Shamsul Iskandar @ Yusre Bin Mohd Akin v Pendakwa Raya (WA-44-15-02/2026)

High Court's power to transfer cases 15

Whenever it is made to appear to the High Court-

that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in any criminal Court subordinate to it;

that some question of law of unusual difficulty is likely to arise;

that a view of the place in or near which any offence has been 20 committed may be required for the satisfactory trial of the same;

that an order under this section will tend to the general convenience of the parties or witnesses; or

that such an order is expedient for the ends of justice, or is required by any provision of this Code, 25 it may order- …

(cc) that any particular criminal case be transferred to and tried before the High Court. ... 30 [7] The Applicant’s application was premised on all the above grounds except (c), obviously, in support of his application. Although I have considered all the issues raised by the Applicant, only grounds (b) and (e) merited more in-depth discussion as below. 5 [8] The Applicant had relied on the High Court case of Riza Shahriz Bin Abdul Aziz v PP [2019] MLJU 1824 as well as other cases in their Bundle of Authorities which had dealt with a similar application. Both parties had prepared very good submissions to assist the Court and I found this case to be very useful guidance when I had 10 considered the arguments of both parties. The learned High Court Judge Mohd Nazlan Bin Mohd Ghazali J (as His Lordship then was) had stated: “[13] Although the discretionary power to transfer cases under Section 417 of the CPC is vested in the High Court, it must be exercised judiciously. 15 In Public Prosecutor v Datuk Harun bin Haji Idris & Ors [1976] 2 MLJ 116, the High Court in the context of discussing Section 417 and Section 418A of the CPC stated in no uncertain terms that under Section 417 of the CPC, the ultimate decision as to whether any particular criminal case should be transferred from a subordinate court to the High 20 Court does not depend merely on the arbitrary selection or whim of the Public Prosecutor but is determined ultimately on the proper exercise of judicial discretion by the High Court. [Emphasis added] 25 Ground 1 - The question of unusual difficulty [9] Therefore, how does the Court exercises its judicial discretion in determining this issue? In Riza Shahriz’s Case (supra), the applicant was charged with 5 counts of money-laundering under the Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of 30 Unlawful Activities Act 2001 (AMLATFPUAA). [10] I refer to paragraphs 7 and 8 of that case and drew comparison with the present case due to similarities in the arguments of the Applicant’s counsel. There, the applicant submitted that several issues of constitutional importance could be raised during the proceedings of the case which will involve complex and novel 5 questions of law, including inter alia the provisions of the AMLATFPUAA, Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 2002 (“MACMA”), Chapter VA of the Evidence Act 1950 and the Federal Constitution. “There will be complex questions of law of unusual difficulty which arise in the case as the offences were allegedly 10 committed outside Malaysia and may involve issues of extraterritorial jurisdiction, cross border transactions and admissibility of evidence from foreign countries. As such, it would be, so the applicant argues, in the interests of expedience that the case be heard in the High Court which has the jurisdiction to 15 determine such complex matters. Secondly, the applicant takes the position that the High Court at Kuala Lumpur has previously allowed the criminal proceedings involving the 1MDB case to be transferred from the Sessions Court to the High Court on the basis that the case raised complex questions of law, and that the transfer of the cases 20 will not cause any delays in the proceedings.”. [11] However, the Applicant in the present application questioned – i. whether ss. 17(a) when read together with the provisions of ss. 19 and 50(1) of the Act would have the cumulative effect 25 of denying the Applicant of his right to a fair trial; and ii. whether s.19 by itself or together with s. 50(1) is unconstitutional; [12] The Applicant submitted that ss. 19 and 50(1) had the cumulative effect of working as a “double presumption” against him, as the prosecution would definitely invoke those sections in order to prove the charge under s.17(a), which is not allowed under the law. Apart from relying on his written submissions, counsel for the Applicant 5 further elaborated on this argument in respect of the above allegation of the existence of a double presumption which they said was genuine and had arisen as the team prepared for his defence. [13] The Court was referred to the Singapore case of Hiralal Badlo v 10 Rex [1950] 16 MLJ 96 where the case dealt with s.3(b) of the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance (the offence was giving bribe to secure release of offender from custody), which counsel submitted was similar in point to the charges faced by the Appellant under s.17(a). It was held that as the arrest of the appellant and his friends 15 was illegal the favour sought in this case was not in relation to the principal affairs of a corporal (receiver of the bribe) within the meaning of s.3(b) of the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance and therefore the conviction was wrong and must be quashed. The Court was also referred to the case of PP v Lim Yam [1961] 27 MLJ 29 20 where the offence of buying rubber without a warrant formed the basis of the bribery charge similar in point to Hiralal Badlo’s Case (supra). The Malacca High Court held that the arrest was illegal and therefore the favour sought by the respondent could not be said to be in relation to the affairs of the sargeant’s principal. 25 [14] The law has developed such that we now have ss.17(a), 19(1) and 50(1) of the Act which I have reproduced for ease of reference-

Offence of giving or accepting gratification by agent A person commits an offence if—

being an agent, he corruptly accepts or obtains, or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain, from any person, for himself or for any other person, any gratification as an inducement or a reward 5 for doing or forbearing to do, or for having done or forborne to do, any act in relation to his principal’s affairs or business, or for showing or forbearing to show favour or disfavour to any person in relation to his principal’s affairs or business; or

he corruptly gives or agrees to give or offers any gratification to 10 any agent as an inducement or a reward for doing or forbearing to do, or for having done or forborne to do any act in relation to his principal’s affairs or business, or for showing or forbearing to show favour or disfavour to any person in relation to his principal’s affairs or business. 15 Acceptor or giver of gratification to be guilty notwithstanding that purpose was not carried out or matter not in relation to principal’s affairs or business

(1) Where in any proceedings against any agent for any offence under paragraph 17(a) it is proved that he corruptly solicited, accepted, obtained or agreed to accept or attempted to obtain any gratification having reason to 20 believe or suspect that the gratification was solicited or offered as an inducement or a reward for his doing or forbearing to do any act or for showing or forbearing to show any favour or disfavour to any person in relation to his principal’s affairs or business, he commits an offence under that paragraph notwithstanding that— 25

he did not have the power, right or opportunity so to do, show or forbear;

he accepted the gratification without intending so to do, show or forbear;

he did not in fact so do, show or forbear; or 30

the act, favour or disfavour was not in relation to his principal’s affairs or business. …

Presumption in certain offences

Where in any proceedings against any person for an offence under 35 section 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22 or 23 it is proved that any gratification has been received or agreed to be received, accepted or agreed to be accepted, obtained or attempted to be obtained, solicited, given or agreed to be given, promised, or offered, by or to the accused, the gratification shall be presumed to have been corruptly received or agreed to be received, accepted or agreed to be accepted, obtained or attempted to be obtained, solicited, given or agreed to be given, promised, or offered as an inducement or a reward for or on account 5 of the matters set out in the particulars of the offence, unless the contrary is proved. [15] It was submitted that in the course of the trial, s.19(1)(d) would be raised by the defence, because similar to the cases of Hiralal Badlo 10 (supra) and Lim Yam (supra), the favour or disfavour was not in relation to the Appellant’s principal’s affairs or business. Despite that no offence has been committed by the Appellant it is submitted that s.19(1) is to be construed as a presumption not in favour of the Appellant and would limit his defence. Further, s.50(1) is a 15 presumption of corrupt intention clearly relied on by the prosecution which would further limit the Appellant’s defence. Counsel argued that it would continue to be so unless these sections are declared unconstitutional, which the Sessions Court did not have the power to do so. This situation also arose in PP v Fadhil Bin Hassan [2017] 20 1 LNS 2013 where the charge was similar to that faced by the Appellant. There, the High Court allowed the use of “double presumption” and s.19(1) was not declared to be unconstitutional. Counsel submitted that they could refer the issue to the High Court later during trial at the Sessions Court but the process would be 25 lengthy and a waste of time. Hence this application was made in order not to waste time. The Appellant’s counsel referred the Court to other cases where the courts had declared certain provisions of law to be unconstitutional as they limited the courts’ powers to decide on facts. It is urged that this is a complex legal question that 30 should be dealt with by the High Court instead. [16] Additionally, the Court was informed that the other person who was separately charged by the MACC was Albert Tei (the giver) and s.19 is not applicable to him. Hence, the Appellant’s interest must be protected. 5 [17] The DPP replied, inter alia, that the constitutionality of s.19(1) could be dealt with on a one-off basis under s.30 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (CJA). She submitted that once s.30 of the CJA is invoked, the trial would be adjourned anyway, and it is a time-consuming process be it at the Sessions Court or the High Court. 10 Therefore, the Court was urged to let the trial run its natural course at the Sessions Court as was intended by Parliament by s.59 of the Act. [18] On another note, I refer to the Appellant’s contention that it would be preferable to raise any constitutional challenge at the High Court 15 (by having it as the trial court). In Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim v Government of Malaysia & Anor [2020] 4 MLJ 133, the Federal Court in a majority decision re-iterated that: “[13] The general scheme of the FC is to empower all courts to interpret the constitution (Gin Poh Holdings Sdn Bhd v. The Government of the State of 20 Penang & Ors [2018] 4 CLJ 1; [2018] 3 MLJ 417 at [35]-[36]). The power to interpret constitutional provisions is not exclusive to the Federal Court. “The Federal Court is not a constitutional court, but as the final court of appeal on all questions of law, is the final arbiter on the meaning of constitutional provisions” (A Harding, Law, Government and the 25 Constitution in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Malayan Law Journal, 1996) at p 138).”. … [15] The limits of the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Federal Court are strictly construed. This is to preserve the role of the Federal Court as 30 a final court of appeal on constitutional issues; “to extend the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Federal Court to matters which are not expressly provided by the Constitution would apart from anything else, deprive aggrieved litigants of their right of appeal to the highest court in the land”. (Rethana M Rajasigamoney v. The Government of Malaysia [1984] CLJ 352; [1984] 1 CLJ (Rep) 323; [1984] 2 MLJ 52 at 54). [Emphasis added] 5 [19] Recently, the Federal Court in the case of The Government of Malaysia v Heidy Quah Gaik Li [2026] 2 MLJ 397 held, inter alia, that: “[11] The proper forum for the respondent to raise the constitutional 10 challenge against the impugned words was the sessions court, where it would have been a relevant question in the context of the charge against her and the judge could have proceeded to either determine the question or refer it to the High Court. By filing an originating summons in the High Court instead, the respondent 15 circumvented the proper forum in an attempt to have the question determined by the Federal Court by way of a constitutional reference. This backdoor attempt to bypass the hierarchy of courts amounted to an abuse of process and a collateral attack against the ongoing sessions court proceedings. …”. 20 [Emphasis added] [20] Therefore, flowing from the above, in regard to the contention that there would be no prejudice to the Respondent, with respect, learned counsel’s argument is misconceived as his client is not the 25 only potential appellant since the Public Prosecutor being the protector of public interest is also a potential litigant in the apex court. [21] The DPP argued further that the Sessions Court Judge was a 30 competent person under the law to hear the case, and there was no evidence to say otherwise: Oh Keng Seng v PP [1974] 2 MLJ 48. [22] The principles in Oh Keng Seng (supra), are applicable to the present application. There, Hashim Yeop Sani J (as His Lordship then was) held that- “First, the application is made under section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It should be borne in mind that broadly speaking, the primary object of 5 that section is to ensure a fair and impartial trial. I have examined the affidavit of the applicant and have found nowhere in the affidavit to show that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the court before which the applicant is charged. Secondly, section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code should be construed as an exception to the ordinary rule on jurisdiction and 10 venue of hearing. The power of transfer under this section should in my view be exercised only if it appears to the court that not to do so may result in an unfair or unimpartial trial or otherwise appears to the court expedient in the interest of justice. Thirdly, an offence of sedition under section 4 of the Sedition Act, 1948 is an ordinary criminal offence which should normally be tried in the 15 ordinary court of appropriate jurisdiction. The fact that a politician is involved by itself alone should not alter the position… More specifically, the decision on this application may be made after considering paragraph (b) of section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code that is, if it appears to the court that some question of law of unusual difficulty is 20 likely to arise the court may order that the case be transferred to and tried before itself. The use of the word “unusual” in that paragraph would seem to me to indicate that the difficulty in relation to the law involved must be such that either the question of law is one which is unique or out of the usual or ordinary or one which has not been dealt with by any court before. The 25 fact that a constitutional point of great importance is expected to be raised during the trial is not sufficient ground to transfer under this section. The exercise of the power based upon such a ground would in my opinion result in absurdity because it will at least theoretically be possible to raise some constitutional question in a good number of criminal cases where 30 the liberty or rights of the subject are involved. It may be argued, although I have my doubts, that paragraph (b) of section 417 may apply to a first prosecution under the new amendment to section 3 of the Sedition Act, 1948; but you cannot say that of this case either. As such I have gone through the affidavits of the applicant and the respondent and found nothing to satisfy 35 section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code for an order of transfer to be justified. It is my view therefore that the application as it stands has no merit and should be dismissed.”. 40 [Emphasis added] [23] During the decision on 28.4.2026, I had read out many paragraphs from the judgment of Riza Shahriz’s Case (supra) which I found them to be relevant here. I do not wish to repeat them but the following paragraphs from the High Court’s judgment were particularly on point i.e on the meaning of “unusual” and on the issue 5 of the judicial officers’ competence: “[19] In my view, the word ‘unusual’ in this context is meant to describe vis-à-vis the extent of the difficulty of the question in issue. It is not intended to mean, as counsel for the applicant appears to suggest that it is unusual purely because a question has not been dealt with by any Court 10 before. Section 417(1) (b) I reiterate speaks of questions of law of unusual difficulty. Not so much novelty in the legal issues. And it goes without saying that any novelty in any point of law does not necessarily make such question of law to be of unusual difficulty. … 15 [25] Significantly, Lin v PP was followed by the High Court in Malaysia in the case of Public Prosecutor v Dato Kee Yong Wee &Ors [1988] 2 MLJ 198 (a case not referred to by either of the parties before me) which in my view rendered the status on the true applicability of Section 417(1)(b) of the CPC for all intents and purposes settled. The following passages from the judgment of 20 KC Vohrah J merit reproduction:- “Section 417(1)(b) of our law corresponds with section 184(1)(b) of the Singapore Criminal Procedure Code. There have been several applications in Singapore under 184(1)(b) for transfer of cases from the 25 Subordinate Courts to the High Court. The reported decisions show that invariably these applications have been dismissed. P. Coomaraswamy J. in Lin v Public Prosecutor [1987] 1 MLJ 106 has discussed these and certain relevant Indian decisions (in respect of somewhat similar Indian provisions) in a historical perspective. Let it be noted that the 30 provisions in India and in the Straits Settlements for transfer of cases on ground of some question of law of unusual difficulty arising were to cater for the past era where judicial officers who were supposed to hear certain difficult cases were either not legally qualified or were inexperienced to deal with them and could hardly 35 have been expected to deal with intricate points of law. P. Coomaraswamy J. said at p. 109: “In the light of the decisions I have referred to, for the provisions of 184(1)(b) to be successfully invoked today the case must be an extraordinarily rare one and I find it extremely difficult to think of one. For the historical reasons I have stated, and, given the qualifications and experience of district judges and the more senior magistrates, I am of 5 the firm view that for all practical purposes and intent, paragraph (b) of 184(1)(b) has fallen into desuetude and obsolescence for transfer of cases to the High Court." [Emphasis added] [24] Therefore, in my view, in order to qualify as “unusual” and “unusual 10 difficulty”, the issue(s) raised by an applicant for transfer of case under s. 417 of the CPC must be such that is “out of the ordinary” and “out of depth” of judicial officers. Now, here is an example of “unusual question of law” which the Court recently allowed an application for transfer of a case from the Sessions Court to the High 15 Court. On 26.5.2026, upon an application by 2 other applicants whom were represented by the same counsel as in the present case, the applications in WA-44-49-04/2026 (Abdul Hamid Shaikh Bin Abdul Razak Shaikh v PP) and WA-44-49-04/2026 (Hydroshoppe Sdn Bhd v PP) were allowed by the Court because 20 in the first case, the director of the company was personally charged under s. 16(b)(B) of the Act and in the other case, his company was charged under s.17A of the same Act. Both were charged upon the same facts (and monetary amount) of alleged corrupt practices. The prosecution had sought for both trials to be heard together where 25 the same witnesses would testify for the prosecution in both trials. The applicants (defence) contended that this would cause hardship to them and were instances where the same person faced a multiplicity of charges arising from the same facts, because he was also the director of the company which now faced criminal 30 prosecution on an alleged corporate liability. [25] The decision to allow the transfer application was made not because of convenience since they would involve the same facts and witnesses, but rather on the basis that there was merit on the issue of “unusual difficulty” raised by the applicants. It was too early for this Court to say whether there will be double jeopardy as alleged 5 by the applicants because there were 2 distinct sections relied upon to charge the director and the company. But it was foreseeable that the outcome of both cases would have far-reaching consequences on corporate governance and criminal enforcement per se upon corporations and their directors as well as senior management 10 personnel. Borrowing the words from the applicants’ submissions, “having regard to the unique and unusual factual and legal matrix, and the significant implications for the development of corporate criminal liability in Malaysia”, the Court found that the matters gave rise to questions of law that were potentially difficult, out of the 15 ordinary as well as likely to be beyond the competence of judicial officers. Due to the uniqueness of the charges and difficulties foreseeable, it was only right that the Court ordered that both trials were to be heard together for expediency. There have been no appeals against the orders of this Court in those applications (and 20 no written grounds of judgment). [26] I do not wish to prejudge the issue in the trials of the present application because the trial is not yet started and neither is it before me. However, it is pertinent to note that from my reading of s. 50 of 25 the Act, it is a legal presumption of law against an accused; but s.19 is not a presumption in law. The provisions of s.19 may limit the defence, but the section is not a legal presumption which when successfully invoked then the evidentiary burden is on the accused to rebut on a balance of probabilities. [27] In a pending case no question as to the correctness or propriety of a finding can arise; consequently, the High Court can examine the 5 proceedings of subordinate court only to satisfy itself as to their regularity: Sia Cheng Soon & Anor v Tengku Ismail Tengku Ibrahim [2008] 5 CLJ 201 (FC). This principle would apply to an appeal on an interim or interlocutory matter but nevertheless, I would say the same principle applies in an application for a transfer 10 of case from the subordinate court to the High Court. Ground 2 – whether the Sessions Court is capable to determine to consider and dispose the said question of law with unusual difficulty 15 [28] I have dealt with this issue in the paragraphs above and would not want to repeat it again. Suffice to add that the presiding judge or judicial officer may decide on any constitutional issue raised at trial because it is within his jurisdiction to do so. In Tan Hoo Eng v Public Prosecutor [2024] MLJU 2849, the Court of Appeal stated, 20 without any reference to Gan Boon Aun (supra), the following: “[44] Contrary to the submission by Mr. Gurbachan Singh, we have no hesitation to decide that a Sessions Court and First Class Magistrate’s Court (referred to collectively in this judgment as the “Subordinate Courts”) have both the “jurisdiction” and “power” to decide constitutional 25 law questions. Our reasons are as follows:

a Sessions Court has the “jurisdiction” under s 63 SCA to “try all offences other than offences punishable with death”. [Trial Jurisdiction (Sessions Court)]. There is no exception in s 63 SCA or any other provision in the SCA which states that the Trial 30 Jurisdiction (Sessions Court) shall exclude the jurisdiction to decide constitutional law issues;

by virtue of s 85 SCA, a First Class Magistrate’s Court has the “jurisdiction” to try certain offences [Trial Jurisdiction (First Class Magistrate’s Court)]. The SCA has imposed certain limitations on the Trial Jurisdiction (First Class Magistrate’s Court) but such limitations do not preclude the First Class Magistrate’s Court from 5 hearing constitutional law questions;

reading together s 99A SCA and Paragraph 27, the Subordinate Courts have the following “powers” under written law, namely s 173(f)(i), (ii) and (m)(i) to (iii) CPC -

power pursuant to s 173(f)(i) and (ii) CPC to decide whether 10 the prosecution has proven a prima facie case of the charge against an accused person [Subordinate Court’s Power (End of Prosecution Case)]; and

power to decide whether the prosecution has proven a charge against an accused person beyond all reasonable doubt at the 15 end of the entire case [Subordinate Court’s Power (End of Entire Case)] - please refer to s 173(m)(i) to (iii) CPC.

the CPC does not state that the Subordinate Court’s Power (End of Prosecution Case) and Subordinate Court’s Power (End of Entire Case) do not include the power to decide on constitutional law 20 issues;

the jurisdiction and power of the Subordinate Courts to decide on constitutional law questions is fortified by s 30(1) CJA which provides that a Subordinate Court has a discretionary power to refer to the High Court any constitutional law issue 25 which arises in the proceedings in the Subordinate Court. Such a discretion is clear from the employment of the permissive term “may” by the legislature in s 30(1) CJA. It is thus clear that if a constitutional law question arises in a case in a Subordinate Court, the Subordinate Court has a discretion 30 to decide on the constitutional law issue or may refer such an issue to the High Court pursuant to s 30(1) CJA.

if we have accepted Mr. Gurbachan Singh’s contention that the Sessions Court has no jurisdiction to decide on constitutional law questions, this will render nugatory the discretionary 35 power conferred by Parliament on the Sessions Court under s 30(1) CJA to refer constitutional law issues to the High Court; and

the interpretation of the above statutory provisions is supported by the following judgment of Azmi LP (sitting alone in an application to the Federal Court) in Yeoh Tat Thong, at p. “Apart from all that, it is my view that the High Court and 5 indeed even subordinate courts have jurisdiction to determine any question affecting the provisions of the [FC], except where the matter comes under Article 4 [FC].” [Emphasis added] 10 [29] The Court was also urged to transfer the Applicant’s case to the High Court simply because he was a public figure; previously having served as the present Prime Minister’s Senior Political Secretary. Basically, it can be summarised that the charges he faced were allegations of receiving bribes such as cash, furniture, electrical 15 appliances and home rental payments from one Albert Tei, in order that he would use his position to enable a company to obtain mineral exploration licenses in Sabah. I do not foresee any unusual difficulty arising from the said charges because the Court noted that many individuals including public figures and politicians have been 20 charged under the same section of the Act and their trials had been completed by the Sessions Courts. Appeals have been filed against the respective Sessions Court’s decision but that is normal. [30] I refer again to Riza Shahriz’s Case (supra) where Justice Mohd. 25 Nazlan stated (and which I whole-heartedly agreed) that: “[51] Otherwise all public figures would benefit from a trial at the High Court when the large majority of others have to settle for a trial at the Sessions Court which have the original jurisdiction to try these criminal cases in the first place. The former PM was a central figure in the 1MDB related charges, which have 30 generated considerable public interest locally as well as internationally. The same cannot be said of the applicant herein. [52] It has not been shown how a trial at the Sessions Court would not result in a fair and objective trial. The plain fact is that it is indisputable that there is no prejudice or injustice caused to the applicant because there are absolutely no changes to the proceedings at all, other than merely on the basis of the venue of the trial. 5 [53] The argument that to commence the case at the Sessions Court would allow the matter be appealed right up to the apex Court whilst true again belies the discriminatory nature of the assertion. Countless other criminal cases registered at the Sessions Court would have to contend with the Court of Appeal 10 being the final appellate court for their cases. [54] It is not wrong to state that in my view criminal cases must commence where they are registered under the law in adherence to the remit of the criminal jurisdiction of the Sessions Court. That should 15 rightfully be the general rule. Transfer applications under Section 417 of the CPC should be the exception, to be invoked only in truly deserving cases which in any event must be in strict compliance with the letter of the law as embodied in Section 417 of the CPC. [Emphasis added] 20 [31] Lastly, I refer to the Singaporean case of Measor & Anor v PP [1972] 1 MLJ 195, where the High Court held: “It is the duty of the High Court to create and maintain confidence in the administration of justice. Special facilities for a trial or trial by a special judge or 25 a special court is apt or at least is capable of being used to destroy that confidence and except where the supreme needs of justice require it, the ordinary course of justice is best left untouched. On the other hand no person should be allowed to undergo a trial by a district judge or magistrate of whom he has reasonable apprehension of being biased but not because the judicial 30 officer is in his opinion incompetent or incapable of properly performing his duty. The High Court will not hesitate to transfer a criminal case from a lower court to itself where there are good grounds for so doing. In this application, I can find no compelling ground for making the order which the applicants seek and the 35 application is therefore dismissed”. [32] There have been no averments that the Sessions Court Judge was incompetent or biased. Hence, there is no cogent reason for this Court to disqualify him or her from conducting the trials. 40 [33] The trials of the Applicant’s cases should proceed in the Sessions Court without further delay. Their reliance on the ground that the transfer would be expedient in the ends of justice, in my view, was misconceived. This Court too have other trials lined up until the middle of next year and this does not include the numerous appeals 5 from the Sessions Court that have been registered here (some are ready to be heard while some are still awaiting the preparation of records of appeal). It would not be in the best interest of the Applicant to delay his trials further when Sessions Court 14 is already tasked (and should be ready) to conduct his cases. 10 [34] I have scrutinised the affidavits filed and the submissions of the parties. I did not find that the Applicant has satisfied the requirements of s.417 of the CPC. As the law is settled on this issue, I see no reason to depart from established judicial precedents 15 which are binding on this Court. CONCLUSION [35] Premised upon the above considerations, the Court found the said application was without merit, and accordingly dismissed it. 20 Dated on 26 June 2026 Sgd. 25 NOOR RUWENA BINTI MD. NURDIN Judge Special Corruption High Court High Court of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur 30 For the Applicant: Datuk Amer Hamzah Arshad with Mr. Yusmadi Yusoff and Mr. Joshua Tay H’ng Foong Messrs. Amerbon, Kuala Lumpur. 5 For the Respondent: DPP Farah Ezlin Binti Yusop Khan with DPP Nurul Qistini Binti Qamarul Abrar and DPP Esther Jacyntha A/P Monyarpram Legal & Prosecution Division, Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission, Putrajaya. 10