Shankar A/L Ulaganathan v Premjothi Chandran (BA-B52NCvC-15-01/2021)

The Plaintiff (Shankar) and the Defendant (Premjothi) were friends who, along with another friend (Gopikrishnan), decided to invest in a restaurant business called Tikka Restaurant in Tawau, Sabah.

The Plaintiff claimed to have invested RM100,000, while the Defendant allegedly contributed RM80,000. 31/12/2024 12:01:04

The restaurant business failed, and the Plaintiff contended that all parties agreed to treat their investments as total losses.

The Defendant disputed this and claimed that the Plaintiff owed him RM80,000, which he purportedly loaned for the business.

On March 21, 2020, the Defendant and two individuals confronted the Plaintiff, allegedly making threats and coercing him to surrender his vehicle (BMW BMM900) as collateral for the debt.

The Defendant escorted the Plaintiff to a police station, where a report was lodged stating that the vehicle was voluntarily handed over.

The next day, the Plaintiff lodged a second police report, alleging that the vehicle was taken forcefully under duress and threats.

The Plaintiff initiated a suit against the Defendant for the conversion of his vehicle, claiming damages.

The Defendant counterclaimed, asserting that the Plaintiff owed him RM80,000 as a loan, not as an investment.

This chain of events eventually culminated in a legal dispute with two primary claims: the Plaintiff’s claim for wrongful conversion of the vehicle and the Defendant’s counterclaim for repayment of the alleged loan. B.

In terms of Plaintiff’s claim that the Defendant forcefully took his vehicle as collateral for an alleged debt. This court ruled in favour of the Plaintiff, finding that the vehicle was taken by force without consent. Damages (value of the vehicle and general damages) were ordered to be assessed later. Claims for exemplary and aggravated damages were dismissed as they were not properly pleaded. S/N Fn3/gixeHE2ju1Bt1zfJdQ C.

In terms of the Defendant’s counter claim that RM80,000 was a loan to the Plaintiff and it should be refund, this court found in favour of the Defendant (Dr. Prem) and ruled that the RM80,000 was a loan, not an investment. The Plaintiff failed to prove the alleged agreement to treat the amount as a business loss.

Each party was ordered to bear their own costs in both the main suit and the counter claim.

Both the Plaintiff and the Defendant filed appeals against my decision, and the High Court, following an application, consolidated both appeals.

In High Court, both parties’ appeals were struck off/dismissed. D.

The assessment proceeding was initiated following the court's decision in the main action, where the Plaintiff's claim for general and special damages was allowed to be assessed under Order 37 of the Rules of Court 2012.

The Plaintiff prayed for the following damages in this proceeding: a. In terms of special damages totalling at RM123,693.18:

fees incurred by the Plaintiff in terms of towing and repair works over the Vehicle - RM12,543.18.

(ii) The loss of use over the Vehicle - RM2,150.00; and

(iii) The difference in the value of the Vehicle (from the date it was taken to when the Vehicle was fit for use)- RM109,000.00. S/N Fn3/gixeHE2ju1Bt1zfJdQ b. In terms of general damages: mental distress, anxiety and suffering the Plaintiff endured.

The assessment proceeding was conducted via trial on 19th July 2024 and 8 August 2024. E.

The bundle of documents for the assessment proceeding is as follows: a. The Common Bundle of Documents in Enclosure 81 (“CBOD”) - marked as bundle ‘A1’. b. The Plaintiff’s Additional Bundle of Documents in Enclosure 92 (“P’s BOD”)- marked as bundle ‘B’. F.

In the course of the proceeding, the following individuals were called to give evidence on behalf of the respective parties: - i) Shankar A/L Ulaganathan (“SP 1”) – The Plaintiff. SP 1’s witness statement is marked as WSSP1. ii) Premjothi A/L Chandran (“SD 1”) – The Defendant. SD 1’s witness statement is marked as WSSD1. S/N Fn3/gixeHE2ju1Bt1zfJdQ iii) Wan Nurul Hidayah Binti Wan Mohd Asri (“SD 2”) – The Defendant’s Assistant & Staff. The Defendant. SD 2’s witness statement is marked as WSSD2.

Having heard the witnesses and reviewed the submissions of both parties, this court assessed and awarded damages totalling RM 73,443.18 to the Plaintiff.

Dissatisfied once again, the Defendant filed an appeal on 19 November 2024. G.

PLAINTIFF’S SUBMISSION

For special damages, the Plaintiff relied on Development and Commercial Bank Berhad v Liew Weng Hang & Ors [2007] 6 CLJ 260 which emphasizes that a tortfeasor is liable for all direct harm caused by their wrongful acts.

Plaintiff argued that the towing and repair costs of RM15,598.18 is supported by documentary evidence such as receipts and insurance reports.

Plaintiff further prayed for borrowed car expenses of RM2,150.00 asserting that these costs were incurred for maintaining a substitute vehicle during the period the Plaintiff was deprived of his own. This claim is supported by receipts and proof of payments.

In terms of depreciation in vehicle value amounting to RM109,000.00, the Plaintiff relied on the insurance coverage report from Allianz, valuing the vehicle at RM144,000.00 as of January 2020. The valuation after repairs placed the car’s worth at RM35,000.00. Plaintiff cited the case of Chin Wooi Keat v Isberg Corp Sdn Bhd (in receivership) & Anor [2014] 10 MLJ 1 which established that plaintiffs in conversion cases are entitled to recover the difference in market value at the time of the conversion and the condition upon return.

According to the Plaintiff, the Defendant failed to rebut the valuation evidence during cross-examination, which under China Road & Bridge Corp & Anor v DCX Technologies Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2014] 5 MLJ 1, implies acceptance.

For general damages, the Plaintiff sought compensation for mental distress, anxiety, and emotional suffering, based on the Plaintiff’s testimony about threats, anxiety, and disruption in his personal and professional life caused by the Defendant’s actions. He stated this led to job loss and mental anguish. The absence of a medical report was explained as being due to financial constraints.

Plaintiff cited the case of Norizan bt Abd Rahman v Dr Arthur Samuel [2013] 4 CLJ 275, a precedent for similar compensation to support their claim. In Norizan, the court awarded RM80,000 for mental anguish, depression, and pain.

Counsel for the Plaintiff averred that the Plaintiff’s consistency throughout cross-examination enhanced the reliability of his claims. The case of Md Zainudin Bin Raujan v Public Prosecutor [2013] 3 MLJ 773 which emphasized that a witness’s credibility is assessed by the consistency of their testimony and its fit with the overall evidence was referred.

In reply to the Defendant’s written submissions, the Plaintiff argued that the Defendant’s submissions attempted to relitigate liability and raise non-material issues. With reference to Defendant’s allegation of refusal to settle amicably, Plaintiff argued that mediation was attempted earlier in the case but failed, demonstrating that settlement efforts were made. No further bona fide proposals were provided by the Defendant afterward.

The Plaintiff further refuted the Defendant’s claim that the Plaintiff suppressed evidence by not calling the witness, Ezreeq, stating that the claim is without merit. The Plaintiff argued that the entire WhatsApp conversation with Ezreeq was presented during cross-examination and included in Enclosure 92, allowing the Defendant’s counsel to examine the evidence. Apart from that, all S/N Fn3/gixeHE2ju1Bt1zfJdQ documents were converted to Part B, removing the necessity to call their makers as witnesses.

With regard to the purported wrong valuation of the vehicle, Plaintiff reiterated that the Plaintiff relied on an insurance report and valuation from Auto Bavaria to prove depreciation. These were unchallenged and supported by documentary evidence. The Plaintiff averred that the Defendant failed to challenge the Plaintiff’s valuation of the vehicle during cross-examination, hence raising this issue in written submissions is belated and an afterthought. Plaintiff again submitted that the failure to cross-examine implies acceptance of evidence (China Road & Bridge Corp v DCX Technologies Sdn Bhd [2014] 5 MLJ 1 referred) .

In terms of whether there is failure to prove losses, the Plaintiff submitted that they had satisfied the burden of proof by presenting documentary evidence and testifying with personal knowledge about the losses incurred. Further, documents admitted as Part B need no corroboration from additional witnesses. The law Order 27 rule 5(3) of the Rules of Court 2012 confirms no necessity to prove authenticity if documents are admitted.

Overall, Plaintiff argued that these claims are grounded on unchallenged evidence, supported by documentary evidence and established judicial principles.

(ii) DEFENDANT’S SUBMISSION

The Defendant argued that the Plaintiff intentionally avoided resolving the matter to pursue inflated claims through legal action. The Defendant argued that the Plaintiff intentionally refused reasonable offers, including the return of the car, to escalate claims.

The Defendant asserted that The Plaintiff allegedly knew the car's whereabouts earlier than claimed and possibly had access to tamper with the car. The S/N Fn3/gixeHE2ju1Bt1zfJdQ Defendant challenged the Plaintiff about the involvement of a third party named "Ezreeq" whose testimony or presence in court was never substantiated.

The Defendant argued that there is exaggeration of damages with many repairs deemed to be wear and tear unrelated to the Defendant’s custody of the car.

The Defendant questioned the valuation of the car and the methods used, arguing that the Plaintiff’s calculations unfairly inflate the compensation sought.

Defendant averred that the Plaintiff's claims of emotional and mental distress are unsubstantiated, as no medical evidence was presented to support this.

The Defendant referred to Sections 101 and 102 of the Evidence Act 1950, emphasizing the Plaintiff's failure to meet legal standards for proving damages The Defendant asserts that the Plaintiff has failed to meet the burden of proof required to substantiate his claims, relying on vague and inconsistent evidence.

The Defendant disputed the Plaintiff’s use of documents moved to Part B of the agreed bundle under Order 27 Rule 5 of the Rules of Court 2012. While the authenticity of the documents is not disputed, their contents are contested.

Defendant cited the case of Tiow Weng Theong v. Melawangi Sdn Bhd [2019] 2 CLJ 655 and Ambusa Maya v. IJM Plantation Berhad [2024] CLJU 445 to emphasize the necessity of corroborating disputed documentary evidence. The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff failed to bring witnesses to corroborate the contents of these documents, leaving them unsupported.

The Defendant requested the court to dismiss the Plaintiff’s claims or assess them at a nominal rate, emphasizing that the claims as unfair demands which lack adequate evidence and are exaggerated. S/N Fn3/gixeHE2ju1Bt1zfJdQ H.

Before we delve into the assessment issues, I would first like to address the issue raised above regarding the reclassification and whether corroboration is required.

Initially, several documents in the Common Bundle of Documents (CBOD) were categorized under Part C, indicating that both their authenticity and contents were disputed. However, on 7th July 2024, the Plaintiff filed a Notice to Admit Documents under Order 27 Rule 5 of the Rules of Court 2012 (as seen in Enclosure 84).

This Notice granted the Defendant 14 days to specify which of the Part C documents they wished to maintain in Part C. According to Order 27 Rule 5(2), failure to respond or provide a notice of non-admission within this period results in the documents being deemed admitted under Order 27 Rule 5(3).

As no response was received from the Defendant after the stipulated 14 days, before the hearing started, the Plaintiff moved the court to reclassify the documents from Part C to Part B. The defendant informed the court that they maintained their position that the documents should remain classified under

This court noted the Defendant's objection to the Plaintiff's use of documents moved to Part B under Order 27 Rule 5 of the Rules of Court 2012. The Defendant argued that while the authenticity of the documents is not disputed, their contents are. The Defendant emphasized the need for supporting S/N Fn3/gixeHE2ju1Bt1zfJdQ evidence and argued that the Plaintiff has failed to provide witnesses to substantiate the contents of these documents.

Under Order 73A(2)(a) of the Rules of Court 2012, the court may admit a statement as evidence even if the maker of the statement is available but not called as a witness. This discretion is exercised when calling the maker would unnecessarily prolong the proceedings or cause additional expense, without significantly affecting the evidential value of the document.

In Mohd Nazari Ab Majit v. Tan Keo Hock & Anor [1999] 1 CLJ 601, the court clarified that documents admitted with formal proof dispensed do not require the maker to testify unless cross-examination of other witnesses or corroborative evidence deems it necessary. This decision emphasizes efficiency in trials without compromising fairness.

Additionally, in Melawangi Sdn Bhd v. Lim Kian Hian [2017] CLJU 1473, the court reiterated that documents in Part B require corroboration but not necessarily the testimony of the maker, provided other supporting evidence is sufficient to establish their evidentiary value.

It is clear that Order 73A of the Rules of Court grants the court discretionary powers to admit certain statements as evidence in civil proceedings, provided it serves the interest of justice and prevents undue delay or expense. Despite the Defendant’s contention that they disputed the contents of the documents, this court is of the view that they did not seriously challenge the contents of each document. This court is satisfied that the corroborative evidence from the Plaintiff himself is sufficient to establish their evidentiary value particularly when all the documents were in fact align with the timeline of events and complement one another.

The Plaintiff has adhered to procedural requirements and properly notified the Defendant, who failed to respond within the stipulated timeframe. The court has the discretion to admit the documents and deem them credible without requiring additional witnesses or original copies, thereby discouraging tactics aimed at causing surprises and unwarranted delays.

This is so particularly when doing so may cause undue delay in view of the volumes of the documents (page 44 to 101 in bundle A, totalling 27 documents – see enclosure 84 Notice to Admit Documents) and this in fact serve no practical purpose. In this case, the Plaintiff’s documents were duly admitted under Order 27 Rule 5 of the Rules of Court 2012, and their authenticity was not contested by the Defendant. The requirement to bring additional witnesses merely to corroborate the contents would unnecessarily prolong the proceedings without adding substantive value to the matter before the court.

It is pertinent to highlight that the Defendant was properly served with notice regarding the Plaintiff’s intention to admit the documents under Part B. Despite having ample opportunity to raise objections, the Defendant failed to do so within the prescribed time frame or during the pre-trial stage. The principle of procedural fairness ensures that parties must assert their objections promptly to prevent unnecessary delays and unfair surprises during the trial.

Allowing the Defendant to belatedly challenge these documents, despite their earlier silence, undermines the efficient administration of justice and defeat the Courts’ aim to resolve disputes expediently. In this case, the Defendant’s silence following proper notice constitutes a waiver of the right to contest the evidentiary weight of the documents.

In Mohd Nazari Ab Majit v. Tan Keo Hock & Anor [1999] 1 CLJ 601 clarifies that where a party has agreed to dispense with formal proof, they cannot later demand additional cross-examination or corroboration unless they reserved such a right at the outset. This court is of the considered view that the authority supports the proposition that failure to promptly object to procedural matters may result in a waiver of the right to contest them later.

Thus, the Defendant's failure to raise timely objections further solidifies the admissibility of these documents without the necessity for additional witnesses. The court is of the view that it has rightfully exercised its discretion to deem the Plaintiff’s evidence sufficient, thereby avoiding unnecessary delays in the proceedings. S/N Fn3/gixeHE2ju1Bt1zfJdQ I. DECISION ON ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES - ENCLOSURE 74 Special Damages i. Fees for towing and repair of the Vehicle:

This court allowed an amount of RM15,368.18 being the fees for towing and repair of the Vehicle (RM15,598.18 – RM230.00)

RM230.00 was not allowed. See Page 92 of Bundle A1- repair on temperature sensor and gas not allowed as this was only done nearly two years after the car was returned, this shall be considered as a wear and tear repair too since based on evidence adduced, this was a first time changing/repair after using the car for more than 10 years.

Other than the sum of RM230.00, the remaining costs incurred had been proven by the Plaintiff and is supported with sufficient documentary evidence including the photographs which show the condition of the car before it was taken (see pages 44 -49 bundle A), while it was being retained by the Defendant (see pages 54 -58 of bundle A) and after it was returned (see pages 69 -83 of bundle A), the receipts and the insurance reports.

This court finds the Defendant’s contention that the person named Ezreeq could have tampered with the car to be speculative and without merit. The court also agrees that there has been no suppression of evidence in these proceedings, and no adverse inference shall be drawn against the Plaintiff. See Page 3 of the WhatsApp conversation in Bundle 'B', which shows the Plaintiff’s text to the person named Ezreeq as follows: S/N Fn3/gixeHE2ju1Bt1zfJdQ WhatsApp on 21 December 2022 at 8.02am “Hi Ezreeq, good morning. I’m Shankar, the guy who’s car you found (BMW 4 series). As you know the police have finally took possession of the car have returned it to me. I’m messaging today to find out if you are willing to testify in court on the condition of the car before the police took it. The date given by court is on the 11th of January at 2.30pm. Your statement will prove to the court that the car was in bad condition because it was left outside by the person who took it and that will allow me to claim for the repairs. Your help would be greatly appreciated.” WhatsApp on 21 December 2022 at 8.03am “No script will be given to you. You can mention things as you see and remember.”

The Plaintiff testified in court at page 23 of the Notes of Proceedings that this person never responded to his messages or called him afterward. Furthermore, this court is satisfied that the Plaintiff’s evidence does not require corroboration under the law. In the absence of any gaps in the chain of evidence or the need for rebuttal evidence, there is no necessity to call every witness to testify in court, as it is well-established that evidence is weighed, not counted. ii. Fees to repair and maintain the Plaintiff’s borrowed car

This court allowed an amount of RM1,075.00 (RM2150 – 50%) as fees to repair and maintain a substitute car during that period.

This court shall only allow 50% of the amount claimed as the same expenses would be incurred too by the Plaintiff in the event his car was not taken.

This court assessed a deduction of 50% is fair as the model of the car taken is a BMW and the car used during that period is a Perodua Bezza, this court agrees that the cost in using this taken car could be higher compared to using the substitute car.

This court noted that in compensating fees to repair and maintain the Plaintiff’s borrowed car, the court will not make any further award for loss of use over the vehicle to avoid duplicity. iii. Difference in the value of the Vehicle from 21.3.2020 (when it was taken) to when the vehicle could be valued, after repairs:

Plaintiff proposed RM109,000 being the difference in the value of the Vehicle from 21.3.2020 (when it was taken) to when the vehicle could be valued, after repairs (RM144,000 – RM35,000) and this court agrees to grant a compensation sum of RM50,000 for loss of value.

The High Court's decision in Chin Wooi Keat v Isberg Corp Sdn Bhd (in receivership) & Anor [2014] 10 MLJ 1, specifically paragraph [41], provides clarity on the principles of assessing damages for conversion. It was held at paragraph [41] that: “The prima facie measure of damages for conversion is the market value of the goods at the time the wrongdoer expropriated them as this would represent the basic loss sustained by the owner. In cases, where the goods are returned, an owner would still be entitled to recover all losses flowing naturally and directly from the wrongdoer’s acts S/N Fn3/gixeHE2ju1Bt1zfJdQ of conversion. On the return of the goods, an owner would recover, not their value, but the damages he has sustained by the wrongful act. He would be entitled to the difference in the market value of the goods at the time of the conversion, less the value of the goods when returned and all consequential losses. ………Where the goods are returned damaged, a plaintiff would be entitled to recover the cost of repair in addition to other losses.”

The court's emphasis on these principles underscores the compensatory nature of damages in tort law, ensuring that the injured party is restored, as much as possible, to the position they would have been in had the wrongful act not occurred. This court noted that the initial measure of damages for conversion is the market value of the goods at the time they were wrongfully taken. This value represents the basic loss to the owner resulting from the expropriation. When the converted goods are returned, the owner is still entitled to recover all naturally and directly arising losses caused by the act of conversion. The measure of damages in such cases is not the value of the goods themselves but the difference between the market value of the goods at the time of conversion and their value upon return, along with any consequential losses suffered. Hence, if the returned goods are damaged, the plaintiff is entitled to recover the cost of repairing the damage and any additional consequential losses stemming from the wrongful act.

In the current case, the Plaintiff is relying on a comparison of the value stated in an insurance coverage for the vehicle obtained on 14.2.2020 (roughly one month before the vehicle was taken on 21.3.2020) with the current value stated in Trade in Price quotation /Offer for purchase obtained in May 2024.

This court noted that the High Court case of Arasis Sdn Bhd v Pacific & Orient Insurance Co Bhd [2013] 1 MLJ 784 demonstrates critical principles S/N Fn3/gixeHE2ju1Bt1zfJdQ in insurance law, particularly regarding the agreed insured sum and the evidentiary burden on insurers in the event of a dispute. In Arasis, the claimant, owner of a vehicle insured by Allianz for RM60,000, sought compensation following the loss of the vehicle before the policy expired. While the insured sum was RM60,000, the insurer only offered RM29,000, prompting the claimant to pursue legal action. The court held that the insured sum of RM60,000 was binding as it was explicitly agreed upon in the insurance cover note. The insured sum represented the market value of the vehicle at the time the policy was issued. On the other hand, the defendant insurer failed to produce evidence justifying its reduced valuation of RM29,000. In the absence of such rebuttal evidence, the court ruled in favour of the plaintiff appellant in Arasis by allowing the appeal, granting the claimant the insured sum of RM60,000.

This court acknowledges based on the above-mentioned authority, the insured sum or a value of a vehicle stated in the cover note can represent the market value of the vehicle at the time the policy was issued. However, this court finds that in the current case, the value given was merely an estimation and it could be further negotiated.

This court should also take into consideration of the natural depreciation of value of a car over the years particularly when the car was not a new car and was only sent for valuation nearly two years after it was taken back. This court noted that on 21.3.2020, the Plaintiff’s vehicle was taken, the vehicle was returned to him on 27.5.2022. The car should be sent for valuation soonest after it was taken back and repaired. However, the valuation was only done in May 2023 although repair was completed on 23.12.2023.

The court also needs to consider the fact that “multiple claims were made and extensive repair was done” would be overlapping with the damages claimed for the repair of the vehicle. Compensation has been granted for repair done. And repair of the vehicle is significant to maintain the value of the car and that is why an estimation of the value shall only be done after repair was done.

Apart from that, this court finds that as per the document tendered by the Plaintiff, the estimation of value also takes into account factors such as the mileage of the car. It is widely known that higher mileage generally correlates with lower value as high mileage vehicle would indicate that the vehicle has experienced more wear and tear. In this case, the Plaintiff did not deny the fact that throughout the period of conversion, the car was not actually used by the Defendant but was parked stationary at a place. Hence, the use of the vehicle is minima and, in a way, generate very low mileage during this period. Hence, benefit of doubt must be given to the Defendant in assessing the loss of value of the vehicle pertaining to this factor.

Having said the above, this court nevertheless observed that no compelling evidence is provided to the contrary by the Defendant in contesting the diminished market value. The Defendant failed to tender any contradicting evidence to rebut the estimate market value asserted by the Plaintiff.

In balancing the claimed diminished value against the circumstances of the case, this court finds that a compensation sum of RM50,000.00 is a fair award for the loss of value.

Total special damages granted is RM66,443.18 (RM15,368.18 +

The Plaintiff also prayed for general damages to be awarded in view of mental distress, anxiety and stress resulted from the incident. In determining whether to grant this general damage, this court considers the following facts:

that no medical report was produced;

(ii) that there was no attempt to seek help/treatment from government clinic/hospital/any other medical body;

(iii) that there was no attempt to seek free counselling offered by any association/body (Plaintiff alleged that he was unable to afford any consultation);

(iv) that there are no supporting documents to link the loss of job to the alleged distress.

The Plaintiff asserted that the threats from the Defendant and his representative had a constant impact on his daily life, causing fear and anxiety. He felt compelled to follow up with the police for the criminal investigation due to these threats. The stress led to him losing his job, and the prolonged deprivation of the vehicle negatively affected his overall mindset and performance.

Despite the seriousness of the Plaintiff’s claimed mental suffering, there is no medical evidence to support his assertions. In the case of Subramaniam a/l Paramasivam & Ors v. Malaysian Airlines System Bhd [2002] 1 MLJ 45, Kang Hwee Gee J (as His Lordship then was) stated at page 62: “To ‘prove’, in the context of the speech of Lord Goddard means to provide some form of evidence sufficient to convince the decider to the point that he believes it to exist or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act on the supposition that it exists (see s 2’s definition of ‘prove’ in the Evidence Act 1950.) The medical practitioner who gave evidence did no more than repeat her complaints. No formal examination or test was conducted on her to verify her complaints. Above all, her complaint of suffering flight phobia by reason that the plane was carrying excess weight was totally unfounded. There was no evidence that the safety of the flight was compromised by carrying excess weight.”

The case of Subramaniam underscores the need for objective evidence, such as medical examinations, to substantiate claims of mental distress.

In light of the above findings, this court concludes that a high award for general damages is not justified. The absence of medical reports, any attempt to seek help or treatment from medical bodies or clinics, and the lack of supporting documents linking the alleged distress to the loss of job all weigh against the Plaintiff's claim for a substantial award for mental distress, anxiety, and stress. Therefore, this court finds that the claim for general damages is not supported by sufficient evidence to warrant a significant compensation.

Even though there are no sufficient materials been tendered before this court to enable the court to ascertain the alleged damages suffered and assess the quantum of damages to be awarded, this court however acknowledged the fact that this incident could have caused some troubles, fear, worries and tension to the Plaintiff.

This court awards a sum of RM7,000.00 as general damages, deeming it a reasonable amount for the inconvenience and hardship suffered by the Plaintiff in dealing with the issue. J.

It must be emphasized that this forum is solely to assess the Plaintiff’s damages, which the Plaintiff has supported through evidence.

This court has no more duty to address specific allegations made by the Defendant in their attempts to relitigate liability. The Defendant’s liability has already been decided.

Having concluded the whole assessment proceeding by way of trial, this court is satisfied that the Plaintiff provided sufficient evidence to support the claimed S/N Fn3/gixeHE2ju1Bt1zfJdQ damages and hence this court granted special damages totalling RM RM66,443.18 and an appropriate sum of RM7000.00 for general damages.

Total damages granted is RM 73,443.18 (RM66,443.18 + RM7000). Dated 25 December 2024 …………………………………………………. (YONG LEOU SHIN) Judge Session Court Shah Alam Selangor Counsel for the Plaintiff Nurul Hanani Azamuddin Messrs Raj, Ong & Yudistra Kuala Lumpur Counsel for the Defendant