Shakib Bin Abu Bakar Banafee v 1. ) Awh International Logistics Sdn. Bhd. (JA-24NCC-29-07/2024)

AWH INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS SDN BHD (No Syarikat: 201301022552 [1052381-A)

2.

AHMAD AKID BIN NOOR AZLEE ... DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Enclosure 13)

Before this court Notice of Application (Enclosure 13) under Order 18, Rule19(1)(b) and (d) of the Rules of Court 2012 scandalous, frivolous or vexatious or otherwise it is an abuse of the process of the Court.

Apart from the striking out, there is also an alternative prayer for the OS to be stayed pending the disposal of another pending Writ action between the parties namely JA-22NCC-37-05/2023.

This Court, after hearing full arguments by counsel for both parties, had dismissed Enclosure 13 with costs.

The Plaintiff has since appealed against the said decision.

decision. The Cause Papers

For the purpose of this application, the cause papers referred to are as follows:-

Originating Summons

Enclosure 1

(ii) Affidavit in Support for the OS - Enclosure 6

(iii) Encosure 11

(iv) - Enclosure 12

Notice of Application

Notice of Application by the Defendants -

(ii) Enclosure 14

(iii) - Enclosure 15

(iv) Enclosure 16

Reply - Enclosure 17

(vi) Reply Enclosure 18 Salient Facts

Prior to this OS, the Plaintiff and the Defendants have two (2) other suits between them that are still pending as of this date.

The first suit is Writ Summons No. JA-22NCC-67-10/2023 (converted from Originating Summons JA-24NCC-11-04/2023) filed by P against , which is an action for minority oppression under section.346 of the Companies Act 2016 .

The second suit is Writ Summons No. JA-22NCC-37-05/2023 filed by claiming that P is only a trustee holding to

Both Suit 67 and Suit 37 have been consolidated and are to be heard together. 11 This present suit on the other hand is a derivative action by P against Basis for filing Enclosure 13

contentions in filing Enclosure 13 is as follows:-

P lacks the capacity to file this OS due to his holding of shares in D1 which is a subject of determination in Suit 37. Should the Court allow Suit 37 in favour of D2 and D3, this action will fall as P derivative action.

This OS is pre-mature since the P did not exhaust procedure. If P had carried himself rightly as the registered and beneficial shareholder of 250,000 units in D1 (despite the filing of Suit 37), P should have called for a meeting pursuant to Section 310 and 311 CA 2016, prior to filing of this OS.

There are duplicity of facts and claims, both in Suit 67 and this OS which P has shareholder.

The OS is an abuse of process for being filed with collateral purpose. The law of striking out

Order 18 Rule 19 (1) ROC 2012 provides:-

The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any pleading or the endorsement, of any writ in the action, or anything in any pleading or in the endorsement, on the ground that-

it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence, as the case may be;

it is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious;

it may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action; or

it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court, and may order the action to be stayed or dismissed or judgment to be entered accordingly, as the case may be.

No evidence shall be admissible on an application under subparagraph (1)(a).

This rule shall, as far as applicable, apply to an originating summons as if it were a pleading.

On the applicable legal principles with regards to a striking out application, reference may be made to Seruan Gemilang Makmur Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Pahang Darul Makmur & Anor [2016] 3 CLJ 1 where it was held by the Federal Court that O.18, r.19(1) of the ROC can only be resorted to in plain and obvious cases:- [26] The tests for striking out application under O. 18 r. 19 of the ROC, as adopted by the Supreme Court in Bandar Builder (supra) are, inter alia as follows: (a) it is only in plain and obvious cases that recourse should be had to the summary process under the rule; (b) this summary procedure can only be adopted when it can be clearly seen (emphasis added); (c) it cannot be exercised by a minute examination of the documents and facts of the case in order to see whether the party has a cause of action or a defence; and (d) If there is a point of law which requires serious discussion, an objection should be taken on the pleadings and the point set down for argument under O. 33 r. 3 of the ROC; and (e) The court must be satisfied that there is no reasonable cause of action or that the claims are frivolous or vexatious or that the defences raised are not arguable.

The Federal Court in Seruan Gemilang also emphasized that such plain and obvious cases must , but it must be capable of being made certain to be :- [27] The Court of Appeal, in Sivarasa Rasiah & Ors v. Che Hamzah Che Ismail & Ors [2012] 1 CLJ 75; [2012] 1 MLJ 473, had adopted the well-settled principle of striking out in the following passage A striking out order should not be made summarily by the court if there is issue of law that requires lengthy argument and mature consideration. It should also not be made if there is issue of fact that is capable of resolution only after taking viva voce evidence during trial, (see Lai Yoke Ngan & Anor v. Chin Teck Kwee & Anor [1997] 2 MLJ 565 (Federal Court)). [28] The basic test for striking out as laid down by the Supreme Court in Bandar Builder (supra) is that the claim on the face of it must be The stress is not only on the word of unsustainability must appear on the face of the claim without having to go into lengthy and mature consideration in detail. If one has to go into lengthy and mature consideration in detail of the issues of law and/or fact, then the matter is not appropriate to be struck out summarily. It must be determined at trial.

Further reference on the abovesaid principles can be found in Tan Wai Hong & ORs v Malaysian Airlines System Berhad & Ors [2017] 4 MLJ 540 where it was held by the Court of Appeal that:- [7] The Court will adopt the following as principles applicable to the consideration of an application to strike out pleadings and endorsements: a) rule 19(1)(a), no affidavit evidence is admissible; b) All the averments in the statement of claim must be assumed to be true; c) The Court should only exercise its powers sparingly and only in clear cases; d) The test to be applied is whether on the face of pleadings, the claim is obviously unsustainable. The matter must be unarguable or almost incontestably bad; e) The burden is on the defendants to show to the Court that f) Where there is a dispute as to the factual matrix of the case, the Court would not strike out the pleadings and endorsements; g) The power to strike out pleadings and endorsements should be exercised after the Court has considered all facts, but the Court must not embark a minute examination of the documents and the facts of the case as this is solely reserved for the trial judge; h) reasonable cause of action on its face. The Oxford English Dictionary ng: Manifestly insufficient or futile. Black Law Dictionary, 9th ed. (Thomson Reuters, aving no legal basis, often filed to following: Vexatious 1. Causing, tending or disposed to cause, vexation. c spec Of legal actions: Instituted without sufficient grounds for the purpose of causing trouble or annoyance to the defendant. interference (sometimes spec by unjustifiable claims or legal acti maliciously and without good grounds, meant to create trouble and i) as (ii) wrong or improper use, misuse, misapplication, perversion; turning the wrong way, diversion to an improper use, corruption, is used for improper purpose; e.g., where the proceedings constitute a sham; where the process of the Court is not being fairly or honestly used, or is employed for some ulterior or improper purpose; j) In exercising the power under Order 18 rule 19(1)(d), the Court is not limited to considering the pleadings of the parties, but is entitled to consider affidavit relating to the issues in the case; and k) Where the Court is to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to dismiss a claim, it is important that there is no dispute between the

Reference shall also be made to the locus classicus case itself: Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 4 CLJ 1, where the Supreme Court (as it was then) had held that:- The principles upon which the Court acts in exercising its power under any of the four limbs of O. 18 r. 19 (1) Rules of the High Court are well settled. It is only in plain and obvious cases that recourse should be had to the summary process under this rule (per Lindley M.R. in Hubbuck v. Wilkinson [1899] 1 QB 86, p. 91) and this summary procedure can only be adopted when it can be clearly seen that a claim or answer is on the face of it "obviously unsustainable" (Attorney-General of Duchy of Lancaster v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co [1892] 3 Ch. 274, CA). It cannot be exercised by a minute examination of the documents and facts of the case, in order to see whether the party has a cause of action or defence (Wenlock v. Moloney [1965] 1 WLR 1238; [1965] 2 All ER 871, CA). The authorities further show that if there is a point of law which requires serious discussion, and objection should be taken on the pleadings and the point set down for argument under O. 33 r. 3 (which is in pari materia with our O. r. 2 Rules of High Court) (Hubbuck v. Wilkinson) (supra). The Court must be satisfied that there is no reasonable cause of action or that the claims are frivolous or vexatious or that the defences raised are not arguable.

One other point which is worth noting is that the procedure underlined under Order 18 Rule 19(1) ROC 2012 amounts to a summary disposal of an action, hence it should only be applied when an action is plainly and obviously unsustainable. Refer in this regard is made to Serac Asia Sdn Bhd v Sepakat Insurance Brokers Sdn Bhd [2013] 6 CLJ 673 where it was decided by the Federal Court that:- ... We also make this observation on the application of the court's summary power to strike out a pleading under O. 18 r. 19 of the Rules of Court 2012 (successor to RHC 1980). Although the power to strike out is a wide discretion, it should be exercised with care and only when the threshold requirement of 'an obvious and unsustainable case', can a pleading be struck out.

in Enclosure 13 that they are making the application under subparagraph 1(b) and (d) of O.18, r.19(1), perhaps further elaborations on those subparagraphs would certainly be necessary. Paragraph (b) Order 18 Rule 19 (1) ROC 2012

On what amounts to scandalous O.18, r.19(1)(b) ROC 2012, it refers to a groundless action with no prospect of success, often raised to embarrass or annoy the other party to the action.

In this regard, reference is made to See Thong & Anor v Saw Beng Chong 2013 3 MLJ 235 where the Court of Appeal had this to say:- -paragraph (1)(b) deals with pleading which is "scandalous, frivolous or vexatious"; ... The words "frivolous or vexatious" generally refer to a groundless action of statement with no prospect of success, often raised to embarrass or annoy the other party to the action. In considering whether any proceedings were vexatious or frivolous, one is entitled to and ought to look at the whole history of the matter and it is not to be determined by whether the pleading discloses a cause of action or not (see: Attorney General of Duchy of Lancaster v. London & North Western Railway Co [1892] 3 Ch 277; and Re Vernazza [1959] 2 All ER 200). It was decided in the above case of Attorney General of Duchy of Lancester that "frivolous or vexatious actions mean cases which are obviously frivolous or vexatious or obviously unsustainable." Paragraph (d) Order 18 Rule 19 (1) ROC 2012

On abuse of court process under O.18, r.19(1)(d) ROC 2012, reference on its meaning can be referred to Godrej Sara Lee Ltd v Siah Teong Teck & Anor [2007] 7 MLJ 153 where it was held by the High Court that:- [22] The case of Gabriel Peter, addresse said: been given a wide interpretation by the courts. It includes considerations of public policy and the interests of justice. This term signifies that the process of the court must be used bona fide and properly and must not be abused. The court will prevent the improper use of its machinery. It will prevent the judicial process from being used as a means of vexation and oppression in the process of litigation. The categories of conduct rendering a claim frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process are not closed and will depend on all relevant circumstances of the case. A type of conduct which has been judicially acknowledged as an abuse of process is the bringing bona fide for the purpose of obtaining relief but for some other ulterior or collateral purpose, it might be struck out as an abuse of the process of the court. Analysis and decision

Upon careful perusals of the cause papers and the affidavits filed by the parties, this C vexatious and an abuse of court process based for the following reasons.

Firstly, this OS herein is pre-mature since the very standing of P is being a subject matter of challenge in Suit 37. In other words, since in D1 is pending determination in Suit 37, then to proceed with this OS would certainly have the effect of this Court shareholdings in D1 prematurely. Further, in the event Suit 37 is it would certainly affect this OS as P would then lack proper standing to be considered a complainant within s.345 CA 2016 for the purposes of instituting a derivative action under s.347 CA

2016.

Section 345 CA 2016 reads:- For the purposes of this Division, "complainant" means-

a member of a company, or a person who is entitled to be registered as a member of a company;

a former member of a company if the application relates to the circumstances in which the member ceased to be a member;

any director of a company; or

the Registrar, in the case of a company declared under section 590.

Section 347 CA 2016 on the other hand states:- 347(1) A complainant may, with the leave of the Court initiate, intervene in or defend a proceeding on behalf of the company.

Proceedings brought under this section shall be brought in the company's name.

The right of any person to bring, intervene in, defend or discontinue any proceedings on behalf of a company at common law is abrogated.

In discussing s.345 CA 2016, the High Court in Independent Oil [2018] 5 CLJ 706 had this to say, in which this Court agrees, that [10] The right to initiate, intervene in, or to defend a proceeding on behalf of a company is granted (and granted exclusively) under section 347 to a "complainant". Section 345 defines a complainant to include a member of a company, a person who is entitled to be registered as a member of a company, a former member of a company (if the application relates to the circumstances in which the person ceased to be a member), a director of a company and the Chief Executive Officer of the Companies Commission of Malaysia in the case of companies whose affairs are under investigation under section 590.

requirement that could only be decided once suit 37 is disposed of a necessary effect of invalidating this entire OS proceeding.

But wait. It would be unjust for this Court to strike out the OS herein purely on the premature ground since the Court can or ought to order a stay of further proceedings of the OS as not only it is the alternative prayer in Enclosure 13 but also if circumstances justifies for the stay to be ordered. Thus, further examinations on other points are indeed necessary.

In this regard, from the available evidence before this Court, this Court finds it as patently obvious that P has failed to demonstrate to the satisfaction of this court that the internal procedure established by D1 had been exhausted before deciding to institute the present OS.

This is crucial as it is trite that in a derivative action, the company (D1) ought to be afforded the opportunity to decide upon the questions of whether to institute legal proceedings in respect of the alleged wrongdoing perpetrated on it. Reference in this regard is made to Warisan TC Holdings Berhad & Anor v Tan Boon Pun [2004] 1 LNS 334 where it was held by the High Court that:- "TBP however has not shown that he could bring himself within the exception to the rule in Foss v. Harbottle (supra). He has not taken any steps to invoke the company procedures before taking this derivative action. He has not by resolution or otherwise approach the board of the company should sue the Defendants. He had not attempted to call for any EGM to ascertain the wishes of shareholders as to whether the company should commence action against

any attempts on his part towards proposing the filing of this OS on behalf of D1.

P should have in this regard called for a meeting pursuant to Section 310 and 311 CA 2016 before instituting the present OS. Section 310 CA 2016 reads:- A meeting of members may be convened by-

the Board; or

any member holding at least ten per centum of the issued share capital of a company or a lower percentage as specified in the constitution or if the company has no share capital, by at least five per centum in the number of the members.

On the other hand, Section 311 CA 2016 reads as follows:-

The members of a company may require the directors to convene a meeting of members of the company.

A requisition under subsection (1)-

shall be in hard copy or electronic form;

shall state the general nature of the business to be dealt with at the meeting;

may include the text of a resolution that may properly be moved and is intended to be moved at the meeting; and

shall be signed or authenticated by the person making the requisition.

The directors shall call for a meeting of members once the company has received requisition to do so from-

members representing at least ten per centum of the paid up capital of the company carrying the right of voting at meetings of members of the company, excluding any paid up capital held as treasury shares; or

in the case of a company not having a share capital, members who represent at least five per centum of the total voting rights of all members having a right of voting at meetings of members.

Notwithstanding subsection (3), in the case of a private company, members representing at least five per centum of the paid up capital of the company carrying the right of voting at meeting of members of the company may require a meeting of members to be convened if more than twelve months has elapsed since the end of the last meeting of members convened pursuant to a requisition under this section and the proposed resolution is not defamatory, vexatious or frivolous.

A resolution may properly be moved at a meeting unless the resolution-

if passed, would be ineffective whether by reason of inconsistency with any written law or the constitution;

is defamatory of any person;

is frivolous or vexatious; or

if passed, would not be in the best interest of the company.

For the purposes of subsections (3) and (4), the right of voting shall be determined at the date the requisition is deposited with the company.

However, no such meeting was called by P. P had thus failed to show that D1 and/ or its directors for that matter and/ or other members were provided an opportunity to decide on institution of the OS.

P has contended that a statutory notice dated 28.05.2024 issued pursuant to Section 348 (2) CA 2016 is sufficient in this regard and approval prior to obtaining leave under Section 348 CA 2016. Section 348 (2) CA 2016 reads:-

The complainant shall give thirty days' notice in writing to the directors of his intention to apply for the leave of Court under section 347

An examination of the said notice dated 28.05.2024 could only be this Court is of the view that it should have been presented internally prior to the said notice being issued and the OS being filed.

The internal procedure of D1 gains further significance in the present OS matter of a challenge in suit 37. Refer to Suhaimi Bin Ibrahim & Ors v Hi-Summit Construction Sdn Bhd & Ors [2015] 2 MLJ 669 (Court of Appeal):-

It is our respective view that for this court to be satisfied that it is in the interest of the company to allow a statutory derivative action to be maintained, the internal processes of the company need to be satisfied. We prefer to have a clear resolution of the company on this. And until those processes are completed, the D3 Suit can still proceed. If the majority shareholders shall decide to discontinue the suit, we find that the present Appellants are fully entitled to file a fresh application under s. 181A.

Refer also to EOW Fun Siew & Anor v Mutual Life Sdn Bhd [2017] CLJU 1259 where it was held that:- [108] This Court finds that the Plaintiffs have clearly not exhausted all internal remedies. The Plaintiffs merely wrote and requested orally for accounts to be prepared. As a director of the company, the 2nd Plaintiff has in fact many options under the Act to seek what he is purportedly claiming for. The Plaintiffs submission that accounts could only be prepared with a court order cannot hold water. S.

of the Act provides that every company and the directors and the managers thereof shall cause to be kept such accounting and other records and for such records to be properly audited. S.

provides that the accounting and other records shall at all times be open to inspection by the directors. S. 170 (1) of the Act provides that a copy of every profit and loss account and balance sheet which is laid before a company in general meeting accompanied by a copy of the auditor's report be sent to all persons or members entitled to receive notice of general meetings of the company. Pursuant to s. 167 (6) of the Act, the Plaintiffs as shareholder and director of the company are entitled to seek for the relief to inspect the accounts. Furthermore, the 2nd Plaintiff as the director of the company is entitled under Article 79 of the Fourth Schedule, Table A of the Act at any time to summon a meeting of directors to discuss the accounting issues. This, the 2nd Plaintiff did not do or just refused to do.

While this court acknowledges that Section 347 and Section 348 CA filing the OS, this court chose to adopt a more purposive approach in interpreting both provisions to promote the purpose of these provisions, so that its purpose (to ensure com faith acting on behalf of the company) is not defeated by a mere literal interpretation. Refer to Section 17A Interpretation Act 1948 & 1967 which states:- In the interpretation of a provision of an Act, a construction that would promote the purpose or object underlying the Act (whether that purpose or object is expressly stated in the Act or not) shall be preferred to a construction that would not promote that purpose or object.

Reference is also made to Tug & Towage Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal [2024] 4 CLJ 499 where the Federal Court held that:- [15] As clearly demonstrated above, under the current regime of the CA 2016 in relation to derivative actions, a complainant may, with leave of the court, initiate, intervene in or defend a proceeding on behalf of the company. Its scope is wide in spectrum where a complainant is not just confined to the members of the company. It also extends to persons who are not members but entitled to be registered as one as well as former members, directors and the Registrar of the Companies. Further, the new provisions required the court, in deciding whether to grant leave, to determine the twin factors of whether the complainant is acting in good faith and whether it appears prima facie to be in the best interest of the company.

Next, it is also apparent that this present OS is almost similar to Suit 67 (the minority oppression). Not only are the facts of both cases similar but the reliefs claimed (appointment of auditors and claim for damages) in some regards are also similar.

The following facts appears in both Suit 67 and this OS:-

Concerns raised in the extraordinary board of directors meeting dated 25.05.2022;

Repayment of private loans issue;

Request for disclosure;

Non-signing of any resolutions;

Police reports made;

Agreements involving KIC Oil and Gas Sdn Bhd and Masoil

Costs incurred by D1 in agreements being higher and loss-causing;

Resolutions of meeting held on 13.12.2023.

The inevitable conclusion derived from the above is there is multiplicity of proceedings when this OS was filed before this court.

There is also no reasonable basis for this OS to be filed when this OS could have been easily combined with Suit 67 which is allowed for by law. In this regard, reference is made to Ranjeet Singh Sidhu & Anor v Zavarco Plc & Ors [2016] 2 CLJ 975 where it was held that:- [34] I have not overlooked the fact that the plaintiffs have "combined" a "double derivative action" with personal causes of action in this suit against all the defendants in this case. I am not able to find any Malaysian case on this point. I am of the opinion that RC does not prohibit such a course adopted by the plaintiffs in this case. I refer to O. 15 rr. 4(1), 5(1) and 6(1) RC as follows: 4(1) Subject to rule 5(1), two or more persons may be joined together in one action as plaintiffs or defendants with the leave of the Court or where:

if separate actions were brought by or against each of them, as the case may be, some common question of law or fact would arise in all the actions; and

all rights to relief claimed in the action (whether they are joint, several or alternative) are in respect of or arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions. 5(1) If claims in respect of two or more causes of action are included by a plaintiff in the same action or by a defendant in a counterclaim, or if two or more plaintiffs or defendants are parties to the same action, and it appears to the Court that the joinder of causes of action or of parties, as the case may be, may embarrass or delay the trial or is otherwise inconvenient, the Court may order separate trials or make such other order as may be expedient. 6(1) A cause or matter shall not be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or non-joinder of any party, and the Court may in any cause or matter determine the issues or questions in dispute so far as they affect the rights and interests of the persons who are parties to the cause or matter. (emphasis added) [35]Order 15 r. 4(1) RC allows the plaintiffs to join all the defendants in this suit without leave of the court if two cumulative conditions are fulfilled, namely:

there is a common question of law or fact; and

the plaintiffs' rights to relief in this suit are in respect of or arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions. For the above proposition, I rely on the following two Court of Appeal cases:

Chan Nyarn Hoi JCA's judgment in S Constantine v. Social Security Organisation (SOCSO) & Anor [1998] 1 CLJ 433; [1998] 1 MLJ 160, at p. 163; and

(ii) the decision of Abdul Malek Ahmad JCA (as he then was) in Lembaga Akitek Malaysia v. Cheah Kim Fah & Ors [1999] 2 CLJ 937; [1999] 1 MLJ 669, at pp. 679 to 680.

Refer also to Tan Eng Joo v Sandeep Singh Grewal & Anor [2022] 6 CLJ 308:- [25] Drawing support from the above two cases, this court finds there is nothing wrong in the instant proceedings for the plaintiff to bring both personal action and leave application to commence a derivative action in the same OS as it is not in dispute that both claims predominantly revolves around the same facts, transactions and events. In addition, this will obviate the necessity of separate trials/hearings, save court resources particularly when the courts are heavily burdened, and costs.

To allow this OS to remain would thus amount to an abuse of court process as this would allow P to litigate his action by installments. In this regard, this OS was filed after almost one (1) year after the date of filing of Suit 37 and Suit 67. With no reasonable explanation e delay in filing of this OS, it is clear that there is a lack of purpose behind the filing of this OS what more there are overlap in facts and reliefs between the OS and Suit 67. Furthermore, the OS also contained matters not pleaded previously in Suit 67 further creates controversies between parties.

Reference in this regard is made to Yat Tung Investment Co Ltd v Dao Heng Bank Ltd [1975] AC 581 where the House of Lords held that:- "...where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by a court of competent jurisdiction, the court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time.

On multiplicity of proceedings, regards must always be had to s.25 (2) of the Court of Judicature Act 1964 which provides as follows:- "Power to dismiss or stay proceedings where the matter in question is res judicata between the parties or where by reason of multiplicity of proceedings in any court or courts the proceedings ought not to be continued.

Thus, based on the combined grounds as analyzed above, there is strong basis for this Court to hold that this OS is wholly unnecessary and tantamount to an attempt by P to embarrass or annoy the other continued with.

For the reasons as adumbrated above, Enclosure 13 is allowed and the OS hereby struck out with costs of RM 25,000.00 subject to allocator fee. Dated 12th November 2025 (NOOR HISHAM BIN ISMAIL) Judge High Court, Johor Bahru For the Plaintiff: Messrs Fakhri & Co No 102-2, 2nd Floor, Jalan Pelabur A 23/A, Seksyen 23 40300, Shah Alam, Selangor Darul Ehsan For the Defendants: Messrs Arthur Wang, Lian & Associates Unit No 568-9-10 & 9-11, Tingkat 9 Kompleks Mutiara, Batu 3 ½, Jalan Ipoh, 51200 Kuala Lumpur