Shehzad Malik Bin Muhammad Sarwar Malik v Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan (WA-24-90-12/2023)

1.

KERAJAAN MALAYSIA ... DEFENDANTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Enclosures 4 & 10)

There were two applications before this Court, namely, the application by –

the 1st Defendant (‘D1’) in encl. 4 to strike out the Originating Summons (‘O.S.’, encl. 1), which was filed on 4.11.2023, and the Affidavit In Support affirmed by the Plaintiff on 17.11.2023 (‘AIS’; encl. 2) under limbs (a), (b) and (d) of O.18, r. 19(1) of the Rules of Court 2012 (‘RC 2012’); and

the 2nd Defendant (‘D2’) in encl. 10 to strike out the Plaintiff’s claim vide the O.S. and AIS under limbs (b) and (d) of O.18, r. 19(1) of the RC 2012.

After having considered the cause papers and the written and oral submissions by the parties [in the case of D2, only the Affidavit In Reply (encl. 13) and the oral submission were considered because D2’s application to file the written submission after 12.9.2025, which was the filing date fixed by the Deputy Registrar during the case management on 11.3.2025, on the ground that the learned Senior Federal Counsel (‘SFC’) had prepared the written submission but was under the mistaken belief that she had filed the same, was disallowed following the Plaintiff’s objection (the relevant correspondences are in encls. 26 and 28)], I had dismissed D1’s and D2’s applications on 24.10.2025.

D1 and D2 are dissatisfied with the decision and have filed a Notice of Appeal on 19.11.2025 and 21.11.2025, respectively. By the letters dated 24.11.2025 (encls. 41 and 42), D1’s solicitors and the SFC have made clear that they are relying on the decision by the apex court in MT Ventures Sdn Bhd & Anor v QM Print Sdn Bhd And Another Appeal [2025] 6 MLRA 595, [2025] 9 CLJ 560 which held, inter alia, that applying a purposive approach and a harmonious reading of ss. 3, 67 and 68(1)(f) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 [Act 91], an appeal can lie “where the striking out was targeted at the specific point of law, which had the capacity to determine the entire action finally, the right of the appeal accrued or vested at that point”.

These are my full grounds of decision.

The Plaintiff was born on 25.6.1996. The Plaintiff’s mother was a Punjabi Sikh before her marriage to the Plaintiff’s father who is a Pakistani Muslim. The Plaintiff’s mother and father were married on 2.8.1993.

At the time when the Plaintiff was born, his parents professed the religion of Islam.

In the Birth Certificate which was exhibited by the Plaintiff (exhibit “SM-1”, encl. 2) with the registration date of 2.7.1996 and extraction date of 19.11.2007, the parents’ religion is not stated. However, in the Birth Certificate which was exhibited by D2 (exhibit “A”, encl. 11) with the same registration date, the Plaintiff’s and his parents’ religion is stated as “Islam”.

The Plaintiff affirmed that at all times his mother raised him as a Sikh.

The Plaintiff’s mother passed away on 17.11.2007 when he was 11 years old. He was then raised by his uncle, Swaran Singh a/l Bikar Singh who professed and practised Sikhism.

In the application for the Plaintiff’s Identity Card, which was signed by the Plaintiff’s father on 30.6.2008, the column for the Plaintiff’s religion was shown as “Islam”.

The Plaintiff’s name in the Birth Certificate was Muhammad Bilawal Shehehzad Malik Bin Muhammad Sarwar Malik. The Plaintiff later applied to the National Registration Department (‘NRD’) to have his name changed to Shehzad Malik Bin Muhammad Sarwar Malik and this was approved on 11.7.2009.

According to the Plaintiff, he has believed, professed and practised fully in Sikhism and has been attending Gurdwara all his life. He has always celebrated Sikh religious festivals like Vaisakhi, Gurpurab, Akand Paath, Bandi Chor Divas and Lohri.

D1 contended that the Plaintiff’s claim discloses no reasonable cause of action; is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious; and is an abuse of the process of the Court while D2 made the same submission except for the O.S. not disclosing a reasonable cause of action.

The relevant part of O. 18, r. 19(1) of the RC 2012 for present purposes is as follows: “Striking out pleadings and endorsements (O. 18, r. 19)

(1) The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any pleading or the endorsement, of any writ in the action, or anything in any pleading or in the endorsement, on the ground that –

it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence, as the case may be;

it is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious;

…; or

it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court, and may order the action to be stayed or dismissed or judgment to be entered accordingly, as the case may be.”.

In SS Motor Century Sdn Bhd v Wawasan Sinar Gemilang Sdn Bhd and 4 Ors [2025] AMEJ 1249, I had set out the trite legal principles which are applicable when a court is faced with a striking out application, or in the instant case, applications, in these words: “[16] In considering the instant application, I am guided by the trite legal principles as follows:

it is only in plain and obvious cases that recourse should be had to the summary process under O.18, r. 19(1) of the RC 2012, namely where a claim is on the face of it obviously unsustainable. The degree of unsustainability must appear on the face of the claim without having to go into lengthy and mature consideration in detail of the issues of law and/ or fact. The summary procedure cannot be exercised by a minute examination of the documents and facts of the case in order to see whether the party has a cause of action. The court must be satisfied that there is no reasonable cause of action or that the claims are frivolous or vexatious [see Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36 (SC) and Seruan Gemilang Makmur Sdn Bhd v. Kerajaan Negeri Pahang Darul Makmur & Anor [2016] 3 CLJ 1 (FC)]. The discretionary power may only be exercised in plain and obvious cases where the case has no chance of success [see Pengiran Othman Shah Bin Pengiran Mohd Yusoff v Karambunai Resorts Sdn Bhd (formerly known as Lipkland (Sabah) Sdn Bhd) [1996] 1 MLJ 309 (CA)]. So long as the SoC discloses a reasonable cause of action, however weak the claim is, it cannot be struck off summarily [see Abdul Rahim Abdul Hamid & Ors v Perdana Merchant Bankers Bhd & Ors [2000] 2 CLJ 457 (CA) and Dato’ Raja Ideris Raja Ahmad & Ors v Teng Chang Khim & Ors [2012] 2 CLJ 288 (CA)]. The court will assume that the contents of the statement of claim are true [see Tuan Haji Ishak Bin Ismail & Ors v Leong Hup Holdings Bhd and Other Appeals [1996] 1 MLJ 661 (CA)];

in determining an application pursuant to limb (a) of O.18, r. 19(1) RC 2012, O. 18, r. 19(2) provides that no evidence shall be admissible on an application under the said limb. This means that limb (a) must be considered without having regard to the AIS and AIR. The court must be satisfied that the statement of claim as it stands is insufficient, even if proved, to entitle the plaintiff to the relief which it asked for (see Thong & Anor v Saw Beng Chong [2013] 3 MLJ 235 (CA) and Amanah Raya Bhd v. Ong Chin Hoo [2019] 6 CLJ 41);

in the context of limb (b) of O.18, r. 19(1) RC 2012, the word “scandalous” means wholly unnecessary and irrelevant and not merely unpleasant allegations. The words “frivolous or vexatious” refer to a groundless action of statement with no prospect of success, often raised to embarrass or annoy the other party to the action. The court has to consider the affidavit evidence adduced by the parties (see Harapan Permai Sdn Bhd v Sabah Forest Industries Sdn Bhd [2011] 2 MLJ 192 (CA) and Thong’s case (supra)]; …

as regards limb (d) of O.18, r. 19(1) RC 2012, an abuse of the process of the court refer to situations where the court’s process is used for an unlawful object and not for the actual purpose intended to achieve justice. The judge is entitled to consider the affidavit evidence [see Thong’s case (supra)].” (see too, the case authorities as cited by the parties, namely Shahidan Shafie v. Atlan Holdings Bhd & Anor & Other Appeals [2005] 3 CLJ 793, Eon Bank Bhd v Gandarama Sdn Bhd [2007] 4 MLJ 247, Indah Desa Saujana Corporation Sdn Bhd & Ors v James Foong Cheng Yuen & Anor [2008] 2 MLJ 11, Small Medium Enterprise Development Bank Malaysia Berhad v. Sigma Pelangi Systems Sdn Bhd [2016] CLJU 943, Regal Elite Letrik Sdn Bhd v. Country Garden Danga Bay Sdn Bhd [2022] CLJU 551, and Swan Property Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Maybank Trustees Bhd & Another Appeal [2023] 2 CLJ 952).”. Analysis and Findings of the Court - Whether the Plaintiff’s claim discloses no reasonable cause of action

O. 18, r. 19(2) RC 2012 provides that no evidence shall be admissible on an application under O. 18, r. 19(1)(a). This means that limb (a) must be considered without having regard to the AIS and AIR (see Amanah Raya Bhd v. Ong Chin Hoo [2019] 6 CLJ 41 and my judgment in Nazariah bt Abbas v Majlis Peguam Malaysia & Ors [2024] MLJU 3665).

In the instant case, the only cause paper in respect of the Plaintiff’s application is the O.S.

In the O.S., the Plaintiff sought, among others, for the following orders or reliefs: “(a) A declaration that the Plaintiff is an individual professing and practising Sikhism and never practiced or professed Islam willingly;

A declaration that the Plaintiff has the constitutional right to profess his religion of choice pursuant to Article 11 of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia;

Since the Plaintiff is an individual not professing and not practicing Islam willingly, a Declaration that the Plaintiff is not subjected to Item 1, List II

A declaration that the Plaintiff’s religious status in the Jabatan Pendaftaran Negara’s record should be amended and corrected to being “Sikh” instead of “Islam”;

A declaration that the Plaintiff’s name is “Bilawal Singh Bhutter” and not “Shehzad Malik Bin Muhammad Sarwar Malik”; …”.

The O.S. also contains the Statement pursuant to O. 7, r. 3(1) of the RC 2012 (‘Statement’) which is re-produced below for ease of reference: “1. The Plaintiff was born on 25.06.1996. At that material time, his mother and father professed the religion of Islam.

The Plaintiff’s mother died on 17.11.2007. After the death of the Plaintiff’s mother, the Plaintiff was raised by his uncle, Swaran Singh A/L Bikar Singh who professed and practised Sikhism.

At all times, the Plaintiff professed and practised Sikhism and not Islam.

The Plaintiff’s upbringing at home was carried out on the basis that the Plaintiff is a Sikh. The Plaintiff acknowledges Sikhism as his religion and asserts that he has been educated with the beliefs and doctrines of Sikhism.

The Plaintiff cannot and will not, under any circumstances retract or abandon his Sikh religious beliefs or embrace any other religion.

The Plaintiff relies on his right to profess and practice Sikhism which is a constitutional right conferred by Article 11 of the Federal Constitution which is a fundamental human right as stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 by the United Nations and various other human rights instruments.”.

The grounds in support of D1’s application as stated in encl. 4 are as follows: “i) Tindakan Pemohon di sini langsung tidak mendedahkan sebarang tuntutan dan/atau kausa tindakan yang munasabah terhadap Defendan Pertama. ii) Tiada alasan munasabah bagi menyokong deklarasi-deklarasi yang dipohon melalui Saman Pemula tersebut. iii) Hal Artikel 11 tersebut hanya dibangkitkan Pemohon atau diada-adakan semata-mata sebagai alasan bagi memulakan prosiding ini di Mahkamah Tinggi Sivil. iv) Status Plaintif yang mendakwa dirinya bukan seorang yang beragama Islam adalah suatu persoalan undang-undang yang hanya wajar dan patut diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Syariah yang berkompeten dan mempunyai bidangkuasa mendengar dan memutuskan permohonan ini kerana persoalan status agama Islam melibatkan persoalan Hukum Syarak. Hal ini disokong oleh undang-undang mantap dan keputusan-keputusan Mahkamah Tertinggi sebelum ini. v) Tindakan Plaintif adalah suatu cubaan pintu belakang ("backdoor attempt") bagi mengelak dan menafikan bidangkuasa Mahkamah Syariah dan demikian suatu penyalahgunaan kuasa dan proses Mahkamah yang Mulia ini. vi) Permohonan membatalkan "status Islam" daripada kad pengenalan Plaintif jelas tidak ditujukan kepada Defendan Pertama sebaliknya kepada Jabatan Pendaftaran Negara yang bukan pihak di dalam tindakan ini. vii) Prayer-prayer yang dipohon Plantif melalui Saman Pemula tersebut tidak menzahirkan kausa tindakan yang munasabah, salah, samar-samar dan tidak jelas. viii) Apa-apa alasan undang-undang yang mungkin dibangkitkan Defendan semasa Pendengaran kelak.”.

Essentially, D1 relied on paragraph 1 of the Statement that at the time when the Plaintiff was born, his parents professed the religion of Islam and therefore, by virtue of s 2 of the Akta Pentadbiran Undang-Undang Islam (Wilayah-Wilayah Persekutuan) 1993 [Act 505], the Plaintiff is “seorang Islam”. The said provision reads as follows: “Tafsiran

(1) … “orang Islam” ertinya –

seseorang yang menganut agama Islam;

seseorang yang salah seorang atau kedua ibu bapanya, pada masa kelahiran orang itu, ialah orang Islam;

seseorang yang cara dia dibesarkan telah dijalankan atas asas bahawa dia orang Islam;

seseorang yang telah masuk Islam mengikut kehendak seksyen 85;

seseorang yang lazimnya dikenali sebagai orang Islam; atau

seseorang yang ditunjukkan telah menyatakan, dalam hal keadaan di mana dia terikat oleh undang-undang untuk menyatakan yang benar, bahawa dia adalah orang Islam, sama ada pernyataan itu secara lisan atau bertulis; …”.

D1 referred to s 46(2)(b)(x) of Act 505 which reads: “Bidang kuasa Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah

…

Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah hendaklah –

…

dalam bidang kuasa malnya, mendengar dan memutuskan semua tindakan dan prosiding dalam mana semua pihak adalah orang Islam dan yang berhubungan dengan – …

perkara lain yang berkenaan dengannya bidang kuasa diberikan oleh mana-mana undang-undang bertulis.” in submitting that the Federal Territory Syariah High Court has the jurisdiction to hear and decide on “semua tindakan dan prosiding dalam mana semua pihak adalah orang Islam dan yang berhubungan (antara lain) perkara-perkara lain yang berkenaan dengannya bidangkuasa diberikan oleh mana-mana undang-undang bertulis - … ini termasuklah dalam hal dan persoalan memutuskan sebarang persoalan berkenaan status agama Islam seseorang individu dan permohonan untuk keluar Islam.”.

Additionally, D1 drew the attention of this Court to “Arahan Amalan Mahkamah Syariah No.3, Tahun 2015 yang memperuntukkan Tajuk Kod Kes 043 ditetapkan bagi permohonan-permohonan Pengisytiharan Status Agama”.

D1 also cited the cases of Md Hakim Lee v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur [1997] 2 MLRH 154, Soon Singh Bikar Singh v. Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (Perkim) Kedah & Anor [1999] 1 MLRA 115 and Kaliammal Sinnasamy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan (Jawi) & Ors [2010] 3 MLRA 355 to support the argument that the instant case involves a renunciation by the Plaintiff of the Islamic faith and therefore this is a matter within the province of the Syariah High Court.

On the other hand, the Plaintiff placed emphasis on the other paragraphs of the Statement in submitting that the crux of the matter is not whether the Plaintiff has renounced Islam, but rather the Plaintiff is seeking recognition that he was never a Muslim from the outset as he does not, and has never, professed Islam.

Further, the Plaintiff referred to Re Mohamed Said Nabi, Decd [1965] 1 MLJ 121 where the court said: “The argument on behalf of the second defendant is briefly this. The word “Muslim” is defined in the Muslims Ordinance, 1957, as meaning “a person who professes the religion of Islam.” To come within this definition it is not sufficient for a man to be born a Muslim, he must be shown to be an orthodox Muslim and he must have outwardly manifested and practised the religion of Islam. Now what is the meaning to be attached to the word “profess”? According to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary “profess” means: “to affirm, or declare one's faith in or allegiance to (a religion, principle, God or Saint etc.).”.

The Plaintiff also cited the definition of the word “profess” in the following dictionaries: “A. Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases (7th Ed, Vol 3) Profess … an open affirmation of belonging to an organization or an acknowledgment of such belonging … B. New Oxford Thesaurus Profess Declare, announce, proclaim, assert, state, affirm, avow, maintain, protest, aver, vow. C. West’s Legal Thesaurus and Dictionary, Willian Statsky Profess To make an open declaration (he professed to be an atheist). Allege, claim, assert, declare, acknowledge, certify, confirm, confess, announce, postulate, avow, warrant, contend, maintain, admit, depose, advance, utter, confess, proclaim, offer, reveal, pronounce, broadcast, publish, pledge, disclose.”.

In a nutshell, the Plaintiff’s stance was that, a person said to be professing Islam would mean that a person openly declares and admits himself as a Muslim. Nowhere does the word “profess” suggest an imposition of religion or religion by operation of law; it must be a willing action by a person and not forced or imposed upon a person by a third party. - Whether the Plaintiff’s claim is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious and/ or is an abuse of the process of the Court

The grounds in support of D1’s application premised on limbs (b) and (d) of O.18, r. 19(1) of the RC 2012 are the same as canvassed earlier i.e. that the Syariah Court, and not this Court, has jurisdiction to hear and decide on the Plaintiff’s renunciation of Islam.

In her oral submission, the learned SFC adopted D1’s submission and added, with reference to Azizah Bte Shaik Ismail & Anor V Fatimah Bte Shaik Ismail & Anor [2002] 6 MLJ 589, Soon Singh A/L Bikar Singh v Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (Perkim) Kedah & Anor [1999] 1 MLJ 489, Dalip Kaur v Pegawai Polis Daerah, Balai Polis Daerah, Bukit Mertajam & Anor [1992] 1 MLJ 1, Lina Joy lwn Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan dan lain-lain [2007] 4 MLJ 585, Jenny bt Peter @ Nur Muzdhalifah Abdullah v Director of Jabatan Agama Islam Sarawak & Ors and other appeals [2017] 1 MLJ 340 and the recent decision in Adam Lee’s case which was decided by the Federal Court on 2.10.2025 (Appeal No. W01-A-542-10/2023), that the Court should determine jurisdiction based on the subject matter, and not merely the remedy sought, and that the issue on whether the Plaintiff is a Muslim or otherwise is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Syariah Court. In this respect, the learned counsel for D1 likewise adopted the SFC’s submission.

The Plaintiff resisted the Defendants’ applications by relying on the same submission as regards limb (a) of O.18, r. 19(1), RC

2012.

For completeness, it should be mentioned that, to the Plaintiff, the real issues which arise from the O.S., and which should be ventilated in a full hearing before this Court, are as follows: “a) Whether the Plaintiff being a Malaysian Citizen has the freedom to profess the religion of his choice as guaranteed under Article 11(1) of the Federal Constitution? b) Whether the Plaintiff being a citizen of Malaysia has equal rights as any other non-Muslim citizen of Malaysia to profess the religion of his choice? c) Whether Freedom of Religion provided under Article 11(1) of the Federal Constitution applies to Muslims in Malaysia. d) If the Plaintiff does not have equal rights as any other non-Muslim citizen of Malaysia to profess the religion of his choice, would it then be a breach of Article 8(2) of the Federal Constitution? e) That the State List in the Ninth Schedule of the Federal Constitution has expressly stated that Syariah Court only has jurisdiction over those who profess the religion of Islam. f) Whether it is sufficient for the Plaintiff to be born a Muslim to be said to have profess the religion of Islam when the word “profess” means to affirm, or declare one's faith in or allegiance to (a religion, principle, God or Saint etc.)? g) If the definition of “profess” is to affirm, or declare one's faith in or allegiance to a religion or belief, is the Plaintiff someone professing the religion of Sikhism? h) Whether the civil court has jurisdiction over the Plaintiff who was raised, practiced and professes the religion of Sikhism and who has expressly stated that he never professed the religion of Islam? i) Since the issues above involve interpretation of the Federal Constitution, the power to interpret is vested only in the Civil Courts, which are judicial institutions established by the Federal Constitution. That the Syariah Courts do not have the authority to interpret the Federal Constitution.”.

In summary, the position taken by both D1 and D2 was that this Court does not have jurisdiction to determine the matter as it falls within the purview of the Syariah Court.

In assessing the application under limb (a) of O. 18, r. 19(1) RC 2012, no affidavit evidence can be considered and thus, in my deliberations, I only considered the O.S. whereas the same restriction does not apply where limbs (b) and (d) are concerned.

In my view, the key passages in Rosliza’s case (supra) which has guided this Court in determining the present applications by D1 and D2 are as follows: “[83] Article 11(1) of the FC guarantees the right to profess and practice one’s religion. The conjunction ‘and’ in art 11(1) suggests that it governs more than mere professing. It extends to how one identifies oneself or how one may be identified with a specific religion and the right to also determine one’s own level of devotion to his or her belief. However, Item 1 of the State List singularly uses the word ‘professing’. Contrasting art 11(1) with Item 1 of the State List, it is plain that the latter was deliberately more narrowly worded to exclude the requirement of ‘practice’. Thus, so long as one is a Muslim by identification whether he practises or not, or whether he continues to believe in the faith or not, he is no less legally identified as a ‘person professing the religion of Islam’. [84] Taken in this context, there is a notable difference between ‘profess’ on the one side and ‘profess and practice’ on the other. The former is a constitutional term and is justiciable before the civil courts. The latter phrase is a question of faith and dogma and therefore falls within the jurisdiction of the Syariah Courts by virtue of art 121(1A) of the FC. [85] The dispute before us relates to the question of one’s constitutional identity. It therefore necessitates constitutional interpretation of something which only the superior courts of this country have the right to address. It is only when one’s faith is the main subject-matter of the dispute does such dispute fall within the jurisdiction of the Syariah Courts. In this regard, there is a significant distinction between ‘one who no longer professes the religion of Islam’ on the one side, and ‘one who never professes the religion of Islam’, on the other. This will be further elaborated later. … [90] At this juncture, a very fundamental distinction identified earlier, emerges. There is a critical distinction between ‘no longer a Muslim’ on the one side, and ‘never was a Muslim’, on the other. The former refers to renunciation cases which as explained, fall within the jurisdiction of the Syariah Courts. The latter, which may be loosely described as ab initio cases, cannot, on a coherent application of the law, fall within the jurisdiction of the Syariah Courts. To understand this, it would perhaps be useful to distinguish Lina Joy. [91] … In this context, Lina Joy is entirely distinguishable from the present case on the basis that the present case is an ab initio case and not a renunciation case. … [93] Ab initio cases are unique and peculiar where the person claims never to have been a Muslim in the first place but for some reason or another he or she is designated as a person who ‘professes the religion of Islam’. Logically, any legal presumption as to their Muslim status cannot apply because they were never identified as Muslim to begin with. Here, Lina Joy and like cases may be distinguished by referring to the decision of Yew Jen Kie J (as she then was) in Azmi. … [95] This is what Yew Jen Kie J held: [26] In Lina Joy’s case, the appellant was a Malay woman brought up as a Muslim. She applied for the removal of ‘Islam’ and her name ‘Azlina bt Jailani’ to ‘Lina Joy’ in her replacement identity card, which application was considered incomplete without an order of the Syariah Court stating that she has renounced Islam. [27] It is to be noted that the applicant in the present case is a Bidayuh by race and had been raised and brought up in a Christian Bidayuh community since birth. The choice of Islam religion was decided for him by his parents following their own conversion to Islamic faith as he was ten years old. He has never practised the Islamic faith and has embraced Christianity. He is not challenging the validity of his minor conversion. In exercise of the constitutional religion freedom, he is seeking a declaration that he is a Christian. [96] Most pertinently, Her Ladyship continued to observe as follows: [41] Given that the Syariah Court shall have jurisdiction only over persons professing the religion of Islam, it is therefore helpful at this juncture to ascertain the meaning of ‘professing’ or ‘profess’. [42] In Words and Phrases Judicially Defined (1990 ed), p 447, under the word ‘profess’, it is stated: Now what is the meaning to be attached to the word ‘profess’? According to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary ‘profess’ means ‘to affirm, or declare one’s faith in or allegiance to (a religion, principle, God or Saints etc)’ Re Mohamed Said Nabi, deceased [1965] 1 MLJ 121 at 122 per Chua J. [43] Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English defined ‘profess’ as ‘a statement of your belief, opinion, or feeling’. [44] From the definition aforesaid, it conveys the meaning that to profess a religion is making a public statement about the religion you believe in. Thus, a person professing the religion of Islam is a person who has made a public declaration, affirmed his faith in or his allegiance to Islam. [45] It is a fact that the Islam religion was chosen and decided for the applicant (a minor) by his mother when she converted to be a Muslim; his conversion was not by reason that he professed the religion of Islam. To put it in another way, the conversion of the applicant to Muslim faith was not on his own volition by affirming, declaring his faith in or allegiance to Islam religion but by virtue of his mother’s conversion when he was a minor aged ten years old and his mother has determined his religion. In my view, since the applicant, who is a Bidayuh by birth, had not in the first place professed his faith in Islam but his conversion followed that of his mother as he was a minor at the material time, logic dictates that he cannot be considered as a person professing that particular faith. That the applicant has not lived like a person professing Islam is seen in his averment that he was raised and brought up in the Bidayuh Christian community. [97] The decision of Yew Jen Kie J in Azmi was appealed against but the appeal was subsequently withdrawn, the Director General of the National Registration Department v Azmi bin Muhammad Azam @ Rooney (Court of Appeal, Civil Appeal No Q-01–159– 05 of 2016). The NRD adhered to the decision of the High Court. The applicant’s name was changed and the word ‘Islam’ was removed from his identity card. [98] What can be distilled from Lina Joy and like cases on the one side, and Azmi and like cases on the other, is that it is a matter of proof that the person affirmatively professed the religion of Islam at the material time. Absent such proof, the case may be classified as an ab initio case. [99] Reverting to the question: do the civil courts possess jurisdiction to determine the status of persons who claim to ‘never have been Muslim’ as opposed to ‘no longer being a Muslim’? The answer to the question must naturally be in the affirmative as otherwise there would be no legal recourse for persons of the ab initio category. When it concerns a renunciation case, the civil courts have consistently held that it was within the jurisdiction of the Syariah Courts conferred under art 121(1A) of the FC. For the record, learned senior federal counsel appearing for the attorney general as amicus curiae, agreed that it is the civil courts that have jurisdiction over persons of the ‘ab initio category’. … [108] The case is no different here. At the risk of repetition, if a matter concerns an ab initio case, that is, the question whether a person is in the first place a ‘person professing the religion of Islam’ it necessarily concerns a question regarding one’s identity under the FC which in turn necessitates constitutional interpretation. This is because the phrase ‘persons professing the religion of Islam’ is a constitutional term. Accordingly, the civil courts are empowered, indeed, duty-bound to adjudicate the matter. It is only in renunciation cases where one already professes or proclaims to profess the religion of Islam (irrespective of whether they actually practise the faith) with the subsequent decision to change what they profess, that the matter is removed to the jurisdiction of the Syariah Court. The distinction drawn from the cases of Lina Joy and Azmi illustrates the difference. Whether it is an ab initio case or a renunciation case will require a careful examination of the factual matrix of the case.” (emphasis added).

After reviewing the numerous case authorities cited by the parties, especially the cases which have elucidated on the distinction between –

“profess” and “profess and practice” in the context of Articles 11 and 121(1A), and item 1, List II - State List, Ninth Schedule in the Federal Constitution, which is, contrary to what D1 had submitted, is relevant to the issue of jurisdiction of the court which should hear this suit; and

“no longer a Muslim” and “never was a Muslim”, and following that, an “ab initio case” and a “renunciation case”, and bearing in mind that the Federal Court in Rosliza's case (supra) said that whether it is an ab initio case or a renunciation case will require a careful examination of the factual matrix of the case, I was not prepared at this juncture, based on the limited affidavit evidence before the court for purposes of the striking out applications and the unique situation presented in this case where the Plaintiff was born to Muslim parents but was allegedly raised as a Sikh, to make a determination on whether this is truly an ab initio case or otherwise. In other words, mature consideration of the O.S. with full arguments is required.

As regards the naming of D1 as a party in this suit, which D1 argued was completely baseless vis-a-vis the reliefs being sought in the O.S., Mr. Rajesh Nagarajan had submitted for the Plaintiff that D1 was named so that D1 can rebut the Plaintiff’s averment that he did not practise Islam. In such a situation, it would then be a “renunciation case” rather than an “ab initio case”.

On the issue that the NRD was not named as a party although one of the prayers concerns the NRD, it was left to the Plaintiff to take the appropriate course of action. At the time of writing this judgment, the Plaintiff’s application to amend the O.S. and AIS by adding the NRD as a party (encl. 31) had already been allowed on 2.11.2025 as there was no objection by D1 and D2.

Based on the foregoing considerations, I was not convinced that the Plaintiff’s application in encl. 1 discloses no reasonable cause of action; is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious; and is an abuse of the process of the Court, or in short, obviously unsustainable. Therefore, D1's and D2's applications in encls. 4 and 10 were dismissed with no order as to costs. DATED: 29.12.2025 (ALIZA SULAIMAN) JUDGE HIGH COURT IN MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR (BKK1) Solicitors for the Plaintiff: Rajesh Nagarajan (Amanda Sonia Mathew with him) Messrs. Raj & Sach Solicitors for the 1st Defendant: Ahmad Kamal Abu Bakar (Arik Zakri bin Dato’ Abdul Kadir with him) Messrs. Arik & Kamal Solicitors for the 2nd Defendant: