everything seemed to have taken place in Malacca. Convenience would dictate that Malacca should be the right f
In the same vein, none of the pleaded facts in SHC statement of claim, the Shah Alam suit or the Kota Kinabalu suit points to Kuala Lumpur. None of the 109 defendants in the present Kuala Lumpur suit, nor SHC himself, reside or conduct business in Kuala Lumpur.
By contrast, the defendants in the Shah Alam suit, particularly SHC and the 2nd defendant therein (See Fong Seng), reside within the territorial jurisdiction of the Shah Alam High Court. SHC himself avers in his statement of claim that his moneylending business was centrally managed from Banting, Selangor.
There is simply no factual nexus between the Kuala Lumpur High Court, the parties involved, the pleaded facts and the dispute, that would render the Kuala Lumpur High Court the more convenient or fairer forum under Order 57 rule 1 (1) of the ROC 2012. Other than that SHC solicitors are located in Kuala Lumpur.
I conclude that the Shah Alam plaintiffs have sufficiently satisfied the statutory considerations under Order 57 rule 1 (4) of the ROC 2012. The Shah Alam High Court is the court with the closest nexus to the dispute. The Kuala Lumpur High Court has no jurisdictional or factual connection that would justify retaining the matter. No involvement of specialist court
The disputes between SHC and the Shah Alam plaintiffs concern ordinary civil and commercial issues of beneficial ownership, corporate control and interference with business operations. None of these matters involves specialised subject matter or technical complexity that would require determination by a specialist court in Kuala Lumpur.
In any event, the High Court case of Export - Import Bank of Malaysia Bhd v Chan Toh Pew & Ors [2025] MLJU 1987 makes clear that the specialisation of the Kuala Lumpur commercial court does not override Order 57 rule 1 (4) of the ROC 2012 equally capable of adjudicating commercial disputes. The proper analysis remains the closest nexus test under Order 57 rule 1 (4) of the ROC 2012, which points firmly to Shah Alam as the appropriate and natural forum.
The court said : argument regarding the specialisation of the Kuala Lumpur Commercial Court in commercial matters, while a relevant consideration, does not outweigh the other factors in favour of transfer. The Ipoh High Court is equally capable of adjudicating commercial disputes, and the benefit of having all related proceedings heard by the same court outweighs the advantage of having the case heard by a specialised court. [44] perty matters, commercial banking disputes can be adequately adjudicated by any High Court, and the benefits of consolidating related proceedings in the Ipoh High Court - where all interconnected cases involving the same parties and factual matrix are pending - clearly outweigh any perceived advantage of having this matter heard in the Kuala Lumpur Commercial Court
SHC submits that the Shah Alam High Court and the Kota Kinabalu High Court should defer to the Kuala Lumpur commercial division on the Such submission is untenable.
High Courts throughout Malaysia, including Shah Alam and other branches without a designated commercial division, routinely hear and determine commercial and corporate matters, including disputes under the Companies Act 2016. These are not specialist subject matter disputes requiring unique procedures or technical expertise of the kind found in the intellectual property court or the admiralty court.
All High Courts in Malaya are courts of co - ordinate jurisdiction. To imply that only the Kuala Lumpur High Court is competent to hear such matters is not supported by law or practice. - shopping conduct and abuse of court process
Before addressing SHC to note the legal position. A litigant who files a fresh suit when the issues could and should have been raised in an earlier action creates a duplicity of proceedings amounting to an abuse of process.
I refer to the High Court case of S L Ng Trading Agency Sdn Bhd v Tohtonku Sdn Bhd [2025] 9 MLJ 946 at 963, which said : Next, a litigant who files a new suit, giving rise to a duplicity of proceedings when it could have counterclaimed in an earlier suit, is also guilty of abuse of process (see the High Court case of Seetha a/p Kumarasamy v Aker Solutions Malaysia Sdn Bhd (sebelum ini dikenali sebagai Aker Kvaerner Malaysia Sdn Bhd) & Ors [2022] MLJU 3277; [2022] CLJU 3049). [56]
To wit, two days after my decision on 10 February 2025 dismissing the ad interim injunction application. It raises identical and overlapping issues as those raised by P in the PGHC suit. [57] P could have counterclaimed in the KLHC suit. But instead chose to file this collateral and duplicitous PGHC suit.
The overlap between the present Kuala Lumpur suit and the Shah Alam suit is striking. SHC pleads substantially identical facts in his statement of defence filed in the Shah Alam suit and the statement of claim filed in the present Kuala Lumpur suit. They include the following :
paragraphs 21 to 22.3 of the statement of defence in the Shah Alam suit and paragraphs 180 to 181.3 of the statement of claim in the present Kuala Lumpur suit, both deal with the meeting of 12.11.2024 at the Novotel hotel;
paragraph 24 of the statement of defence in the Shah Alam suit and paragraph 183 of the statement of claim in the present Kuala Lumpur suit, both concern the removal of Mr. Tang Yuet Mun as that purpose;
paragraph 25 of the statement of defence in the Shah Alam suit and paragraph 184 of the statement of claim in the present Kuala Lumpur suit, both concern the police report lodged by SHC arising from the Novotel hotel meeting;
paragraph 28 of the statement of defence in the Shah Alam suit and paragraph 186 of the statement of claim in the present Kuala Lumpur suit, both concern the meeting between Simon Lee and his wife and seven directors of moneylending companies in Taiping and Kamunting;
paragraphs 31 to 36 of the statement of defence in the Shah Alam suit and paragraphs 187 to 191.2 of the statement of claim in the present Kuala Lumpur suit, both concern SHC the moneylending business premises in Taiping and his meetings with the directors of those companies between 19.11.2024 and 22.11.2024; and
paragraphs 40 to 43.6 of the statement of defence in the Shah Alam suit and paragraphs 193 to 199.6 of the statement of claim in the present Kuala Lumpur suit, both concern the seven new employees hired by Simon Lee, the refusal by the shop managers of Master City and Pasti Tunai Jaya to release the keys of the premises to Simon Lee and those employees, and the subsequent visit to the Taiping police station during which Simon Lee signed the handwritten agreement under duress.
Any overlap of facts or issues between the present Kuala Lumpur suit and the Shah Alam suit is entirely of SHC own making. SHC could have filed a counterclaim in the Shah Alam suit, but instead chose to commence this fresh action in Kuala Lumpur months later.
Any multiplicity or risk of inconsistent findings arises solely from SHC transfer application would be to condone - shopping conduct that creates multiplicity of proceedings over the same facts and issues.
Here, SHC - shopping conduct has created, rather than avoided, fragmentation. Despite two pre - existing proceedings already afoot, namely (i) the Kota Kinabalu suit concerning SHC and the Chee brothers (the 1st to 4th defendants herein), and (ii) the Shah Alam suit concerning SHC and Simon Lee, he deliberately initiated a fresh Kuala Lumpur suit. In doing so, SHC artificially combined factually distinct and unrelated disputes into the present Kuala Lumpur suit under the guise of
This is evident from SHC e present Kuala Lumpur suit. At paragraphs 145 to 177 of his statement of claim, he particularises allegations solely against the Chee brothers relating to the Sabah and Sarawak businesses, without implicating Simon Lee. Whereas at paragraphs 179 to 204 of his statement of claim, he particularises allegations solely against Simon Lee concerning the Taiping and Kamunting businesses, without implicating the Chee brothers.
By contrast, the dispute between SHC and Simon Lee has already been properly and actively managed in the Shah Alam suit. Any purported entirely self - created by SHC - file separate and distinct disputes in an unrelated forum.
In light of the above, the Shah Alam plaintiffs are properly invoking Order 57 of the ROC 2012 to secure genuine convenience or fairness. And to prevent SHC from dislodging a lawfully chosen and far - advanced forum (Shah Alam suit) in favour of a later - filed Kuala Lumpur suit in which SHC has recast himself as plaintiff. This is a classic instance of forum shopping and an abuse of the process of the court.
As trial dates have already been fixed for January 2027 in the Shah Alam suit, a transfer at this stage could derail the progress already achieved in Shah Alam, require the matter to be re - managed in Kuala Lumpur and unnecessarily increase costs.
SHC contends that the Shah Alam s present Kuala Lumpur suit, and cannot be determined in isolation because the facts are said to form a single, continuous narrative involving SHC moneylending businesses nationwide. That characterisation is inaccurate.
Even on SHC Simon Lee (the Lee brothers) and the Chee brothers are distinct, compartmentalised and independently framed. The Shah Alam dispute can be determined without the involvement of the other defendants in the present Kuala Lumpur suit. This is evident from the structure of SHC statement of claim in the present Kuala Lumpur suit, which simply reproduces the separate narratives already pleaded in the Kota Kinabalu suit and the Shah Alam suit.
Part D - concerning the alleged usurpation of SHC Sabah and Sarawak by the Chee brothers.
Part E - concerning the alleged usurpation of SHC Taiping and Kamunting by Simon Lee (the Lee brothers).
These are not overlapping causes of action. They are separate factual disputes involving different actors, different regions and different alleged misconduct. Prejudice to the Shah Alam plaintiffs
Allowing the Shah Alam p transfer application would conserve judicial resources and prevent prejudice to the Shah Alam plaintiffs. To permit SHC e present Kuala Lumpur suit would delay the just disposal of proceedings and undermine the progress already achieved in the Shah Alam High Court since February 2025.
In Liziz Plantation v Liew Ah Yong [2021] 10 MLJ 360, the High Court made clear that the interests of justice include avoiding delay, unnecessary cost and disruption to an already - advanced action. The court held that transferring a case at an advanced stage would delay need for th
The court said (at page 367 - 368, 372) : very much aware that in the event the transfer application were to be allowed, the proceedings in this action will be delayed with its attendant increase in costs as the matter will take some time to be transferred to the High Court at Bharu. This does not augur well for the underlying need for the just, expeditious and economical disposal of the action. [37] More importantly, with the proceedings in this action having reached an advanced stage of being ready for hearing it would not be in the interest of justice to have the action transferred to another court as a transfer would not
Here, the Shah Alam suit was filed first in time and has progressed through multiple case managements with pre - trial directions already complied with, save for witness statements. Trial dates have already been fixed in January 2027.
By contrast, the present Kuala Lumpur suit is a later, parallel action which bears no factual or practical connection to Kuala Lumpur. A transfer at this juncture would not derail the progress in the present Kuala Lumpur suit as it is only at pleading stage (the 17th defendant just having filed its reply to the 3rd d defence to its counterclaim on 3.12.2025).
Judicial resources will also be spared. SHC Alam plaintiffs can be managed within the existing Shah Alam suit, where pre - trial directions have already been substantially complied with. The facts pleaded in the present Kuala Lumpur suit are substantially the same as those in the Shah Alam suit. To re - manage the claim in Kuala Lumpur would inevitably increase costs and duplicate effort.
Further, the Shah Alam High Court has already dealt with the factual disputes in the Shah Alam suit during the Shah Alam p interlocutory injunction application. The parties filed a combined total of nine affidavits amounting to over 3,200 pages, together with written submissions. These affidavit evidence containing averments and exhibits, were already before the Shah Alam High Court.
The Shah Alam High Court had also issued grounds of judgment in granting an ad interim injunction order dated 13.6.2025. Subsequently, during the inter - partes hearing on 8.10.2025, a consent order was entered into between parties with respect to the interlocutory injunction.
Given the substantial progress made and the Shah Alam High considerable time and resources already invested in examining the facts and merits of the case, any interruption of proceedings would cause prejudice to the Shah Alam plaintiffs and result in unnecessary wastage of judicial resources.
In Multiglow Corporation Sdn Bhd & Anor v SCG Consultants Sdn Bhd [2020] MLJU 1221, the High Court emphasised that injustice arises not only when a plaintiff pursues an action in a forum inconvenient to the defendant, but equally when a plaintiff is deprived of a timely trial. The court further cautioned that a transfer should not be granted if it would unjustly deprive the plaintiff of the advantages of the first - instance forum, and that such relief is only appropriate where there is a real and substantial connection to the alternative venue. No such connection to Kuala Lumpur exists in the present case. Accordingly, a transfer should be granted to the Shah Alam plaintiffs.
The court said : In both instances, the first step is to determine whether the first instance forum is the natural forum, or whether the forum has the closest connection with the action and the parties. The court adjudicates whether there is another forum that is more appropriate under the doctrine of comity. [58] A court must balance the interests of the parties, since there is injustice not only when a plaintiff is allowed to pursue the action in a forum inconvenient to the defendant, but also when a plaintiff is not allowed a timely trial. [59] Generally, the court will not grant a petition to transfer or an injunction if the grant unjustly will deprive the plaintiff of advantages in the first instance forum. Nevertheless, a real and substantial connection between the venue and the cause(s) of action should exist to provide defendants some protection against being pursued in jurisdictions that have little or no connection with the transaction or the parties.
SHC contends that the Shah Alam plaintiffs transfer application does not save time, costs and expenses and the interest of justice favour having the matter heard in the present Kuala Lumpur suit. The factual position is otherwise.
The Shah Alam suit and the present Kuala Lumpur suit have not progressed in parallel. Trial dates for the Shah Alam suit have been fixed for January 2027. The only remaining step is the filing of witness statements. By contrast, the present Kuala Lumpur suit remains at the pleadings stage, and no trial dates have been fixed. It is therefore not correct to say that both suits stand on equal footing.
The principle that a later suit should not impede the progress of an earlier, trial ready suit is well established. In Federal Land Development [2022] 7 MLJ 883, the High Court refused consolidation where the earlier suit was ready for trial but the later suit was still in limbo. The court held earlier suit to endure delay while the later suit caught up. The same reasoning applies here. The Shah Alam suit is ready for trial; the present Kuala Lumpur suit is not.
The court said (at page 902 - 903): It is worthy of emphasis that the very first of the defamation suits (Suit 26) attention that this Suit 843 at the same time is very much in a state of limbo in light of the pending interlocutory appeals and stay applications. [65] Given the situation on the status of the Suit 843 and the defamation suits, it is not unfair or wrong to contend that if this application is allowed, the parties in the defamation suits would most probably have to endure a long wait before they are given the opportunity of being heard or having the merits of their case adjudicated on. That is simply and patently unfair. [66] Resort to O 4 r 1 of the RC 2012 in my view is plainly unsuited in a situation where one of the suits is at an advanced stage of the proceedings, in comparison to the other. Here, the defamation suits are ready for trial and ought to have started on 26 October 2020 if not for the Movement Control Order in force then. [67] This is in contrast to this Suit 843 which has not even reached the stage of the close of pleadings. The defamation suits should therefore be allowed to proceed in a just, expeditious and economical manner unimpeded by the status of this Suit 843. And this is not to mention the complexity about the multiplicity of parties and legal representations in this
The court had also raised an essential point that bears relation to our case. Namely, that prejudice would manifest where the roles of the parties are reversed in the different suits or if some parties are not included as parties in the other suit. The court observed (at page 897 - 899) : The paramount consideration in this encl 206 is whether there would be risks of inconsistent findings and decisions in respect of the common issues if Suit 843 and defamation suits are tried separately (see the Court of Appeal decision in Jaya Sudhir a/l Jayaram v Nautical Supreme Sdn Bhd). [40] First, there is the weighty issue about the different capacities of the parties in the different suits. For some, their roles are reversed. For instance, the plaintiffs in the defamation suits are the fifth, sixth and seventh defendants in this Suit 843. [44] It is also to be observed that when there are parties in one suit who are not parties in the other suit, the application should be refused. In the case of Ng Joo Soon it was held that : [15] especially to third parties like the 2nd and 3rd Defendants who are not parties in both proceedings if the application was allowed. Under such circumstances, it would certainly not be desirable for the application to be allowed. [45] Here, out of the total 26 parties in the defamation suits and this Suit 843, there are only four parties that are present in both. These 22 parties would suffer prejudice and embarrassment if this application is allowed. [46] In other words, although it may seem that time and costs would be saved, that would not actually be the case in view of the different plaintiffs, different causes of action, different issues and different arguments. Indisputably, a consolidation in this case would not outweigh any savings on time and costs, and serve only to complicate and delay the just, expeditious and economical disposal of especially the defamation suits and this Suit 843. [47] It should also be observed that in MBf Capital Bhd & Anor v Tommy Thomas & Anor [1998] MLJU 506; [1998] 3 CLJ Supp 390 the High Court in disallowing the consolidation application held that a litigant should not have to pay for unnecessary cost to spend time listening to matters and evidence that do not concern him
The prejudice in our case is plain.
The Shah Alam suit is ready for trial; the Kuala Lumpur suit is not. Trial dates have been fixed in the Shah Alam High Court, and pre - trial case management directions have been complied with. In contrast, the present Kuala Lumpur suit is still at the pleadings stage and there are three interlocutory applications pending disposal at this Kuala Lumpur High Court. Namely, this transfer application and the two striking out applications by the remaining 93 defendants for lack of jurisdiction of the Kuala Lumpur High Court, in light of the Kota Kinabalu suit.
The present Kuala Lumpur suit involves 109 defendants, most of whom have no connection to the Shah Alam suit dispute. The Shah Alam plaintiffs are merely six out of 109 defendants in the present Kuala Lumpur suit. Conclusion
For the reasons above, I allowed application in Enclosure 34. I ordered costs in the cause. Dated 2 January 2026 Quay Chew Soon Judge High Court of Kuala Lumpur (Commercial Division NCC 2 & Admiralty 9) Counsels Kwan Will Sen, Lee Suan Cui and Celin Khoo Roong Ten (Messrs. Lim Chee Wee Partnership) for the Plaintiff Alicia Sabrina Gomez (Messrs. Tommy Thomas) for the 1st to 16th, 18th to 39th, 42nd to 44th, 46th to 47th, 49th to 54th, 56th, 58th, 60th, and 62nd to 108th Defendants Case reference 1. Low Long Yoong & Anor v Lok Kok Choon & Anor [2014] 4 CLJ 577 2. Export - Import Bank of Malaysia Bhd v Chan Toh Pew & Ors [2025] MLJU 1987 3. S L Ng Trading Agency Sdn Bhd v Tohtonku Sdn Bhd [2025] 9 MLJ 946 4. Liziz Plantation v Liew Ah Yong [2021] 10 MLJ 360 5. Multiglow Corporation Sdn Bhd & Anor v SCG Consultants Sdn Bhd [2020] MLJU 1221 6. Abdul Samad & Ors [2022] 7 MLJ 883 Legislation reference 1. Order 4 rule 1, Order 57 rule 1 and Order 92 rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012

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Refers toCompanies ActExternal
“ourts throughout Malaysia, including Shah Alam and other branches without a designated commercial division, routinely hear and determine commercial and corporate matters, including disputes under the Companies Act 2016. These are not specialist subject matter disputes requiring unique procedures or technical expertise”
Cites[1998] MLJU 506External
“ate and delay the just, expeditious and economical disposal of especially the defamation suits and this Suit 843. [47] It should also be observed that in MBf Capital Bhd & Anor v Tommy Thomas & Anor [1998] MLJU 506; [1998] 3 CLJ Supp 390 the High Court in disallowing the consolidation application held that a litigant s”
Cites[2020] MLJU 1221External
“54. In Multiglow Corporation Sdn Bhd & Anor v SCG Consultants Sdn Bhd [2020] MLJU 1221, the High Court emphasised that injustice arises not only when a plaintiff pursues an action in a forum inconvenient to the defendant, but equally when a plaintiff is deprived of a timely trial. The”
Cites[2022] CLJU 3049External
“so guilty of abuse of process (see the High Court case of Seetha a/p Kumarasamy v Aker Solutions Malaysia Sdn Bhd (sebelum ini dikenali sebagai Aker Kvaerner Malaysia Sdn Bhd) & Ors [2022] MLJU 3277; [2022] CLJU 3049). [56]”
Cites[2022] MLJU 3277External
“arlier suit, is also guilty of abuse of process (see the High Court case of Seetha a/p Kumarasamy v Aker Solutions Malaysia Sdn Bhd (sebelum ini dikenali sebagai Aker Kvaerner Malaysia Sdn Bhd) & Ors [2022] MLJU 3277; [2022] CLJU 3049). [56]”

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Cites[2025] MLJU 1987External
“28. In any event, the High Court case of Export - Import Bank of Malaysia Bhd v Chan Toh Pew & Ors [2025] MLJU 1987 makes clear that the specialisation of the Kuala Lumpur commercial court does not override Order 57 rule 1 (4) of the ROC 2012 equally capable of adjudicating commercial disputes. The proper analysis”

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Content

1 Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya Di Kuala Lumpur Dalam Negeri Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur (Bahagian Dagang) Guaman Sivil No. : WA - 22 NCC - 344 - 06 / 2025 Antara See Hong Cheen @ See Hong Chen Dan

Chee Chi Nyen 2. Chee Chi Vui 3. Chee Chi Seng 4. Chee Chi Vun 5. Lee Hyen Sip @ Simon 6. Lee Hyen Yan 7. Anchor Ways Sdn. Bhd.

Aneka Mega Sdn. Bhd.

Angkasa Tekad Sdn. Bhd.

Arena Usahajaya Sdn. Bhd.

Asas Tunai Sdn. Bhd.

Astana Wang Budi Sdn. Bhd.

Bakti Alunan Sdn. Bhd.

Beribu Sakti Sdn. Bhd.

Best Secret Loan & Mortgage Sdn. Bhd.

Bestpure Harvest (Money Lender) Sdn. Bhd.

Borasmas Sdn. Bhd.

Borneo Bumi Erabaru Sdn. Bhd.

Botung Credit & Leasing Sdn. Bhd.

Bumi Wang Jaya Sdn. Bhd.

CCV Money Lender Sdn. Bhd.

Chee Chi Seng Mortgage Sdn. Bhd.

Chee Chi Vui Money Lender Sdn. Bhd.

Chong Su Ping 25. Double Eight Consult Sdn. Bhd.

Era Tunai Sdn. Bhd.

Fajar Wiramas Sdn. Bhd.

Fast Prove Mortgage Sdn. Bhd.

Golden CCN Sdn. Bhd.

Golden One Entity (Money Lender) Sdn. Bhd.

Golden One Entity Sdn. Bhd.

Golden Leader Sdn Bhd 33. Good Focus Mortgage Sdn. Bhd.

Great Eden (Money Lender) Sdn. Bhd.

Great Plan Station Sdn. Bhd.

Harapan Dominasi Money Lender Sdn. Bhd.

Hasil Kosmik Loan & Mortgage Sdn. Bhd.

Inter Capital Mortgage Sdn. Bhd.

Jalur Popular Sdn. Bhd.

Jasa Credit Sdn. Bhd.

Kimpomas Sdn. Bhd.

Kina Era Sdn. Bhd.

Kukuh Maju Sdn. Bhd.

Kunia Plantation (Sabah) Sdn. Bhd.

L.S.P. Money Lender Sdn. Bhd.

Laju Indah Loan & Mortgage Sdn. Bhd.

LHY Development Resources Sdn. Bhd.

Lega Maju Enterprise Sdn Bhd 49. Maju Bosku Sdn. Bhd.

Master City Sdn. Bhd.

Max Advance Centre Sdn. Bhd.

Megaday Capital (Money Lender) Sdn. Bhd.

Milenium Waja Sdn. Bhd.

Miri Best Yield Sdn. Bhd.

Murni Simbol Sdn. Bhd.

Niaga Tunaijaya Sdn. Bhd.

Nilam Muhibbah Sdn. Bhd.

Nyata Jadi Sdn. Bhd.

Panorama Mulia Sdn. Bhd.

Pasti Niagamaju Sdn. Bhd.

Pasti Tunai Jaya Sdn. Bhd.

Pimpin Abadi Sdn. Bhd.

Pimpinan Ceria (Money Lender) Sdn. Bhd.

Pimpinan Ceria Sdn. Bhd.

Pimpinan Jujur (Money Lender) Sdn. Bhd.

Pimpinan Jujur Sdn. Bhd.

Pimpinan Utama Sdn. Bhd.

Platinum Oriental Sdn. Bhd.

Radiant Palm Sdn. Bhd.

Rentas Jujur Sdn. Bhd.

Ribuan Tekad Sdn. Bhd.

Rundingan Bagus Sdn. Bhd.

Sabagood Consult Sdn. Bhd.

Sasa Gold Sdn. Bhd.

Satulogat Jaya Sdn. Bhd.

Senang Lulus Sdn. Bhd.

Sinabarisan Sdn. Bhd.

Sinawira Sdn. Bhd.

SK Tunai Sdn. Bhd.

Success Ways Planner Sdn. Bhd.

Sudi Bantu Sdn. Bhd.

Super Best Sdn. Bhd.

Superbest Mortgage Sdn. Bhd.

Superdeals Resources Sdn. Bhd.

Supergold Commerce (Money Lender) Sdn. Bhd.

Syarikat Emas Kota Belud Sdn. Bhd.

Syarikat Emas Kota Marudu Sdn. Bhd.

Syarikat Emas Kudat Sdn. Bhd.

Tek Ley Money Lender Sdn. Bhd.

Tenny Wong Chi Kiong Money Lender Sdn. Bhd.

Tetap Layan Sdn. Bhd.

Tetap Tunai Sdn. Bhd.

Timjuta Sdn. Bhd.

Top Serve Planner Sdn. Bhd.

Trusjujur Sdn. Bhd.

Truskinabalu Sdn. Bhd.

Truslulus Sdn. Bhd.

Trusstunai Sdn. Bhd.

Tunai Eramas Sdn. Bhd.

100

Tunai Korporat Sdn. Bhd.

101

Tunai Segera Sdn. Bhd.

102

Tunai Sekawan Sdn. Bhd.

103

U Wang Bersatu Servis Sdn. Bhd.

104

Waja Tunai Sdn. Bhd.

105

Wangmaju Bersatu Sdn. Bhd.

106

Wilayan Capital (Money Lender) Sdn. Bhd.

107

World Class Mortgage Sdn. Bhd.

108

Yuwang Moneylender Sdn. Bhd.

109

YW Lega Taiping Sdn. Bhd. - Defendan

Grounds of Decision

Introduction

The 5th, 8th, 32nd, 43rd, 49th, 50th and 82nd defendants herein are also the plaintiffs in the Shah Alam High Court Civil Suit No. : BA - 22 NCvC - 63 - 02 / 2025 Shah Alam suit .

They filed this notice of application dated 27.8.2025 in Enclosure 34, seeking an order that is suit insofar as directed against them be transferred to the Shah Alam High Court hearing the Shah Alam suit transfer application . The transfer application is made under Order 4 rule 1, Order 57 rule 1 and Order 92 rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012 ROC 2012 and the inherent jurisdiction of the court.

On 2.1.2026, I allowed the transfer application. Here are the grounds of my decision.

The 5th, 8th, 32nd, 43rd, 49th, 50th and 82nd defendants herein are Shah Alam plaintiffs herein is referred Background facts The Shah Alam suit

The Shah Alam plaintiffs filed the Shah Alam suit on 14.2.2025. The Shah Alam suit was thus filed first in time.

On 18.4.2025, the defendants in the Shah Alam suit (including SHC) entered their appearance. On 27.5.2025, the defendants in the Shah Alam suit filed their statement of defence. SHC did not file any counterclaim against the Shah Alam plaintiffs. On 10.6.2025, the Shah Alam plaintiffs filed their reply.

Since SHC suit on 18.4.2025, six case managements have been conducted and substantial pre - trial directions have already been complied with. Trial dates have been fixed for two weeks in January 2027.

In contrast, the present Kuala Lumpur suit remains at the pleading stage. The present Kuala Lumpur suit

Approximately four months later, on 3.6.2025, SHC commenced the present Kuala Lumpur suit. This was a week after he had filed his statement of defence on 27.5.2025 in the Shah Alam suit. SHC is the sole plaintiff in the present Kuala Lumpur suit.

Save for the 2nd defendant in the Shah Alam suit (See Fong Seng), all other parties in the Shah Alam suit are also named as parties in the present Kuala Lumpur suit. For comparison, the overlap is set out in the table below. Shah Alam suit Parties Kuala Lumpur suit 4th Plaintiff Golden Leader Sdn Bhd 32nd Defendant 5th Plaintiff Kukuh Maju Sdn Bhd 43rd Defendant 6th Plaintiff Super Best Sdn Bhd 82nd Defendant 7th Plaintiff Master City Sdn Bhd 50th Defendant 1st Defendant See Hong Cheen @ See Hong Chen (SHC) Plaintiff 2nd Defendant See Fong Seng - 3rd Defendant Lega Maju Enterprise Sdn Bhd 48th Defendant 4th Defendant YW Lega Taiping Sdn Bhd 109th Defendant 5th Defendant Pasti Tunai Jaya Sdn Bhd 61st Defendant 6th Defendant Nilam Muhibbah Sdn Bhd 57th Defendant

At the time SHC filed the present Kuala Lumpur suit (on 3.6.2025), there were already two suits afoot involving the defendants herein.

Namely :

the Shah Alam suit, which was filed on 14.2.2025; and

the Kota Kinabalu High Court Civil Suit No. : BKI - 23 NCvC - 10 - 11 / 2024 Kota Kinabalu suit , involving six of the East Malaysian defendants herein.

On 27.8.2025, the Shah Alam plaintiffs filed this transfer application in Enclosure 34.

SHC (and the rest of the defendants in the Shah Alam suit) only sought to transfer the Shah Alam suit to Kuala Lumpur almost two months later, on 10.10.2025.

A perusal of the pleadings and reliefs sought in both the Shah Alam suit and the present Kuala Lumpur suit reveals that the core dispute between the 1st plaintiff in the Shah Alam suit ( Simon Lee ) and SHC is the same. Namely, the question of ultimate beneficial ownership of the moneylending businesses in Taiping and Kamunting.

In the Shah Alam suit, the Shah Alam plaintiffs seek declarations on beneficial ownership of moneylending companies, rights of inspection over company records, declarations of wrongful interference, injunctive relief to restrain such interference and damages.

Likewise, in the statement of claim of the present Kuala Lumpur suit, SHC seeks substantially similar reliefs. Namely, declaration on beneficial ownership over the same clusters of moneylending companies that are the subject of dispute in the Shah Alam suit (albeit alongside a wider range of defendants unrelated to the present Kuala Lumpur suit), rights of inspection, declarations of alleged breach of duties and interference, injunctive protection, as well as damages and related consequential reliefs.

Decision

I allowed the transfer application in Enclosure 34 for the following reasons :

the requirements for transfer under Order 57 rule 1 of the ROC 2012 are met. All of the facts pleaded by SHC in his statement of claim in the present Kuala Lumpur suit against the Shah Alam plaintiffs occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of the Shah Alam High Court;

the Kuala Lumpur High Court has no jurisdictional nexus with the disputes between SHC and the Shah Alam plaintiffs, and is not the natural forum for the disputes in the Shah Alam suit;

S s conduct amounts to forum shopping and is an abuse of the process of the court; and

there would be no prejudice to SHC if this transfer application is allowed.

Here is my explanation. Order 57 rule 1 requirements and no jurisdictional nexus

The transfer application is premised on Order 57 rule 1 of the ROC 2012. Under Order 57 rule 1 (1) of the ROC 2012, the c more conveniently or fairly tried in some other c

Order 57 rule 1 (4) of the ROC 2012 mandates that the court consider whether the proposed transferee court is located at or nearest to :

where the cause of action arose;

(ii) where the defendant resides or has his place of business;

III

(iii) where the material facts exist or are alleged to have occurred;

(iv) where any disputed land is situated; or

whether, for other reasons, it is desirable in the interests of justice that the proceedings be transferred.

On the facts of this case, all of the factors in Order 57 rule 1 (4) (i) to

support transferring the present Kuala Lumpur suit to Shah Alam. None of the pleaded facts in the present Kuala Lumpur suit, nor those in SHC defence in the Shah Alam suit, occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of the Kuala Lumpur High Court.

Even in his own statement of claim filed in the present Kuala Lumpur suit, SHC

In Low Long Yoong & Anor v Lok Kok Choon & Anor [2014] 4 CLJ 577, the High Court emphasised that the most important task in a transfer application is to ascertain which court has the closest nexus to the dispute. There, the transfer was allowed to Muar, Johor (from Penang) because the witnesses resided in Johor, and the pleaded facts (on extortion, forgery and misrepresentation) all occurred in Johor.

The court said (at page 598) : In my view, the most important task in a transfer application is to ascertain which court has the closest nexus to the dispute. In Sin Hai Estate Berhad & Ors v. Lim Jit Kim & Ors [2003] 1 LNS 16; [2003] 2 AMR 336 His Lordship Justice Abdul Malik Ishak (after examining all the factors) expressed it in the following manner: Everything seemed to have taken place in Malacca. Convenience would dictate that Malacca should be the right f

In the same vein, none of the pleaded facts in SHC statement of claim, the Shah Alam suit or the Kota Kinabalu suit points to Kuala Lumpur. None of the 109 defendants in the present Kuala Lumpur suit, nor SHC himself, reside or conduct business in Kuala Lumpur.

By contrast, the defendants in the Shah Alam suit, particularly SHC and the 2nd defendant therein (See Fong Seng), reside within the territorial jurisdiction of the Shah Alam High Court. SHC himself avers in his statement of claim that his moneylending business was centrally managed from Banting, Selangor.

There is simply no factual nexus between the Kuala Lumpur High Court, the parties involved, the pleaded facts and the dispute, that would render the Kuala Lumpur High Court the more convenient or fairer forum under Order 57 rule 1 (1) of the ROC 2012. Other than that SHC solicitors are located in Kuala Lumpur.

I conclude that the Shah Alam plaintiffs have sufficiently satisfied the statutory considerations under Order 57 rule 1 (4) of the ROC 2012. The Shah Alam High Court is the court with the closest nexus to the dispute. The Kuala Lumpur High Court has no jurisdictional or factual connection that would justify retaining the matter. No involvement of specialist court

The disputes between SHC and the Shah Alam plaintiffs concern ordinary civil and commercial issues of beneficial ownership, corporate control and interference with business operations. None of these matters involves specialised subject matter or technical complexity that would require determination by a specialist court in Kuala Lumpur.

In any event, the High Court case of Export - Import Bank of Malaysia Bhd v Chan Toh Pew & Ors [2025] MLJU 1987 makes clear that the specialisation of the Kuala Lumpur commercial court does not override Order 57 rule 1 (4) of the ROC 2012 equally capable of adjudicating commercial disputes. The proper analysis remains the closest nexus test under Order 57 rule 1 (4) of the ROC 2012, which points firmly to Shah Alam as the appropriate and natural forum.

The court said : argument regarding the specialisation of the Kuala Lumpur Commercial Court in commercial matters, while a relevant consideration, does not outweigh the other factors in favour of transfer. The Ipoh High Court is equally capable of adjudicating commercial disputes, and the benefit of having all related proceedings heard by the same court outweighs the advantage of having the case heard by a specialised court. [44] perty matters, commercial banking disputes can be adequately adjudicated by any High Court, and the benefits of consolidating related proceedings in the Ipoh High Court - where all interconnected cases involving the same parties and factual matrix are pending - clearly outweigh any perceived advantage of having this matter heard in the Kuala Lumpur Commercial Court

SHC submits that the Shah Alam High Court and the Kota Kinabalu High Court should defer to the Kuala Lumpur commercial division on the Such submission is untenable.

High Courts throughout Malaysia, including Shah Alam and other branches without a designated commercial division, routinely hear and determine commercial and corporate matters, including disputes under the Companies Act 2016. These are not specialist subject matter disputes requiring unique procedures or technical expertise of the kind found in the intellectual property court or the admiralty court.

All High Courts in Malaya are courts of co - ordinate jurisdiction. To imply that only the Kuala Lumpur High Court is competent to hear such matters is not supported by law or practice. - shopping conduct and abuse of court process

Before addressing SHC to note the legal position. A litigant who files a fresh suit when the issues could and should have been raised in an earlier action creates a duplicity of proceedings amounting to an abuse of process.

I refer to the High Court case of S L Ng Trading Agency Sdn Bhd v Tohtonku Sdn Bhd [2025] 9 MLJ 946 at 963, which said : Next, a litigant who files a new suit, giving rise to a duplicity of proceedings when it could have counterclaimed in an earlier suit, is also guilty of abuse of process (see the High Court case of Seetha a/p Kumarasamy v Aker Solutions Malaysia Sdn Bhd (sebelum ini dikenali sebagai Aker Kvaerner Malaysia Sdn Bhd) & Ors [2022] MLJU 3277; [2022] CLJU 3049). [56]

2025

To wit, two days after my decision on 10 February 2025 dismissing the ad interim injunction application. It raises identical and overlapping issues as those raised by P in the PGHC suit. [57] P could have counterclaimed in the KLHC suit. But instead chose to file this collateral and duplicitous PGHC suit.

The overlap between the present Kuala Lumpur suit and the Shah Alam suit is striking. SHC pleads substantially identical facts in his statement of defence filed in the Shah Alam suit and the statement of claim filed in the present Kuala Lumpur suit. They include the following :

paragraphs 21 to 22.3 of the statement of defence in the Shah Alam suit and paragraphs 180 to 181.3 of the statement of claim in the present Kuala Lumpur suit, both deal with the meeting of 12.11.2024 at the Novotel hotel;

paragraph 24 of the statement of defence in the Shah Alam suit and paragraph 183 of the statement of claim in the present Kuala Lumpur suit, both concern the removal of Mr. Tang Yuet Mun as that purpose;

paragraph 25 of the statement of defence in the Shah Alam suit and paragraph 184 of the statement of claim in the present Kuala Lumpur suit, both concern the police report lodged by SHC arising from the Novotel hotel meeting;

paragraph 28 of the statement of defence in the Shah Alam suit and paragraph 186 of the statement of claim in the present Kuala Lumpur suit, both concern the meeting between Simon Lee and his wife and seven directors of moneylending companies in Taiping and Kamunting;

paragraphs 31 to 36 of the statement of defence in the Shah Alam suit and paragraphs 187 to 191.2 of the statement of claim in the present Kuala Lumpur suit, both concern SHC the moneylending business premises in Taiping and his meetings with the directors of those companies between 19.11.2024 and 22.11.2024; and

paragraphs 40 to 43.6 of the statement of defence in the Shah Alam suit and paragraphs 193 to 199.6 of the statement of claim in the present Kuala Lumpur suit, both concern the seven new employees hired by Simon Lee, the refusal by the shop managers of Master City and Pasti Tunai Jaya to release the keys of the premises to Simon Lee and those employees, and the subsequent visit to the Taiping police station during which Simon Lee signed the handwritten agreement under duress.

Any overlap of facts or issues between the present Kuala Lumpur suit and the Shah Alam suit is entirely of SHC own making. SHC could have filed a counterclaim in the Shah Alam suit, but instead chose to commence this fresh action in Kuala Lumpur months later.

Any multiplicity or risk of inconsistent findings arises solely from SHC transfer application would be to condone - shopping conduct that creates multiplicity of proceedings over the same facts and issues.

Here, SHC - shopping conduct has created, rather than avoided, fragmentation. Despite two pre - existing proceedings already afoot, namely (i) the Kota Kinabalu suit concerning SHC and the Chee brothers (the 1st to 4th defendants herein), and (ii) the Shah Alam suit concerning SHC and Simon Lee, he deliberately initiated a fresh Kuala Lumpur suit. In doing so, SHC artificially combined factually distinct and unrelated disputes into the present Kuala Lumpur suit under the guise of

This is evident from SHC e present Kuala Lumpur suit. At paragraphs 145 to 177 of his statement of claim, he particularises allegations solely against the Chee brothers relating to the Sabah and Sarawak businesses, without implicating Simon Lee. Whereas at paragraphs 179 to 204 of his statement of claim, he particularises allegations solely against Simon Lee concerning the Taiping and Kamunting businesses, without implicating the Chee brothers.

By contrast, the dispute between SHC and Simon Lee has already been properly and actively managed in the Shah Alam suit. Any purported entirely self - created by SHC - file separate and distinct disputes in an unrelated forum.

In light of the above, the Shah Alam plaintiffs are properly invoking Order 57 of the ROC 2012 to secure genuine convenience or fairness. And to prevent SHC from dislodging a lawfully chosen and far - advanced forum (Shah Alam suit) in favour of a later - filed Kuala Lumpur suit in which SHC has recast himself as plaintiff. This is a classic instance of forum shopping and an abuse of the process of the court.

As trial dates have already been fixed for January 2027 in the Shah Alam suit, a transfer at this stage could derail the progress already achieved in Shah Alam, require the matter to be re - managed in Kuala Lumpur and unnecessarily increase costs.

SHC contends that the Shah Alam s present Kuala Lumpur suit, and cannot be determined in isolation because the facts are said to form a single, continuous narrative involving SHC moneylending businesses nationwide. That characterisation is inaccurate.

Even on SHC Simon Lee (the Lee brothers) and the Chee brothers are distinct, compartmentalised and independently framed. The Shah Alam dispute can be determined without the involvement of the other defendants in the present Kuala Lumpur suit. This is evident from the structure of SHC statement of claim in the present Kuala Lumpur suit, which simply reproduces the separate narratives already pleaded in the Kota Kinabalu suit and the Shah Alam suit.

Part D - concerning the alleged usurpation of SHC Sabah and Sarawak by the Chee brothers.

Part E - concerning the alleged usurpation of SHC Taiping and Kamunting by Simon Lee (the Lee brothers).

These are not overlapping causes of action. They are separate factual disputes involving different actors, different regions and different alleged misconduct. Prejudice to the Shah Alam plaintiffs

Allowing the Shah Alam p transfer application would conserve judicial resources and prevent prejudice to the Shah Alam plaintiffs. To permit SHC e present Kuala Lumpur suit would delay the just disposal of proceedings and undermine the progress already achieved in the Shah Alam High Court since February 2025.

In Liziz Plantation v Liew Ah Yong [2021] 10 MLJ 360, the High Court made clear that the interests of justice include avoiding delay, unnecessary cost and disruption to an already - advanced action. The court held that transferring a case at an advanced stage would delay need for th

The court said (at page 367 - 368, 372) : very much aware that in the event the transfer application were to be allowed, the proceedings in this action will be delayed with its attendant increase in costs as the matter will take some time to be transferred to the High Court at Bharu. This does not augur well for the underlying need for the just, expeditious and economical disposal of the action. [37] More importantly, with the proceedings in this action having reached an advanced stage of being ready for hearing it would not be in the interest of justice to have the action transferred to another court as a transfer would not

Here, the Shah Alam suit was filed first in time and has progressed through multiple case managements with pre - trial directions already complied with, save for witness statements. Trial dates have already been fixed in January 2027.

By contrast, the present Kuala Lumpur suit is a later, parallel action which bears no factual or practical connection to Kuala Lumpur. A transfer at this juncture would not derail the progress in the present Kuala Lumpur suit as it is only at pleading stage (the 17th defendant just having filed its reply to the 3rd d defence to its counterclaim on 3.12.2025).

Judicial resources will also be spared. SHC Alam plaintiffs can be managed within the existing Shah Alam suit, where pre - trial directions have already been substantially complied with. The facts pleaded in the present Kuala Lumpur suit are substantially the same as those in the Shah Alam suit. To re - manage the claim in Kuala Lumpur would inevitably increase costs and duplicate effort.

Further, the Shah Alam High Court has already dealt with the factual disputes in the Shah Alam suit during the Shah Alam p interlocutory injunction application. The parties filed a combined total of nine affidavits amounting to over 3,200 pages, together with written submissions. These affidavit evidence containing averments and exhibits, were already before the Shah Alam High Court.

The Shah Alam High Court had also issued grounds of judgment in granting an ad interim injunction order dated 13.6.2025. Subsequently, during the inter - partes hearing on 8.10.2025, a consent order was entered into between parties with respect to the interlocutory injunction.

Given the substantial progress made and the Shah Alam High considerable time and resources already invested in examining the facts and merits of the case, any interruption of proceedings would cause prejudice to the Shah Alam plaintiffs and result in unnecessary wastage of judicial resources.

In Multiglow Corporation Sdn Bhd & Anor v SCG Consultants Sdn Bhd [2020] MLJU 1221, the High Court emphasised that injustice arises not only when a plaintiff pursues an action in a forum inconvenient to the defendant, but equally when a plaintiff is deprived of a timely trial. The court further cautioned that a transfer should not be granted if it would unjustly deprive the plaintiff of the advantages of the first - instance forum, and that such relief is only appropriate where there is a real and substantial connection to the alternative venue. No such connection to Kuala Lumpur exists in the present case. Accordingly, a transfer should be granted to the Shah Alam plaintiffs.

The court said : In both instances, the first step is to determine whether the first instance forum is the natural forum, or whether the forum has the closest connection with the action and the parties. The court adjudicates whether there is another forum that is more appropriate under the doctrine of comity. [58] A court must balance the interests of the parties, since there is injustice not only when a plaintiff is allowed to pursue the action in a forum inconvenient to the defendant, but also when a plaintiff is not allowed a timely trial. [59] Generally, the court will not grant a petition to transfer or an injunction if the grant unjustly will deprive the plaintiff of advantages in the first instance forum. Nevertheless, a real and substantial connection between the venue and the cause(s) of action should exist to provide defendants some protection against being pursued in jurisdictions that have little or no connection with the transaction or the parties.

SHC contends that the Shah Alam plaintiffs transfer application does not save time, costs and expenses and the interest of justice favour having the matter heard in the present Kuala Lumpur suit. The factual position is otherwise.

The Shah Alam suit and the present Kuala Lumpur suit have not progressed in parallel. Trial dates for the Shah Alam suit have been fixed for January 2027. The only remaining step is the filing of witness statements. By contrast, the present Kuala Lumpur suit remains at the pleadings stage, and no trial dates have been fixed. It is therefore not correct to say that both suits stand on equal footing.

The principle that a later suit should not impede the progress of an earlier, trial ready suit is well established. In Federal Land Development [2022] 7 MLJ 883, the High Court refused consolidation where the earlier suit was ready for trial but the later suit was still in limbo. The court held earlier suit to endure delay while the later suit caught up. The same reasoning applies here. The Shah Alam suit is ready for trial; the present Kuala Lumpur suit is not.

The court said (at page 902 - 903): It is worthy of emphasis that the very first of the defamation suits (Suit 26) attention that this Suit 843 at the same time is very much in a state of limbo in light of the pending interlocutory appeals and stay applications. [65] Given the situation on the status of the Suit 843 and the defamation suits, it is not unfair or wrong to contend that if this application is allowed, the parties in the defamation suits would most probably have to endure a long wait before they are given the opportunity of being heard or having the merits of their case adjudicated on. That is simply and patently unfair. [66] Resort to O 4 r 1 of the RC 2012 in my view is plainly unsuited in a situation where one of the suits is at an advanced stage of the proceedings, in comparison to the other. Here, the defamation suits are ready for trial and ought to have started on 26 October 2020 if not for the Movement Control Order in force then. [67] This is in contrast to this Suit 843 which has not even reached the stage of the close of pleadings. The defamation suits should therefore be allowed to proceed in a just, expeditious and economical manner unimpeded by the status of this Suit 843. And this is not to mention the complexity about the multiplicity of parties and legal representations in this

The court had also raised an essential point that bears relation to our case. Namely, that prejudice would manifest where the roles of the parties are reversed in the different suits or if some parties are not included as parties in the other suit. The court observed (at page 897 - 899) : The paramount consideration in this encl 206 is whether there would be risks of inconsistent findings and decisions in respect of the common issues if Suit 843 and defamation suits are tried separately (see the Court of Appeal decision in Jaya Sudhir a/l Jayaram v Nautical Supreme Sdn Bhd). [40] First, there is the weighty issue about the different capacities of the parties in the different suits. For some, their roles are reversed. For instance, the plaintiffs in the defamation suits are the fifth, sixth and seventh defendants in this Suit 843. [44] It is also to be observed that when there are parties in one suit who are not parties in the other suit, the application should be refused. In the case of Ng Joo Soon it was held that : [15] especially to third parties like the 2nd and 3rd Defendants who are not parties in both proceedings if the application was allowed. Under such circumstances, it would certainly not be desirable for the application to be allowed. [45] Here, out of the total 26 parties in the defamation suits and this Suit 843, there are only four parties that are present in both. These 22 parties would suffer prejudice and embarrassment if this application is allowed. [46] In other words, although it may seem that time and costs would be saved, that would not actually be the case in view of the different plaintiffs, different causes of action, different issues and different arguments. Indisputably, a consolidation in this case would not outweigh any savings on time and costs, and serve only to complicate and delay the just, expeditious and economical disposal of especially the defamation suits and this Suit 843. [47] It should also be observed that in MBf Capital Bhd & Anor v Tommy Thomas & Anor [1998] MLJU 506; [1998] 3 CLJ Supp 390 the High Court in disallowing the consolidation application held that a litigant should not have to pay for unnecessary cost to spend time listening to matters and evidence that do not concern him

The prejudice in our case is plain.

The Shah Alam suit is ready for trial; the Kuala Lumpur suit is not. Trial dates have been fixed in the Shah Alam High Court, and pre - trial case management directions have been complied with. In contrast, the present Kuala Lumpur suit is still at the pleadings stage and there are three interlocutory applications pending disposal at this Kuala Lumpur High Court. Namely, this transfer application and the two striking out applications by the remaining 93 defendants for lack of jurisdiction of the Kuala Lumpur High Court, in light of the Kota Kinabalu suit.

The present Kuala Lumpur suit involves 109 defendants, most of whom have no connection to the Shah Alam suit dispute. The Shah Alam plaintiffs are merely six out of 109 defendants in the present Kuala Lumpur suit. Conclusion

For the reasons above, I allowed application in Enclosure 34. I ordered costs in the cause. Dated 2 January 2026 Quay Chew Soon Judge High Court of Kuala Lumpur (Commercial Division NCC 2 & Admiralty 9) Counsels Kwan Will Sen, Lee Suan Cui and Celin Khoo Roong Ten (Messrs. Lim Chee Wee Partnership) for the Plaintiff Alicia Sabrina Gomez (Messrs. Tommy Thomas) for the 1st to 16th, 18th to 39th, 42nd to 44th, 46th to 47th, 49th to 54th, 56th, 58th, 60th, and 62nd to 108th Defendants Case reference 1. Low Long Yoong & Anor v Lok Kok Choon & Anor [2014] 4 CLJ 577 2. Export - Import Bank of Malaysia Bhd v Chan Toh Pew & Ors [2025] MLJU 1987 3. S L Ng Trading Agency Sdn Bhd v Tohtonku Sdn Bhd [2025] 9 MLJ 946 4. Liziz Plantation v Liew Ah Yong [2021] 10 MLJ 360 5. Multiglow Corporation Sdn Bhd & Anor v SCG Consultants Sdn Bhd [2020] MLJU 1221 6. Abdul Samad & Ors [2022] 7 MLJ 883 Legislation reference 1. Order 4 rule 1, Order 57 rule 1 and Order 92 rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012

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Malaysian judgment

Case metadata

Court: High Court of Malaysia
Decision date: 2 Jan 2026
Case number: WA-22NCC-344-06/2025
Coram: YA Dato' Quay Chew Soon
Practice area: Transfer of proceedings - Order 57 rule 1 of the Rules of Court 2012 – Whether this court has jurisdictional nexus with the dispute – Whether this court is the natural forum for the dispute – Whether forum shopping and abuse of court process – Whether multiplicity of proceedings and risk of inconsistent findings
Version: Alasan Penghakiman 1
Published: 9 Jan 2026
Source ID: 9f420243-9ee4-40f4-b416-53ee1bd3de6e

Catchwords

Transfer of proceedings - Order 57 rule 1 of the Rules of Court 2012 – Whether this court has jurisdictional nexus with the dispute – Whether this court is the natural forum for the dispute – Whether forum shopping and abuse of court process – Whether multiplicity of proceedings and risk of inconsistent findings

Parties

See Hong Cheen @ See Hong Chen - plaintiff - ejudgment_parties
1. ) CHEE CHI NYEN - defendant - ejudgment_parties
2. ) CHEE CHI VUI - defendant - ejudgment_parties
3. ) CHEE CHI SENG - defendant - ejudgment_parties
4. ) CHEE CHI VUN - defendant - ejudgment_parties
5. ) LEE HYEN YAN - defendant - ejudgment_parties

Primary source

Compare this reader text against the official judgment source.

Open source PDF

See Hong Cheen @ See Hong Chen v CHEE CHI NYEN (WA-22NCC-344-06/2025)

High Court of Malaysia2 Jan 2026

The written judgment as the court issued it, with the coram, case number, and source links. Every paragraph has its own anchor.

Outcome

What the court ordered

I allowed the transfer application in Enclosure 34 for the following reasons :
the requirements for transfer under Order 57 rule 1 of the ROC 2012 are met. All of the facts pleaded by SHC in his statement of claim in the present Kuala Lumpur suit against the Shah Alam plaintiffs occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of the Shah Alam High Court;
the Kuala Lumpur High Court has no jurisdictional nexus with the disputes between SHC and the Shah Alam plaintiffs, and is not the natural forum for the disputes in the Shah Alam suit;
S s conduct amounts to forum shopping and is an abuse of the process of the court; and
there would be no prejudice to SHC if this transfer application is allowed.
Here is my explanation. Order 57 rule 1 requirements and no jurisdictional nexus
The transfer application is premised on Order 57 rule 1 of the ROC 2012. Under Order 57 rule 1 (1) of the ROC 2012, the c more conveniently or fairly tried in some other c
Order 57 rule 1 (4) of the ROC 2012 mandates that the court consider whether the proposed transferee court is located at or nearest to :
where the cause of action arose;
where the defendant resides or has his place of business;
where the material facts exist or are alleged to have occurred;
where any disputed land is situated; or
whether, for other reasons, it is desirable in the interests of justice that the proceedings be transferred.
On the facts of this case, all of the factors in Order 57 rule 1 (4) (i) to
support transferring the present Kuala Lumpur suit to Shah Alam. None of the pleaded facts in the present Kuala Lumpur suit, nor those in SHC defence in the Shah Alam suit, occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of the Kuala Lumpur High Court.
Even in his own statement of claim filed in the present Kuala Lumpur suit, SHC
In Low Long Yoong & Anor v Lok Kok Choon & Anor [2014] 4 CLJ 577, the High Court emphasised that the most important task in a transfer application is to ascertain which court has the closest nexus to the dispute. There, the transfer was allowed to Muar, Johor (from Penang) because the witnesses resided in Johor, and the pleaded facts (on extortion, forgery and misrepresentation) all occurred in Johor.
The court said (at page 598) : In my view, the most important task in a transfer application is to ascertain which court has the closest nexus to the dispute. In Sin Hai Estate Berhad & Ors v. Lim Jit Kim & Ors [2003] 1 LNS 16; [2003] 2 AMR 336 His Lordship Justice Abdul Malik Ishak (after examining all the factors) expressed it in the following manner: Everything seemed to have taken place in Malacca. Convenience would dictate that Malacca should be the right f
In the same vein, none of the pleaded facts in SHC statement of claim, the Shah Alam suit or the Kota Kinabalu suit points to Kuala Lumpur. None of the 109 defendants in the present Kuala Lumpur suit, nor SHC himself, reside or conduct business in Kuala Lumpur.
By contrast, the defendants in the Shah Alam suit, particularly SHC and the 2nd defendant therein (See Fong Seng), reside within the territorial jurisdiction of the Shah Alam High Court. SHC himself avers in his statement of claim that his moneylending business was centrally managed from Banting, Selangor.
There is simply no factual nexus between the Kuala Lumpur High Court, the parties involved, the pleaded facts and the dispute, that would render the Kuala Lumpur High Court the more convenient or fairer forum under Order 57 rule 1 (1) of the ROC 2012. Other than that SHC solicitors are located in Kuala Lumpur.
I conclude that the Shah Alam plaintiffs have sufficiently satisfied the statutory considerations under Order 57 rule 1 (4) of the ROC 2012. The Shah Alam High Court is the court with the closest nexus to the dispute. The Kuala Lumpur High Court has no jurisdictional or factual connection that would justify retaining the matter. No involvement of specialist court
The disputes between SHC and the Shah Alam plaintiffs concern ordinary civil and commercial issues of beneficial ownership, corporate control and interference with business operations. None of these matters involves specialised subject matter or technical complexity that would require determination by a specialist court in Kuala Lumpur.
In any event, the High Court case of Export - Import Bank of Malaysia Bhd v Chan Toh Pew & Ors [2025] MLJU 1987 makes clear that the specialisation of the Kuala Lumpur commercial court does not override Order 57 rule 1 (4) of the ROC 2012 equally capable of adjudicating commercial disputes. The proper analysis remains the closest nexus test under Order 57 rule 1 (4) of the ROC 2012, which points firmly to Shah Alam as the appropriate and natural forum.
The court said : argument regarding the specialisation of the Kuala Lumpur Commercial Court in commercial matters, while a relevant consideration, does not outweigh the other factors in favour of transfer. The Ipoh High Court is equally capable of adjudicating commercial disputes, and the benefit of having all related proceedings heard by the same court outweighs the advantage of having the case heard by a specialised court. [44] perty matters, commercial banking disputes can be adequately adjudicated by any High Court, and the benefits of consolidating related proceedings in the Ipoh High Court - where all interconnected cases involving the same parties and factual matrix are pending - clearly outweigh any perceived advantage of having this matter heard in the Kuala Lumpur Commercial Court
SHC submits that the Shah Alam High Court and the Kota Kinabalu High Court should defer to the Kuala Lumpur commercial division on the Such submission is untenable.
High Courts throughout Malaysia, including Shah Alam and other branches without a designated commercial division, routinely hear and determine commercial and corporate matters, including disputes under the Companies Act 2016. These are not specialist subject matter disputes requiring unique procedures or technical expertise of the kind found in the intellectual property court or the admiralty court.
All High Courts in Malaya are courts of co - ordinate jurisdiction. To imply that only the Kuala Lumpur High Court is competent to hear such matters is not supported by law or practice. - shopping conduct and abuse of court process
Before addressing SHC to note the legal position. A litigant who files a fresh suit when the issues could and should have been raised in an earlier action creates a duplicity of proceedings amounting to an abuse of process.
I refer to the High Court case of S L Ng Trading Agency Sdn Bhd v Tohtonku Sdn Bhd [2025] 9 MLJ 946 at 963, which said : Next, a litigant who files a new suit, giving rise to a duplicity of proceedings when it could have counterclaimed in an earlier suit, is also guilty of abuse of process (see the High Court case of Seetha a/p Kumarasamy v Aker Solutions Malaysia Sdn Bhd (sebelum ini dikenali sebagai Aker Kvaerner Malaysia Sdn Bhd) & Ors [2022] MLJU 3277; [2022] CLJU 3049). [56]
To wit, two days after my decision on 10 February 2025 dismissing the ad interim injunction application. It raises identical and overlapping issues as those raised by P in the PGHC suit. [57] P could have counterclaimed in the KLHC suit. But instead chose to file this collateral and duplicitous PGHC suit.
The overlap between the present Kuala Lumpur suit and the Shah Alam suit is striking. SHC pleads substantially identical facts in his statement of defence filed in the Shah Alam suit and the statement of claim filed in the present Kuala Lumpur suit. They include the following :
paragraphs 21 to 22.3 of the statement of defence in the Shah Alam suit and paragraphs 180 to 181.3 of the statement of claim in the present Kuala Lumpur suit, both deal with the meeting of 12.11.2024 at the Novotel hotel;
paragraph 24 of the statement of defence in the Shah Alam suit and paragraph 183 of the statement of claim in the present Kuala Lumpur suit, both concern the removal of Mr. Tang Yuet Mun as that purpose;
paragraph 25 of the statement of defence in the Shah Alam suit and paragraph 184 of the statement of claim in the present Kuala Lumpur suit, both concern the police report lodged by SHC arising from the Novotel hotel meeting;
paragraph 28 of the statement of defence in the Shah Alam suit and paragraph 186 of the statement of claim in the present Kuala Lumpur suit, both concern the meeting between Simon Lee and his wife and seven directors of moneylending companies in Taiping and Kamunting;
paragraphs 31 to 36 of the statement of defence in the Shah Alam suit and paragraphs 187 to 191.2 of the statement of claim in the present Kuala Lumpur suit, both concern SHC the moneylending business premises in Taiping and his meetings with the directors of those companies between 19.11.2024 and 22.11.2024; and
paragraphs 40 to 43.6 of the statement of defence in the Shah Alam suit and paragraphs 193 to 199.6 of the statement of claim in the present Kuala Lumpur suit, both concern the seven new employees hired by Simon Lee, the refusal by the shop managers of Master City and Pasti Tunai Jaya to release the keys of the premises to Simon Lee and those employees, and the subsequent visit to the Taiping police station during which Simon Lee signed the handwritten agreement under duress.
Any overlap of facts or issues between the present Kuala Lumpur suit and the Shah Alam suit is entirely of SHC own making. SHC could have filed a counterclaim in the Shah Alam suit, but instead chose to commence this fresh action in Kuala Lumpur months later.
Any multiplicity or risk of inconsistent findings arises solely from SHC transfer application would be to condone - shopping conduct that creates multiplicity of proceedings over the same facts and issues.
Here, SHC - shopping conduct has created, rather than avoided, fragmentation. Despite two pre - existing proceedings already afoot, namely (i) the Kota Kinabalu suit concerning SHC and the Chee brothers (the 1st to 4th defendants herein), and (ii) the Shah Alam suit concerning SHC and Simon Lee, he deliberately initiated a fresh Kuala Lumpur suit. In doing so, SHC artificially combined factually distinct and unrelated disputes into the present Kuala Lumpur suit under the guise of
This is evident from SHC e present Kuala Lumpur suit. At paragraphs 145 to 177 of his statement of claim, he particularises allegations solely against the Chee brothers relating to the Sabah and Sarawak businesses, without implicating Simon Lee. Whereas at paragraphs 179 to 204 of his statement of claim, he particularises allegations solely against Simon Lee concerning the Taiping and Kamunting businesses, without implicating the Chee brothers.
By contrast, the dispute between SHC and Simon Lee has already been properly and actively managed in the Shah Alam suit. Any purported entirely self - created by SHC - file separate and distinct disputes in an unrelated forum.
In light of the above, the Shah Alam plaintiffs are properly invoking Order 57 of the ROC 2012 to secure genuine convenience or fairness. And to prevent SHC from dislodging a lawfully chosen and far - advanced forum (Shah Alam suit) in favour of a later - filed Kuala Lumpur suit in which SHC has recast himself as plaintiff. This is a classic instance of forum shopping and an abuse of the process of the court.
As trial dates have already been fixed for January 2027 in the Shah Alam suit, a transfer at this stage could derail the progress already achieved in Shah Alam, require the matter to be re - managed in Kuala Lumpur and unnecessarily increase costs.
SHC contends that the Shah Alam s present Kuala Lumpur suit, and cannot be determined in isolation because the facts are said to form a single, continuous narrative involving SHC moneylending businesses nationwide. That characterisation is inaccurate.
Even on SHC Simon Lee (the Lee brothers) and the Chee brothers are distinct, compartmentalised and independently framed. The Shah Alam dispute can be determined without the involvement of the other defendants in the present Kuala Lumpur suit. This is evident from the structure of SHC statement of claim in the present Kuala Lumpur suit, which simply reproduces the separate narratives already pleaded in the Kota Kinabalu suit and the Shah Alam suit.
Part D - concerning the alleged usurpation of SHC Sabah and Sarawak by the Chee brothers.
Part E - concerning the alleged usurpation of SHC Taiping and Kamunting by Simon Lee (the Lee brothers).
These are not overlapping causes of action. They are separate factual disputes involving different actors, different regions and different alleged misconduct. Prejudice to the Shah Alam plaintiffs
Allowing the Shah Alam p transfer application would conserve judicial resources and prevent prejudice to the Shah Alam plaintiffs. To permit SHC e present Kuala Lumpur suit would delay the just disposal of proceedings and undermine the progress already achieved in the Shah Alam High Court since February 2025.
In Liziz Plantation v Liew Ah Yong [2021] 10 MLJ 360, the High Court made clear that the interests of justice include avoiding delay, unnecessary cost and disruption to an already - advanced action. The court held that transferring a case at an advanced stage would delay need for th
The court said (at page 367 - 368, 372) : very much aware that in the event the transfer application were to be allowed, the proceedings in this action will be delayed with its attendant increase in costs as the matter will take some time to be transferred to the High Court at Bharu. This does not augur well for the underlying need for the just, expeditious and economical disposal of the action. [37] More importantly, with the proceedings in this action having reached an advanced stage of being ready for hearing it would not be in the interest of justice to have the action transferred to another court as a transfer would not
Here, the Shah Alam suit was filed first in time and has progressed through multiple case managements with pre - trial directions already complied with, save for witness statements. Trial dates have already been fixed in January 2027.
By contrast, the present Kuala Lumpur suit is a later, parallel action which bears no factual or practical connection to Kuala Lumpur. A transfer at this juncture would not derail the progress in the present Kuala Lumpur suit as it is only at pleading stage (the 17th defendant just having filed its reply to the 3rd d defence to its counterclaim on 3.12.2025).
Judicial resources will also be spared. SHC Alam plaintiffs can be managed within the existing Shah Alam suit, where pre - trial directions have already been substantially complied with. The facts pleaded in the present Kuala Lumpur suit are substantially the same as those in the Shah Alam suit. To re - manage the claim in Kuala Lumpur would inevitably increase costs and duplicate effort.
Further, the Shah Alam High Court has already dealt with the factual disputes in the Shah Alam suit during the Shah Alam p interlocutory injunction application. The parties filed a combined total of nine affidavits amounting to over 3,200 pages, together with written submissions. These affidavit evidence containing averments and exhibits, were already before the Shah Alam High Court.
The Shah Alam High Court had also issued grounds of judgment in granting an ad interim injunction order dated 13.6.2025. Subsequently, during the inter - partes hearing on 8.10.2025, a consent order was entered into between parties with respect to the interlocutory injunction.
Given the substantial progress made and the Shah Alam High considerable time and resources already invested in examining the facts and merits of the case, any interruption of proceedings would cause prejudice to the Shah Alam plaintiffs and result in unnecessary wastage of judicial resources.
In Multiglow Corporation Sdn Bhd & Anor v SCG Consultants Sdn Bhd [2020] MLJU 1221, the High Court emphasised that injustice arises not only when a plaintiff pursues an action in a forum inconvenient to the defendant, but equally when a plaintiff is deprived of a timely trial. The court further cautioned that a transfer should not be granted if it would unjustly deprive the plaintiff of the advantages of the first - instance forum, and that such relief is only appropriate where there is a real and substantial connection to the alternative venue. No such connection to Kuala Lumpur exists in the present case. Accordingly, a transfer should be granted to the Shah Alam plaintiffs.
The court said : In both instances, the first step is to determine whether the first instance forum is the natural forum, or whether the forum has the closest connection with the action and the parties. The court adjudicates whether there is another forum that is more appropriate under the doctrine of comity. [58] A court must balance the interests of the parties, since there is injustice not only when a plaintiff is allowed to pursue the action in a forum inconvenient to the defendant, but also when a plaintiff is not allowed a timely trial. [59] Generally, the court will not grant a petition to transfer or an injunction if the grant unjustly will deprive the plaintiff of advantages in the first instance forum. Nevertheless, a real and substantial connection between the venue and the cause(s) of action should exist to provide defendants some protection against being pursued in jurisdictions that have little or no connection with the transaction or the parties.
SHC contends that the Shah Alam plaintiffs transfer application does not save time, costs and expenses and the interest of justice favour having the matter heard in the present Kuala Lumpur suit. The factual position is otherwise.
The Shah Alam suit and the present Kuala Lumpur suit have not progressed in parallel. Trial dates for the Shah Alam suit have been fixed for January 2027. The only remaining step is the filing of witness statements. By contrast, the present Kuala Lumpur suit remains at the pleadings stage, and no trial dates have been fixed. It is therefore not correct to say that both suits stand on equal footing.
The principle that a later suit should not impede the progress of an earlier, trial ready suit is well established. In Federal Land Development [2022] 7 MLJ 883, the High Court refused consolidation where the earlier suit was ready for trial but the later suit was still in limbo. The court held earlier suit to endure delay while the later suit caught up. The same reasoning applies here. The Shah Alam suit is ready for trial; the present Kuala Lumpur suit is not.
The court said (at page 902 - 903): It is worthy of emphasis that the very first of the defamation suits (Suit 26) attention that this Suit 843 at the same time is very much in a state of limbo in light of the pending interlocutory appeals and stay applications. [65] Given the situation on the status of the Suit 843 and the defamation suits, it is not unfair or wrong to contend that if this application is allowed, the parties in the defamation suits would most probably have to endure a long wait before they are given the opportunity of being heard or having the merits of their case adjudicated on. That is simply and patently unfair. [66] Resort to O 4 r 1 of the RC 2012 in my view is plainly unsuited in a situation where one of the suits is at an advanced stage of the proceedings, in comparison to the other. Here, the defamation suits are ready for trial and ought to have started on 26 October 2020 if not for the Movement Control Order in force then. [67] This is in contrast to this Suit 843 which has not even reached the stage of the close of pleadings. The defamation suits should therefore be allowed to proceed in a just, expeditious and economical manner unimpeded by the status of this Suit 843. And this is not to mention the complexity about the multiplicity of parties and legal representations in this
The court had also raised an essential point that bears relation to our case. Namely, that prejudice would manifest where the roles of the parties are reversed in the different suits or if some parties are not included as parties in the other suit. The court observed (at page 897 - 899) : The paramount consideration in this encl 206 is whether there would be risks of inconsistent findings and decisions in respect of the common issues if Suit 843 and defamation suits are tried separately (see the Court of Appeal decision in Jaya Sudhir a/l Jayaram v Nautical Supreme Sdn Bhd). [40] First, there is the weighty issue about the different capacities of the parties in the different suits. For some, their roles are reversed. For instance, the plaintiffs in the defamation suits are the fifth, sixth and seventh defendants in this Suit 843. [44] It is also to be observed that when there are parties in one suit who are not parties in the other suit, the application should be refused. In the case of Ng Joo Soon it was held that : [15] especially to third parties like the 2nd and 3rd Defendants who are not parties in both proceedings if the application was allowed. Under such circumstances, it would certainly not be desirable for the application to be allowed. [45] Here, out of the total 26 parties in the defamation suits and this Suit 843, there are only four parties that are present in both. These 22 parties would suffer prejudice and embarrassment if this application is allowed. [46] In other words, although it may seem that time and costs would be saved, that would not actually be the case in view of the different plaintiffs, different causes of action, different issues and different arguments. Indisputably, a consolidation in this case would not outweigh any savings on time and costs, and serve only to complicate and delay the just, expeditious and economical disposal of especially the defamation suits and this Suit 843. [47] It should also be observed that in MBf Capital Bhd & Anor v Tommy Thomas & Anor [1998] MLJU 506; [1998] 3 CLJ Supp 390 the High Court in disallowing the consolidation application held that a litigant should not have to pay for unnecessary cost to spend time listening to matters and evidence that do not concern him
The prejudice in our case is plain.
The Shah Alam suit is ready for trial; the Kuala Lumpur suit is not. Trial dates have been fixed in the Shah Alam High Court, and pre - trial case management directions have been complied with. In contrast, the present Kuala Lumpur suit is still at the pleadings stage and there are three interlocutory applications pending disposal at this Kuala Lumpur High Court. Namely, this transfer application and the two striking out applications by the remaining 93 defendants for lack of jurisdiction of the Kuala Lumpur High Court, in light of the Kota Kinabalu suit.
The present Kuala Lumpur suit involves 109 defendants, most of whom have no connection to the Shah Alam suit dispute. The Shah Alam plaintiffs are merely six out of 109 defendants in the present Kuala Lumpur suit. Conclusion
For the reasons above, I allowed application in Enclosure 34. I ordered costs in the cause. Dated 2 January 2026 Quay Chew Soon Judge High Court of Kuala Lumpur (Commercial Division NCC 2 & Admiralty 9) Counsels Kwan Will Sen, Lee Suan Cui and Celin Khoo Roong Ten (Messrs. Lim Chee Wee Partnership) for the Plaintiff Alicia Sabrina Gomez (Messrs. Tommy Thomas) for the 1st to 16th, 18th to 39th, 42nd to 44th, 46th to 47th, 49th to 54th, 56th, 58th, 60th, and 62nd to 108th Defendants Case reference 1. Low Long Yoong & Anor v Lok Kok Choon & Anor [2014] 4 CLJ 577 2. Export - Import Bank of Malaysia Bhd v Chan Toh Pew & Ors [2025] MLJU 1987 3. S L Ng Trading Agency Sdn Bhd v Tohtonku Sdn Bhd [2025] 9 MLJ 946 4. Liziz Plantation v Liew Ah Yong [2021] 10 MLJ 360 5. Multiglow Corporation Sdn Bhd & Anor v SCG Consultants Sdn Bhd [2020] MLJU 1221 6. Abdul Samad & Ors [2022] 7 MLJ 883 Legislation reference 1. Order 4 rule 1, Order 57 rule 1 and Order 92 rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012

Catchwords

Parties

See Hong Cheen @ See Hong Chen - plaintiff - ejudgment_parties

1. ) CHEE CHI NYEN - defendant - ejudgment_parties

2. ) CHEE CHI VUI - defendant - ejudgment_parties

3. ) CHEE CHI SENG - defendant - ejudgment_parties

4. ) CHEE CHI VUN - defendant - ejudgment_parties

5. ) LEE HYEN YAN - defendant - ejudgment_parties