(iii) the affidavit in support of the application must comply with the requirements of rule 2 of the Order 14. It is to be observed that a case is not within Order 14: (a) where no statement of claim has been served on the defendant; (b) where the indorsement on the writ includes a claim or claims outside the scope of Order 14 as coming within r. 1 (2); (c) where the affidavit in support of the application is defective, e.g. in omitting to state the deponent's belief that there is no defence to the claim or part to which the application relates; (d) where the application is made in an action against the Government [Order 73 rule 5 (1)]. If the plaintiff fails to satisfy either of these considerations, the summons may be dismissed. If, however, these considerations are satisfied, the plaintiff will have established a prima facie case and he comes entitled to judgment. The burden then shifts to the defendant to satisfy the Court why judgment should not be given against him [see Order 14 rule 3 and 4 (1)].". ................... “In Gold Ores Reduction Co. v. Pain [1892] 2 QB 14 it was held that for the purpose of Order 14 application the statement of claim must be complete and good in itself; any defect or omission cannot be corrected or supplemented by the plaintiff's affidavit. Furthermore, if the defect is one of substance, the application for summary judgment will be dismissed (See Sheba Gold Mining Co. v. Trubshawe [1892] 1 QB 674).” 8 [16] On the part of the Defendant, the Court of Appeal in Chen Heng Ping @ Tian Seow Hock & 5 Ors v. Intradagang Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad [1995] 3 CLJ 690, Mahadev Shanker JCA held at p.693: “When an application is made for summary judgment under Order 14 supported by an affidavit which goes to show that there is no defence, the defendants must show cause why leave to defend must be given. This means that the defendants must provide answers on oath which constitute evidence that they have a defence which is fit to be tried. Denials in a defence do not constitute evidence. They are challenges to the other side to show proof. In the present case the guarantors do not appear to have appreciated this. Their affidavits merely relied on the defence they pleaded, which consists of bare denials and points of law which they could not sustain.” [17] In Bank Negara Malaysia v. Mohd Ismail & Ors [1992] 1 CLJ Rep 14 [1992] 1 MLJ 400, Mohamed Azmi SCJ said at page 408: “In our view, basic to the application of all those legal propositions, is the requirement under Order 14 for the court to be satisfied on affidavit evidence that the defence has not only raised an issue but also that the said issue is triable. The determination of whether an issue is or is not triable must necessarily depend on the facts or the law arising from each case as disclosed in the affidavit evidence before the court. On the treatment of conflict of evidence on affidavits, Lord Diplock speaking in the Privy Council on Eng Mee Yong & Ors v. Letchumanan 5 had this to say at p 217…” 9 D. ANALYSIS AND FINDING OF THIS COURT [18] The First Defendant in its counter claim is now claiming the sum of RM225,677.38 as at 6.1.2021 for the outstanding maintenance charges owed by the Plaintiff for the period beginning from 6.7.2019 to 6.1.2021. [19] After hearing submissions by parties, and perusing all the cause papers (including Affidavits and Statements of Claim and defence), this Court ruled that the application should be allowed for the following reasons: [20] Firstly, this Court was satisfied that all the pre-requisites for this application have been satisfied as decided in the case of National Company for Foreign Trade v. Kayu Raya Sdn Bhd (supra) and under Order 14 rule 1, Rules of Court 2012. [21] Secondly, on the part of the First Defendant being the Management Corporation for the building, it is authorized, and duty bound to determine and impose charges as well as sinking fund to be deposited into the maintenance account and sinking fund for the purposes of proper maintenance, management and expenditure of the buildings/properties. (See Section 59 (1) (b) and (c) of the Strata Management Act 2013) 10 [22] Thirdly, the Plaintiff has been a proprietor/owner in Wisma Cosway for 42 years and as such it is fully aware of its obligations to pay monthly service charges throughout. The First Defendant has held a total of 12 AGMs and as a long-standing proprietor, the Plaintiff therefore has knowledge and ought to have known of all the 12 AGMs among which the issue of proprietors having to pay maintenance charges have always been a life issue and have been discussed. [23] Fourthly, the Plaintiff cannot claim ignorance of the sum claimed because the First Defendant has been issuing invoices every month for its services to the Plaintiff. Lest we forget, the accounts of the First Defendant was audited by an external auditor. [24] Fifthly, the Plaintiff cannot claim ignorance of the obligations to pay maintenance fees to the Plaintiff every month. This is because the Plaintiff has been sued many times by the First Defendant as the following paragraphs would show: