(A) Di manakah sebenarnya dadah-dadah ini ditemui sama ada pada diri tertuduh atau di Hotel De Grand Orchard di Kuala Lumpur [13] Peguam tertuduh yang bijaksana menghujahkan bahawa dadah-dadah ekshibit (P13(1-2)) tidak dijumpai di dalam stokin di betis kiri dan kanan tertuduh tetapi sebaliknya dijumpai di dalam beg kepunyaan Nagea Butt di bilik nombor 409. [14] Peguam tertuduh yang bijaksana menghujahkan bahawa berdasarkan keterangan yang dizahirkan adalah mustahil untuk seseorang dapat memuatkan saiz dan keberatan bungkusan dadah-dadah tersebut yang agak tebal dan besar (tanpa stokin mengembang) di dalam kedua-dua stokin (ekshibit P18 & 19) itu jika sekali pun ianya diikat dengan gelang getah (ekshibit P20(1) and (2)) tanpa jatuh terutama sekali setelah mengambilkira perjalanan jauh yang dilalui oleh tertuduh (termasuk naik bukit sedikit) daripada stesyen minyak Shell ke Hotel Nouvelle tempat di mana tertuduh ditangkap. S/N 4xVmxwDEispcL7gNebaQ [15] Pada hemat kami, penghujahan peguam tertuduh ini tidak bermerit. Bagi mengupas isu sama ada mustahil atau tidak dadah-dadah bersaiz tebal dan berat ini boleh diletakkan pada kedua-dua betis kaki tertuduh ini, maka adalah penting untuk kami mengimbas kembali keterangan SP3. [16] SP3 di dalam keterangannya semasa pemeriksaan balas (kandungan 9 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 2 di m/s 33-34) mengatakan seperti yang berikut: “S : Dalam Eksibit P17 laporan polis dan penyataan saksi, tuan jumpa dua bungkusan yang terikat pada kaki kiri dan kanan di bahagian betis, setuju? : Setuju. [Saksi dirujuk kepada Gambar Barang Kes Eksibit P5] : Tuan telah camkan Eksibit P13(1) dan P13(2) seperti dalam gambar ini, setuju? : Setuju. : Masa tuan jumpa dua barang ini, memang ada isi kandungan dan agak tebal dan besar? : Ya. S/N 4xVmxwDEispcL7gNebaQ S : Ikut keterangan tuan dia ada letak dekat betis sebelah kiri dan kanan kaki dia? : Ya. : Dia pakai stokin, macam mana bila kamu jumpa? : Dia pakai stokin warna biru, dalam dia selit dan getah dia itu atas stokin. : Stokin yang kamu maksudkan adalah seperti yang telah kamu camkan P18 dan P19, setuju stokin itu tidak berapa terkembang, kalau betul barang itu diikat dan dipakai dan dia berjalan, dia akan kembang agak banyak, tapi stokin ini tidak nampak kembang, setuju? : Betul. : Tuan katakan stokin ini telah diikat dengan dua getah P20(1-2) pada kedua-dua kaki kiri dan kanan? : Setuju. : Setuju getah ini kalau dilihat adalah getah yang tidak berapa kuat, tidak cukup panjang untuk diikat atas betis? : Cukup. S/N 4xVmxwDEispcL7gNebaQ : Saya cadangkan sekiranya seseorang itu yang diikat dia mesti tidak boleh jalan jauh? : Ya, pasal pergeseran berlaku sebab dia tebal. : Setuju, kalau dia pakai stokin dengan getah, tidak ada pita untuk mengikat kaki dengan barang kes yang tebal itu, dia tidak boleh berjalan jauh dan akan terkeluar dan jatuh? : Jatuh tidak, tetapi dia akan hard to walk. : He can't walk too far it will come out, setuju? : Setuju. : Saya cadangkan sebenarnya tuan tidak menjumpai dua barang kes dalam kes ini iaitu bungkusan P13(1-2) pada betis kiri dan kanan OKT? : Tidak setuju” [17] Berdasarkan kepada keterangan SP3 di atas, pada hemat kami, walaupun bungkusan-bungkusan dadah tersebut diikat sedemikian rupa, tertuduh masih boleh berjalan walaupun menghadapi sedikit kesukaran untuk berjalan jauh. Mengikut SP3 lagi, kedua-dua bungkusan tersebut tidak akan terjatuh kerana ianya telah diikat dengan kemas dengan dua getah (P20(1-2)) pada kedua-dua kaki kiri dan kanan tertuduh. Justeru itu, tiada alasan untuk kami S/N 4xVmxwDEispcL7gNebaQ tidak mempercayai keterangan SP3 tentang perkara ini. Keterangan yang diberikan oleh SP3 ini bukanlah sesuatu yang ganjil, luar biasa atau mustahil untuk diletakkan kepercayaan seperti frasa atau kiasan yang popular di kalangan pengamal undang-undang jenayah iaitu “lembu melompat ke bulan” (cow jumping over the moon). [18] Mengenai penerimaan keterangan saksi-saksi polis ini, kami ingin meminjam kata-kata mutiara Thomson CJ di dalam kes Public Prosecutor v. Mohamed Ali [1962] CLJU 129, [1962] 1 LNS 12, bila beliau mengatakan seperti yang berikut: “In the second place, the refusal to accept the evidence of the Police witness was very offensive. That witness said there was a 20 miles per hour speed limit in force. His evidence was not accepted and the only reason stated for refusing to accept it was that no evidence was "adduced to substantiate it". The witness is a traffic policeman, presumably by reason of his rank of some experience. He was unlikely to be mistaken and to refuse to accept his evidence on a point like this on the ground that it was not "substantiated" was neither more nor less than to call him a liar. If Magistrates are going to adopt this sort of attitude to Police evidence in connection with road traffic cases there will be an end to all law enforcement in the country. When a Police witness says something that is not inherently improbable his evidence must in the first instance be accepted. If he says he saw a cow jumping over the moon his evidence is, of course, not to be S/N 4xVmxwDEispcL7gNebaQ accepted, but if be says he saw a cow wandering along one of the main streets of Kuala Lumpur (the sort of thing we all see every day of our lives) there is not the slightest justification for refusing to believe him. Of course, if his evidence is contradicted by other evidence or is shaken by cross-examination then it becomes the business of the Magistrate to decide whether or not it should be accepted. In the absence of contradiction, however, and in the absence of any element of inherent improbability the evidence of any witness, whether a Police witness or not, who gives evidence on affirmation, should normally be accepted.” (Penekanan ditambah) [19] Selanjutnya, mengenai kebolehterimaan keterangan saksi-saksi pendakwaan khususnya keterangan SP3, pada pandangan kami, setelah kami menilai keseluruhan keterangan SP3 dan SP4 secara mendalam, kami berpuas hati bahawa keterangan yang diberikan oleh kedua-dua saksi utama ini adalah benar dan boleh dipercayai. Tiada sebab untuk kami meragui dan menolak keterangan mereka didalam menjalankan tugas sebagai seorang pegawai polis. Dapatan yang dicapai ini adalah bersandarkan kepada nas undang-undang berikut: [20] Di dalam kes Md Zainudin Raujan v. PP [2013] 4 CLJ 21, Mahkamah Pesekutuan melalui penghakiman yang disampaikan oleh S/N 4xVmxwDEispcL7gNebaQ Hasan Lah HMP (beliau pada ketika itu) memutuskan seperti yang berikut: “[55] PW5 was a police witness. The learned trial judge found him to be a credible witness. It is true that the prosecution's case rested solely on the evidence on PW5. However, under the law there is no requirement for his evidence to be corroborated. The learned trial judge believed PW5 and as such his evidence was sufficient to establish the case for the prosecution. Any requirement for PW5’s evidence to be corroborated will conflict with s. 134 of the Evidence Act 1950 which provides that no particular number of witnesses shall in any case be required for proof of any fact (see Balachandran v. PP [2005] 1 CLJ 85).” (Penekanan ditambah) [21] Di dalam kes PP v. Dato' Seri Anwar Ibrahim [2014] 4 CLJ 162, Mahkamah Rayuan menyatakan seperti yang berikut: "It must be borne in mind that s. 114 illustration © of the Evidence Act 1950 provides that the court may presume that judicial and official acts have been regularly performed. In State of Punjab v. Rameshwar Dass [1975] Cri LI 1630, the Punjabi & Haryana Court held at p. 1631 as follows: It is well settled that prima facie the public servants must be assumed to act honestly and conscientiously. It would, S/N 4xVmxwDEispcL7gNebaQ therefore, be basically wrong, without other cogent ground to consider them as untrustworthy witness in respect of their activities in performance of their official duties merely because of their official status unless the evidence is considered to be suspicious and that the conviction of the accused cannot be sustained on the statements of the official witnesses. The presumption that a person acts honestly applied as much in favour of a police officer as of other persons, and it is not a judicial approach to distrust and suspect him without good grounds". [22] Walau apa pun, ternyata isu yang dibangkitkan ini adalah suatu dapatan fakta dimana Hakim Bicara yang bijaksana mempunyai kelebihan melihat SP3 memberi keterangannya dan membuat penilaian tentangnya berbanding dengan kami di peringkat rayuan ini. Di penghujung pengamatan yang dibuatnya terhadap keterangan SP3 ini, Hakim Bicara yang bijaksana di dalam alasan penghakimannya merumuskan seperti yang berikut dan kami petik: “[79] Isu seterusnya sama ada stokin yang dikatakan digunakan oleh OKT untuk menyimpan dadah pada kedua-dua betisnya. Apa yang dicadangkan oleh pihak pembelaan tentang keadaan stokin itu merupakan satu spekulasi sahaja dan pandangannya tersendiri. Namun begitu, keterangan SP3 adalah bahawa dadah tersebut dijumpai di dalam stokin yang diikat dengan gelang getah pada kedua-dua betis OKT. Tiada sebab untuk SP3 mereka-reka cerita sebegitu sekiranya ia tidak berlaku. S/N 4xVmxwDEispcL7gNebaQ [80] SP3 masih kekal dengan jawapan beliau walaupun ditanya berkali-kali oleh pihak pembelaan. Tingkat laku SP3 adalah konsisten dan kredibiliti beliau tidak tergugat dan menerangkan apa yang sebenarnya berlaku pada tarikh kejadian.” [23] Disimpulkan, penghujahan peguam tertuduh yang bijaksana bahawa adalah mustahil untuk seseorang memuatkan saiz dan keberatan bungkusan dadah di dalam keadaan seperti yang dinyatakan adalah ditolak. Pada hemat kami dadah-dadah ini sengaja disorok dengan pengetahuan tertuduh semata-mata untuk mengelakkannya daripada mudah dikesan oleh pihak berkuasa. [24] Di dalam kes Neggani Asmo v. PP [2013] 1 LNS 265, Mahkamah Rayuan melalui penghakiman yang disampaikan oleh Azahar Mohamed HMR (beliau pada ketika itu) memutuskan seperti yang berikut: “[19] Certainly, the manner on how the drugs were concealed more often than not indicates an intention to avoid detection and thereby point to knowledge. Obviously, drugs traffickers would not carry drugs openly but they would make use of all kinds of ploy or trick or deception to conceal the drugs from being detected by enforcement agencies. In Teh Hock Leong v. PP [2008] 4 CLJ 764, Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) said: Turning to the facts of the present instance, we agree with the learned trial judge that the method employed to bring the drugs in question from Thailand into Malaysia was done in a most S/N 4xVmxwDEispcL7gNebaQ cunning fashion to escape detention by the authorities. The method employed to convey or transport a drug may sometimes furnish evidence of knowledge. For example, an attempt to carefully conceal a drug may indicate an intention to avoid detection and thereby point to knowledge. Of course, it all depends on the facts of the individual case." [25] Di dalam kes Teh Hock Leong v. PP [2008] 4 CLJ 764, Mahkamah Rayuan melalui penghakiman yang disampaikan oleh Gopal Sri Ram (beliau pada ketika itu) memutuskan seperti yang berikut: “[8] Turning to the facts of the present instance, we agree with the learned trial judge that the method employed to bring the drugs in question from Thailand into Malaysia was done in a most cunning fashion to escape detection by the authorities. The method employed to convey or transport a drug may sometimes furnish evidence of knowledge. For example, an attempt to carefully conceal a drug may indicate an intention to avoid detection and thereby point to knowledge. Of course, it all depends on the facts of each individual case.” [26] Di dalam kes Wjchai Onprom v. PP [2006] 3 CLJ 724, Mahkamah Rayuan melalui penghakiman yang disampaikan oleh Gopal Sri Ram (beliau pada ketika itu) memutuskan seperti yang berikut: S/N 4xVmxwDEispcL7gNebaQ “(2) In his judgment the learned judge, after a careful summary of the evidence, correctly took the view that on the facts established it was not necessary for the prosecution to rely on the presumption under s. 37(da)(iv) of the Act since this was a case of actual trafficking. The appellant was caught conveying a very large quantity of cannabis from Thailand to Malaysia. In view of the amount involved, it was safe to infer that the drug was intended for a third person or persons, known or unknown. So, this was not a case of mere passive possession. There were overt acts done by the appellant, namely the active concealment of the drug on his person followed by its conveyance from Thailand into Malaysia which reasonably supported the existence of criminal purpose proscribed by the Act. The very same facts also gave rise to a strong inference that the appellant was aware of his possession, knew the nature of the drug possessed and had the power of disposal over it. So much for the prima facie proof of actual trafficking. (paras 4 & 11).” [27] Di dalam kes Koh Tiong Hock v. Public Prosecutor [2011] 4 MLJ 40, Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan seperti yang berikut: “[12] With respect, the law is clear and well settled in that knowledge or intention as the mental element of an offence can only be proved by inference from the surrounding circumstances. See Public Prosecutor v Chan Pan Leon [1956] 1 MLJ 237, Warner v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1968] 2 All ER 356 (HL); Ong Ah Chuan v Public Prosecutor [1981] 1 MLJ 64 (PC); Wong Nam Loi v Public Prosecutor [1997] 3 MLJ S/N 4xVmxwDEispcL7gNebaQ 795 (CA) and Public Prosecutor v Abdul Rahman bin Akif [2007] 5 MLJ 1; [2007] 4 CLJ 337 (FC) and Emmanuel Yaw Teiku v Public Prosecutor [2006] 5 MLJ 509 (FC). The effect of the decision Toh Su Kuan is clearly to the contrary in holding that knowledge can be proved only by direct evidence and not by way of drawing an inference from proved facts. We note that Toh Su Kuan has been disregarded, not followed or practically ignored by subsequent decisions of this court. See Gunalan a/l Ramachandran & Ors v Public Prosecutor [2004] 4 MLJ 489; [2004] 4 CLJ 551, Mimanga Lesaly v Public Prosecutor [2005] 4 MLJ 314 and Wjchai Ompron v Public Prosecutor [2006] 5 MLJ 415. It may not have been specifically overuled but the Federal Court had struck its death knell when it was rejected for being erroneous and inconsistent with settled legal principles. See Parlan bin Dadeh v Public Prosecutor (2008] 6 MLJ 19 which held that Toh Su Kuan should be overuled and not followed for being erroneous and per incuriam. [13] In Tunde Apatira & Ors v Public Prosecutor [2001] 1 MLJ 259 where packets of drug were swallowed by the appellants and found in their stomachs when arrested, the Federal Court affirmed their convictions for trafficking holding that the totality of the evidence reasonably supports that the appellants were in actual possession of the proscribed drug at the time of their initial detention. In Teh Hock Leong v Public Prosecutor (Criminal Appeal No 05-84 of 2003 since reported in [2010] 1 MLJ 741) the proscribed drug in the form of 48 Malayan Law Journal [2011] 4 MLJ ABCDE FGH/ solution was soaked in S/N 4xVmxwDEispcL7gNebaQ towel and under clothes and transported in a back pack with clear object to avoid detection. This court held that the evidence of knowledge can be inferred as follows: The method employed to convey or transport a drug may sometimes furnish evidence of knowledge. For example, an attempt to carefully conceal a drug may indicate an intention to avoid detection and thereby put to knowledge. Of course, it all depends on the fact of each case. [14] In our case the manner the packets P14A-H containing the proscribed drug were taped to the appellant's body, covered with braces and concealed under his T-shirt and jacket to avoid detection supports an inescapable inference that he must have known that they contained dangerous drug. Such inference is further fortified by the appellant's own admission in P35 that he was paid to transport the said drug out of the country. On top of that you need only look at any of the eight transparent plastic packets P14A-H to see the drug tablets contianed therein. Photographs P7A and B show how visible they were to the naked eye, it was most unlikely for the appellant not to have seen them when the packets were taped to the front and sides of his abdomen. [15] On established facts, there is clearly overwhelming evidence for the learned judge to find not only knowledge and possession but also trafficking as defined unders 2 of the DDA of the proscribed drug by the appellant to require his explanation and to reject what was proferred in defence.” S/N 4xVmxwDEispcL7gNebaQ [28] Di dalam kes Lam Cheuk Wang and another v. Public Prosecutor [1994] SGCA 88, Mahkamah Rayuan Singapura memutuskan seperti yang berikut: “[31] We were unable to accept these arguments. They were completely without merit. The crucial issue was whether the first appellant had rebutted the presumption under s 18 of the Act that he knew that what was sewn into the vest which he wore was heroin. The trial judge had rejected the appellant's explanation and held that he had not rebutted the presumption of knowledge that operated against him. In our judgment, the trial judge was completely justified in his findings. We agree with the trial judge's finding that, given the deliberate manner in which the heroin was concealed on the first appellant's body, it was most unlikely that the first appellant did not know he was carrying heroin. His accounts of the meetings with Ah Keung and with the second appellant, and in particular [1994] 2 SLR(R) Lam Cheuk Wang v PP 887 his account of Ah Keung's alleged instructions at the fourth meeting, were not convincing in the least.” Seterusnya di m/s 888 dinyatakan: “[35] Counsel's third ground was that the second appellant's defence should not have been rejected by the trial judge. Her defence that she did not know what she was carrying was drugs S/N 4xVmxwDEispcL7gNebaQ was based on the fact that the first appellant was her boyfriend taking her on a trip to Brussels and that he had asked her to wear the vest with blocks of substance sewn into it, and that in so doing she had relied on his assurance that he would not get her into trouble. The trial judge did not believe her evidence and was of the view that with her background and experience she would not have so readily donned a bulky white vest with blocks of substance sewn into it under highly suspicious circumstances without wanting to know what the substance was. The burden of rebutting the presumption rested on the second appellant, and the trial judge was amply justified in finding that she had failed to do so on a balance of probabilities.” [29] Sehubungan dengan itu, tidak dapat dinafikan lagi bahawa keterangan SP3 mengenai kedua-dua bungkusan yang telah dijumpai tersebut secara langsung telah mematahkan pembelaan tertuduh dan merungkai persoalan di manakah sebenarnya tempat dadah-dadah tersebut ditemui. Sudah terang lagi bersuluh bahawa pembelaan yang diberikan oleh tertuduh bahawa dadah-dadah ini sebenarnya dijumpai di bilik nombor 409 Hotel De Grand Orchard, Kuala Lumpur dan ianya dikatakan milik Nagea Bhut (pengedar sebenar) adalah bersifat penafian dan rekaan semata-mata dan tidak boleh dipercayai. [30] Di dalam kes PP v. Klong K’ Djoanh & Satu Lagi Rayuan [2016] 5 CLJ 533, Mahkamah Rayuan melalui penghakiman yang disampaikan oleh Zakaria Sam HMR memutuskan seperti berikut: S/N 4xVmxwDEispcL7gNebaQ “[33] Di bawah s.39B(1), apa yang perlu dibuktikan ialah milikan dan kawalan dengan pengetahuan dan bukannya kepunyaan (ownership). Walaupun diandaikan dadah itu kepunyaan Brave, tetapi tertuduh dengan penuh pengetahuan membawanya ke Malaysia dari India, itu sudah cukup untuk memenuhi kehendak s.39B (1) ADB. lsu sama ada Brave atau adik Brave adalah pemilik beg P24, tidak relevan sama sekali bagi pertuduhan di bawah s.39B(1) ADB.” [34] Bukanlah beban atas pendakwaan untuk menyiasat versi tertuduh mengenai Brave yang dikatakan pengedar sebenar kerana seorang pengedar maslh memerlukan jaringan (networks) seperti tertuduh untuk menjalankan tugas pengedaran bagi pihaknya. [35] Di sini pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan bahawa tertuduh mempunyai kawalan, jagaan dan pengetahuan terhadap dadah yang dirampas.” [31] Pada hemat kami juga, berdasarkan keterangan yang diberikan oleh tertuduh, tertuduh cuba mengambil kesempatan untuk memanipulasi keadaan dengan mengatakan bahawa dadah-dadah tersebut dijumpai hasil serbuan kedua yang dibuat oleh pihak polis di Hotel De Grand Orchard, Kuala Lumpur sedangkan dadah-dadah yang dijumpai di dalam serbuan kedua ini adalah sesuatu yang berasingan dan dikendalikan oleh pasukan polis yang berlainan iaitu dari Ibu Pejabat Polis Kontinjen Selangor yang diketuai oleh Inspektor Mohd Alime Mazlan bin Ab Rahman. S/N 4xVmxwDEispcL7gNebaQ [32] Tertuduh telah dikatakan memberi 'Alcontra Notice' dengan menyatakan bahawa dadah-dadah tersebut milik Nagea Bhut. Namun begitu tiada butiran terperinci mengenai penama tersebut yang diberikan oleh tertuduh kepada SP4 semasa siasatan dijalankan. Notis tersebut ternyata tidak lengkap dan tidak sempurna dan hanya nama Butt sahaja diberikan oleh tertuduh. Ini menyukarkan SP4 untuk menjalankan siasatan mendalam mengenai kewujudan penama ini. Dengan itu, kami memutuskan bahawa anggapan yang menentang dibawah seksyen 114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 diatas kegagalan pihak pendakwaan memanggil penama ini sepertimana yang dihujahkan oleh pihak pembelaan adalah tidak berasas dan tidak boleh digunapakai terhadap pihak pendakwaan.