Semantan Estate (1952) Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Malaysia (08(f)-250-07/2025(W))

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PESURUHJAYA TANAH PERSEKUTUAN

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PENGARAH TANAH DAN GALIAN (WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN) PENDAFTAR HAKMILIK (WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN) … RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN DALAM MAHKAMAH PERSEKUTUAN MALAYSIA BIDANG KUASA RAYUAN PERMOHONAN SIVIL NO.: 08(f)-251-07/2025(W) ANTARA SEMANTAN ESTATE (1952) SDN. BHD. … PEMOHON DAN PENDAFTAR HAKMILIK (WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN) … RESPONDEN

I agree with the reasoning in the broad grounds of judgement of Her Ladyship Chief Judge of the High Court of Malaya (CJM).

I wish to add on the specific issue regarding the scope and effect of the 2009 High Court Order by the learned Judicial Commissioner Zura binti Yahya.

The present leave applications fall to be decided by reference to the 2009 High Court Order by the learned JC.

This issue arose because the applicant in relying on the same, submitted that the subject land should be transferred and registered in the applicant’s name.

The salient feature of the 2009 High Court Order is that the applicant was declared to have retained its beneficial interest in the said Land. At the material time, it bears emphasis that the said Land was registered in the respondent’s name, and the Order did not direct its transfer or registration in the applicant’s name. The declaration was therefore confined to the recognition of the applicant’s beneficial interest as against the Government, without conferring any registrable interest under the National Land Code 1965 (NLC). This determination has since been affirmed up to the Federal Court, including the dismissal of the respondent’s leave and review applications in 2012 and 2018 respectively.

Accordingly, the 2009 High Court Order remains conclusive as to the applicant’s rights. It establishes only a beneficial interest and not a registrable title, and this settled position governs the present leave applications before this Court.

The applicant’s present contention that the said Land ought now to be transferred and registered in its name is therefore inconsistent with the settled legal position established by the 2009 High Court Order. The learned JC had not ordered any such transfer or registration; rather, the declaration was confined to the recognition of a beneficial interest and a corresponding right to possession as against the Government. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal was correct in holding that the applicant’s interest remained equitable and not registrable.

The Federal Court discussed the distinction between a registered interest and a beneficial interest under the National Land Code 1965 (“NLC”) in Yeo Ping Tieng & Ors v Elitprop Sdn Bhd [2019] MLJU

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Applying the principles in Yeo Ping Tieng to the present matter, the 2009 High Court Order did no more than declare that the applicant retained its beneficial interest in the said Land. The Order did not direct the transfer or registration of the Land in the applicant’s name. It therefore recognised only an equitable entitlement and not a registrable interest under the NLC.

In the context of this leave application under section 96(a) and (b) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, the question whether the applicant possesses a registrable or beneficial interest does not raise any novel or unsettled principle of law. The Courts of Appeal merely applied established doctrine distinguishing between registered and beneficial ownership. In my view, the determination that the applicant’s rights are confined to the beneficial interest declared in the 2009 High Court Order involves no issue of general public importance or constitutional interpretation warranting further consideration by this Court.

The Court of Appeal, in construing the 2009 High Court Order, did not alter its substance; it merely affirmed its legal character as a declaratory pronouncement. This is not novel.

Having considered the written and oral submissions of the parties, as well as the helpful observations of learned amicus curiae, I agree with Her Ladyship CJM that none of the proposed questions of law advanced by the applicant meets the statutory threshold prescribed under section 96(a) or section 96(b) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964.

The central premise of the applicant’s case rests upon the 2009 High Court Order made by the learned JC. That order, as the record makes clear, was purely declaratory in nature—recognising the applicant’s beneficial interest and entitlement as against the Government, but issuing no operative order for transfer or registration of the land.

In conclusion, the issues now advanced seek to reopen findings that are both settled in law and final in their appellate disposition. The matters raised do not disclose any novel or arguable question of general principle or constitutional importance; rather, they concern the proper application of well-established doctrines distinguishing beneficial from registrable interests.

Accordingly, we find no merit in the present applications for leave to appeal.

Consequently, I agree that the matter should be remitted to the High Court for the assessment of adequate compensation as ordered by the Court of Appeal. -Sgd-HANIPAH BINTI FARIKULLAH