Sharifah Rohaizan Binti Syed Mansor v Ahmad Sadli @ Ahmad Fadli Bin Majid (KA-22NCvC-14-03/2023)

This dispute raises a fundamental question concerning contractual capacity: whether a prior clinical diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease automatically vitiates the legal capacity of an individual to execute a 10/07/2026 01:25:01 KA-22NCvC-14-03/2023 Kand. 99 S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ land disposal instrument, or whether the presumption of sanity remains intact during a demonstrated lucid interval.

The Plaintiff is the daughter and administratrix of the estate of her father, Syed Mansor Bin Syed Kassim Barakbah ("the Deceased"), who passed away on 16.12.2021.

The Deceased was the registered owner of a piece of land held under GM 94 Lot 1515, Bandar Bukit Kayu Hitam, District of Kubang Pasu, until 28.09.2021 (“the Property”).

On 25.08.2015, the Deceased and the Defendant executed a Sale & Purchase Agreement (“the SPA”) for the sale of the Property for a total consideration of RM300,000.00. The Property was subsequently transferred to the Defendant on 28.09.2021 (“the Transfer”).

For the sake of chronological and procedural clarity, this Court must record the transition regarding the Plaintiff’s capacity to sue. This action was originally commenced in March 2023 by the Plaintiff acting in her capacity as the court-appointed committee for the S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ Deceased under the Mental Health Act 2001. However, during the pendency of this suit, the Deceased sadly passed away on 16 December 2021. By operation of law, the committee was automatically dissolved upon his demise. Consequently, pursuant to an Order of this Court dated 10 June 2024, the Writ and Statement of Claim were formally amended to reflect the Plaintiff's current standing as a beneficiary and heir of the Deceased's estate. This Court is satisfied that the Plaintiff has the requisite locus standi to maintain this action in her amended capacity.

The Plaintiff in the Statement of Claim pleads that the Transfer was invalid as the Deceased was a person lacking mental capacity at the material time. The Transfer instrument is alleged to be an act of fraud and/or deception since the Deceased lacked the mental capacity to understand the transaction or the consequences of his actions.

The Plaintiff insisted that the Deceased’s mental incapacity was reportedly confirmed by documents from Pantai Hospital Penang in 2016, which diagnosed him with dementia (Alzheimer’s disease). S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ

Furthermore, the Plaintiff asserts that the Defendant never handed over any consideration to the Deceased or the Plaintiff to complete the transfer of the Property. It is alleged that the Defendant has unjustly enriched himself from the Property obtained through these allegedly fraudulent means.

As a result of the Defendant’s alleged wrongful and/or negligent acts, the Plaintiff pleads that the Deceased and the Plaintiff suffered several losses, including: a) Loss of the Property and its title; b) Loss of the use and enjoyment of the Property; c) Loss of rental income, estimated at RM1,000.00 per month starting from 1.10.2021; and d) Loss of legitimate expectation.

Following the Defendant’s failure to respond to a Notice of Demand dated 25.11.2022, the dissatisfied Plaintiff initiated this legal action to seek the judicial nullification of the transaction and the recovery of the Property. The Plaintiff’s Submission S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ

The Plaintiff’s case rests on these primary pillars. First, the Plaintiff argues that the Deceased lacked the cognitive capacity to enter into a contract under Sections 11 and 12 of the Contracts Act 1950 (“the Contracts Act”).

The Plaintiff relies heavily on the testimony of a consultant who conducted an in-person examination on 04.02.2016 and diagnosed the Deceased with Alzheimer’s disease. Hence, the Plaintiff submits that since the Deceased lacked "executive function", the ability to reason, plan, and understand consequences, the contract was void ab initio.

Secondly, the Plaintiff contends that, by virtue of Section 26 of the Contracts Act, the agreement is void for the Deceased never received the full benefit of the RM300,000 purchase price. While RM100,000 was paid, the Plaintiff highlights that the balance of RM200,000 was purportedly directed to a third party, an employee named Zainol. According to the Plaintiff, there is no documentary proof that this money was ever received by Zainol or that it provided any benefit to the deceased’s estate, suggesting the transaction was nothing but a sham. S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ

Thirdly, the Plaintiff pleads that the Defendant obtained the Property through fraud or deception by exploiting a man with a known deteriorating mental state, as the Plaintiff characterises the transaction as highly irregular, noting the speed at which documents were stamped and the unusual instructions for payment distribution as evidence of a conspiracy. It is also submitted that the Defendant unjustly enriched himself at the expense of the deceased and his rightful beneficiaries. The Defence 15. The Defendant maintains that as a bona fide purchaser who dealt through intermediaries and never met the Deceased, he did not know of the alleged incapacity, which renders the contract legally binding.

In rebutting the claim of mental incapacity, the Defendant contends that a medical diagnosis of early-stage Alzheimer’s does not legally equate to a total loss of contractual capacity, especially where contemporaneous evidence proves the existence of lucid intervals.

In rebutting the allegation of lack of consideration, the Defendant maintains that he fully discharged his legal obligations by strictly S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ adhering to the payment mechanism established in the SPA. Under Clause 2.1 of the SPA, the Defendant was legally required to deposit the purchase price with the Deceased’s appointed stakeholder law firm, Messrs M N Halim Syaffie & Associates, rather than with the Deceased personally.

After all, the Defendant rebuts the claim of fraud by emphasising that the transaction was a standard arm's-length deal facilitated by intermediaries and the Deceased’s own solicitor. The Trial 19. The Plaintiff called a total of three (3) witnesses to support her case: a) The Plaintiff herself, who is the biological daughter and a beneficiary of the Deceased (SP1); b) The daughter-in-law of the Deceased, Sharifah Rofita binti Syed Fesul (SP2); and c) A Consultant Neurologist from Pantai Hospital Penang, who examined the Deceased in person and provided the medical diagnosis of Alzheimer's disease, Dr Wong Yee Choon (SP3). S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ

The Defendant called a total of five (5) witnesses, including independent professional third parties. They are: a) A Psychiatrist and Mental Health Specialist who provided an expert secondary evaluation of the Deceased’s mental capacity, Dr Nurul Nadia Ismail (SD1); b) The Assistant Land Administrator at the Kota Setar Land Office who witnessed the Deceased executing Form 14A, Ommulkhair binti Ahmad (SD2); c) The conveyancing lawyer who handled the SPA and the Property transfer, Ida Ruhayu binti Talib (SD3); d) The Defendant himself (SD4); and e) The Commissioner for Oaths who witnessed the Deceased executing a Statutory Declaration (“the SD”) regarding his sanity and the sale of the Property, Azhari bin Hamid (SD5). Issues to be determined by the Court 21. The issues to be determined by the Court in the case are as follows: S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ a) Whether the Deceased possessed the requisite mental capacity under Sections 11 and 12 of the Contracts Act to understand the transaction and make decisions freely at the material times of executing the SPA and Form 14A; b) Whether the Defendant paid the agreed purchase price of RM300,000.00 and whether the transaction was void under Section 26 of the Contracts Act for a purported lack of valid consideration; c) Whether the transfer of the Property was obtained through fraud, conspiracy, or deception perpetrated by the Defendant, particularly by taking advantage of the Deceased’s medical condition; and d) Whether, in the event the SPA was found void, the parties would be required to be restored to their original positions under Section 66 of the Contracts Act. Decision and Findings of the Court S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ

Having meticulously evaluated the totality of the evidence, including the oral testimonies of the witnesses, the contemporaneous documentary evidences, and the comprehensive submissions of both learned counsels, this Court finds that the Plaintiff has failed to discharge the legal burden of proof to establish that the Deceased lacked contractual capacity at the material times, that there was a failure of consideration, or that the transaction was obtained through fraud or deception. Herein are my reasons. A. Mental Capacity 23. At the heart of this case lies a crucial legal question: Did the Deceased have the necessary mental capacity, as required by Sections 11 and 12 of the Contracts Act, to sign the SPA on 25.08.2015 and execute Form 14A on 04.04.2016?

The law is unequivocal. Under Section 11 of the Contracts Act, a person is competent to contract if they are of the age of majority and are of "sound mind". Section 12(1) further clarifies that a person is of sound mind if, at the time of making the contract, they are capable of understanding it and forming a rational judgment as to its effect upon their interests. S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ

The Defendant, citing Imperial Loan Co Ltd v Stone [1892] 1 QB 599 and Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Yap Bee Lee & Ors [1991] 1 CLJ 271, argued that a contract made by a person of unsound mind is merely voidable, and can only be set aside if it is proven that the other contracting party knew of the mental incapacity at the material time.

This Court acknowledges the Defendant’s heavy reliance on the principles outlined in Imperial Loan Co (supra) and Asia Commercial Finance (supra). However, this Court accepts the Plaintiff’s submission that the Malaysian statutory framework provides a higher and more absolute level of protection for those lacking mental faculty. While the Defendant’s lack of personal knowledge is factually accepted, given that he dealt solely through intermediaries and never met the Deceased face-to-face, this lack of notice does not, as a matter of law, cure an underlying lack of capacity.

The legal position in Malaysia has been decisively clarified by Ian Chin J in Sim Kon Sang Peter (Administrator of the estate of Chong Yu Tai, decd) v Datin Shim Tok Keng [1994] 2 MLJ 517, where His Lordship ruled that where the Contracts Act 1950 applies, S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ the English common law position regarding the 'knowledge' of the other party is superseded. The statutory reasoning is as follows: a) Under Section 10(1) of the Contracts Act, all agreements are contracts only if they are made by the 'free consent of parties competent to contract'; and b) Section 11 of the Contracts Act explicitly defines competence as requiring a person to be of the age of majority and of 'sound mind'.

In Sim Kon Sang Peter (supra), the Court applied the landmark principle from Tan Hee Juan v Teh Boon Keat & Anor [1934] MLJ 96, which dealt with the contractual capacity of minors as seen at p.526 (paras. E-G): “Since s 11 of the Act covers not only cases relating to the age of majority but also cases of unsoundness of mind, the decision in Tan Hee Juan v Teh Boon Keat & Anor, though a decision in respect of a want of age, applies equally to a case relating to unsoundness of mind. Therefore, if the Act applies to the present case, it means that any contract made by a person of unsound mind is void and not merely voidable. S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ The contrary is the case if the English common law applies...” [Emphasis added]

For the avoidance of doubt and for the sake of clarity, it is crucial to understand why the High Court in Sim Kon Sang Peter (supra) ultimately applied the English common law principle from Imperial Loan Co. (supra). In that case, Ian Chin J applied the common law, which holds that such contracts are merely voidable and require proof of the purchaser's knowledge of the insanity, only because the disputed land transfers occurred in 1973 and 1974, before the Contracts Act 1950 came into force in Sabah.

His Lordship explicitly held that if the Contracts Act 1950 were to apply, Section 11 dictates that any contract made by a person of unsound mind is absolutely void. In our case herein, the SPA was executed in 2015 and is strictly governed by the Contracts Act; the contract would be void ab initio if the Deceased's incapacity is proven.

Therefore, the Defendant's heavy reliance on the common law requirement of "knowledge" is misplaced. The Defendant's lack of knowledge regarding the Deceased's mental state is legally S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ irrelevant to the issue of contractual capacity under the Act, although it remains highly relevant to defeating the Plaintiff's separate allegation of fraud.

Consequently, the Defendant’s status as a bona fide purchaser without notice provides no legal defence against a proven claim of total incapacity. Under Malaysian law, a void contract never existed in the eyes of the law; therefore, there is no valid legal shell into which a purchaser's good faith can be breathed. The law prioritises the absolute protection of the mentally infirm over the commercial interests of a purchaser, regardless of that purchaser's good faith or the use of intermediaries. Consequently, the statutory regime under the Contracts Act 1950 fundamentally decouples the question of absolute capacity from the equitable doctrine of a bona fide purchaser for value without notice.

The sole and determinative inquiry for this Court, therefore, is not what the Defendant knew, but rather whether the Deceased possessed the requisite sanity, specifically the ability to understand the contract and form a rational judgment of its effects, at the specific moments he executed the SPA and Form 14A. S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ i. Burden of Proof and the Primacy of Attending Physicians 34. The burden of proving such mental incapacity at the material time lies squarely on the Plaintiff pursuant to Section 101 of the Evidence Act 1950, as affirmed by Vernon Ong J (later, FCJ) in Goh Guan Seng v. Tenaga Nasional Berhad [2012] MLRHU 1178: “Burden Of Proof - Civil Proceedings [9] In law, the party who desires the court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability bears the burden of proof (s 101(1) Evidence Act 1950). The burden of proof is on that party is twofold: (i) the burden of establishing a case; and

(ii) the burden of introducing evidence. The burden of proof lies on the party throughout the trial. The standard of proof required of the plaintiff is on the balance of probabilities. The evidential burden of proof is only shifted to the other party once that party has discharged its burden of proof. If that party fails to discharge the original burden of proof, then the other party need not adduce any evidence. In this respect it is the plaintiff who must establish his case. If the plaintiff fails to do so, it will not do for the plaintiff to say that TNB have not established its defence (Selvaduray v. Chinniah [1939] 1 MLRH 107; [1939] 1 MLJ 253; s 102 Evidence Act S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ 1950). It should also be noted that there must be some preponderance in the plaintiff's favour at the conclusion of the whole case. Even if the plaintiff established a prima facie case, but at the conclusion of the trial the Court found that the position was exactly even, then any preponderance in favour of the plaintiffs had ceased to exist. If that happens, then the plaintiff has failed to discharge the burden of proof which is upon it, and the plaintiff must necessarily fail (Abrath v. North Eastern Railway Co [1883] 11 QBD 440, 452 (CA)).” [Emphasis added]

To discharge this burden, the Plaintiff relied on the medical diagnosis of Dr Wong (SP3). SP3 is a Consultant Neurologist at Pantai Hospital Penang who personally examined the Deceased on 04.02.2016.

During the first in-person consultation, SP3 conducted a Mini-Mental State Examination (“MMSE”) to assess the Deceased's cognitive status. The Deceased scored 21/30, which SP3 testified was "abnormally relatively low" considering the Deceased's high academic background as a Cambridge graduate. SP3 detailed the Deceased's severe cognitive failures during this test: the Deceased S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ did not know the year, month, date, or day, and failed to recall three simple objects after just one minute, scoring zero out of three on the recall test. Furthermore, SP3 observed that the Deceased wrote a grammatically poor sentence ("Thanks for help") and drew a pentagon of a very poor standard. To corroborate the cognitive test results, SP3 conducted a brain MRI on the same day.

The scan revealed widened spaces and grooves in the brain, indicating cerebral atrophy, alongside evidence of small, old strokes in the basal ganglia. Based on the clinical examinations, the patient's history of progressive memory loss over the past two years, and the MRI results, SP3 formally diagnosed the Deceased with Dementia, most likely caused by Alzheimer's Disease.

SP3 provided extensive testimony on how this disease completely stripped the Deceased of his capacity to understand and execute contracts. He explained that Alzheimer's disease causes a progressive decline in memory, thinking abilities, and judgment. Crucially, SP3 testified that the disease destroys a person's executive functions, the mental skills needed to reason, plan, weigh choices logically, and make sound judgments. Due to this deterioration, SP3 concluded that the Deceased would gradually S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ lose the ability to process information, understand consequences, and would become entirely dependent on others to make decisions.

During cross-examination, the Defendant's learned counsel aggressively challenged SP3's findings, suggesting that the Deceased was perfectly able to take care of himself and make his own decisions by December 2016. SP3 remained unshaken and explicitly rejected these suggestions.SP3 also firmly denied the defence's suggestion that the Deceased deliberately refused to answer the MMSE questions properly because he felt insulted by simple questions, stating that the Deceased did attempt to answer other parts of the test.

While SP3 was firm in his oral testimony regarding the Deceased's severe incapacity, he was forced to make a significant concession regarding his own written records. When confronted by the Defendant's counsel over the fact that his initial medical report dated 04.02.2016 was merely a simple letter with a five-line statement that completely omitted any mention of prescribed medication for dementia, SP3 admitted to the flaw. He testified that the omission of the medication from the report was an oversight, as he is not well-versed in legal documents, though he insisted under oath that S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ medication was indeed prescribed and dispensed by the hospital on that day.

Citing Veerayah a/l Subramaniam v Padamakavander a/l Subramaniam [2010] 3 MLRH 47, the Plaintiff urged the Court to prefer the evidence of the attending Dr Wong, who physically examined the Deceased, over the Defendant’s expert evaluation by Dr. Nurul Nadia (SD1), which was based purely on secondary records.

While this Court acknowledges the principle in Veerayah, the weight of an attending doctor's testimony is not absolute; it must be evaluated against the accuracy and completeness of their contemporaneous records. In this instance, the Court finds SP3’s oral testimony to be severely compromised. His medical report from February 2016 had failed to document severe symptoms such as psychosis or delusions.

Most tellingly, SP3’s own contemporaneous clinical note explicitly recorded that the Deceased "was still able to look after own self," a finding that directly contradicts his retrospective courtroom assertion of total cognitive failure. S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ

Furthermore, while the Plaintiff vigorously argued that the evidence of Dr Nurul Nadia (SD1) should be discounted because she did not physically examine the Deceased, the law does not close the door on secondary, document-based expert evaluations. As established in the High Court case of Intan Shaharzad Mohd Azri & Anor v. Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors [2025] 6 MLRH 504, an expert witness is fully competent to assist the Court by conducting a clinical analysis of contemporaneous medical records and testing reports, even without direct patient contact. In this instance, SD1’s secondary evaluation was not speculative; it was a rigorous, logical, and scientific audit of SP3’s own sparse records, MRI scans, and MMSE scores. SD1's evidence successfully exposed the critical clinical inconsistencies in SP3's diagnosis, thereby providing this Court with invaluable, balanced medical assistance that cannot be swept aside merely because she did not physically sit with the Deceased.

As testified by SD1, the recording of positive symptoms and prescribed treatments is a mandatory ethical and professional requirement for any medical report. Hence, the total absence of medication records in the contemporaneous documents supports S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ the inference that the Deceased was in a stable, high-functioning state that did not warrant immediate pharmaceutical intervention, a fact which fundamentally contradicts the Plaintiff’s narrative of total cognitive incapacity.

Beyond the substantive clinical shortcomings of SP3’s testimony, this Court must also highlight a critical procedural failure by the Plaintiff. Under Order 40A Rule 3 of the Rules of Court 2012, expert evidence is subject to strict statutory requirements, including a mandatory declaration that the expert understands their overriding duty to the Court rather than to the party instructing them. While the Defendant’s expert, SD1, fully complied with these rules by executing a proper Affidavit by Expert (enclosed as Lampiran 68), the Plaintiff’s expert, SP3, completely failed to comply with the procedural rules of Order 40A. In civil litigation, procedural compliance in presenting expert testimony is not a mere technicality; it directly governs the admissibility and weight of the expert's findings. SP3’s failure to submit his evidence in accordance with the mandatory provisions of Order 40A further diminishes any judicial weight this Court can safely accord to his testimony. S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ

Furthermore, this Court must consider the clinical-ethical framework governing dementia assessments, as lucidly explained by the Defendant's expert, Dr Nurul Nadia (SD1). SD1 directed this Court's attention to the fundamental medical-ethical principle of Patient Autonomy. In geriatric psychiatry, patient autonomy establishes a presumption of decision-making capacity; a medical diagnosis of early-stage dementia does not automatically strip a patient of their right to self-determination or their legal authority to manage and dispose of their own property. SD1 testified that unless a patient is clinically proven to be completely disoriented, delusional, or heavily dependent, stripping them of their civil autonomy based on general, subjective family observations violates accepted bioethical standards. Given that the Deceased was a high-functioning, highly educated individual who showed no positive symptoms of severe confusion, delusion, or psychiatric dependency in early 2016, his right to exercise his patient autonomy by selling his property must be legally respected and protected by this Court.

To further test the clinical credibility of SP3’s assertion that the Deceased lacked all executive and linguistic capacity on 4 February 2016, this Court's attention was directed to a critical contemporaneous observation highlighted during the expert S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ testimony of SD1 (Dr Nurul Nadia). While SP3 testified that the Deceased's English was 'rather poor' and indicative of severe cognitive decline, SD1 pointed out under cross-examination that on page 19 of the contemporaneous clinical file, the Deceased had in fact handwritten a flawless, highly structured, and remarkably polite English sentence, namely: 'You are a good doctor and thank you'. SD1 agreed that this extensive written statement was inconsistent with someone who was uncooperative, angry, or clinically disoriented. This Court accepts SD1's expert clinical observation and finds that an individual suffering from advanced, incapacitating Alzheimer’s disease who has supposedly lost basic executive function could not possibly compose, synthesise, and handwrite a grammatically perfect, contextual statement of gratitude to his attending physician. The sheer coherence of this written statement, brought to light through SD1's expert analysis, severely undermines SP3's clinical findings and exposes a clear confirmation bias in the Plaintiff’s expert medical narrative.

This Court also finds immense, fatal logical inconsistency in the Plaintiff's conduct—a practice of 'cherry-picking' that heavily undermines their assertion of the Deceased’s mental incapacity. The undisputed evidence shows that during the exact same period S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ in August 2015, the Deceased executed two major property transactions: (i) the Sale and Purchase Agreement for the subject Property (Lot 1515) to the Defendant, and (ii) a Sale and Purchase Agreement for a double-storey shophouse in Bandar Alor Merah to one Dato’ Che Sofi bin Ishak. If the Deceased was indeed so severely incapacitated by Alzheimer's/Dementia in August 2015 as to be completely incompetent to contract, both transactions would be equally void. Yet, the Plaintiff and her family accepted the validity of the shophouse transaction with Dato’ Che Sofi without any challenge, while choosing to litigate only against the Defendant. This selective challenge is a tacit admission that the Deceased possessed sufficient capacity to execute transactions at the material time, August 2015, and exposes the present suit as a strategically targeted action rather than an objective quest to protect an incapacitated estate.

Having addressed the evidentiary weight of the clinical records and the attending physician’s testimony, the Court must now scrutinise the specific diagnostic metrics relied upon, specifically evaluating the MMSE results through the unique lens of the Deceased’s high intellectual faculty. S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ ii. Evaluation of Cognitive Tests and Intellectual Context 51. The Plaintiff pointed to the Deceased's score of 21/30 on the MMSE as conclusive proof of incapacity. However, this Court finds merit in SD1’s testimony, as she candidly testified that the MMSE is a screening tool, not a definitive diagnostic test for legal insanity. Furthermore, this Court considers the Deceased's intellectual background, as a Cambridge graduate and former high-ranking civil servant.

Specifically, SP1 clarified in her oral testimony that the Deceased was not merely a State Financial Officer but had in fact served as the State Secretary (Setiausaha Kerajaan Negeri) of Kedah. This factual refinement is of immense significance to this Court's assessment of cognitive capacity. As the former State Secretary, the Deceased had spent decades at the absolute pinnacle of state administration, demonstrating an exceptionally high level of administrative intellect, meticulousness, and familiarity with official government machinery and land laws. A man of such stellar civil service prestige and a Cambridge education does not easily lose his intrinsic, deeply ingrained understanding of legal solemnity or of official land transfer instruments. This professional background strongly supports the finding that the Deceased understood exactly S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ what he was executing when he signed the SPA and subsequently went to the Land Office to affix his thumbprint.

This finding of cognitive alertness is further fortified by a critical, fatal admission made by the Plaintiff (SP1) herself during cross-examination. When confronted with the original SPA dated 25 August 2015, SP1 candidly admitted to the Court that the Vendor's signature was indeed the genuine signature of the Deceased, rejecting any suggestion of forgery. Crucially, SP1 agreed with the Defendant's counsel that the signature was highly complex, intricate, and extremely difficult to replicate or copy. She further conceded that such a meticulous signature perfectly reflected the Deceased's intrinsically careful and organised personality ('melambangkan peribadi Dato’ Syed Mansor yang cermat'). This Court finds it highly improbable that an individual suffering from severe, incapacitating Alzheimer's disease—who allegedly could not comprehend his daily affairs—could execute a signature of such consistent complexity and intricacy. The physical precision of the signature, coupled with SP1’s admission of its meticulous nature, serves as compelling visual and factual evidence of the Deceased’s cognitive coordination and deliberate intent at the material moment of execution. S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ

As SD1 posited, individuals of such high intellect often find the rudimentary nature of MMSE questions, such as being asked the current year, to be insulting or irritating, leading to a lack of cooperation that results in an artificially low score.

In line with the principle in Hart v O’Connor [1985] 2 All ER 880; [1985] AC 1000, where a condition is not apparent and the person appears to act normally, the validity of the contract should be judged by the same standards as those of one made by a person of sound mind.

Having established that the transaction must be judged by the standards of a person of sound mind where an affliction is not apparent to others, the Court must now reconcile the Deceased’s clinical medical diagnosis with his actual functional capacity at the material moments of execution. While the Plaintiff relies on the progressive nature of Alzheimer’s to argue for a permanent state of incapacity, the law acknowledges that mental competence is not always static and may exist intermittently even in those generally afflicted. S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ

This necessitates a transition from a general medical label to the specific legal doctrine of ‘lucid intervals,’ requiring the Court to evaluate whether the Deceased possessed the requisite sanity during his direct interactions with the independent professional witnesses. iii. The ‘Lucid Interval’ Doctrine and Independent Witnesses 58. Under Section 12(2) of the Contracts Act, the law recognises that a person who is usually of unsound mind may contract during a period of temporary sanity.

In a locus classicus case of Hall v Warren [1893] All ER Rep 57, Sir William Grant established a critical evidentiary rule: where a general state of mental affliction has been established, the party alleging that a specific act occurred during a lucid interval must prove that there was more than just a mere cessation of violent symptoms. The rule in Hall v Warren requires proof of a restoration of the mind sufficient to enable the individual to judge soundly what he was doing at the material time. This principle is further refined by the evidentiary test articulated in Cartwright v Cartwright (1793) 161 ER 923, which posits that the best proof of a lucid interval is the "rational act, rationally done". If the act itself, in its complexity, its alignment with S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ the individual's long-held values, and the manner of its execution, demonstrates a rational mind at work, the law presumes contractual capacity notwithstanding a general medical diagnosis.

The common law principles enunciated in Hall v Warren and Cartwright v Cartwright seamlessly interface with Section 12(2) of the Contracts Act 1950, effectively shifting this Court's focus from a static, retrospective clinical diagnosis to a dynamic, contemporaneous assessment of the functional capacity of the Deceased at the specific moments he executed the SPA and Form 14A. This Court finds a clear existence of such lucidity through a solid wall of independent professional testimonies during trial: a) The Land Administrator (SD2), the one who conversed with the Deceased for 30 minutes on 04.04.2016 and confirmed that the Deceased was healthy, rational, and communicative. SD2 testified that she would have exercised her authority to refuse the transfer had she detected any lack of fitness. b) The Commissioner of Oaths (SD5), who witnessed the execution of a Statutory Declaration on 31.01. 2016, just four days prior to the diagnosis, where the Deceased affirmed, he S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ was of sound mind and intended to sell the Property to prevent heir interference; and c) The conveyancing lawyer (SD3) confirmed the Deceased personally initiated the transaction, set the price of RM300,000 (which was consistent with market value), and provided detailed instructions on fund distribution.

In the present case, the Deceased's proactive execution of a Statutory Declaration on 31.01.2016, affirming his sanity and intention to sell the Property, demonstrates complex forward planning and executive function. Such rational conduct, witnessed by independent third parties, just four days before a clinical diagnosis, strongly indicates that the Deceased was operating within a lucid interval at the material time.

This Court must also address the six-year chronological gap between the execution of the SPA on 25 August 2015 and the final registration of the transfer on 28 September 2021. The Plaintiff attempted to portray this delay as highly irregular and suspicious. However, the conveyancing solicitor, SD3, testified that the delay was due to a formal administrative inquiry initiated by the Kubang S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ Pasu Land Office under Section 27 of the National Land Code. This statutory inquiry was triggered after the Deceased's late son, Syed Alfian, entered a private caveat on 6 March 2016. Crucially, during this Land Office investigation, both the Deceased and the conveyancing lawyer were summoned to appear in person. The Land Administrator conducted a meticulous inquiry into the Deceased's capacity and voluntary intent, ultimately finding no irregularity and clearing the registration of the Borang 14A. The fact that the transfer was subjected to such intense, formal, and statutory administrative scrutiny by a public authority before registration completely neutralises the Plaintiff's claim of a clandestine or fraudulent transaction and adds further statutory legitimacy to the Deceased's mental capacity at the material times.

In light of the totality of the evidence, this Court finds that the Plaintiff has failed to discharge the burden of proof required to establish that the Deceased was of unsound mind at the material times of execution. The Plaintiff’s medical evidence was undermined by internal contradictions and omissions, whereas the Defendant’s case was corroborated by three neutral, independent professionals who witnessed the Deceased's rational conduct first-hand. S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ B.

The Plaintiff alleged that the SPA is void under Section 26 of the Contracts Act because the Deceased purportedly never received the RM300,000 purchase price. The Plaintiff relied on Seah Siang Mong v Ong Ban Chai and Another Action [1996] MLJU 484 to support its contention. Unfortunately, the court finds the Plaintiff's reliance on Seah Siang is highly misplaced.

In Seah Siang, it was an agreed fact that the purchaser completely failed to pay the initial consideration of RM35,000 and failed to complete the purchase, which rendered the agreement void ab initio. In stark contrast, under Clause 2.1 of the SPA in this present case, the Defendant was legally mandated to deposit the purchase price with the stakeholder, Messrs M N Halim Syaffie & Associates. The Defendant successfully produced Official Receipt No. 0041 dated 25.08.2015, proving that the full RM300,000 was paid into the firm's client account (See Bundle B1, p. 81).

This finding of full and valid payment is not merely supported by the stakeholder’s receipt; it is corroborated by irrefutable, objective banking documentation. The Defendant successfully produced his Al Rajhi Bank transaction record (Account No. 15400-001- S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ 0001880600550), which clearly shows that on 25 August 2015—the exact date of the SPA—a sum of RM300,000.00 was cleared and debited from his account via an inward clearing cheque. This transaction was formally verified and stamped by the bank’s officer, Ana Mardia Binti Mohamad Noor. This contemporaneous bank statement constitutes irrefutable documentary evidence that conclusively negates the Plaintiff's speculative claim that the Defendant did not pay any money. The RM300,000.00 purchase price was real, cleared, and fully paid into the stakeholder account on the day of execution.

As established in the Apex Court case of K Murugesu v Nadarajah [1980] 2 MLJ 82, the exchange of mutual promises and the fulfilment of the payment obligation to the stakeholder constitute valid executory consideration, as per Chang Min Tat FJ (as he then was): “This particular illustration is in these words:

A agrees to sell his house to B for $10,000. Here, B's promise to pay the sum of $10,000 is the consideration for A's promise to sell the house and A's promise to sell the house is the consideration for B's promise to pay the $10,000. These are lawful considerations. S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ The agreement must be seen as a case of executory consideration. A promise is made by one party in return for a promise made by the other; in such a case, each promise is the consideration for the other. "A promise made without a consideration is void. But where there is a promise against a promise, one promise is consideration of the other because each may have his action against the other for non-performance," per Holt CJ in Harrison v. Cage [1698] 12 Mod 214. The rule that consideration can consist of mutual promises is now too well established to be questioned.”

This strict conveyancing standard perfectly aligns with the landmark Court of Appeal authority in Aik Ming (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Chang Ching Chuen & Ors [1995] 3 CLJ 639. In that case, Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as his Lordship then was) affirmed that to claim the equitable shield of a bona fide purchaser for value, a party must demonstrate that they have paid all their money under the contract of sale. Here, the Defendant did not merely pay a nominal deposit; he cleared the full contract sum of RM300,000.00 into the designated stakeholder client account on the exact day the SPA was executed. Having fully and irreversibly parted with the entire purchase price, the S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ Defendant's status as a bona fide purchaser for value is complete and legally perfected under the Aik Ming standard .

The Plaintiff urged the Court to draw an adverse inference under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 due to the Defendant’s failure to produce receipts for the remaining RM200,000, which was allegedly paid to a third party, Zainol bin Mat. However, this Court declines to draw such an inference as the Defendant’s legal obligation was discharged upon payment to the stakeholder. Any subsequent dispute concerning the lawyer’s disbursement of those funds, including the Deceased’s instructions conveyed through a “Surat Opsyen” to gift RM200,000 to Zainol as a "hadiah sagu hati," is a matter between the Deceased’s estate and the stakeholder law firm (See Bundle B1, pp.103 to 105). Such a dispute does not provide a legal basis to invalidate the title of a bona fide purchaser who has already fulfilled their contractual obligations. Whether the Deceased's solicitors subsequently misapplied or failed to disburse those funds to the Deceased or to Zainol (under the Deceased’s Surat Opsyen and Surat Akuan) is a matter of professional negligence or breach of stakeholder duty between the estate and the law firm. It is legally impossible for any subsequent solicitor-S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ client dispute to invalidate the legal title of a bona fide purchaser for value who fully discharged his duties.

The Plaintiff further argued that this Court must draw an adverse inference against the Defendant under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 for failing to call the broker, Haji Othman, and the Deceased's employee, Zainol bin Mat, to testify. I find this argument to be wholly misconceived in law. As established by the Federal Court in Serac Asia Sdn Bhd v Sepakat Insurance Brokers Sdn Bhd [2013] 5 MLJ 1, an adverse inference under Section 114(g) cannot be drawn where there is already sufficient, primary documentary evidence before the court to establish the material facts. In this case, the cleared Al Rajhi Bank statement and Official Receipt No. 0041 constitute direct, independent proof of payment of the RM300,000.00. There was no evidentiary gap regarding the Defendant's payment that required oral supplementation. Furthermore, the burden of proving that Zainol did not receive the money, or that the Surat Opsyen executed by the Deceased was a sham, rested squarely on the Plaintiff under Section 101 of the Evidence Act 1950. If the Plaintiff wished to establish Zainol's non-receipt, the onus was on the Plaintiff to subpoena Zainol to the S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ stand. The Plaintiff cannot rely on Section 114(g) to rescue her own failure to discharge the burden of proof.

Moreover, once the Defendant successfully produced the Official Receipt for RM300,000 issued by the authorised stakeholder (Messrs M N Halim Syaffie & Associates), the evidential burden shifted back to the Plaintiff. If the Plaintiff wanted to prove Zainol had never received the money, the Plaintiff bore the burden to subpoena Zainol to the witness stand. The Plaintiff’s failure to call Zainol means that if any adverse inference under Section 114(g) is to be drawn, it operates against the Plaintiff, not the Defendant.

Significantly, in the Form 14A, the Deceased signed an express acknowledgement that he had received the RM300,000 in accordance with the SPA, specifically, the clause where the Deceased acknowledged receipt states "Wang sebanyak RM 300,000.00 dengan ini saya akui telah terima mengikut Perjanjian Jual Beli bertarikh 25/08/2015" (See Bundle B1, p.82). This contemporaneous written admission by the Deceased, witnessed by an independent government official (SD2), outweighs the Plaintiff's retrospective and undocumented claims of non-receipt. S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ

The Plaintiff submitted that the entire transaction surrounding the transfer of the Property was highly suspicious and that it was obtained through improper means. The core of the Plaintiff’s allegation is that the Defendant and his intermediaries exploited the Deceased’s deteriorating mental state, specifically his clinical diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease, to secure a transfer of high-value property for his own benefit.

A pivotal point raised by the Plaintiff concerned the absence of independent legal advice. The Plaintiff argued that the Deceased, given his cognitive impairment, could not have truly understood the nature, consequences, or legal finality of the transaction. Furthermore, the Plaintiff contended that the undocumented disbursement of RM200,000.00, the balance of the purchase price, to a third party, Zainol bin Mat (the Deceased's driver), rather than to the Deceased himself, served as a clear indicator of a fraudulent scheme designed to siphon assets away from the Deceased's estate. S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ

The Defendant denied any involvement in fraud, maintaining his status as a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. His rebuttal was anchored on the testimony of SD4, who confirmed during trial that he had never personally met or conversed with the Deceased at any material time before the litigation. The Defendant testified that he negotiated the purchase price of RM300,000.00, which he asserted represented the fair market value in 2015, solely through a broker, Haji Othman bin Awang.

During cross-examination, the Plaintiff’s counsel vigorously attacked this narrative, highlighting that the name of this broker, Haji Othman, was completely absent from the Defendant's Amended Statement of Defence, nor was he called as a witness. The Plaintiff urged the Court to infer that the broker was a fabricated afterthought designed to conveniently distance the Defendant from the Deceased.

While this Court acknowledges the trite principle that parties are bound by their pleadings and that evidence unbacked by pleadings is generally disregarded, this rule is not an inflexible engine of injustice where no prejudice occurs. The omission of the broker Haji Othman’s name from the Amended Statement of Defence does not S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ prove fatal to the Defence. The primary material fact pleaded by the Defendant was that he operated strictly as a bona fide purchaser, dealing exclusively through intermediaries and never meeting the Deceased face-to-face. As established by the Federal Court in Boustead Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v. Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 331, the formal requirements of pleading are fully satisfied if the material facts giving rise to a defence are set out; the law does not mandate the explicit pleading of underlying evidentiary details (facta probantia) as opposed to primary material facts (facta probanda). Crucially, the Plaintiff cannot maintain a claim of sudden surprise or procedural prejudice; it was the Plaintiff’s own learned counsel who actively ventilated, and extensively cross-examined the Defendant (SD4) on Haji Othman's role, identity, and absence from the stand (see Notes of Proceedings, pp. 217–220). Pursuant to the Supreme Court authority of Superintendent of Lands and Surveys (4th Div) v. Hamit bin Matusin [1994] 3 MLJ 185, an objection to an alleged variance from the pleadings must be raised at the first instance when the evidence is led; by choosing to rigorously litigate and cross-examine on the issue rather than raising a timeous objection to its admissibility, the Plaintiff is deemed to have inferentially consented to the narrative and waived any subsequent procedural S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ right to object. In the totality of the trial matrix, the Defendant’s oral testimony remains credible and unshaken; he negotiated the RM300,000.00 purchase price through an intermediary and had no personal contact with the Deceased. The Plaintiff, conversely, failed to adduce any cogent evidence establishing a direct, fraudulent nexus between the Defendant and any acts of deception or exploitation directed against the Deceased.

In an attempt to substantiate the claim of fraud and irregularities, the Plaintiff heavily scrutinised the conduct of the conveyancing lawyer (SD3). The Plaintiff argued in their submissions that it was highly suspicious for SD3 to purportedly disburse the balance of RM200,000 to a third party, En. Zainol, without any documentary proof, urges this Court to invoke an adverse inference against the Defendant under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950.

In answer to the Plaintiff's contention regarding the RM200,000.00 disbursement to Zainol, this Court reiterates its findings under Section B, supra. Once the Defendant fully discharged his contractual obligation by clearing the total purchase price into the stakeholder account, the legal character of those funds was transformed. Any subsequent disbursement to Zainol—executed S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ

The Defendant emphasised that all due diligence and legal arrangements were handled by the Deceased’s own appointed solicitor, Ida Ruhayu binti Talib (SD3), of Messrs M N Halim Syaffie & Associates. Crucially, the Defendant highlighted that allegations of fraud, lack of consideration, and lack of mental capacity had already been the subject of an intensive professional inquiry.

In evaluating the Plaintiff's claims of a fraudulent conspiracy, this Court accords significant weight to the outcome of the formal inquiry conducted by the Advocates & Solicitors Disciplinary Board (“DB”). SD3 (Ida Ruhayu) testified that a complaint was filed by the Deceased’s son, Syed Alfian, and subsequently continued by the Plaintiff herself, alleging professional misconduct and fraud in connection with the transfer of the Property. S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ

The evidence reveals that the allegations presented before the DB were mirror images of the issues currently before this Court: a) whether there was fraud against the Deceased; b) whether the purchase price was fully paid; and c) whether the Deceased possessed the capacity to contract given his Alzheimer’s diagnosis.

The Disciplinary Committee—a statutory tribunal uniquely constituted by both legal and medical professionals—conducted a comprehensive inquiry into these identical allegations. Significantly, the DB in an Order dated 23.03.2024 (See Bundle B1, p.72) affirmed the Disciplinary Committee’s finding of ‘no liability’ and dismissed the complaint in its entirety. The Board found no evidence of misconduct or any failure of due diligence in SD3’s handling of the Deceased’s property transfer. This Court also notes that the Plaintiff neither appealed this Order nor produced any new evidence to rebut the professional regularity confirmed by the solicitor’s governing body.

Hence, this Court finds that the Plaintiff has wholly failed to establish the elements of fraud. As settled in the landmark Federal Court S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ decision of Sinnaiyah & Sons Sdn Bhd v. Damai Setia Sdn Bhd [2015] 5 MLRA 191, the standard of proof for fraud in a civil action is on the balance of probabilities. In delivering the judgment, Richard Malanjum CJ (Sabah and Sarawak) (later, CJ) held as follows: “[49] …With respect, we are inclined to agree with the proposition of law that at law there are only two standards of proof, namely, beyond reasonable doubt for criminal cases while it is on the balance of probabilities for civil cases. As such even if fraud is the subject in a civil claim the standard of proof is on the balance of probabilities... Henceforth, the standard of proof in civil cases where fraud is alleged is on the balance of probabilities..”[Emphasis added]

Despite this burden being on a balance of probabilities, the Plaintiff failed to produce a single shred of cogent evidence to demonstrate collusion, conspiracy, or active deception by the Defendant. The allegation that the Defendant "targeted" the Deceased was entirely unsupported. As the Defendant dealt exclusively through intermediaries and satisfied the purchase price via the authorised stakeholder, there was no factual opportunity for him to have perpetrated the personal deception alleged by the Plaintiff. S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ

Ultimately, as this action seeks to set aside a registered land transfer, the dispute must be resolved within the statutory framework of Section 340 of the National Land Code. The core feature of the Torrens system is registration. Section 340(1) of the National Land Code codifies the cornerstone of the Torrens system, conferring indefeasibility upon registration, subject only to the statutory exceptions set out in Section 340(2). While Section 340(2) provides that a registered title may be defeated on grounds of fraud, misrepresentation, or a void instrument, the burden of proving these exceptions rests entirely on the party challenging the register. As established by the Federal Court in Tan Ying Hong v. Tan Sian Teck & Ors [2010] 2 MLJ 1, in the absence of cogent and proven fraud or incapacity, the registered proprietor's title remains absolute and unimpeachable. Having failed to satisfy this Court on the balance of probabilities that the SPA was a void instrument or that the registration was procured via fraud, the statutory shield of deferred indefeasibility under Section 340(1) remains intact, and the Defendant's registered title stands unimpeachable.

For the sake of completeness, this Court also finds that the Plaintiff's claim is fatally barred by the equitable doctrine of laches, S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ acquiescence, and inordinate delay. The undisputed facts show that the SPA was executed on 25 August 2015. The Deceased's late son, Syed Alfian, was fully aware of the transaction and entered a private caveat as early as 6 March 2016. Yet, despite asserting that the Deceased was completely incapacitated, neither Syed Alfian nor any other family member took any steps to file a legal suit to set aside the SPA during the Deceased's lifetime, nor did they apply to have the Deceased declared of unsound mind under the Mental Health Act 2001 until years later. Instead, the family sat on their rights for nearly eight (8) years, only commencing this action in March 2023. As established in the landmark authorities of Zaidi Md Yusoff v. Noraini Mokhtar & Another Case [2005] 6 MLRH 61 and Wan Salimah Wan Jaffar v. Mahmood Omar [1998] 4 MLRH 1, such a prolonged, unexplained delay, during which the key actor passes away, constitutes laches and acquiescence that defeat the claim. The equitable doctrine operates on the maxim vigilantibus non dormientibus iura subveniunt—equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights. By delaying this suit until after the Deceased had passed away, the Plaintiff inordinately prejudiced the Defendant, effectively depriving this Court of the Deceased's own invaluable, direct testimony regarding his mental state and his voluntary instructions. To permit the Plaintiff to set aside a S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ commercial transaction after such a prolonged, calculated silence would constitute a grave miscarriage of justice and a violation of the 'clean hands' doctrine.

Furthermore, while the Plaintiff alleged a fraudulent transaction facilitated by a lawyer (SD3), she failed to join said lawyer as a co-defendant or third party to this suit. By choosing to sue only the purchaser, who had already fulfilled his contractual obligations by paying the authorised stakeholder, the Plaintiff’s narrative of a "fraudulent conspiracy" was rendered speculative and legally untenable.

The evidence instead points toward a rational act rationally done, which serves as a powerful defence against allegations of both fraud and incapacity. The Deceased proactively executed a Statutory Declaration on 31.01.2016, asserting that he was of sound mind and that he entered into the sale of his own free will. This level of forward planning and defensive legal strategy is the antithesis of being defrauded or of acting without understanding.

In summary, the Plaintiff’s claim of fraud collapses due to a total lack of clear and convincing evidence. The transaction was handled by S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ an independent professional cleared of misconduct by her own Board, witnessed by a neutral Land Administrator and a Commissioner for Oaths, and supported by the Deceased's own sworn declaration. D. RESTITUTION UNDER SECTION 66 OF THE CONTRACTS

During the course of the trial, this Court explicitly directed both parties to submit on the legal effect on the contract should it be found that there was no consideration or a lack of mental capacity. In compliance, both the Plaintiff and the Defendant dedicated portions of their Additional Submissions to arguing the application of Section 66 of the Contracts Act.

The Plaintiff submitted that if the SPA is found to be void ab initio due to either mental incapacity or lack of consideration, the parties must be restored to their original positions. Relying on Section 66 of the Contracts Act, the Plaintiff argued that the Property must be unconditionally returned to the Deceased's estate, with no obligation to refund the Defendant. The Plaintiff anchored this argument on the S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ testimony of SP1, who claimed that the Deceased's estate never received the purchase price.

Conversely, the Defendant submitted that Section 66 is fundamentally a restitutionary provision intended to prevent unjust enrichment. The Defendant argued that he had fully discharged his obligation by paying RM300,000 to the stakeholder law firm, Messrs M N Halim Syaffie & Associates. During cross-examination, the Defendant (SD4) remained unshaken, confirming explicit, full payment of the RM300,000.00 contract sum directly to the stakeholder firm on 25 August 2015. (See Notes of Proceedings, pp. 220–221).

The Defendant emphasised that relief under Section 66 dictates the restoration of the advantage received. The Defendant cited the Federal Court case of Lori Malaysia Bhd v Arab-Malaysian Finance Bhd [1999] 2 CLJ 997 to support his case. The Defendant contended that since he had made the full payment of the RM300,000 purchase price, this sum constituted an advantage that must be refunded to him if the contract is voided. S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ

For the sake of completeness, even if this Court were to find the SPA void due to mental incapacity or lack of consideration, the Plaintiff's prayer to reclaim the land without refunding the Defendant is legally untenable. Section 66 of the Contracts Act clearly mandates that "when an agreement is discovered to be void, or when a contract becomes void, any person who has received any advantage under the agreement or contract is bound to restore it, or to make compensation for it, to the person from whom he received it".

The evidence unequivocally demonstrates that the Defendant discharged his legal obligation by paying the RM300,000 consideration sum to the Deceased's authorised stakeholder. What the stakeholder subsequently did with those funds was based entirely on the Deceased's own instructions. This was comprehensively explained by the conveyancing lawyer, SD3, during re-examination, where she clarified the existence of a Surat Opsyen and a Surat Akuan executed by the Deceased.

Based on the extracted testimonies above, the RM300,000 payment was undeniably deposited into the stakeholder account on behalf of the Deceased, and its subsequent distribution to a third party, En. S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ Zainol was done in accordance with the Deceased's explicit written directives. This payment to the Deceased's appointed stakeholder constitutes a clear advantage received by the vendor under the agreement.

Therefore, had the SPA been voided, this Court would have ordered the Plaintiff to refund the RM300,000 to the Defendant as a strict prerequisite for the return of the Property. However, since this Court has already ruled that the Deceased possessed the requisite mental capacity, that valid consideration was passed, and that the SPA and Form 14A are completely valid and binding, the invocation of Section 66 does not arise, and the issue is rendered academic. Conclusion 99. Having meticulously evaluated the totality of the evidence, this Court hereby orders as follows: a) The Plaintiff’s claim is dismissed in its entirety; b) The SPA dated 25.08.2015 and the Form 14A transfer registered on 28.09.2021 are hereby declared valid, binding and indefeasible in law; S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ c) The Defendant remains the absolute and lawful registered owner of the Property held under GM 94 Lot 1515, Bandar Bukit Kayu Hitam, Daerah Kubang Pasu, Kedah; and d) Costs are awarded to the Defendant, to be paid by the Plaintiff in the sum of RM30,000.00, subject to the payment of the allocator fee. Dated: 9th July, 2026 -------------------------------------------------------------------- YA. Dr. Hj. JOHN LEE KIEN HOW @ MOHD JOHAN LEE JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA ALOR SETAR Solicitor for the Plaintiff : Arun Ganesh Boopalan & Andrew Navin Messrs. Kamil Hashim Raj & Lim Advocates & Solicitors Solicitors for the Defendant : Mohamad Nizan Bin Azdahari, Nur Iman Najwa, Ahmad Dasuki Bin Che Hasan@Che Yusuf & Mohd Razaly Bin Abdul Rahman Messrs. Dasuki & Co. Advocates & Solicitors S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ Table of Authorities Cases Aik Ming (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Chang Ching Chuen & Ors & Another Case [1995] 2 MLJ 770; [1995] 3 CLJ 639 Boustead Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v. Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 331 Hart v O’Connor [1985] 2 All ER 880; [1985] AC 1000 Imperial Loan Co Ltd v Stone [1892] 1 QB 599 Intan Shaharzad Mohd Azri & Anor v. Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors [2025] 6 MLRH 504 K Murugesu v Nadarajah [1980] 2 MLJ 82 Lori Malaysia Bhd v Arab-Malaysian Finance Bhd [1999] 2 CLJ 997 Seah Siang Mong v Ong Ban Chai & Another Action [1996] MLJU 484 Serac Asia Sdn Bhd v Sepakat Insurance Brokers Sdn Bhd [2013] 5 MLJ 1 Sim Kon Sang Peter (Administrator of the Estate of Chong Yu Tai, Deceased) v Datin Shim Tok Keng [1994] 2 MLJ 517 Sinnaiyah & Sons Sdn Bhd v. Damai Setia Sdn Bhd [2015] 5 MLRA 191 Boustead Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v. Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 331 Tan Ying Hong v. Tan Sian Teck & Ors [2010] 2 MLJ 1 Veerayah a/l Subramaniam v Padamakavander a/l Subramaniam [2010] 3 MLRH 47 Wan Salimah Wan Jaffar v. Mahmood Omar [1998] 4 MLRH 1 Zaidi Md Yusoff v. Noraini Mokhtar & Another Case [2005] 6 MLRH 61 Statutes Contracts Act 1950 Evidence Act 1950 S/N wy4sgfEhLkCvCxjg/BKlXQ