Selvarajan A/L Veeriah v Bangsar Aman Management Corporation (WA-22NCvC-777-12/2024)

BANGSAR AMAN MANAGEMENT CORPORATION

KARTHIGASU A/L K. RATNASINGAM

FOO JIA–HOU

ANG LING LING

ADRIAN HO TUCK DJI

RUBAN SATKUNA NATHAN

PLANET GARDENS SDN BHD (NO. SYARIKAT: 201101002535 (930672-A)) 21/01/2026 00:24:19 WA-22NCvC-777-12/2024 Kand. 230 GUAMAN SIVIL NO: WA-22NCvC-777-12/2024 8. LIEW TZE HANN

ISAAC DANIEL (NO. K/P: 641009-10-5563) …DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (re 7th & 8th Defendants’ Striking-out Application) Introduction [1] Nine parties are named in this civil suit as defendants. The Plaintiff prays for various orders against them respectively, in respect of a small strata development consisting of only 12 units of apartments. [2] The subject matter herein is the 7th and 8th Defendants’ application to strike-out the Plaintiff's claim against them, on the ground that it is frivolous and vexatious, and an abuse of process of court. [3] The sole issue for determination is whether the Plaintiff’s claim against the 7th and 8th Defendants is obviously unsustainable. The principles applicable to a striking-out application under Order 18 rule 19 Rules of Court 2012 are trite, as expounded in Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36. [4] On the facts, I find that there is no basis whatsoever for the Plaintiff to make any claim against the 7th and 8th Defendants in this civil suit. It was an abuse of court process for the Plaintiff to have named them as co-defendants in this civil suit. Therefore, I decided to allow their striking-out application. My reasons are explained in detail below. Background Facts [5] The Plaintiff and his sister – who has been named as a third party in this suit – are co-proprietors of one unit of apartment in the small strata development known as Bangsar Aman in Kuala Lumpur consisting of only 12 units of apartments. [6] The 7th Defendant is the proprietor of several units of apartments in Bangsar Aman while the 8th Defendant is a director of the 7th Defendant company. [7] The Plaintiff’s sister, who is the Plaintiff’s co-proprietor of his unit, served as a treasurer of the 1st Defendant (management corporation). The Plaintiff’s Claim against the 7th & 8th Defendants [8] The Plaintiff’s Statement of Claim is very lengthy; the English translation is 120 pages long. However, as against the 7th and 8th Defendants, there is no direct allegation against them pleaded by the Plaintiff. [9] It appears that the Plaintiff is merely making an unsubstantiated allegation that all the Defendants, including the 7th and 8th Defendants, have conspired to injure him. The 7th & 8th Defendants’ Contention [10] The 7th Defendant contends that the Plaintiff has no locus standi to be suing it. [11] The 8th Defendant is just a director of the 7th Defendant company. He contends that the Plaintiff has no reasonable cause of action against him. Analysis of the Law and Facts [12] In Renault SA v Inokom Corp Sdn Bhd & Anor [2010] 5 MLJ 394, the Court of Appeal allowed an appeal and issued a striking-out order pursuant to O.18 r.19 Rules of Court 2012. The Court of Appeal expounded the law on tort of conspiracy. The following passages are illuminating: “[32] In regard to the tort of conspiracy, the following need to be satisfied at this interlocutory stage:

an agreement between two or more persons (that is an agreement between Tan Chong and others);

an agreement for the purpose of injuring Inokom and Quasar;

that acts done in execution of that agreement resulted in damage to Inokom and Quasar;

damage is an essential element and where damage is not pleaded the statement of claim may be struck out. (see Yap JH v Tan Sri Loh Boon Siew & Ors [1991] 4 CLJ (Rep) 243). [33] It is clear that the very first element to be shown must be an agreement between two or more persons for the purpose of injuring Inokom and Quasar. ‘Agreement’ is not limited to a signed and sealed agreement but any informal agreement, including a combination of efforts of the alleged co-conspirators. After that, it has to be shown or at least alleged that acts were done in execution of that agreement which resulted in damage to Inokom and Quasar. In this case, the acts done would have to be unlawful, namely, the alleged false representation made by Renault to Inokom and Quasar as to the level of investment Inokom and Quasar wiil have to make for the Kangoo project. [34] It is trite law that the agreement to injure must come first (in other words the agreement should have crystallised), before the alleged unlawful acts are done in execution or pursuant to the agreement. [35] Inokom and Quasar have pleaded in the statement of claim that the agreement or conspiracy to injure was made sometime in the year 2001 (para 41 of the statement of claim):

Sometime in 2001, the representatives from the 1st and 2nd Defendants wrongfully and maliciously conspired and combined amongst themselves to defraud and to injure the Plaintiffs in their said businesses. [36] Inokom and Quasar have also pleaded that the alleged representation was first made by Renault during discussions with Inokom and Quasar regarding the Kangoo project in the year 2000 (paras 30(7) and (8) of the statement of claim):

…

In accordance with …, the Plaintiffs and the 1st Defendant had, sometime in the year 2000, further discussed the possibility of the 1st Plaintiff assembling, manufacturing and distributing the Renault Kangoo model vehicles in Malaysia.

The 1st Defendant had represented to the Plaintiffs that in order for the Renault Kangoo vehicles to be assembled, manufactured and distributed by the 1st Plaintiff in Malaysia, the 1st Plaintiff ought to invest a sum of about USD27 million (equivalent to about RM102.6 million with an exchange rate of 3.8). [37] Inokom and Quasar have never denied the fact that the alleged representation was first made by Renault to them in the year 2000. [38] We are unanimous that there cannot in law and in fact conceivably be an agreement or combination or conspiracy between Renault and Tan Chong to injure Inokom and Quasar when the alleged representation was pleaded to have been made in 2000 and the alleged conspiracy was pleaded to have occurred in 2001. [39] The alleged representation was made only by Renault to Inokom and Quasar. The court cannot draw, from Inokom’s and Quasar’s bare allegation that Renault had made the alleged representation to them, an inference or conclusion that Renault and Tan Chong had conspired in any way in the making of the said representation. [40] We are unanimous that there is no cause of action in the tort of conspiracy against Tan Chong. The appeal is allowed. The statement of claim against Tan Chong is struck off. APPEAL NO W-03–116 OF 2004 [41] Moving on to consider the appeal by TC Euro with regards to its application to strike off the writ and statement of claim, it is noted that the statement of claim consisting of 45 paragraphs in all, upon being stripped of its extensive assertions against Renault and Tan Chong, has directed only four paragraphs against TC Euro in support of Inokom’s and Quasar’s RM150,000,000 claim for conspiracy to injure… [42] There is no allegation of any overt acts carried out by TC Euro in the pleadings and by necessary implication TC Euro had not carried out any overt acts.The gist of the tort of conspiracy is not the conspirational agreement alone but that agreement plus the overt acts causing damage (Marrinam v Vibart [1963] 1 QB 234 , affirmed [1963] 1 QB 528). Pleading. The Statement of Claim should describe who the several parties are and their relationship with each other. It should allege the agreement between the defendants to conspire, and state precisely what was the purpose or what were the objects of the alleged conspiracy, and it must then proceed to set forth, with clarity and precision, the overt acts which are alleged to have been done by each of the alleged conspirators in pursuance and in furtherance of the conspiracy; and lastly, it must allege the injury and damages occasioned to the plaintiff thereby. (THE COMMON LAW LIBRARY — Number 5 — PRECEDENTS OF PLEADINGS — Section 26 — CONSPIRACY). [43] It is to be noted that besides the absence of allegations of overt acts on the part of TC Euro the statement of claim has also failed to plead the agreement between the defendants to conspire and state precisely what was the purpose or what were the objects of the alleged conspiracy. The statement of claim has also failed to set forth with clarity and precision the overt acts which are alleged to have been done by each of the alleged conspirators in pursuance and in furtherance of the conspiracy. [44] According to the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, (7th Ed), ‘conspiracy’ means ‘a secret plan by a group of people to do something harmful or illegal’. [47] Going by the dictionary definition of ‘conspiracy’ there could never have been any conspiracy when all element of secrecy is lost, because Inokom and Quasar themselves were informed and had full knowledge of Tan Chong’s action. [48] We are unanimous that there is no cause of action in the tort of conspiracy as against TC Euro. The statement of claim is vexatious and frivolous. Just as fraud must be pleaded with great particularity, so must the constituent ingredients of the alleged conspiracy by TC. Euro be pleaded. In the circumstances, for reasons already stated, the appeal is allowed and the statement of claim against TC Euro is struck off. [13] There is simply no basis for the Plaintiff to allege any conspiracy involving the 7th and 8th Defendants. The 7th Defendant is just another proprietor of apartments within Bangsar Aman while the 8th Defendant is the director of the 7th Defendant company. They are equally liable to pay Maintenance Charges and Sinking Fund contribution. There could be no agreement between the 7th and 8th Defendants with the other Defendants which could possibly amount to a conspiracy to injure the Plaintiff – who is also just another proprietor of an apartment within the same development. [14] Further, the Plaintiff has no right whatsoever to be suing the 7th and 8th Defendants for their arrears in Maintenance Charges and Sinking Fund contribution. Only the 1st Defendant (the Management Corporation of Bangsar Aman) has the statutory power to mount a claim against the 7th and 8th Defendants – which is already being done. [15] The fact that the Plaintiff’s sister/co-proprietor for his unit (the 3rd Party in this civil suit) was the treasurer of the MC is an additional fact that militates against the Plaintiff’s unsubstantiated allegation of conspiracy to injure him. If there were indeed fraud in the expenditure of the MC – as alleged by the Plaintiff – the first person who ought to have lodged a police report for fraud ought to have been the treasurer, i.e. the Plaintiff’s sister who is a co-proprietor of his unit. At the very least, she ought to have lodged a report with the Commissioner of Buildings – if she had really detected any fraud as alleged by her brother (the Plaintiff). This is an additional point that goes towards showing that the Plaintiff has no cogent reason to justify adding the 7th and 8th Defendant into this suit as a defendant. Conclusion [16] It is my judgment that it was an abuse of process of court for the Plaintiff to have named the 7th and 8th Defendant in his suit against the MC and the committee members – which actually included his own sister (treasurer) at the material time. A striking-out order would be justified where there is abuse of process of court. [17] Based on Renault SA v Inokom Corp Sdn Bhd (supra), I am satisfied that the Plaintiff’s pleaded case against the 7th and 8th Defendants is obviously unsustainable. I am therefore constrained to allow the 7th and 8th Defendant’s application to strike out the Plaintiff’s claim against them. Date of Decision: 30th October 2025 ………………………… Gan Techiong Judicial Commissioner High Court of Malaya at Kuala Lumpur (NCvC9) Plaintiff acting in person (Absent without reason) Counsel for the 1st Defendant: Sarah Ho Yixin (Tan Yoong Chang with her) SOLICITORS FOR THE 1ST DEFENDANT: MESSRS SREENEVASAN Advocates & Solicitors Suites B-1C & D, Level, Block B The Five @ Kompleks Pejabat Damansara, Jalan Dungun, Damansara Heights, 50490 KUALA LUMPUR. Counsel for the 2nd Defendant: Syahana Binti Azhari SOLICITORS FOR THE 2ND DEFENDANT: MESSRS NANDRAJOG Advocates & Solicitors 3-9-9, Tower 3, UOA Business Park, 1, Jalan Pengaturcara U1/51, Kawasan Perindustrian Temasya, 40150 SHAH ALAM, SELANGOR. Counsel for the 3rd-6th Defendants: Pavitra Pillai A/P Ramesh Pillai (James Lau Jian Hui with her) SOLICITORS FOR THE 3RD-6TH DEFENDANTS: MESSRS M DAVID MORAIS Advocates & Solicitors 274, Lorong Maarof, Bukit Bandaraya, 59100 KUALA LUMPUR. Counsel for the 7th-8th Defendants: Tong Wei Chen SOLICITORS FOR THE 7TH-8TH DEFENDANTS: MESSRS YAP LIEW & PARTNERS Advocates & Solicitors No. 89 Jalan Ara, Bangsar Baru 59100 KUALA LUMPUR CASES REFERRED TO:

Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36.

Renault SA v Inokom Corp Sdn Bhd & Anor [2010] 5 MLJ 394

Order 18 rule 19 Rules of Court 2012.