Sensation Network Sdn. Bhd. v Hong Leong Bank Berhad (WA-12BNCvC-67-07/2025)

Ini adalah rayuan terhadap keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen yang telah menolak tuntutan Perayu (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai Plaintif). Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen juga memerintahkan agar Responden (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai Defendan) memulangkan RM100,000.00 kepada Plaintif tanpa memberikan faedah.

Plaintif dan Defendan telah menandatangani perjanjian perkhidmatan induk standard antara bank dengan pembekal perkhidmatan luar pada 02.01.2019. Tarikh bermulanya perjanjian itu adalah 02.01.2019. Tarikh tamat perjanjian ialah pada 02.01.2022.

Adapun perjanjian itu adalah untuk Plaintif membekalkan kepada Defendan saudagar-saudagar yang berkelayakan untuk program perkhidmatan luar Defendan.

Pada 20.05.2021, Defendan telah menamatkan perjanjian tersebut. Defendan dikatakan telah membekalkan maklumat yang dibekalkan Plaintif kepada pihak ketiga.

Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah memerintahkan bahawa penamatan kontrak itu dibuat menurut klausa 14.1. Perjanjian tersebut. Ia berdasarkan keterangan saksi Defendan. Di samping itu, ia turut disahkan oleh Plaintif. Dapatan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen ini dapat dilihat di para 34, 35, 36 dan 37 Alasan Penghakiman. Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen berpendapat penamatan itu bukannya kesalahan untuk mencapai sasaran penghakiman.

Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen juga berpendapat notis penamatan bertarikh 20.05.2021 adalah sah dan teratur. Di samping itu, Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen juga berpendapat bahawa seksyen 158 dan 159 Akta Kontrak, 1950 tidak terpakai dalam kes ini. Ia adalah disebabkan ia tidak diplidkan dalam Penyata Tuntutan Plaintif. Perjanjian ini adalah perjanjian perkhidmatan dan bukannya perjanjian agensi.

Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen juga berpendapat Defendan di bawah klausa 12 mempunyai hak eksklusif untuk melantik pembekal perkhidmatan lain. Oleh itu, Defendan boleh melantik pembekal perkhidmatan selepas tamatnya kontrak di antara Plaintif dan Defendan.

Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen juga berpendapat Plaintif sebagai "agen" tidak mempunyai hak kepada maklumat-maklumat perhubungan dengan saudagar-saudagar. Defendan tiada hak untuk memberikan maklumat-maklumat itu kepada pihak ketiga. Malahan, di bawah klausa 9.2.(a) perjanjian perkhidmatan itu Plaintif berkewajipan memulangkan data dan maklumat tersebut kepada Defendan. Ia telah diakui oleh Plaintif sendiri semasa memberikan keterangan menurut Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen.

Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah memerintahkan pemulangan deposit RM100,000.00 tanpa sebarang faedah. Ini disebabkan tiada peruntukan berkenaan faedah kepada pemulangan deposit di dalam perjanjian perkhidmatan tersebut. Undang-undang berkaitan dengan rayuan

Adalah sudah terang lagi bersuluh prinsip-prinsip berkenaan keadaan bilakah Mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan campur tangan terhadap keputusan Hakim bicara, ia boleh dilakukan sekiranya terdapat kesilapan yang ketara oleh Hakim bicara atau Hakim bicara gagal meneliti keterangan-keterangan secara kehakiman Ng Hoo Kui v. Wendy Tan Lee Peng Administrator of The Estate of Tan Ewe Kwang, Deceased & Ors [2020] 10 CLJ 1, Gan Yook Chin & Anor v. Lee Tng Chin & Ors [2004] 4 CLJ 309, Watt or Thomas v. Thomas [1947] AC 484.

Persoalan dalam kes ini adakah terdapat kesilapan ketara atau Hakim bicara gagal menilai keterangan secara kehakiman untuk campur tangan keputusan dan dapatan Hakim bicara. Bagi menjawab persoalan ini Mahkamah perlu meneliti Alasan Penghakiman dan meneliti nota prosiding.

Penelitian kepada Alasan Penghakiman, nota prosiding dan memorandum rayuan serta hubungan pihak-pihak adalah didapati bahawa pertelingkahan berkenaan sama ada perjanjian di antara Plaintif adalah perjanjian perkhidmatan atau perjanjian agensi. Ini adalah disebabkan di sebalik menentukan ianya bukan perjanjian agensi, Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah mengungkapkan bahawa Plaintif adalah agen kepada Defendan berkaitan dengan maklumat-maklumat saudagar-saudagar perniagaan yang dikatakan Defendan tidak boleh menyebarkan maklumat itu kepada pihak ketiga.

Adakah dapatan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen bahawa perjanjian itu adalah perjanjian perkhidmatan dan bukan perjanjian agensi? Di dalam Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency, $ 2 0^{th} $ Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, Thompson Reuters, 2014, muka surat 1 yang menyatakan seperti berikut:

Agency is the fiduciary relationship which exists between two persons, one of whom expressly or impliedly manifests assent that the other should acts on his behalf so as to affect his relations with third parties, and the other of whom similarly manifests assent so to act or so acts pursuant to the manifestation. The one on whose behalf the act or acts are to be done is called the principal. The one whose behalf the act or acts are to be done is called the agent. Any person other than the principal and the agent may be referred to as a third party.

In respect of the acts to which the principal so assents, the agent is said to have authority to act; and this authority constitutes a power to affect the principal's legal relations with third parties.

Where the agent's authority results from a manifestation of assent that he should represent or act for the principal expressly or impliedly made by the principal to the agent himself, the authority is called actual authority, express or implied. But the agent may also have authority resulting from such a manifestation made by the principal to a third party; such authority is called apparent authority.

A person may have the same fiduciary relationship with a principal where he acts on behalf of that principal but has no authority to affect the principal's relations with third parties. Because of the fiduciary relationship such a person may also be called an agent.

Rujukan kepada teks kontrak itu menunjukkan bahawa tiada keterangan yang dikemukakan di hadapan Hakim bicara untuk memutuskan sebaliknya. Ia dapat dilihat mengatakan "Standard Master Service Agreement Between The Bank and The Outsourcing Service Providers", Plaintif di dalam perjanjian tersebut dirujuk sebagai "the service provider". Perkhidmatan yang diberikan dinyatakan di bawah jadual ketiga perjanjian tersebut obligasi kedua-dua pihak juga dinyatakan Appendix B dan C perjanjian.

Mahkamah ini berpendapat tiada alasan atau asas yang membolehkan Mahkamah ini campur tangan dengan dapatan Hakim bicara bahawa perjanjian itu adalah perjanjian perkhidmatan.

Adalah menjadi prinsip bahawa Mahkamah di dalam mentakrifkan terma kontrak adalah tamat dengan terma yang dipersetujui oleh pihak-pihak SPM Membrane, Switch Sdn. Bhd. v. Kerajaan Negeri Selangor [2016] 1 MLJ 464. Mahkamah dalam terma berkaitan penamatan kontrak ia perlu dilakukan taksiran yang ketat Catajaya Sdn. Bhd. v. Shoppoint Sdn. Bhd. & Ors [2021] 2 MLJ 374. [60] The judicial observations in the authorities as we have stated above represent a clear, consistent and principled approach that termination clauses in a contract must be interpreted strictly. Both the High Court and the Court of Appeal in the instant appeal viewed that termination clauses must be interpreted strictly. In fact the Court of Appeal in its Judgment reminded itself that: ... adopting such an approach does not mean that the general rule of interpretation of the contract as enunciated in Berjaya Times Square's case (supra) should not be adhered too. Therefore the clear meaning and intent of section 11 read with section 13 (sic) must be given effect and considered against the backdrop of the parties' intention during the negotiation leading to the agreement.

Mahkamah ini mendapati Hakim bicara telah memutuskan penamatan kontrak oleh Defendan adalah berdasarkan fasal-fasal di dalam kontrak tersebut. Hakim bicara didapati merujuk kepada fasal-fasal kontrak yang berkaitan sebagai asas kepada dapatannya. Jika terdapat dapatan Hakim bicara yang tidak disokong dengan keterangan Mahkamah ini berkewajipan untuk campur tangan.

Isu sama ada dapatan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen yang berdasarkan kepada keterangan saksi-saksi dan terma-terma perjanjian dipersetujui oleh Mahkamah ini bukannya penentu kepada campur tangan Mahkamah ini. Apa yang penting dapatan ini dibuat berdasarkan keterangan yang ada di hadapan Hakim bicara. Ia bukannya dapatan yang ketara kesilapannya.

Pada hemat Mahkamah ini, Mahkamah Rayuan tidak sewajarnya campur tangan dengan dapatan Hakim bicara semata-mata tidak bersetuju dengan dapatan tersebut. Ini adalah disebabkan pertimbangan berikut:

Hakim bicara berpeluang melihat saksi-saksi memberi keterangan. Tingkah laku saksi yang relevan semasa memberi keterangan boleh dilihat oleh Mahkamah. Ia boleh dijadikan asas untuk memutuskan sama ada keterangan tersebut kredibel dan keterangannya boleh diterima atau ditolak.

Hakim bicara telah menjalani latihan ikhtisas dalam undang-undang. Hakim bicara adalah diharapkan dapat menilai keterangan berdasarkan prinsip undang-undang. Perbezaan pandangan di antara Mahkamah bicara dan Mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan tidak boleh dijadikan asas untuk menganggu dapatan Hakim bicara.

Penelitian kepada duluan kehakiman adalah didapati Mahkamah adalah jarang untuk campur tangan keputusan Hakim bicara melainkan terdapat kesilapan yang ketara, keputusan dan dapatan tidak berdasarkan kepada keterangan saksi-saksi. la adalah penting bagi mewujudkan keyakinan dan kepercayaan kepada Hakim bicara menjalankan perbicaraan dengan adil dan berpandukan kepada undang-undang serta membuat dapatan yang wajar. Hakim bicara tidak wajar dibayangi dengan kebimbangan dapatannya akan diketepikan oleh Mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan.

Oleh itu, Hakim bicara hendaklah memastikan dapatan dan keputusan dilakukan dengan sentiasa berlandaskan prinsip undang-undang. Hakim bicara hendaklah meneliti, menimbang dan menilai keterangan-keterangan sebelum membuat dapatan dan keputusan. Adalah amalan yang baik dan molek untuk penganalisaan keterangan-keterangan yang menjadi asas kepada dapatan Hakim bicara dicerminkan di dalam Alasan Penghakiman. Ini bagi membolehkan Hakim rayuan memutuskan dengan tepat tanpa tersasar daripada dapatan yang dibuat oleh Hakim bicara.

Dalam kes ini, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa dapatan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen bahawa maklumat yang diperolehi oleh Plaintif adalah kepunyaan Defendan disebabkan Plaintif adalah agen kepada Defendan tidak bermakna Plaintif dan Defendan memasuki perjanjian agensi. la pada hemat Mahkamah hanya ungkapan bagi menunjukkan perhubungan Plaintif dan Defendan berkenaan maklumat tersebut. la bukannya satu hubungan kontraktual Plaintif dan Defendan di bawah perjanjian agensi.

Setelah Hakim bicara memutuskan bahawa perjanjian tersebut adalah perjanjian perkhidmatan dan bukan perjanjian agensi yang diperolehi oleh Mahkamah ini, maka Hakim bicara dengan tepat memutuskan bahawa seksyen 158 dan 159 Akta Kontrak 1950 tidak terpakai dalam kes ini. Kegagalan Hakim bicara

Peguam Perayu yang bijaksana di dalam hujahannya telah membangkitkan beberapa kekhilafan yang dilakukan oleh Hakim bicara. Kekhilafan tersebut adalah Hakim bicara tidak mempertimbangkan bahawa Defendan telah gagal memberikan notis kepada Plaintif untuk memperbaiki sasaran pengrekutan. Ini menyebabkan Hakim bicara gagal mempertimbangkan bahawa Defendan telah melanggar kewajipan suci hati (good faith) dalam kontrak.

Suci hati di dalam undang-undang kontrak telah dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Lai Fee & Anor v. Wong Yu Vee & Ors [2023] 3 MLJ 503 para 61 & 70 seperti berikut: [61] In our considered view, the principle that the law does not expect people to arrange their affairs on the basis that others may commit fraud is not inconsistent with the principle of free consent under the Contracts Act. We say this because the Contracts Act starts on the assumption that all contracts are valid. It is only if it can be proved that the consent was procured by coercion, fraud, misrepresentation or undue influence, then the contract becomes voidable at the option of the innocent party. [70] For the reasons adverted to in paras [38]----[67] above, we answer question 3 in the affirmative. We are of the view that the principle that the law does not expect people to arrange their affairs on the basis that others may commit fraud is representative of the position of Malaysian law. This principle is consonant with the Contracts Act which underlines the importance of free consent in a contract. Free consent is an integral part of the process of negotiations preceding the contract; and this underscores the duty of good faith in the creation of a contract, ie, the duty to act honestly. Namun, penelitian kepada kes tersebut ia adalah berkaitan dengan perbincangan kontrak yang dikatakan melibatkan salah nyataan (misrepresentation) dan fraud.

Adalah dapat difahami bahawa suci hati di dalam undang-undang kontrak di Malaysia diterima masuk sebagai terma tersebut di dalam sebuah kontrak. Ia dinamakan oleh mereka oleh Ng Seng Yi di dalam artikelnya berjudul Good Faith in Contract Law: The Malaysian Perspective 50 (2) JMCL 39, di muka surat 56. Pragmatism is important in the common law of contract.147 The doctrine of good faith is a telling example. As a matter of general rule, Malaysia does not recognise a general duty of good faith in contracts. However, the general rule is not absolute. Like the position in England and Singapore, Malaysia has developed the law on a piecemeal basis through contractual implied terms. It is opined that the Malaysian approach is satisfactory and pragmatic for two reasons. First, it acknowledges that good faith is already inherent in Malaysian contract law. However, it does not necessarily translate into an actionable general duty of good faith. In many instances, the existing contract law principles are self-sufficient. Second, context is crucial. It is only when the tests of implied terms are satisfied to render a duty of good faith necessary and without it the contract will not work, the court will imply a duty of good faith by law and/or in fact into contracts. However, the introduction of 'relational' contracts in Yam Seng may pose challenges as to whether a general duty of good faith can be implied into such contracts. It is hoped that the court will clarify the scope and implications of a relational contract vis-à-vis the application of a general duty of good faith in the near future. If the parties intend to impose a duty of good faith, they should expressly stipulate so in the contract. This pragmatic approach does not derogate from the established rules of contract law. It is more likely to respect the intention of the parties than a general overriding duty of good faith. It affirms the importance of the freedom of contract and contractual certainty. At this juncture, one will certainly remember the words of Lord Steyn delivered in a lecture, where his Lordship said: I have no heroic suggestion for the introduction of a general duty of good faith in our contract law. It is not necessary. As long as our courts always respect the reasonable expectations of parties, our contract law can satisfactorily be left to develop in accordance with its own pragmatic traditions. And where in specific contexts duties of good faith are imposed on parties, our legal system can readily accommodate such a well-tried notion. Pertimbangan yang menarik berkenaan dengan suci hati dalam kontrak dapat dilihat di dalam kes Pantai Medical Centre Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Suresh Kumar Hariharan [2026] CLJU 561 para 33, yang menyatakan seperti berikut:

We are of the following view regarding the issue of whether there exists a Contractual Duty (Good Faith) in the performance of a Right/Obligation/Discretion:

a Contractual Duty (Good Faith) may exist on a construction of all the relevant provisions of the contract in question. In this regard, we rely on the following judgment of Lord Sumption JSC in British Telecommunications, at [37] - [37] The manner in which English law ensures that contractual effect is given to the art 8 objectives is by treating BT's discretion under cl 12 as limited. As a general rule, the scope of a contractual discretion will depend on the nature of the discretion and the construction of the language conferring it. But it is well established that in the absence of very clear language to the contrary, a contractual discretion must be exercised in good faith and not arbitrarily or capriciously: Abu Dhabi National Tanker Co v. Product Star Shipping Ltd, The Product Star (No 2) [1993] 1 Lloyd's Rep 397 (per Leggatt LJ at 404); Gan Insurance Co Ltd v. Tai Ping Insurance Co Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1047, [2001] 2 All ER (Comm) 299 (per Mance LJ at [67]); Paragon Finance plc v. Staunton, Paragon Finance plc v. Nash [2001] EWCA Civ 1466, [2002] 2 All ER 248, [2002] 1 WLR 685 (per Dyson LJ at [39]-[41]). This will normally mean that it must be exercised consistently with its contractual purpose: see Ludgate Insurance Co Ltd v. Citibank NA [1998] Lloyd's Rep IR 221 (per Brooke LJ at 239- 240); Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Hyman [2000] 3 All ER 961 (per Lord Steyn and Lord Cooke of Thorndon at 970 and 972), [2002] 1 AC 408 (at 459 and 461)..." (emphasis added);

if a contract is silent on a Contractual Duty (Good Faith), the court may imply a Contractual Duty (Good Faith) if the following two tests are fulfilled cumulatively-

the "officious bystander' test; and

the "business efficacy' test [2 Cumulative Tests (Implied Term)]. Our Federal Court has applied the 2 Cumulative Tests (Implied Term) in Sababumi, at p. 169 to 170, as follows: "Reverting to the first type of implied term which is dependent on a court drawing an inference as explained above, there are two tests to fix the parties with such an intention, ie that the parties must have intended to include such an implied term in the contract. The first test is a subjective test, as stated by MacKinnon LJ in Shirlaw v. Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd [1939] 2 KB 206 at p 227, that such a term to be implied by a court is 'something so obvious that it goes without saying, so that if, while the parties were making their bargain, an officious bystander were to suggest some express provision for it in the agreement, they would testily suppress his with a common "Oh, of course". The second test is that the implied term should be of a kind that will give business efficacy to the transaction of the contract of both parties. The test was described by Lord Wright in Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd & Ors v. Cooper [1941] AC 108 at p 137, that in regard to an implied term, '... it can be predicated that "It goes without saying", some term not expressed but necessary to give the transaction such business efficacy as the parties must have intended.' Business efficacy in my opinion, simply means the desired result of the business in question. Both tests in my opinion must be satisfied before a court infers an implied term. Thus, Lord Wilberforce in Liverpool City Council v. Irwin & Anor [1977] AC 239 at p 254 spoke of an implied term as a matter of necessity, so that the element of 'business efficacy is inseparable'. Lord Simon of Glaisdale in BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v. Hastings Shire Council (1977) 16 ALR 363 described both tests as conditions the compliance of which the court must be satisfied, in addition to what I may describe as other requirements, of existing law. Closer to home, Chong Siew Fai J (as he then was) in Yap Nyo Nyok v. Bath Pharmacy Sdn Bhd [1993] 3 CLJ 188; [1993] 2 MLJ 250 held that both tests must be satisfied. If the implied term was not necessary to give business efficacy, the answer to the officious bystander, would have been a testy answer of 'Oh, don't talk rubbish'. The two tests referred to earlier are to enable the court to decide as to whether it should or should not infer that the implied term contended for is a term which parties to a contract must have intended to include in the contract." (emphasis added). The above judgment of Sababumi regarding the 2 Cumulative Tests (Implied Term) had been affirmed by the Federal Court in a judgment delivered by Zulkefli Ahmad Makinudin PCA in See Leong Chye @ Sze Leong Chye & Anor v. United Overseas Bank Bhd & another appeal [2018] 10 CLJ 1; [2019] 1 MLJ 25, at [74] to [76]. In this regard, when the Court of Appeal in KAB Corporation implied, among others, a duty to act "honestly and in good faith" with regard to the exercise of a contractual discretion, regrettably, the 2 Cumulative Tests (Implied Term) had not been applied in that case;

when a Contractual Duty (Good Faith) does not exist -

contracting parties are entitled to act solely in their own interest with regard to a contractual right or obligation; and

a contracting party's exercise of a contractual discretion may be reviewed by the court if such exercise is unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense-please refer to the Court of Appeal case of KAB Corporation; and

if a Contractual Duty (Good Faith) exists, either way of construction of the contract or by the court's implication of the Contractual Duty (Good Faith) [please refer to the above subparagraphs (1) and (2)] , the Contractual Duty (Good Faith) has three contents as decided by Allsop P (as he then was) in the New South Wales Court of Appeal case of Macquarie International Health Clinic Pty Ltd v. Sydney South West Area Health Service (2010) 383 ALR 577, at [12], as follows-

obligations to act honestly and with a fidelity to the bargain;

obligations not to act dishonestly and not to act to undermine the bargain entered or the substance of the contractual benefit bargained for; and

an obligation to act reasonably and with fair dealing having regard to the interests of the parties (which will, inevitably, at times conflict) and to the provisions, aims and purposes of the contract, objectively ascertained.

Walau bagaimanapun, dalam kes ini Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen pada hemat Mahkamah tidak terkhilaf apabila tidak mempertimbangkan suci hati di atas kegagalan untuk memberikan maklumat untuk Plaintif menambahkan pengrekutan. Ia bukannya sebahagian daripada terma perjanjian yang berkaitan dengan suci hati. Ia tidak mewajarkan campur tangan Mahkamah ini.

Mahkamah ini juga mendapati hujahan bahawa Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen tidak mengambil perhatian kepada percanggahan keterangan saksi Defendan dalam kes ini sukar untuk dipersetujui oleh Mahkamah ini. Peguam Perayu menyatakan kegagalan tersebut menyebabkan dapatan yang dibuat tidak boleh dipertahankan. Penganalisaan keterangan saksi-saksi dan penerimaan masuk keterangan dan kredibiliti saksi-saksi pada hemat Mahkamah adalah di bawah budi bicara Hakim bicara. Mahkamah ini wajar campur tangan sekiranya budi bicara tersebut dilakukan bercanggah dari prinsip undang-undang.

Penelitian kepada nota prosiding dan Alasan Penghakiman tidak dapat sebarang petanda yang menunjukkan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah membuat penganalisaan saksi-saksi dan memutuskan menerima keterangan mereka bercanggah dengan undang-undang.

Akhirnya, setelah meneliti Alasan Penghakiman, nota prosiding dan hujahan kedua-dua Perayu dan Responden, Mahkamah ini berpendapat tiada keadaan yang membolehkan Mahkamah ini campur tangan dan mengubah dapatan dan keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen. Oleh itu, rayuan adalah ditolak dengan kos. Bertarikh: 25hb Mei 2026 ROSLAN BIN MAT NOR HAKIM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR Peguam PerayuBagiPihakOng Swee Long Eng Yi Wang (Tetuan Tiew & Associates)Peguam RespondenBagiPihakNurul Ameerah Natasya binti Ismail Ridha Chua Jia Shen (Tetuan Shaikh David & Co.)